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Reporters Preface

REPORTERS PREFACE
Since the legislature adopted the Penal Code of 1974, new insights have emerged regarding
what a penal code should address, and how it should do so. Moreover, the broader legal landscape
has changed greatly. The Penal Code Revision Project was predicated on the belief that the time
was ripe to take a step back and conduct a panoramic review of the Kentucky Penal Code, as
was done in 1974. The two volumes of this Final Report are the fruits of that review.
The Proposed Penal Code seeks to replace the current code with a clear, concise, and
comprehensive set of provisions. Specifically, the Proposed Code seeks to include necessary
provisions not contained in the current code; to eliminate unnecessary or inconsistent provisions of
the current code; to revise existing language and structure to make the Code easier to understand
and apply; and to ensure that the offenses and rules contained in the Code are coherent and relate
to one another in a consistent and rational manner. At the same time, the Proposed Code aims to
track the substantive policy judgments reflected in the original code and its subsequent amendments.
When the process of clarifying and reconciling current provisions required drafters to make
substantive choices, the proposed changes have been explained and justified in the accompanying
commentary.
In developing the Proposed Code, the drafters were guided by five general drafting
principles. First, the drafters have made an effort to use clear, accessible language and
organization. One of the critical functions of a penal code is to provide notice to citizens of what
conduct is prohibited. Clear and accessible writing allows real, not just theoretical, notice while
also ensuring that no offender escapes liability because of an incomplete or ambiguous offense
definition. More straightforward code provisions also promote development of clearer jury
instructions, making it easier for jurors to fulfill their critical role. Even for members of the criminal
justice system, who work with the Code every day and must be intimately familiar with its rules,
plain-language expression is essential.
Second, the Proposed Code endeavors to provide a comprehensive statement of rules.
An effective penal code must include all necessary rules governing liability. Comprehensiveness
helps avoid inappropriate results. Courts, which decide individual cases and act independently of
one another, cannot be as effective as a legislature in formulating coherent general doctrines that
will work together as the provisions of a comprehensive code can and must. Moreover, an uncodified
rule is more likely to be applied differently in similar cases than a codified rule, as the terms of the
latter are fixed, explicit, and available to all officials at each stage in the process.
Third, the drafters have aimed to consolidate offenses. Perhaps inevitably, four decades
of piecemeal modification of the Code have led to the addition of hundreds of new offenses, many
of which cover the same conduct as previous offenses or appear in various other chapters of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes rather than in the Penal Code in Chapters 500 et seq. Consolidation
ensures against the confusion that results when one encounters, and must make sense of, multiple
provisions that overlap or contradict, and also against the mistakes that ensue when one fails
to notice, or find, provisions that may apply to a given case. Consolidation also aids the task of
proper grading, because it is nearly impossible to maintain consistent, proportional grading when
offense definitions are based on insignificant, or incomprehensible, distinctions.
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Fourth, the drafters have striven to grade offenses rationally and proportionally. One
virtue of a recodification project, relative to the usual piecemeal legislative additions and alterations
to the Code, is the opportunity it provides for a general review of the system of grading offenses,
considering how all offenses relate to one another rather than considering individual offenses in a
vacuum. For a system of criminal justice to be fair, liability must be assigned according to the
relative seriousness of the offense(s) committed. The drafters have sought to recognize all, and
only, suitable distinctions among the relative severity of offenses and to develop a scheme to grade
each offense proportionally to its gravity in light of those distinctions.
Finally, the Proposed Code seeks to retain all (but only) reasonable policy decisions
embodied in current law. Because substantive policy decisions on criminal law rules reflect value
judgments properly left to the legislature, the Proposed Code aims to follow the substance of
current law wherever possible. In some places, however, current law contains multiple contradictory
rules  and therefore no clear rule  on a subject. Other rules may have been sound when
enacted, but no longer reflect current realities or sensibilities and require expansion, alteration, or
deletion. Still other current legal rules have been created by the courts through case law, rather
than by the legislature through statutory enactment, and appear to be in direct tension with the
governing statutory provision. In those situations where the existing legal rule seems clearly at
odds with the goal of producing a rational, coherent penal code, the drafters have had little choice
but to modify the existing rule, using supporting commentary to the Proposed Code to describe
and justify the proposed change.
A few words are in order regarding issues that the Proposed Code does not address.
First, the Proposed Code addresses substantive criminal law rules only. It excludes numerous
provisions in the current code governing procedural, sentencing, and regulatory issues, retaining
only the rules necessary to elaborate or explain the Penal codes substantive rules. This does not
mean, however, that the Proposed Code would eliminate those provisions. Rather, the Proposed
Code was drafted with the understanding that such provisions would be retained, but moved to
other chapters of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, by means of a conforming amendments bill to
be enacted by the General Assembly contemporaneously with a new penal code.
Second, the Proposed Code does not address certain categories of offenses. Drug offenses,
weapon offenses, and various crime-control offenses designed primarily to combat ongoing
criminal enterprises, are not included in the Proposed Code. Here again, the exclusion of those
offenses, and a number of narrow regulatory offenses addressed specifically to particular groups
or corporations, does not reflect any judgment about the wisdom of the current provisions governing
such conduct. Rather, we anticipate the retention of the relevant current prohibitions, either outside
the Code or within the code articles reserved for such offenses, through conforming amendments
legislation that would bring forward all relevant current provisions.
In many instances, the Codes commentary explicitly states that a particular current offense,
procedural or sentencing rule, or civil or regulatory provision should be preserved outside the
Proposed Code by means of a conforming amendment. Yet the commentarys failure to include
such a clear statement with respect to any particular provision  especially one that does not
address an issue relating to substantive criminal law  should not be understood to indicate a
recommendation that the provision in question should be eliminated.
xvi
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As discussed above, the drafters have sought to retain all defensible policy decisions
embodied in current law. In recognition that such value judgments are best left to the legislature,
the Proposed Code includes footnotes identifying several substantive policy issues that require the
General Assembly attention. Each footnote presents the arguments on both sides of the issue and
states the Reporters recommendation, if any.
As a final matter, it is important to note that proposed Chapter 900 is not intended to
address all issues (or indeed, any issues) regarding the sentencing and disposition of offenders.
Rather, Chapter 900 deals only with those basic issues necessary to make clear the meaning of the
Proposed Codes general scheme of liability  for example, that offense grades define a certain
hierarchy; that the Code contemplates certain broad factors that will operate to aggravate an
offenses grade, and addresses those factors by imposing general aggravations rather than applying
them to specific offenses; and that the Code anticipates a new scheme for imposing liability for
multiple offenses, ensuring that each additional offense of conviction will contribute to an offenders
total punishment. The Proposed Codes silence as to other, more complex sentencing issues does
not indicate a lack of awareness or concern about such issues, but an understanding that they were
beyond the scope of the present project. Moreover, the authorized terms of imprisonment and
fines appearing in Chapter 900 are themselves tentative. The primary focus of the Projects work
has been to ensure that the grading of different offenses is rational and proportional, and not to
determine the appropriate absolute severity of punishment attaching to a grade. Accordingly, the
proposed offense grades are intended only to convey the relative seriousness of offenses, and not
the sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense.
On a personal note, I thank the Project Staff for their excellent and invaluable work often
under difficult circumstances. Attorney John Powell and Professors Les Abramson and Michael
Cahill have done a wonderful job and contributed much to the project.
In closing, let me commend the Kentucky Criminal Justice Council for its foresight and
commitment to explore the development of a new penal code. The serious problems in the current
Kentucky Penal Code are no worse than those existing in other American jurisdictions, and less
serious than those in many. With no new national model in sight, such as a Model Penal Code
Second, it was courageous of Kentucky to take the lead in exploring how a second wave of
American criminal law recodifications might be stimulated.

Paul H. Robinson
Philidelphia
July, 2003
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History of Penal Code Project Work

HISTORY OF PENAL CODE
PROJECT WORK
GENERAL CHRONOLOGY
In July 1998, House Bill 455 (passed in March) took effect, establishing the Kentucky
Criminal Justice Council and directing the Council to review and make written recommendations
on . . . the Penal Code. The first Penal Code Committee meeting, with Professor William Fortune
as Chair, occurred in January 1999. In March, the Committee met again to hear presentations
from Professor Robert Lawson of University of Kentucky, the primary author of the 1974 code,
and Professor Les Abramson of University of Louisville. University of Kentucky Law students
undertook research under the supervision of Professor Fortune to survey the amendments to the
current code that had been made since its inception, ultimately producing a searchable computer
database. The Committees work also was helped by a June 2000 questionnaire mailed to
constituency groups statewide requesting input and recommendations on penal code reform.
With this groundwork done, the Penal Code reform project was formally undertaken by
the Criminal Justice Council in July 2000. An initial briefing of House Leadership staff and the staff
of the Senate Presidents Office occurred in August 2000. The same month, the Councils Penal
Code Committee drafted and adopted a set of guiding principles for the reform process. The
plans for the project were presented to the District Court Judicial College in September.
With a sense that the project would benefit from some professional expertise, the National
Counsel of State Legislatures was contacted to determine what assistance might be available. The
Council was referred to Professor Paul H. Robinson, an internationally know criminal code drafting
expert, who had recently been invited to make a presentation on the subject of criminal code
reform at the National Councils annual meeting.
In October 2000, Professor Robinson was invited to make a presentation on penal code
reform to a joint meeting of the Criminal Justice Council and the Interim Joint Committee on the
Judiciary and was soon thereafter hired to serve as Reporter, whose job was to guide the penal
code reform project. Initial appointments were made to the subcommittee of the Councils Penal
Code/Sentencing Committee that would be the primary group guiding the drafting and debating
process, the Penal Code Work Group. This same month, the code reform project was presented
to the Circuit Court Judicial College.
The first steps of the Penal Code/Sentencing Committee were to formally name Professor
Robinson Reporter for Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project, to establish a contractual agreement
with him, and to approve in November a six-step work process proposed by the Professor.
Professor Robinson then began work on the preparation of background materials, the first step in
the drafting process, which is described in detail below.
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The first draft of the Codes General Part provisions were circulated to the Penal Code
Work Group for Comment in July 2001. That same month, Professor Les Abramson was
designated to assist as primary draftsman for the official commentary. In September, the first draft
of the revision project was distributed statewide.
At its May 2002 meeting, the Penal Code Work Group discussed the desire of the
prosecutors representatives to limit the project to proposing amendments to the existing code.
Ultimately a majority of the Work Group concluded that a general rewrite of the code was the best
approach to fulfilling the statutory mandate of Penal Code reform. In August 2002, the
representatives of the Commonwealths Attorneys Association and the County Attorneys Association
decided that they would rather participate in the reform effort at the Penal Code Committee level
and they subsequently withdrew from the Work Group itself. The Attorney General, however,
continued to participate in the drafting process at the Work Group level.
In February 2003, after nearly monthly all-day meetings, the Work Group finished its
discussion of all the issues flagged by the pro/con footnotes. The proposed text and official
commentary was complete.

THE DRAFTING PROCESS
At the start of its work, the Penal Code Work Group, upon suggests of Professor Robinson,
developed a drafting process that was repeated in developing each chapter of the Proposed
Code. First, the Reporter reviewed all of current Kentucky law, both that within the current penal
code and, with the help of Council staff, that outside the code, and brought together from all
sources those provisions that concerned each specific subject area. Relevant court decisions and
references to existing treatises on Kentucky criminal law were added to this collection of background
materials. These background material collections were organized generally according te the subject
matter distinctions embodied in the chapter headings of the current Kentucky Penal Code.
The drafting process for each code chapter then began with a careful review of the relevant
portion of the background materials collection, after which the Reporter would generate a first
draft of the proposed chapter that would capture the legislative judgments contained in current law
but in a more coherent and consistent form, using as clear and direct a drafting style as was
possible. These drafts, along with the corresponding set of background materials, were then
distributed to the criminal law professors on the Penal Code Work Group and, after further revision,
to the full Work Group.
The reviewers then responded with written comments on the proposed drafts, often
suggesting alternative draft formulations where the original proposal was seen as problematic. The
Reporter and staff would then respond to the comments by either making the suggested change or
asking the reviewer follow-up questions that would clarify the concern expressed or would offer
arguments in support of the proposed drafts formulation.

xx

History of Penal Code Project Work

The reviewer would then respond in writing to these responses and the dialogue would
continue until all of the reviewers concerns had been addressed to his or her satisfaction. Often
this dialogue process would take four or five cycles to resolve all issues. Ultimately, every
reviewer comment resulted in either a change to the proposed draft that satisfied the reviewer or
was flagged as an issue that was to be put to the full Working Group. The revised drafts developed
through this dialogue process were then resubmitted to the entire Work Group for further review
and comment. The aim of the process was to create a written record of concerns and responses
that would highlight for the Legislature in its future work the issues that required discussion and
their resolution by the participants of the Work Group.
The end result of the process has been the draft text and commentary contained in this
two-volume Final Report. The draft text, in Volume 1, is annotated with many dozen pro-con
footnotes. The footnotes signal those issues on which there was no consensus within the Working
Group, and contains a summary of the arguments on each side of the issue that were developed
during Working Group discussions. This Final Report, which is being widely distributed to
participants in the criminal justice system throughout the State (and beyond), will give readers a full
appreciation of what is, and what is not, controversial in the proposed text and of the reasons for
the points of disagreement.
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WHY A NEW PENAL CODE?
INTRODUCTION
It has been nearly thirty years since the legislature adopted the Penal Code of 1974. In
that time, the Code has been expanded and amended in numerous ways. Those subsequent
alterations, however, have each sought to address the specific matter at hand, with little attention to
the general effects of the change on the Codes overall structure, its terminology, or its application.
Meanwhile, three decades have passed without an overarching review of the Penal Code as a
whole to determine what modifications should, or must, be made to reflect changing times, developing
insights, and changes in the broader legal landscape. As a result, the current Penal Code has
numerous inconsistencies, redundancies, ambiguities, and contradictions. As was the case in 1974
 and may well be the case again in another thirty or forty years  the time is ripe to take a step
back and conduct a more panoramic review of the Penal Code.
The proposed Code attempts to eliminate these problems and replace the current Code
with a clear, concise, and comprehensive set of provisions. Specifically, the proposed Code seeks
to include necessary provisions not contained in the current Code; to eliminate unnecessary or
inconsistent provisions of the current Code; to revise existing language and structure to make the
Code easier to understand and apply; and to ensure that the offenses and rules contained in the
Code are cohesive and relate to one another in a consistent and rational manner. At the same time,
the proposed Code aims to track the substantive policy judgments reflected in the original Code
and its subsequent amendments. When the process of clarifying and reconciling current provisions
made such substantive choices necessary, the drafters have sought to explain and justify the proposed
changes with commentary designed to assist the enacters, and ultimately the users, of the Code.
In developing the proposed Penal Code, the drafters were guided by five general drafting
principles, set forth below. The first three principles relate to the form of the Code. Experience
shows that proper form can aid, and poor form can hinder, a codes ability to achieve its substantive
functions. The final two principles concern the Codes content.

1. USE CLEAR, ACCESSIBLE LANGUAGE AND ORGANIZATION
One of the critical functions of a penal code is to provide notice to citizens of what conduct
is prohibited. Indeed, the fundamental principle of legality  the requirement of a clear prior
written prohibition as a prerequisite to criminal liability  underlies numerous constitutional and
other core criminal-law rules, such as the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws and
the constitutional invalidation of vague offenses. Providing notice also has obvious practical value,
for citizens can hardly be expected to obey the laws commands if they are unaware of them, or
cannot understand them. Accordingly, clear and accessible writing enables provision of true notice
and ensures that no judgment is imposed that was not clearly intended and expressed by the
legislature, and that no offender who violates the rules will escape liability because of an incomplete
or ambiguous declaration of the laws commands.
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The virtues of plain-language drafting extend beyond the direct imposition of liability. The
penal code serves functions beyond notifying the general public in advance of the laws commands
of them. The code is also the ultimate basis of guidance for lay juries, who must decide after the
fact whether a criminal offense has been committed in a particular situation. More straightforward
code provisions promote development of clearer jury instructions, making it easier for jurors to
fulfill their role. Even (perhaps especially) for members of the criminal justice system, who work
with the code every day, plain language expression is essential. Law-enforcement officers, for
example, are charged with implementing the codes rules fully and fairly. Yet these officers are not
lawyers. No less than the general populace, their ability to perform their legal role is enhanced by
clarity in the criminal laws written expression.
Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, but by no means
exhaustive, collection of examples of current Kentucky laws shortcomings in this area.1

a. Clear language
Several drafting methods promote the goal of clarity. First, effective communication calls
for short, commonly used words and avoidance of legal terms of art where possible. When such
legal terms are used, they should be defined, and it should be easily apparent that the terms use is
to be guided by the definition and not left to unguided speculation. One difficulty with current law
is that important terms, many of which have no commonly understood meaning or are complex
legal terms, are left undefined. In such cases, users of the Code (including judges, lawyers, law
enforcement officials, and jury members) must guess at the legislatures intended meaning. To
avoid this problem, the proposed Code includes a provision at the end of each Chapter that lists all
defined terms used in that Chapter.
As an example of the type of clear language that the Code requires, the current Penal
Code is not clear about whether its provisions relating to offenses, defenses, and other general
provisions apply to offenses outside the Penal Code. Proposed Section 103(2)  which ensures
that the Codes culpability terms, defenses, and other general provisions apply to any offense,
whether defined in the Code or elsewhere  is consistent with Kentucky Supreme Court opinions
applying Penal Code definitions and defenses to cases arising under statutes outside the Penal
Code.2

For example, numerous other provisions use unclear language. See, e.g., KRS 501.010(3); 501.030(2);
501.070(1)(a); 501.070(3); 501.090; 502.010(1); 502.020; 503.090(1); 505.020(2)(c)-(d); 532.090; 534.050.
2
See, e.g., Powell v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by
Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1998) (definition of possession in KRS 500.080(14) is proper
definition for jury instructions for cases arising under KRS Chapter 218A); Farris v. Commonwealth, 836
S.W.2d 451 (Ky. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925 (Ky.
1998) (applying Penal Code definition of entrapment to non-Code drug trafficking offense).
1
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Two other examples also reinforce the importance of clarity. First, Section 204(2) explicitly
recognizes that, in the absence of clear language stating otherwise, an offense definition will not
preclude omission liability even if it uses terms (such as active verbs) that may appear to require an
affirmative act. Current Kentucky law contains no such explicit declaration of this point. For
example, a person may be liable for homicide by engaging in conduct causing death. The defendant
may also be liable for homicide through an omission causing death, if he had a legal duty and
capacity to act but did not.
Second, the default rules of Section 205(2) and (3) differ from KRS 501.040, which
states that if an offense does not prescribe a particular mental state, one of the four mental states is
applicable to some or all of the material elements of the offense if the proscribed conduct necessarily
involves such culpable mental state. The current formulation is troublesome in at least three
respects: (1) it does not indicate which mental state to apply where one or more might be applicable;
(2) it does not say whether any culpability level is needed for conduct that does not necessarily
involve culpability, or how to tell whether conduct necessarily involves culpability; and (3) it does
not indicate what to do for circumstance or result elements  as opposed to conduct elements 
if no culpability level is prescribed.
In some cases, the current Codes language, though it may not represent the clearest or
simplest method of expressing a rule, has been defined and clarified over time by judicial decisions.
For this reason and for the mere sake of stability, the drafters have sought to maintain the language
of current law whenever that language would give a reader adequate notice of the provisions
intended meaning. Where modification of existing language is considered necessary, the drafters
have prepared commentary to explain the relation between the proposed language and existing
statutory language, as explicated by current precedent.
b. Clear organization
The Code, and each of its provisions, must be effectively organized so that each components
meaning and function is plain and all provisions are easily found. For example it invites confusion
when issues for which there are rules of general application are addressed a second time in specific
offense provisions. Current Kentucky law contains numerous offenses that unnecessarily reiterate,
or even undermine, General Part provisions.
For example, many current offenses are defined to prohibit certain conduct and attempting
such conduct.3 For unexplained reasons, this approach to defining offenses short-circuits the
general rules for attempts set forth in the General Part, under which attempts are distinguished from
completed crimes for grading purposes.4
See, e.g., KRS 434.225; 434.445; 434.685; 516.110; 518.070; 520.090; 524.040; 524.050; 524.080; 524.090;
526.030; 529.010(2); 529.020; 531.020; 531.030.
Other current offenses define an attempt offense separately from a proscribed, completed offense,
without regard to the general provisions governing attempt liability. See, e.g., KRS 434.225; 516.050; 516.070;
520.015.
4
See KRS 506.010.
3
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Similarly, several current offenses are defined to include anyone who aids or conspires
with another in planning or committing the offense,5 even though general rules covering accomplice
liability, attempts, and conspiracies are defined in the General Part.6 Similar problems exist when
current offenses include references to justification7 or duress8 defenses already defined in the
General Part. The proposed Code ensures consistency by avoiding offense definitions that revisit,
or revise, rules already included in the General Part.
The Codes various rules should be classified sensibly, to ensure that meaningfully different
rules are distinguished and similar rules are treated alike. For example, the proposed Codes
organization separates justifications, excuses, and nonexculpatory defenses.9 Recognizing such
distinctions is important because a defenses function as a justification, an excuse, or a nonexculpatory
defense has significant legal implications.10 Current Kentucky law, however, is not organized to
accurately distinguish between these three defense types.11
The failure to properly establish such distinctions has resulted in inconsistent rules, such as
the rules involving the burdens of proof for general defenses. Current law requires that the defendant
prove the insanity defense, but all other excuses must be disproved by the Commonwealth beyond
a reasonable doubt once the defendant has introduced some evidence on the issue.12

See, e.g., KRS 387.990; 434.340; 434.445; 434.855; 517.020; 521.050; 522.040; 524.110.
See KRS 502.020 (complicity); KRS 506.020 (attempts); 506.040 (conspiracy).
7
See, e.g., KRS 525.200; 525.220.
8
See, e.g., KRS 521.020(2).
9
Justification defenses, such as self-defense and use of force in defense of property, immunize
conduct that avoids a harm or evil that is objectively worse than the offense itself. Excuse defenses, such as
insanity and immaturity, operate to exculpate persons who cannot properly be held responsible for objectively
harmful conduct. Finally, nonexculpatory defenses, such as entrapment and the statute-of-limitations defense,
provide exemptions for liability because  even though the actors conduct is objectively harmful and the
actor is responsible for it  some alternative societal interest is deemed to be more important than the assessment
of criminal liability.
10
For example, a person enjoying a self-defense justification may be assisted by others, and may not
legally be interfered with. On the other hand, an aggressor is entitled to resist a person who enjoys an excuse
because he mistakenly believes himself to be acting in self-defense; such a person, even if excused, is not
justified. Moreover, because justifications recognize conduct that is socially acceptable, and often desirable,
it is sensible to require the prosecution to prove that conduct was not justified. Excuses and nonexculpatory
defenses, in contrast, operate to prevent liability for harmful conduct that would ordinarily constitute an
offense. Accordingly, and because the state-of-mind or other evidence relevant to an excuse or nonexculpatory
defense is frequently within the control of the defendant, it is sensible to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant for those defenses, as the proposed Code does.
11
KRS Chapter 503 improperly treats  by defining several justifications to protect one who believes
himself to be justified  mistake as to a justification as justifications, rather than excuses. See KRS 503.120.
The proposed Code categorizes this defense as an excuse, as it relates to the actors mental state rather than to
whether the act itself is objectively justified.
Current Kentucky law also does not recognize nonexculpatory defenses as a distinct class of defenses.
12
See KRS 500.070.
5
6
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These evidentiary rules differ for no obvious reason.13 Since excuse defenses are all the
same in terms of their underlying principles and their central issue (the defendants blameworthiness
for an admitted violation), they should be treated similarly in terms of the burden of proof, as is
done in the proposed Code.14
Similarly, current law requires the Commonwealth to disprove certain nonexculpatory
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.15 This is plainly inconsistent with the rule shifting the burden
of proof to the defendant for the insanity excuse. If such a burden-shifting rule is appropriate for an
excuse defense  under which the defendant would be considered blameless in committing the
offense  it should also apply to nonexculpatory defenses, which involve no claim of blamelessness.
The proposed Code employs such a rule.16
Another benefit of effective organization is found in Section 2101, a consolidation provision
for the theft offenses assuring that the offense definitions and grading provisions are read together
as applying to different forms of the same offense. Section 2101 avoids the problem of having to
charge several different offenses to make sure that an indictment covers conduct that may fall into
different theft categories.

Similarly, although current KRS 500.070 requires the Commonwealth to disprove any affirmative
defense other than insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may bear the burden of proving the
applicability of certain offense exemptions and exceptions that are not affirmative defenses. See, e.g.,
KRS 527.040(1)(b) (the convicted felon can prove that he had permission to possess a handgun); Eary v. Com.,
659 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1983) (construing KRS 527.040).
Section 106(3) avoids such anomalies by defining affirmative defense to mean any defense other
than one that operates by negating a required offense element and providing a default rule that affirmative
defenses must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 106(2)(b).
13

Section 501(5) places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove an excuse defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.
14

15
See, e.g., Com. v. Day, 983 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1999) (once defendant has raised entrapment defense,
Commonwealth must prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was not entrapped).

Proposed Section 601(3) provides that, as with excuses, the defendant must prove a nonexculpatory
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
16
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2. PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF RULES
It is critical not only that a penal code say things clearly, but that it say everything that needs
to be said. The code must be comprehensive as well as comprehensible. Failure to provide all
necessary provisions will necessarily lead to either or both of two results: (1) failures of justice, as
the codes omissions and loopholes lead to liability where none is deserved or allow an offender
to avoid deserved punishment; or (2) a de facto delegation of authority to the courts (or usurpation
of authority by the courts), as judicial interpretations try to fill in the gaps left by the legislature. The
costs of the first result are obvious. Yet the alternative of judicial intervention, however necessary
to achieve sensible or just results in individual cases, may ultimately impose costs as well. The
interests of advance notice (discussed above), democracy, and legal consistency and coherence
suggest that the legislature, rather than the courts, must bear the primary responsibility for creating
criminal law rules.
Insisting on comprehensiveness leads to several important benefits. First,
comprehensiveness helps avoid inappropriate results. Courts, which decide individual cases and
act independently of one another, cannot be as effective as a legislature in formulating coherent
general doctrines that will work together as the provisions of a comprehensive code can and must.
Second, an uncodified rule is more likely to be applied differently in similar cases than a codified
rule, as the terms of the latter are fixed, explicit, and available to all officials at each stage in the
process.
Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, but by no means
exhaustive, collection of examples of current Kentucky laws shortcomings in this area.17

For example, in the General Part, the proposed Code introduces several other currently omitted
provisions that govern important common issues and make clear the relationships between various parts of the
Code. See, e.g., Sections 106(2) (defining scope of Commonwealths burden of persuasion; providing default
rule that all other facts, such as jurisdiction and venue, need only be proven by a preponderance of
therule that all other facts, such as jurisdiction and venue, need only be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence) 201 (making clear bases of liability); 202 (categorizing and defining offense elements); 205(6)
(proof of more culpable mental state satisfies requirement of less serious one); 255 (rules governing conviction
of multiple grades of an offense); 303 (rules governing transferred intent); 400 (clarifying that justification,
excuse, and nonexculpatory defenses bar liability); 415 (justification defense for persons with special
responsibilities for others); 420 (defining bodily harm and great bodily harm); 602(4) (describing situations
that allow for tolling the limitations period); 805 (defense to certain inchoate offenses for defendant who are
victims or whose conduct is inevitably incident to the offense); 806 (defense to inchoate offenses for persons
who renounce offenses and prevent their commission).
The proposed Special Part also includes several offenses not recognized in current law. See, e.g.,
Section 2205 (causing or risking a catastrophe).
17
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a. General Part rules
The current Penal Code (as well as the Kentucky Constitution and criminal rules) contains
no provision dealing with the presumption of innocence, except in the context of military courtsmartial and the content of jury instructions. Section 106(1) of the proposed Code explicitly
recognizes a principle fundamental to Western criminal justice: [a] defendant is presumed innocent
until proven guilty. The proposed Code also provides a number of explicit rules governing the
application of general defenses, which, for example, elaborate the relevant evidentiary burdens,
describe what happens when a person creates the conditions of his own defense, and clarify what
conduct may lawfully be assisted (or resisted) and what conduct may not.18
Although current law defines consent as a defense for specific offenses,19 the current
Penal Code contains no general defense to govern when the consent of the victim operates as a
defense to liability. Section 251(1) defines a general consent defense.
b. Special Part offenses
The current Code sometimes fails to criminalize conduct that merits criminal liability. This
may mean that no liability is possible for serious conduct or, as is more common, that prosecution
is possible only for less serious offenses, resulting in punishment that falls short of the relative
gravity of the offense. For example, the Penal Code criminalizes wanton endangerment as a Class
D felony,*20 but does not specifically criminalize recklessly causing a catastrophe, creating a risk of
a catastrophe, threatening to cause a catastrophe, or failure on the part of certain persons to
prevent a catastrophe. Under current law, those acts would count only as ordinary wanton
endangerment or wanton criminal mischief,21 which are graded lower than the proposed Class B
felony offense of causing or risking catastrophe in Section 2205.
3. CONSOLIDATE OFFENSES
A third goal is consolidation of all criminal offenses. Perhaps inevitably, nearly three decades
of piecemeal modification of the Code have led to the addition of hundreds of new offenses, many
of which cover the same conduct as previous offenses (but, in some cases, provide for conflicting
levels of punishment) or appear in various other areas of the Kentucky Statutes rather than in the
Penal Code.

See Sections 411, 501, 601.
See, e.g., KRS 513.030.
20
See KRS 508.060-.070.
18
19

21

See KRS 512.020-.040.
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It is not only redundant, but potentially counterproductive or self-contradictory, to add
extra offenses whose prohibitions are identical to an existing offense; or to add prohibitions against
narrow, specific forms of conduct in addition to (or in lieu of) a more general prohibition against all
such relevant conduct; or to scatter serious crimes throughout the Commonwealths statutory
code instead of ensuring that all relevant offenses appear within the Penal Code, where their
significance and relation to one another is clear. Consolidation ensures against the confusion that
results when one encounters, and must make sense of, multiple provisions that overlap22 or
contradict, and also against the mistakes that ensue when one fails to notice, or find, provisions that
may apply to a given case. Consolidation ensures the briefest, clearest statement of the criminal
laws rules, while also exposing and eliminating inadvertent omissions, duplications, and
inconsistencies in the statutory scheme. The consolidation goal has two aspects. First, all criminal
offenses must be defined within the penal code itself, and not elsewhere. Second, superfluous
specific offenses must be eliminated in favor of a reduced number of offenses that are defined as
broadly as is feasible.
As to the first element, a statutory scheme in which a significant number of important
offenses are defined outside of the penal code will have at least three shortcomings. First, and
most obviously, the likelihood of notice to the public diminishes as the dispersion of criminal provisions
in the Commonwealths laws increases. It is simply much easier for the layperson to educate
herself about the Commonwealths criminal law if that law can be found in one place. A second,
and subtler, notice problem will affect the legislature itself. If crimes are spread throughout the
Commonwealths statutory code, the legislature will be less likely to view the criminal law as a
consistent, unified scheme. A new offense may be placed outside the code, making it less likely
that the legislature will consider how that offense fits within the existing matrix of criminal offenses.
Additionally, the penal code itself may be amended without consideration of the amendments
impact on offenses outside the code. Third, the existence of criminal offenses outside the code will
generate problems of statutory construction. For example, it may not be clear whether the legislature
expected the penal codes default culpability provision to apply to uncodified offenses. In short,
the possibility of criminal offenses appearing outside the penal code undermines the entire project
of setting aside a separate penal code within the overall Commonwealths code scheme.
Current Kentucky law defines numerous serious crimes outside the Penal Code. Hundreds
of misdemeanors and felonies are scattered throughout the Kentucky Revised Statutes. Many of
those current non-Code offenses overlap, or simply restate, prohibitions appearing in the current
Penal Code. The proposed Code would supersede most of these current non-Code offenses,
whose prohibitions are incorporated into the proposed Codes more general offenses.23

According to interpretive canons, such overlapping provisions must be read so that none renders
any other superfluous  a task which frequently requires courts to distort the meaning of one provision in
order to accommodate another.
23
Compare Section 5103 (official misconduct), with KRS 6.731-.761; 61.097-64.990; 70.990. Compare
Section 5301 (obstructing governmental operations), with KRS 39A.990; 65.341; 149.040; 149.083; 432.590;
438.180; 441.035. Compare Section 5314 (tampering with physical evidence), with KRS 17.170.
22
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Within the Penal Code itself, consolidation is no less important. Formulation of an offense
in one provision, rather than many, reduces uncertainty as to the nature and scope of the banned
conduct. A general prohibition avoids confusion and grading inconsistency. At the same time, it
reduces the need for the legislature to enact additional prohibitions in the future, because a more
general provision is more easily adapted to changing circumstances.
Current Kentucky offenses often fail to realize this goal of consolidation within a single,
general offense. This occurs in two ways. In some cases, the current Penal Code criminalizes
specific forms of conduct in lieu of a broader prohibition against such conduct generally. For
example, current law has no general prohibition against false statements to the government,24 but
includes various offenses prohibiting false statements in particular forms or applications.25 Similarly,
current law has no general offense to cover obstruction of governmental operations,26 but defines
a variety of specific offenses covering particular forms of obstruction.27
In other cases, Kentucky law includes narrow, specific offenses in addition to a broader
prohibition against such conduct generally. For example, although one provision in the current
Penal Code explicitly covers theft by deception, 28 a number of other provisions in Kentucky
statutory law prohibit specific forms of such theft or attempts to commit such theft. 29
Proposed Section 1201 provides a final example of the advantages of consolidation. Under
current law, when particular facts may not exactly fit the definition of a particular assault offense, it
becomes necessary to also charge lesser degrees of assault, which are defined as distinct offenses.
Section 1201(1) defines the offense of assault based on its most fundamental elements only. Section
1201(2) provides a list of grading factors that will aggravate the penalty, thus establishing degrees
within a single offense. While the baseline penalty for the general assault offense is a Class A
misdemeanor, the presence of any (or all) of the five categories of aggravators can result in an
increased penalty up to a Class A felony. 30

Cf. Section 5203(1)(a)(ii) (making false entry in, or alteration of, document required to be kept for
information of government)
25
See, e.g., KRS 138.990 (records required under cigarette tax); KRS 138.300 (documentation required
under gasoline tax).
26
Cf. Section 5301(1).
27
See, e.g., KRS 257.490 (obstructing performance of duties of Livestock Sanitation Division); KRS
251.990 (obstructing performance of duties relating to grain contracts); KRS 227.270 (obstructing performance
of duties by Fire Marshal).
28
See KRS 514.040.
29
See, e.g., KRS 434.095 (obtaining real estate loan by substituting or making false instrument); KRS
434.655 (fraudulent use of credit or debit card after reporting it lost, as stolen, or not received); 434.660
(furnishing goods or services to user of false credit card with intent to defraud); 434.670 (failure to furnish
goods, services, etc., represented in writing as furnished); 516.130 (using slugs in coin machine with intent to
defraud).
30
Other proposed sections provide similar potential increases in penalty with use of aggravators. See,
e.g., Sections 1202, 1204, 1401.
24
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The above examples of current Kentucky laws shortcomings in this area are representative,
but by no means exhaustive. 31
4. GRADE OFFENSES RATIONALLY AND PROPORTIONALLY
For a system of criminal justice to be fair, liability must be assigned according to the relative
seriousness of the offense(s) committed. It is critical that the Codes system of grading offenses
recognize all, and only, suitable distinctions among the relative severity of offenses and develop a
scheme to grade each offense proportionally to its gravity in light of those distinctions.
In most cases, determinations of seriousness reflect value judgments as to which
reasonable people might differ, and as to which the legislature (as the most direct political voice of
the people) should have the ultimate authority. Accordingly, the drafters of the proposed Code
have sought to defer to the grading determinations instantiated in existing Kentucky law where
possible. In some cases, however, broad examination of current grading determinations reveals
logical inconsistencies that, it is presumed, the legislature would have sought to avoid had it been
aware of them. Such inconsistencies may develop for several reasons. As new offenses are
added to a penal code, the legislature may neglect to consider how the grade of each new offense
relates to the grades for other, preexisting offenses. As noted earlier, the sheer increasing number
of offenses, especially offenses outside the Code itself, makes it difficult to maintain consistency 
assuming one even manages to locate and consider all relevant offenses. In any event, the shared
experience of various jurisdictions is that over time, proportionality in the grading of offenses
diminishes.
One of the virtues of a broad recodification effort is the opportunity it provides to review
the grading system as a whole, considering how all offenses relate to one another rather than
considering individual offenses in a vacuum. Following such a review, the drafters have altered the
grades of certain offenses where doing so seems necessary to maintain any legitimate sense of
proportionality. In addition, a change in grading in the proposed Code has sometimes been
necessitated by the consolidation of offenses. Because current law often contains multiple offenses
that overlap and prohibit the same conduct (as discussed in section 3 above), but might impose
different grades for that conduct, it is simply impossible to follow current law on the matter, and
it becomes necessary to choose a single, consistent grade for the prohibited conduct.

In addition to the examples discussed in the text, the proposed Code also introduces several other
offenses generally criminalizing conduct that current Kentucky law criminalizes only in particular contexts.
Compare, e.g., Section 808 (possessing instruments of crime), with, e.g., KRS 119.115 (possessing key to
voting machine); KRS 511.050 (possessing burglary tools); KRS 514.065 (possessing device for theft of
telecommunications services). Compare Section 3104(1) (tampering with writing, record, or device), with, e.g.,
KRS 514.040 (tampering with utility or service meters); KRS 119.115 (tampering with voting machines).
Overlapping offenses are also a recurring problem in current law. Compare, e.g., 514.110 (general
prohibition against receiving stolen property), with, e.g., 434.650 (fraudulent use; presumption as to knowledge
or revocation); 434.690 (receiving goods, services, etc. obtained by fraud); 434.855(misuse of computer
information). Compare KRS 512.020 (general criminal mischief) with KRS 434.845 (unlawful access to computer).
31
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The task of grading offenses has three goals: each offenses grading scheme must recognize
all relevant distinctions between degrees of the offense; that scheme must avoid introduction of
irrelevant distinctions; and the overall grading scheme must maintain proportionality across offenses.
We discuss each of these three goals in turn, and conclude with a discussion of the related, but
distinct issue of creating rules to govern the overall grade  that is, the total amount of liability
 where more than one offense has been committed.
a. Consistently recognize appropriate distinctions
The proposed Code seeks to ensure that the grading for each offense recognizes all relevant
distinctions in the relative seriousness of various forms of an offense. In most cases, current law
reflects such distinctions, and the proposed offenses grading distinctions will tend to track existing
distinctions. In a few cases, however, current laws grading for offenses seems too crude, failing to
recognize legitimate distinctions of degree.
Perhaps the most striking example relates to the grading of theft offenses. Current law
alters the grading at only one cut-off level of $300 in value for any property involved,32 meaning
that theft of $400 would receive the same grade as theft of $40,000, or even $4,000,000. The
grading for property damage offenses is similarly crude, recognizing only three levels of value for
the amount of damage caused: under $500, over $500, and over $1,000.33
Section 2110 not only provides a single grading scheme for all forms of theft, but also adds
additional layers to the grading hierarchy by introducing new grading distinctions at the $1,000,
$10,000, and $100,000 levels, and a more limited distinction for certain thefts involving less than
$50. In addition, Section 2110(2)(b) includes a specific grading provision for theft of a motor
vehicle. Section 2206 similarly expands the grading categories for property damage, recognizing
six different categories of the value of the property damaged.
b. Avoid irrelevant or unclear distinctions
Another goal of the proposed Code is to avoid the inconsistency that results when seemingly
similar offenses are graded differently. This goal represents the other side of the offense-degree
coin from the goal discussed immediately above; in addition to recognizing all relevant distinctions,
the Code must refuse to recognize distinctions that do not or should not exist.

32
33

See KRS 514.130.
See KRS 512.020 to .040.
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For example, current law defines arson in the third degree, a Class D felony, as wantonly
caus[ing] destruction or damage to a building of [ones] own or of another by intentionally starting
a fire or causing an explosion when property damage results from the defendants dangerous
activity.34 Arson in the second degree, a Class B felony, occurs when one starts a fire or causes
an explosion with intent to destroy or damage a building that belongs to another, or for purposes
of insurance fraud.35 For some reason, the lower-graded offense requires actual resulting property
damage while the higher-graded one does not. The scope of the two offenses is the same in nearly
all other respects, and particularly with respect to the specific concern that drives the existence of
a distinct arson offense (as opposed to the general property damage offense): the element of
endangerment. The proposed Code grades arson based on the level of endangerment or physical
harm the arson involves.36
To take another example, current theft provisions include unnecessary specialized penalty
provisions when the stolen property is anhydrous ammonia.37 No obvious justification exists for
specifying this type of property while omitting other types of property. To compound the problems
with the current grading of theft, various specific offense outside the Penal Code also criminalize
specific forms of theft, and impose penalties that differ widely from the general theft provision.38
Similar grading conflicts between a general Penal Code provision and various specific non-Penal
Code provisions also exist in other areas, such as property damage.39
Similarly, under the current law for the offense of harassment, an aggravating factor for
increased grading sets a time limit for a prior conviction against the same victim.40 The proposed
Code eliminates the time limit.41

KRS 513.040(1).
KRS 513.030(1).
36
See Section 2203. Other proposed examples of justifiable distinctions for a grading increase include
Section 2302 (grading the criminal trespass offense at one grade higher when privacy or security interests are
at stake or when the owner has shown a clear intent to bar entry); Section 3101 (grading the forgery offense
higher when certain types of writings are involved); Section 4105 (grading for the nonsupport offense depends
on whether the nonsupport has exceeded a specific dollar amount or period of time, or whether the nonsupport
has resulted in a particular condition such as destitute circumstances); Section 5304 (grading one method of
committing the offense of fleeing the police higher when serious physical injury is caused or substantially
risked).
37
See KRS 514.030(2) and 514.110
38
Compare KRS 514.030 (theft by taking; Class D felony if amount exceeds $300, Class A misdemeanor
otherwise), with, e.g., KRS 433.865 (theft of dairy equipment; $100-$300 fine); KRS 437.420 (theft of animal; six
months to one year).
39
Compare KRS 512.020 to .040 (criminal mischief; Class D felony if damage over $1,000, Class A
misdemeanor if damage over $500, Class B misdemeanor otherwise), with, e.g., KRS 437.420(2) & 437.429
(damaging or destroying animal facility, or any animal or property in or on it; six months to one year and fine of
up to $5,000); KRS 438.060 (making stream, dam, pool, or pond unfit for use; thirty days to six months and $10$100 fine);
34
35

40
41
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c. Maintain proportionality between various offenses
The two goals discussed above relate to decisions about grading specific offenses or
degrees of offenses. A third objective in grading criminal offenses is to ensure that grading remains
rational when the grades of different offenses are compared with one another. In other words, the
Code must maintain proportionality of grading across offenses and make certain that the relative
level of liability for different offenses parallels the relative harm or wrong they reflect.
Although the drafters of the proposed Code have deferred, where possible, to the apparent
legislative determinations regarding the relative harm of each offense that current grading levels
reflect, in a few instances a comparison of different offenses reveals grading discrepancies contrary
to any sense of proportionality. For example, the current offense of theft of identity, which
prohibits possession of personal information with intent to commit theft, is graded as a Class D
felony 42  the same grade as for an actual completed theft of any amount over $300.43
Sale or transfer of such information (or possession with intent to do so) for purposes of
committing a later theft is a Class C felony,44 which is more serious than actual theft of any amount.
Numerous other fraud offenses, which typically deal with attempts to commit theft, are also graded
as seriously or more seriously than theft.45 As noted above, the proposed Code eliminates this
grading anomaly by recognizing more distinctions in the grading of theft, and thus enabling actual
theft of large amounts to be graded more seriously than mere attempts to defraud.

See KRS 514.160.
See KRS 514.030(2) (theft by taking), 514.040(8) (theft by deception), 514.060(4) (theft of services).
44
See KRS 514.170.
45
See, e.g., KRS 341.990(5) (false statement to obtain unemployment benefits; Class D felony if
benefits procured or attempted to be procured exceed $100, Class A misdemeanor otherwise); KRS 382.990(8)
(false statement about value of property; Class D felony); KRS 434.320 (insolvent broker accepting customers
money; Class D felony); KRS 434.570 (false statement as to identity or financial condition; Class D felony);
KRS 434.670 (failure to furnish goods or services represented as furnished; Class D felony if discrepancy in
value exceeds $100, otherwise Class A misdemeanor); KRS 517.060 (defrauding secured creditors; Class D
felony if amount involved exceeds $100).
Some of these offenses do not contradict the grading of theft so much as they appear to add superfluous
offenses that complicate the Code for no reason. See also, e.g., KRS 304.47-020(2)(a), (b) (fraudulent insurance
acts; graded same as theft); KRS 205.8463(1), (2) (fraudulent statements to obtain payment for health services;
graded same as theft).
42

43
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To take another example, under current Kentucky law, facilitation  a form of complicity
whereby a person aids another in committing a crime by knowingly provid[ing] an offender with
means or opportunity for the commission of the crime  is treated as a distinct inchoate offense.
Although the conduct it covers is not meaningfully different from any other form of aid giving rise to
complicity liability, facilitation receives a grading discount  it is graded as much as three full
grades lower than other types of complicity.46 Proposed Section 301(6) grades facilitation similarly
to other complicity offenses.
d. Develop a rational scheme of liability for multiple offenses
An additional goal of the proposed Code moves beyond grading individual offenses, and
even beyond issues of proportionality in grading different offenses, to consider broader grading
issues that arise from the challenging problem of overall grading of multiple offenses. All too
often, this problem is met with solutions that themselves compromise the goals of rationality and
proportionality in grading.
Some of the problems in the current grading scheme probably relate to current laws
concurrent-versus-consecutive system for sentencing multiple offenses. Except in certain
circumstances, current law requires that all sentences for multiple offenses be served concurrently.47
Where the exceptions apply, the defendant must serve a full consecutive term for each
relevant conviction. This double-or-nothing approach creates one set of undesirable results where
offenders may serve no additional jail time for committing additional offenses, and a different but
equally undesirable set of results where offenders may face disproportionately lengthy sentences
for multiple offenses whose cumulative harm is not great.
Current laws general rule requiring concurrent sentences for multiple convictions has the
regrettable consequence of trivializing, to the point of complete irrelevance, all offenses other than
the single most serious one.
The proposed Code addresses all these problems by introducing a system ensuring that
each additional offense of conviction leads to additional, but incrementally less, liability. Thus, no
offense is trivialized with a concurrent sentence, and the disproportionality of consecutive sentences
is avoided.48

See KRS 506.080.
For a discussion of current law rules on consecutive and concurrent sentencing, see the commentary
for Section 905.906.
48
See Section 905.906 and commentary.
46

47
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5. RETAIN ALL  BUT ONLY  RATIONAL, DEFENSIBLE POLICY DECISIONS
EMBODIED IN CURRENT LAW

Substantive policy decisions about the rules of the criminal law  such as what conduct
should be criminalized and what adjudicative rules should govern the imposition of criminal liability49
 reflect value judgments that are properly made by the legislature rather than a group of drafters.
For this reason, the proposed Code seeks to follow the substance of current law wherever possible.
In some places, however, the current law contains multiple contradictory rules  and
therefore no clear rule  on a subject. Other rules may have been sound when enacted, but no
longer reflect current realities or sensibilities and require expansion, alteration, or deletion. Still
other current legal rules have been created by the courts through case law, rather than by the
legislature through statutory enactment, and thus lack the legitimacy of a clear legislative mandate
 in fact, often they are in direct tension with the governing statutory provision. In those situations
where the existing legal rule seems clearly at odds with the goal of producing a rational, coherent
Penal code, drafters are forced to modify the existing rule, using supporting commentary to the
draft Code to describe and justify the proposed change.
a. Consistent and rational use of culpability requirements
in defining principles, offenses, and defenses
In creating the Penal Code of 1974, the drafters recognized the importance and difficulty
of comprehensively defining and using the mental states which are elements of the specific offenses.
Despite their efforts, in some respects current law is casual or imprecise in its use of culpability
requirements in defining offenses, leading to interpretive difficulties.
For example, under current law, when an offense does not prescribe a particular mental
state, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required . . . with respect to some or all of the
material elements [of the offense], if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable
mental state. As is discussed in section 1.a above, this provision offers very little guidance regarding
rules for reading in culpability requirements where none is stated.50 This failure is especially
troublesome given the statutory rule that a person must have culpability with respect to each
element of an offense,51 which demands that culpability must be read in for offense elements
whenever they are not explicitly stated, which is often the case.

A third substantive category, offense grading, is discussed in section 4 above.
See KRS 501.040.
51
See KRS 501.030(2).
49
50
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The proposed Code addresses these problems more clearly than current law in two ways.
First, the Code explicitly details, in both the draft provisions and commentary, how the culpability
rules are designed to function.52 Second, the proposed Code takes care to ensure that every
offense is drafted with these rules in mind.53
b. Eliminating provisions of confusing or limited application
The current Penal Code contains a number of outdated offenses that do not belong in a
modern penal code. The proposed Code attempts to identify and eliminate these provisions. For
example, Section 105 does not retain current law that the bodily impact causing death counts as
a result element for homicide. That special rule creates criminal jurisdiction for a specific, very
unusual fact pattern: where the offenders conduct and the victims death occur outside Kentucky,
but the physical contact causing death occurs in Kentucky.54 Because the rule would be of extremely
limited applicability and does not serve any significant policy interest, there is no reason to carve
out a specific exception to generally applicable rules of jurisdiction to cover this one situation.
Another example is the current provision stating that the issue of whether a person knew
or should have known that the result he caused was rendered substantially more probable by his
conduct is a fact issue.55 Any culpability requirement, including the required culpability as to
causing a prohibited result, will be included within an offenses definition and will have to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, proposed Section 203 does not include this
unnecessary and confusing language.

Section 205(2) provides a general rule that a stated culpability requirement for one objective element
governs subsequently elaborated objective elements as well, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition. Section
205(3) provides a read-in culpability requirement of recklessness where no culpability level is specified
(either through direct statement or through application of the rule of Section 205(2)), to avoid excess verbiage
and ensure that offenses, or offense elements, do not allow absolute liability for want of an explicit culpability
term for each element.
53
For example, the proposed arson offense states:
(1) Offense. Defined. A person commits an offense if, by means of fire or explosive, he knowingly:
(a) damages a building or habitable structure of another or a vital public facility; or
(b) damages any property, whether his own or anothers, with the intention that insurance be
collected for such loss.
Section 2201(1). The structure clearly indicates that the prescribed culpability requirement (knowingly) is
intended to apply to each of the offense elements contained in subsections (a) and (b).
52

54
55
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See KRS 500.060(3).
See KRS 501.060(4).

Why a New Penal Code?

CONCLUSION
Undertaking the Kentucky Penal Code Reform Project represents a rare and profound
opportunity to eradicate the numerous inconsistencies and contradictions that currently plague
Kentucky penal law. In nearly all cases, the needed corrections are significant, but should not be
at all controversial, for it is usually possible to clean up the form and structure of the law without
altering its fundamental goals or rules. The proposed Penal Code both simplifies and rationalizes
the statutory criminal law of Kentucky. It is rooted in the values and policy judgments of the
present, but its language, organization, and comprehensive scope promise to better serve those
interests in the future.
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Definitions

_____________

Section 500.101. Short Title and Effective Date
(1) This Act shall be known and may be cited as the Kentucky Penal Code of 2001.
(2) This Code shall take effect on [January 1, 2004].
Section 500.102. Principle of Construction
(1) Principle of Construction. All provisions of this Code shall be liberally construed
according to the fair import of their terms, to promote justice, and to effect the objects of the law.
(2) Effect of Commentary. The commentary accompanying this Code may be used as an
aid in construing the provisions of this Code.

Section 500.103. Applicability
(1) Common law offenses are abolished and no act or omission shall constitute a criminal
offense unless defined as an offense under this Code or another statute of this Commonwealth.
(2) The provisions of Part I of this Code are applicable to offenses defined by other
statutes, unless this Code otherwise provides.
(3) This provision shall not affect the power of a court to punish for contempt or to
employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order or a civil judgment or
decree.
Section 500.104. Restrictions on Applicability
(1) The provisions of this Code shall not apply to any offense committed prior to [January
1, 2004], notwithstanding KRS 500.040(1). Such an offense must be construed and punished
according to the provisions of law existing at the time of the commission thereof in the same
manner as if this Code had not been enacted.
1
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(2) For purposes of this Section, an offense shall be deemed to have been committed
prior to [January 1, 2004], if any element of the offense occurred prior thereto.
(3) Civil Remedies Unaffected. This Code shall not bar, suspend or otherwise affect any
right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered
or enforced in a civil action.
Section 500.105. Criminal Jurisdiction
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this Commonwealth for an offense that he
commits, while either within or outside the Commonwealth, by his own conduct or that of
another for which he is legally accountable, if:
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the Commonwealth; or
(b) the conduct outside the Commonwealth constitutes an attempt to commit an
offense within the Commonwealth; or
(c) the conduct outside the Commonwealth constitutes a conspiracy to commit an
offense within the Commonwealth, and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs
in the Commonwealth; or
(d) the conduct within the Commonwealth constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or
conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of both this
Commonwealth and such other jurisdiction.
(e) the conduct is a violation of a statute of this Commonwealth that expressly
prohibits conduct outside the Commonwealth.
(2) An offense is committed partly within this Commonwealth if:
(a) conduct that is an element of the offense, or
(b) a result that is an element of the offense,
occurs within the Commonwealth.
(3) Permissive Inference. If the body of a homicide victim is found within the
Commonwealth, that fact shall sustain the Commonwealths burden of production in establishing
that the death occurred within the Commonwealth.
(4) Omission Liability. An offense that is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed
by the law of this Commonwealth is committed within the Commonwealth, regardless of the location
of the offender at the time of the omission.

Section 500.106. Burdens of Proof; Affirmative Defenses; Permissive Inferences
(1) Presumption of Innocence. A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
(2) Burden of Persuasion. The burden is on the Commonwealth:

2
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(a) to prove all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt;
(b) to disprove all exceptions, exemptions, defenses, and mitigations beyond a
reasonable doubt, unless this Code expressly provides otherwise; and
(c) to prove by a preponderance of the evidence all other facts required for liability,
unless this Code expressly provides otherwise.
(3) Burden of Production.
(a) Burden on the Commonwealth. The case shall be presented to the factfinder
only if the Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence, considered in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth and all reasonable inferences therefrom, to allow a rational factfinder to find
that all required offense elements have been proven, and any exemptions or exceptions have been
disproved, beyond a reasonable doubt.
(b) Burden on the Defendant. The factfinder shall be instructed as to an affirmative
defense or mitigation only if there is sufficient evidence, considered in the light most favorable
to the defendant and all reasonable inferences therefrom, to allow a rational factfinder to
find that all requirements of the defense are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Definition. An affirmative defense is any defense other than one that operates
by negating a required offense element.
(4) Permissive Inferences. When the Code establishes a permissive inference with respect
to any fact, it has the following consequences:
(a) when there is evidence of the facts that give rise to the inference, the issue of
the existence of the inferred fact must be submitted to the factfinder, unless the Court is
satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the inferred fact; and
[(b) when the issue of the existence of the inferred fact is submitted to the factfinder,
the Court shall charge that while the inferred fact must, on all the evidence, be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the law declares that the factfinder may regard the facts giving
rise to the inference as sufficient evidence of the inferred fact.]1

Issue: Should the Code include (4)(b), which may authorize the use of a permissive inference
instruction to the jury?
Pro: This is a standard procedure in other states and there is little reason to think it is problematic.
Indeed, if a permissive inference is suitable for use in satisfying the burden of production, which is not
disputed, it would seem odd to hide from jurors the fact that the inference is allowed (but not required) by law.
The use of permissive inferences has been constitutionally approved. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197 (1977). The Reporter is unable to find any other jurisdiction that does not provide for their use, as is
provided in (4)(b). The existence of permissive inferences also is useful in providing a workable compromise
when reformers disagree over offense elements  allowing adoption of the more demanding offense requirement but providing a permissive inference instruction that will help the prosecution establish the required
element.
Con: Jury instructions for permissive inferences are not generally used in current Kentucky practice,
and would be somewhat inconsistent with the Kentucky practice of giving only bare bones instructions.
Reporter: No recommendation.
1

3

Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project

Section 500.107. Definitions
Unless a particular context clearly requires a different meaning:
Act has the meaning given in Section 501.204(4).
Adulterated has the meaning given in Section 531.3105(2)(a).
Affirmative defense has the meaning given in Section 500.106(3)(c).
Another means a person or persons as defined in this Code other than the defendant.
Association has the meaning given in Section 507.701(2)(c).
Benefit has the meaning given in Section 553.5302(2).
Building has the meaning given in Section 522.2201(2).
Business record has the meaning given in Section 531.3107(2)(a).
Catastrophe has the meaning given in Section 522.2205(4)(a).
Circumstance element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(4).
Commonwealth or this Commonwealth means the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and
all land and water in respect to which the Commonwealth of Kentucky has either exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction, and the air space above such land and water. Other state means any
state or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.
Conduct means an act, a series of acts, or a failure to act when bound by a legal duty to
act.
Conduct element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(2).
Consequence has the meaning given in Section 503.303(2).
Contraband has the meaning given in Section 553.5307(2)(a).
Corporate agent has the meaning given in Section 507.701(2)(a).
Correctional worker has the meaning given in Section 513.1304(2).
Credit card has the meaning given in Section 531.3118(2)(a).
Dangerous contraband has the meaning given in Section 553.5307(2)(b).
Dangerous instrument has the meaning given in Section 515.1501(3)(a).
Deadly weapon has the meaning given in Section 515.1501(3)(b).
Debit card has the meaning given in Section 531.3118(2)(b).
Deprive has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(a).
Detention facility has the meaning given in Section 553.5306(2)(a).
Deviate sexual intercourse has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(a).
Distribute has the meaning given in Section 562.6203(2)(a).
Dwelling means any building or structure, though movable or temporary, which is for the
time being either totally or partially in use as a home or place of lodging.
Element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(1).
Enterprise has the meaning given in Section 531.3107(2)(b).
Escape has the meaning given in Section 553.5306(2)(b).
Fiduciary has the meaning given in Section 531.3112(2).
Financial institution has the meaning given in Section 521.2107(4).
4
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Force likely to cause death or serious physical injury has the meaning given in Section
504.419(2).
Forcible compulsion has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(b).
Forcible felony has the meaning given in Section 504.414(4).
Government means the United States, any State, county, municipality, or other political unit, or
any department, agency, or subdivision of any of the foregoing, or any corporation or other association
carrying out the functions of government.
Governmental function has the meaning given in Section 553.5301(2)(a).
Grossly negligent mistake has the meaning given in Section 501.207(3)(b).
Grossly negligently has the meaning given in Section 501.206(4).
He means a person, as defined by this Section.
High managerial agent has the meaning given in Section 507.701(2)(b).
Highly secured premises has the meaning given in Section 523.2303(4).
Inchoate offense means any offense defined in Chapter 508 of this Code.
Included offense. One offense is an included offense of another if:
(1) it is established by proof of the same facts, or less than all the facts, required to
establish the commission of the other offense; or
(2) it consists only of an inchoate offense toward commission of the other offense;
or
(3) it differs from the other offense only in the respect that
(i) a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or
public interest, or
(ii) a lesser kind of culpability, suffices to establish its commission.
Includes or including means comprehending among other particulars, without limiting
the generality of the foregoing word or phrase.
Instrument of crime has the meaning given in Section 508.808(2).
Intentionally has the meaning given in Section 501.206(1).
Intoxication has the meaning given in Section 503.302(3)(a).
Involuntary intoxication has the meaning given in Section 505.506(3).
Knowingly has the meaning given in Section 501.206(2).
Law enforcement authority means a public servant authorized by law or by governmental
agencies to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of offenses.
Material false statement has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(a).
Matter has the meaning given in Section 562.6203(2)(b).
Mental illness or retardation has the meaning given in Section 505.504(3).
Mentally incapacitated has the meaning given in Section 513.1302(2)(a).
Mentally retarded has the meaning given in Section 513.1302(2)(b).
Minor has the meaning given in Section 541.4104(2).
Mislabeled has the meaning given in Section 531.3105(2)(b).
Movable property has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(b).
Negligent mistake has the meaning given in Section 501.207(3)(c).
5
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Negligently has the meaning given in Section 501.206(5).
Nonexculpatory defense has the meaning given in Section 506.601(4).
Oath has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(b).
Objective element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(5).
Obscene has the meaning given in Section 562.6203(2)(c).
Obtain has the meaning given in Section 521.2103(3).
Official proceeding has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(c).
Owner has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(c).
Peace officer means any person who by virtue of his office or public employment is
vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses, whether that
duty extends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses.
Pecuniary benefit has the meaning given in Section 553.5309(2)(b).
Penal custody has the meaning given in Section 553.5306(2)(c).
Person means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or
unincorporated association.
Personal identity has the meaning given in Section 531.3104(2).
Physical evidence has the meaning given in Section 553.5313(2).
Physical injury means substantial physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical
condition, and includes throwing or causing to be thrown upon the person feces, or urine, or other
bodily fluid.
Physically helpless has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(c).
Physically or mentally helpless has the meaning given in Section 512.1205(2).
Place of worship means a church, synagogue, mosque, temple, or other building, structure,
or place used primarily for religious worship and includes the grounds of a place of worship.
Primary culpability required by the offense charged has the meaning given in Section
505.511(4).
Private place has the meaning given in Section 524.2401(1)(e).
Promoting the distribution has the meaning given in Section 562.6203(2)(d).
Propelled vehicle has the meaning given in Section 521.2112(2).
Property has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(d).
Property of another has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(e).
Prosecution means all legal proceedings by which a persons liability for an offense is
determined, commencing with the return of the indictment or the issuance of the information, and
including the final disposition of the case upon appeal.
Protective order has the meaning given in Section 512.1204(3).
Public performance has the meaning given in Section 531.3116(2).
Public place has the meaning given in Section 561.6105(2).
Public servant has the meaning given in Section 551.5101(2).
Reasonable belief or reasonably believes means a belief that the person is not negligent
in holding.
Reasonable mistake has the meaning given in Section 501.207(3)(d).
6
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Receiving has the meaning given in Section 521.2109(2).
Reckless mistake has the meaning given in Section 501.207(3)(a).
Recklessly has the meaning given in Section 501.206(3).
Relative has the meaning given in Section 514.1401(3)(b).
Required or authorized by law has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(d).
Restrain has the meaning given in Section 514.1401(3)(c).
Result element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(3).
Riot has the meaning given in Section 561.6101(2).
School means a public, private, or parochial elementary or secondary school, community
college, college, or university and includes the grounds of the school.
Serious physical injury means physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or
that causes serious, prolonged disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily member or organ.
Service animal has the meaning given in Section 5306(2).
Services has the meaning given in Section 521.2105(2).
Sexual conduct by a minor has the meaning given in Section 562.6202(2)(b).
Sexual contact has the meaning given in Section 562.1304(2).
Sexual intercourse has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(a).
Statement has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(e).
Statute means the Constitution or an Act of the General Assembly of this Commonwealth.
Storage structure has the meaning given in Section 523.2303(5).
Substantive offense means any offense defined in Part II of this Code.
Transportation facility has the meaning given in Section 561.6108(2).
Unjustified has the meaning given in Section 504.416(2).
Unlawful threat has the meaning given in Section 553.5310(3).
Vital public facility has the meaning given in Section 522.2205(4)(b).
Voluntary intoxication has the meaning given in Section 503.302(3)(b).
Without consent has the meaning given in Section 514.1401(3)(c).
Writing has the meaning given in Section 531.3101(2).
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CHAPTER 501. BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF OFFENSE LIABILITY
Section 501.201.
Section 501.202.
Section 501.203.
Section 501.204.
Section 501.205.
Section 501.206.
Section 501.207.
Section 501.208.
Section 501.209.

Basis of Liability
Offense Elements Defined
Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result
Requirement of an Act; Omission Liability; Possession Liability
Culpability Requirements
Culpability Requirements Defined
Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability
Mental Illness or Retardation Negating Required Culpability
Definitions

____________
Section 501.201. Basis of Liability
Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, a person is liable for an offense if he:
(1)
(a) satisfies all the elements of an offense, and does not satisfy the requirements of
any bar to liability, contained in Chapter 508 or Part II of this Code or in a statute of the
Commonwealth outside of this Code, or,
(b) if an element of the offense is missing, it is imputed to him by a provision of
Chapter 503, and
(2) does not satisfy the requirements of any defense provided in Chapters 502, 504, 505,
or 506 of this Code.

Section 501.202. Offense Elements Defined
(1) The elements of an offense refer to:
(a)
(i) such conduct, or
(ii) such attendant circumstances, or
(iii) such result of conduct, and
(b) such culpability requirements, as defined in Sections 501.205 and 501.206,
as are contained in the offense definition or the provisions establishing the offense grade.
(2) A conduct element is that part of an offense definition that requires an offenders act
or failure to perform a legal duty.
(3) A result element is any change of circumstances required to have been caused by the
persons conduct.
(4) A circumstance element is any objective element that is not a conduct or result
element.
(5) The objective elements of an offense include conduct, attendant circumstances, and
result elements, but not culpability requirements.
9
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Section 501.203. Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result
(1) Conduct is the cause of a result if:
(a) the conduct is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not
have occurred; and
(b) the manner of occurrence of the result is rendered substantially more probable
by the conduct; and
(c) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal
requirements imposed by the Code or by the law defining the offense.
(2) Concurrent Causes. Where the conduct of two or more persons each causally
contributes to a result and each alone would have been sufficient to cause the result, the
requirement of Subsection (1)(a) of this Section is satisfied as to both persons.

Section 501.204. Requirement of an Act; Omission Liability; Possession
Liability
(1) Either Act or Omission to Perform Duty Required. A person is not guilty of an offense
unless his liability is based upon an act or a failure to perform a legal duty.
(2) Either Act or Omission to Perform Duty Suffices. Unless an offense definition clearly
states otherwise, either an act or a failure to perform a legal duty may satisfy any conduct element
of any offense.
(3) Possession an Act. Possession is an act, as required by Subsection (1), if the person:
(a) knowingly obtained or received the thing possessed, or
(b) was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient time to have been able to
terminate his possession.
(4) Definition. An act is a bodily movement, whether voluntary or involuntary.

Section 501.205. Culpability Requirements
(1) To be guilty of an offense, a person must have culpability, as defined in Section
501.206, as to every objective element of the offense, except as provided by Subsection (4).
(2) Application of Stated Culpability Requirement. When an offense definition contains a
stated culpability requirement, that requirement shall apply to all subsequent objective elements
within the grammatical clause in which it appears and any subsequent objective elements to which
common usage would suggest the legislature intended it to apply.
(3) Absence of a Stated Culpability Requirement. When no culpability requirement is
specified with regard to an objective element, a requirement of recklessness is applicable, except
as provided in Subsection (4).
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(4) Absolute and Ordinary Negligence Liability. An offense may impose liability based on
ordinary negligence, or no culpability, as to an objective element only if:
(a) the offense is a misdemeanor or a violation and is not punishable by incarceration
or by a fine exceeding $500, or
(b) the statute defining the offense clearly and explicitly indicates a legislative purpose
to:
(i) impose criminal liability based upon no culpability or liability for ordinary
negligence, and
(ii) grade the offense more seriously than would be allowed under
Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Culpability as to Criminality Not Required. No level of culpability as to whether
conduct constitutes an offense, or as to the existence, meaning, or application of the law
defining an offense, is required by an offense definition, unless the definition expressly
provides that it is required.
(6) Proof of Greater Culpability Satisfies Requirement for Lower. When the law requires
negligence as to an objective element, the requirement is satisfied by proof of intent, knowledge,
recklessness, [or gross negligence]** as to the element. [When the law requires gross negligence
as to an objective element, the requirement is satisfied by proof of intent, knowledge, or recklessness
as to the element.]** When the law requires recklessness as to an objective element, the requirement
is satisfied by proof of intent or knowledge as to the element. When the law requires knowledge
as to an objective element, the requirement is satisfied by proof of intent as to the element.

Section 501.206. Culpability Requirements Defined
(1) Intentionally. A person acts intentionally:
(a) with respect to conduct, if it is his conscious object to engage in such conduct,
or, as the case may be, to have another engage in such conduct;
(b) with respect to a circumstance, if it is his hope or belief that such circumstance
exists; and
(c) with respect to a result, if it is his conscious object to cause such result.
(d) Requirement of Intention Satisfied if Intention Conditional. When a particular
intention is required by an offense definition, the requirement is satisfied although such
intention is conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
(2) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly:
(a) with respect to his own conduct, if he is aware that he is engaging in such
conduct, and, with respect to anothers conduct, if he is aware that another is engaging or
will engage in such conduct;
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(b) with respect to a circumstance, if he believes there is a high probability that
such circumstance exists; and
(c) with respect to a result, if he is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such result.
(3) [Recklessly]. A person acts [recklessly]2:
(a) with respect to conduct, if he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that he or another person is engaging in or will engage in such conduct;
(b) with respect to a circumstance, if he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that such circumstance exists; and
(c) with respect to a result, if he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that his conduct will cause such result.
(d) Disregard Must be a Gross Deviation. The persons disregard of the risk
must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the persons situation.
(4) [With Gross Negligence]. A person acts [with gross negligence]:
(a) with respect to conduct, if he fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that he or another person is engaging in or will engage in such conduct;
(b) with respect to a circumstance, if he fails to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that such circumstance exists; and
(c) with respect to a result, if he fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that his conduct will cause such result.
(d) Failure to be Aware Must be a Gross Deviation. The persons failure to be
aware of the risk must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the persons situation.
Issue: Should the current culpability terminology of wantonly, recklessly, and negligently be
changed to conform to what has become the standard American terminology of recklessly and negligently,
as proposed Section 501.206 reflects?
Pro: Since Kentuckys adoption of the current terms, the rest of the country has come to a consensus
on the use of culpability terms, as reflected in the current draft. Current legal dictionaries, for example, now give
only those standard meanings. If the Commonwealth does not switch over to standard usage, it will increasingly
create confusion for Kentucky lawyers and judges in the use of legal statutes and court opinions from other
jurisdictions and standard legal treatises. If Kentucky is to become increasingly involved with other states, as
is the clear modern trend, it will eventually have to make the change. To delay the change is only to delay and
increase the ultimate transition cost and to suffer unnecessary and avoidable confusion in the interim. Kentucky
lawyers and judges were able to successfully change their culpability terminology with the last recodification
(the current Kentucky terminology reflects a change in the previous Kentucky law), and there is every reason
tobelieve that they can manage a change this time  this change being the last change they will have to make.
Further, the proposed terminology is consistent with the Kentucky terminology used in civil law, thus the
proposed change would avoid the confusion of having the same term have different meanings in the criminal
and civil context.
Con: The disruption to Kentucky lawyers and judges would not be worth the benefits of the change
in terminology.
Reporter: Recommends the change in terminology, as currently reflected in the text.
2
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(5) [Negligently]. A person acts [negligently]:
(a) with respect to conduct, if he fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that he or another person is engaging in or will engage in such conduct;
(b) with respect to a circumstance, if he fails to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that such circumstance exists; and
(c) with respect to a result, if he fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that his conduct will cause such result.
(6) Effect of Change in Terminology. The change in terminology in itself (from wantonly
to recklessly and from recklessly to with gross negligence) shall have no effect on the
meaning of the defined terms.

Section 501.207. Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability
(1) Subject to the limitations of Sections 503.303 and 503.304, a required culpable
mental state is not satisfied if it is negatived by a persons ignorance or mistake as to a matter of
either fact or law.
(2) Correspondence Between Mistake Defenses and Culpability Requirements. Any
mistake as to an offense element, including a reckless mistake, will negate the existence of intention
or knowledge as to that element. A grossly negligent mistake as to an offense element will negate
the existence of intention, knowledge, or recklessness as to that element. A negligent mistake as to
an offense element will negate the existence of intention, knowledge, recklessness, or gross negligence
as to that element. A reasonable mistake as to an offense element will negate intention, knowledge,
recklessness, gross negligence, or negligence as to that element.
(3) Definitions.
(a) A reckless mistake is an erroneous belief that the actor is reckless in forming,
or for which the actor is aware of a substantial risk that the belief is erroneous.
(b) A grossly negligent mistake is an erroneous belief that the actor is grossly
negligent in forming or is a belief for which the actor should be aware of a substantial risk
that the belief is erroneous.
(c) A negligent mistake is an erroneous belief that the actor is negligent in forming
or is a belief for which the actor should be aware of a substantial risk that the belief is
erroneous.
(d) A reasonable mistake is an erroneous belief that the actor is non-negligent in
forming.

Section 501.208. Mental Illness or Retardation Negating Required Culpability
Evidence that a person suffered from a mental illness or retardation is admissible whenever
it is relevant to prove that the person did or did not have a required culpable mental state.
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Section 501.209. Definitions
(1) Act has the meaning given in Section 501.204(4).
(2) Circumstance element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(4).
(3) Conduct has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(4) Conduct element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(2).
(5) Element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(1).
(6) Grossly negligent mistake has the meaning given in Section 501.207(3)(b).
(7) Grossly negligently has the meaning given in Section 501.206(4).
(8) Intentionally has the meaning given in Section 501.206(1).
(9) Knowingly has the meaning given in Section 501.206(2).
(10) Mental illness or retardation has the meaning given in Section 505.504(3).
(11) Negligent mistake has the meaning given in Section 501.207(3)(c).
(12) Negligently has the meaning given in Section 501.206(5).
(13) Objective elements has the meaning given in Section 501.202(5).
(14) Reasonable mistake has the meaning given in Section 501.207(3)(d).
(15) Reckless mistake has the meaning given in Section 501.207(3)(a).
(16) Recklessly has the meaning given in Section 501.206(3).
(17) Result element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(3).
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CHAPTER 502. DEFENSES RELATINGTO THE OFFENSE HARM OR EVIL
Section 502.251.
Section 502.252.
Section 502.253.
Section 502.254.
Section 502.255.

Consent
Customary License; De Minimis Infraction; and Conduct Not Envisaged
by Legislature as Prohibited by the Offense
Prosecution When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements of More than
One Offense
Conviction When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements of More than
One Offense
Definitions

____________

Section 502.251. Consent
(1) In General. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or
to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes
the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prohibited by the law defining the offense.
(2) Consent to Physical Injury. Notwithstanding Subsection (3) of this Section, when
conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens physical injury, consent
to the infliction or threat of such harm is a defense if:
(a) the physical injury caused or threatened by the conduct consented to is not
serious; or
(b) the conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint
participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport.
(3) Ineffective Consent. Unless otherwise provided by this Code or by the law defining
the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(a) it is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct
charged to constitute the offense; or
[(b) it is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental illness or retardation, or
intoxication is manifestly unable, or known by the actor to be unable, to make a reasonable
judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense;]3

3

Issue: Should the Code include (3)(b), which allows lack of consent to be shown from the victims
manifest inability to make a reasonable judgment?
Con: Allowing this form of ineffective consent would be unfair to the intoxicated defendant who fails
to see a victims manifest inability to consent because of his intoxication, as may commonly occur in cases of
date rape.
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(c) it is given by a person whose improvident consent is sought to be prohibited by
the law defining the offense; or
(d) it is induced by force, duress, or deception of a kind sought to be prohibited
by the law defining the offense.

Section 502.252. Customary License; De Minimis Infraction; and Conduct Not
Envisaged by Legislature as Prohibited by the Offense
The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged
to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendants
conduct:
(1) was within a customary license, neither expressly negatived by the person whose
interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;
(2) caused a harm or evil too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or
(3) did not actually cause the harm or evil sought to be prohibited by the law defining the
offense. The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under this Subsection without filing a written
statement of its reasons.

Section 502.253. Prosecution When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements
of More than One Offense
When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one
offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense.

Pro: This common form of defining ineffective consent is necessary to protect potential victims who
are, for any variety of reasons, unable to make a reasonable judgment. The intoxicated defendant is not
improperly disadvantaged here. His proper argument is not to claim that the woman in fact consented, when
she was manifestly unable to do so, but rather to claim that he lacked the requisite culpability as to her lack of
consent. Whether he may avoid liability based on such a claim will depend on the definition of the offense and
the culpability level required as to the element of the victims lack of consent. In any case, the date rape
defendant will be treated no differently with regard to his voluntary intoxication than any other voluntarily
intoxicated defendant.
Reporter: No recommendation.
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Section 502.254. Conviction When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements
of More than One Offense 4
(1) Limitations on Conviction for Multiple Related Offenses. The factfinder may find a
defendant guilty of any offense, or grade of an offense, for which he satisfies the requirements for
liability, but the court shall not enter a judgment of conviction for more than one of any two offenses
if:
(a) the two offenses are based on the same conduct and:
(i) the harm or wrong of one offense is:
(A) entirely accounted for by the other offense,
(B) of the same kind, but lesser degree, than that of the other
offense; or
(ii) the two offenses differ only in that:
(A) one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally
and another to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct, or
(B) one requires a lesser kind of culpability than the other; or

4

505.020?

Issue: Should the Code delete proposed Section 254 in favor of retaining the current provision, KRS

Pro: The current provision has existed since the enactment of the current Penal Code and its rules
have been fleshed out over time in the case law. A new rule for multiple convictions would introduce confusion.
Con: The current rules governing multiple convictions, as elaborated through KRS 505.020 and the
case law, are already confused and confusing. Instead of making an effort to set out underlying principles to
guide judgment, the current Penal Code simply leans on the notion of an included offense, an idea borrowed
from constitutional double jeopardy law, which itself is murky, if not incoherent. The included offense
concept has not proven useful or clear as a guide to determining when multiple liability is appropriate. Decisions
regarding the propriety of imposing multiple liability have, for the most part, been delegated to the courts, with
predictably unpredictable results. See, e.g., Com. v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1996) (overruling multiple prior
Kentucky Supreme Court double-jeopardy decisions, which themselves appeared to adopt different tests).
The multiple-offense issue is vitally important given that the proposed Code seeks to define a new
liability scheme that would eliminate concurrent sentences. See proposed Section 509.906. Currently, the issue
of multiple liability can effectively be swept under the rug, as a court can enter additional convictions that have
no practical consequence in terms of the defendants total liability. But if we take seriously the project of
imposing additional liability for all the distinct harms (and only the distinct harms) a defendant has caused, we
also need to take care in describing the conditions under which multiple liability is, or is not, allowed.
The current Penal Code reform project represents an opportunity for Kentucky to take the lead in
addressing this fundamentally important issue. But even holding aside that opportunity, this matter is simply
too significant to allow ad hoc judicial decision-making, rather than at least attempting to provide legislative
guidelines or at least a statutory explanation of suitable criteria.
Reporter: No recommendation.

17

Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project

(b) one offense consists only of an inchoate offense toward commission of:
(i) the other offense, or
(ii) a substantive offense that is related to the other offense in the manner
described in Subsection (1)(a);
(c) each offense is an inchoate offense toward commission of a single substantive
offense; or
(d) the two offenses differ only in that one is based on the defendants own conduct
and another is based on the defendants accountability, under Section 301, for another
persons conduct; or
(e) inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the
offenses.
(2) Entry of Judgment. Where Subsection (1) prohibits multiple judgments of conviction,
the court shall enter a judgment of conviction for the most serious offense among the offenses in
question, including different grades of an offense, of which the defendant has been found guilty.
(3) Definitions.
(a) Inchoate offense means any offense defined in Chapter 508 of this Code.
(b) Substantive offense means any offense other than an inchoate offense.

Section 502.255. Definitions
(1) Conduct has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(2) Conduct element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(2).
(3) Inchoate offense has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(4) Included offense has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(5) Intoxication has the meaning given in Section 503.302(3)(a).
(6) Mentally retarded has the meaning given in Section 513.1302(2)(b).
(7) Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(8) Prosecution has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(9) Result element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(3).
(10) Substantive offense has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
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CHAPTER 503. IMPUTATION OF OFFENSE ELEMENTS
Section 503.301.
Section 503.302.
Section 503.303.
Section 503.304.
Section 503.305.

Accountability for the Conduct of Another
Voluntary Intoxication
Divergence Between Consequences Intended or Risked and Actual
Consequences
Mistaken Belief Consistent with a Different Offense
Definitions

____________
Section 503.301. Accountability for the Conduct of Another
(1) Accountability. A person is legally accountable for conduct of another person if:
(a) having the culpability required by the offense definition, he causes such other
person to perform the conduct constituting the offense; or
(b) having the culpability required by the offense definition, he intentionally aids,
solicits, commands, or conspires with another in the planning or commission of the offense;
or
(c) the statute defining the offense makes him so accountable.
(2) Exception to Accountability. Unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise,
a person is not so accountable for the conduct of another under this Section if:
(a) he is a victim of the offense committed; or
(b) his conduct is inevitably incident to commission of the offense; or
(c) before commission of the offense, he:
(i) manifests a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose,
and
(ii) deprives his prior effort of its effectiveness or makes proper effort to
prevent commission of the offense.
(d) Complete and Voluntary Renunciation Defined. A renunciation is not voluntary
and complete within the meaning of this Section if it is motivated in whole or in part by:
(i) a belief that circumstances exist which pose a particular threat of
apprehension or detection of the accused or another participant in the criminal
enterprise or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose;
or
(ii) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or to
transfer the criminal effort to another victim or another but similar object.
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(3) Unconvicted Principal or Confederate No Defense. A person who is legally accountable
for the conduct of another may be convicted upon proof that the objective elements of the offense
are satisfied, although the other person claimed to have committed the offense has not been
prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, or has
been acquitted.
(4) Complicity in Attempted Offense. A person who would be accountable for the offense
conduct of another under Subsection (1) if the other committed the offense is guilty of an attempt
to commit the offense.
(5) Attempted Complicity. A person who attempts to aid, solicit, or conspire with another
in the planning or commission of an offense under Subsection (1) is guilty of an attempt to commit
the offense, whether or not the offense is attempted or committed by the other person.
(6) Knowingly Aiding an Offense; Grading of Criminal Facilitation. A person who would
be accountable for the offense conduct of another under Subsection (1) except that he only
knowingly aids the other in the planning or commission of an offense, is liable as a criminal facilitator
of the offense and is subject to a sentence:
(a) two grades lower than if he had intentionally aided, or
(b) for a Class C misdemeanor,
whichever is greater.

Section 503.302. Voluntary Intoxication
(1) Except as provided in Section 505.506, a persons intoxication at the time of committing
an offense is not a defense unless it negatives a required culpability element of the offense.
(2) When recklessness is a required element of the offense, if the person, due to voluntary
intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he not been intoxicated,
such unawareness is not a defense.
(3) Definitions.
(a) Intoxication means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting
from the introduction of substances into the body.
(b) Voluntary intoxication means intoxication caused by substances that the
actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he
knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under
such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime.
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Section 503.303. Divergence Between Consequences Intended or Risked and
Actual Consequences
(1) When culpability as to a particular consequence of a persons conduct is required by
an offense definition and the consequence that actually occurs is not that designed, contemplated,
or risked by the person, as the case may be, the required culpability nonetheless is established if
the actual consequence differs from the consequence designed, contemplated, or risked, only in
the respect that:
(a) a different person or different property is injured or affected, or
(b) the consequence intended, contemplated, or risked was as or more serious or
extensive an injury or harm than the actual consequence.
(2) Definition. Consequence means a result element of an offense definition and the
attendant circumstance elements that characterize the result.

Section 503.304. Mistaken Belief Consistent with a Different Offense
Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise provide a defense under Section 501.207
to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the person would be guilty of another offense
of the same or a higher grade had the situation been as he supposed.

Section 503.305. Definitions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Circumstance element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(4).
Conduct has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
Consequence has the meaning given in Section 503.303(2).
Element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(1).
Intoxication has the meaning given in Section 503.302(3)(a).
Objective element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(5).
Result element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(3).
Voluntary intoxication has the meaning given in Section 503.302(3)(b).
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CHAPTER 504. JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES
Section 504.400.
Section 504.411.
Section 504.412.
Section 504.413.
Section 504.414.
Section 504.415.
Section 504.416.
Section 504.417.
Section 504.418.
Section 504.419.
Section 504.420.

General Defenses
General Provisions Governing Justification Defenses
Lesser Evils
Execution of Public Duty
Law Enforcement Authority
Use of Force by Persons with Special Responsibility for Care,
Discipline, or Safety of Others
Defense of Person
Defense of Property
Use of Force by Aggressor
Use of Force Likely to Cause Death or Serious Physical Injury
Definitions

___________________
Section 504.400. General Defenses
(1) The defenses provided in Chapters 504, 505, and 506 bar conviction even if all
elements of the offense charged have been satisfied.
(2) Civil Remedies Unaffected. The fact a person has a defense provided by Chapters
504, 505, or 506 does not abolish or impair any remedy for such conduct that is available in any
civil action.

Section 504.411. General Provisions Governing Justification Defenses
(1) Superiority of More Specific Justifications. The justifications provided in Section
504.412 (Lesser Evils) or Section 504.413 (Execution of Public Duty) are not available if the
factual circumstances of a claimed justification are described in one of the other provisions of this
Chapter.
(2) Multiple Justifications. Except as provided in Subsection (1) of this Section, if a
persons conduct satisfies the requirements of more than one justification defense, all such
justification defenses are available.
(3) Assistance of, Resistance to, and Interference With Justified Conduct. Except as
otherwise provided by law, conduct that is justified may not lawfully be resisted or interfered with,
and lawfully may be assisted by any person.
(4) Causing the Justifying Circumstances No Bar to a Justification Defense. The fact that
a person has caused the circumstances giving rise to the need for justified conduct shall not prevent
his conduct constituting the offense from being held to be justified.
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(5) Liability for Culpably Causing Justifying Circumstances.
(a) Notwithstanding Subsection (4), a person commits an offense if, acting with
the culpability required by the offense definition, he causes the circumstances that justify
himself or another to engage in the conduct that constitutes the offense.
(b) Defense. A person may have a general defense to his conduct giving rise to
liability under Subsection (5)(a).

Section 504.412. Lesser Evils
Conduct is justified if:
(1) it is immediately necessary to avoid a harm or evil; and
(2) the harm or evil avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense charged; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly
appear.

Section 504.413. Execution of Public Duty
Conduct is justified if it is required or authorized by:
(1) the law defining the duties or functions of a public servant or the assistance to be
rendered to such servant in the performance of his duties; or
(2) the law governing the execution of legal process; or
(3) the judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal; or
(4) any other provision of law imposing a public duty.

Section 504.414. Law Enforcement Authority
(1) Peace Officers Use of Force in Making an Arrest.
(a) The conduct of a peace officer, [or any person whom he has summoned or
directed to assist him,]5 is justified if:
5

Issue: Should the bracketed language be retained, making the law enforcement justification
available to persons acting at the direction of peace officers to assist them?
Pro: Peace officers need as much help from citizens as they can get. There is little danger of abuse
here, because the proposed justification is available only for conduct that a citizen is summoned or directed
to do to assist the officer.
Con: This justification should be narrowly and clearly drawn so that its scope is not subject to
expansion or abuse. Current Kentucky law does not explicitly include private citizens in its law enforcement
justification, but refers to persons acting under official authority in making or assisting in making an arrest.
KRS 503.090(1). The current provision authorizes deadly force only where the person using it is authorized to
act as a peace officer. KRS 503.090(2)(a).
Reporter: No recommendation.
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(i) it is necessary to effect a lawful arrest, and
(ii) the officer expresses his purpose.
(b) Limitation. Force likely to cause death or serious physical injury is not justified
under Subsection (1)(a) unless:
(i) such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by
resistance or escape; and
(ii) the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony
that involves the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury, or is
attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise 6 indicates that he
will endanger human life or inflict serious physical injury unless arrested without
delay.
(c) Invalid Warrant. Conduct by a peace officer making an arrest pursuant to an
invalid warrant is justified if the conduct would have been justified if the warrant were
valid, unless he knows that the warrant is invalid.
(2) Private Persons Use of Force in Making an Arrest.
(a) Lawful Arrest. The conduct of a private person who makes, or assists another
private person in making, a lawful arrest is justified to the same extent as if he were
summoned or directed by a peace officer to make such arrest, except that he is not justified
in the use of force likely to cause death or serious physical injury unless such force is
immediately necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury to himself or another.
(b) Unlawful Arrest. The conduct of a private person who is summoned or
directed by a peace officer to assist in making an arrest that is unlawful is justified to the
same extent as if the arrest were lawful, if the private person does not know that the arrest
is unlawful.

Issue: Should the provision add language limiting an officers use of force likely to cause serious
physical injury to those instances in which the arrestee clearly indicates that he will inflict serious physical
injury?
Pro: A police officer needs to have notice of when he/she will be allowed to use deadly physical force
when facing a life and death decision; a jury also needs to have guidance regarding the use of this force when
faced with the choice of whether to take away the liberty of the officer. Requiring a clear indication supplies
the notice to the officer and the guidance to the jury, valuing the life of the victim balanced with the societal
need for protection of the safety of the officer.
Con: Police officers should be authorized to use deadly force when an arrestees conduct indicates
that he will endanger human life. It is in all citizens interest to give officers this authority. More importantly, the
effect of this provision is not to set the standard for police conduct  police officials will do that  but rather
to set the standard for prosecution of an officer who uses deadly force. Even if one believed that police
officials should set a higher standard, such as clearly indicates, an officer should not suffer criminal liability
where the arrestee has indicated he will endanger human life, even though the arrestee has not clearly
indicated it.
Reporter: No recommendation.
6
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(3) Use of Force to Prevent an Escape.
(a) Escape from Penal Custody. The conduct of a peace officer or other person
who has an arrested or lawfully detained person in his penal custody or presence is justified
if:
(i) necessary to prevent the escape of the arrested person from penal
custody, and
(ii) it would be justified if performed to arrest such person.
(b) Escape from a Detention Facility. The conduct of a guard or other peace
officer, including the use of force likely to cause death or serious physical injury, is justified
if immediately necessary to prevent the escape from a detention facility by a person lawfully
detained in such institution under sentence for an offense or awaiting trial or commitment
for an offense.
(4) Definition. Forcible felony means any felony that, as committed, involves the use or
threat of physical force or violence against any individual or creates a substantial risk of death or
serious physical injury.

Section 504.415. Use of Force by Persons with Special Responsibility for Care,
Discipline, or Safety of Others
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justified if:
(1)
(a) the defendant is the parent, guardian, teacher, or other person similarly
responsible for the general care and supervision of a minor or a person acting at the
request of such responsible person, and the force is necessary to safeguard or promote
the welfare of the minor, [including the maintenance of reasonable discipline in a school,
class, or other group;]7 or

7

Issue: Should the bracketed authorization for the use of corporal punishment be deleted?
Pro: Given that 27 states have now banned corporal punishment in schools (most over the last 30
years), it is time for Kentucky to consider doing so as well. Even the United States Senate, which proposed, as
part of the Education bill, legislation to limit teacher civil liability to acts which constitute gross negligence or
reckless misconduct have excluded lawsuits involving corporal punishment from this protection. In a 98-1
vote, this provision states, Nothing in this section shall be considered to affect state or local law (including
rule or regulation) or policy pertaining to the use of corporal punishment. While this is hardly a ringing
endorsement to eliminate the practice, it seems that the Senate considers this particular method of discipline
not worth protecting in any special way. Eliminating corporal punishment is an international concern and
trend.
Con: Current laws authorization of the practice appropriately limits its use. Further, the maintenance
of proper order and discipline often is necessary for the safety of those in the group, including those who are
disciplined.
Reporter: No recommendation.
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and:

(b) the defendant is the guardian or other person similarly responsible for the
general care and supervision of an incompetent person, and the force is necessary to
safeguard or promote the welfare of the incompetent person, including the prevention of
his misconduct, or, when such incompetent person is in a hospital or other institution for his
care and custody, for the maintenance of reasonable discipline in such institution; and
(c) the force used does not create a substantial risk of causing death, serious
physical injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress, or gross degradation; or
(2) the defendant is a doctor or other therapist or a person assisting him at his direction,

(a) the force is necessary to administer a recognized form of treatment that is
adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient; and
(b) the treatment is administered with the consent of the patient or, if the patient is
a minor or an incompetent person, with the consent of his parent or guardian or other
person legally competent to consent in his behalf, or the treatment is administered in an
emergency when no one competent to consent can be consulted and a reasonable person,
wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent; or
(3) the defendant is a warden or other authorized official of a detention facility, and:
(a) the force used is necessary to enforce the lawful rules, regulations, or procedures
of the facility; and
(b) if force likely to cause death or serious physical injury is used, its use is otherwise
justifiable under this Chapter; or
(4) the defendant is a person responsible for the safety of a vessel or an aircraft, or a
person acting at his direction or authorized or required by law to maintain order or decorum in a
vehicle, train, or other carrier or in a place where others are assembled, and
(a) the force used is necessary to prevent interference with the operation of the
vessel or aircraft or obstruction of the execution of a lawful order or to maintain order or
decorum; and
(b) if force likely to cause death or serious physical injury is used, its use is otherwise
justifiable under this Chapter.

Section 504.416. Defense of Person
(1) The use of force against an aggressor is justified when and to the extent such conduct
is immediately necessary to defend oneself or another person against the aggressors use of unjustified
force.
(2) Definition. Unjustified conduct is conduct that satisfies the objective elements of an
offense and is not justified by this Chapter.
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Section 504.417. Defense of Property
The use of force against an aggressor is justified when and to the extent such conduct is
immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the aggressors unjustified trespass on, or other
unjustified interference with property that is lawfully in ones possession or in the possession of
another for whose protection one acts.

Section 504.418. Use of Force by Aggressor
The justifications described in this Chapter are not available to a person who:
(1) is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forcible
felony; or
(2) initially provokes the use of force against himself, with the intent to use such force as an
opportunity to inflict physical injury upon the assailant; or
(3) otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself, unless:
(a) the force in response to his provocation is so great that he is in imminent danger
of death or serious physical injury, and he has exhausted every less harmful means to
escape such danger; or
(b) in good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates
clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the
assailant continues or resumes the use of force.

Section 504.419. Use of Force Likely to Cause Death or Serious Physical Injury
(1) Unless expressly provided otherwise by this Chapter, the use of force likely to cause
death or serious physical injury is justified only if such force is immediately necessary to prevent:
(a) death or serious physical injury to oneself or another, or
(b) the commission of arson, kidnapping, or sexual intercourse compelled by force
or threat.8

Issue: Should (1)(b) also authorize the use of deadly force to prevent burglary of a dwelling, even
if there is no threat of death or serious bodily injury?
Pro: The use of deadly force to prevent a burglary is consistent with the idea that property owners
(owners, renters, or business persons) need legal support to defend their property completely. The inclusion of
burglary among the listed felonies broadens the authority for using deadly force for felonies which by their
nature involve the potential for violence to the defendant or others.
8
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(2) Definition. Force likely to cause death or serious physical injury
(a) includes:
(i) the firing of a firearm in the direction of a person, even though no intent
exists to kill or inflict serious physical injury; and
(ii) the firing of a firearm at a vehicle in which a person is riding; and
(b) does not include:
(i) discharge of a firearm using ammunition designed to disable or
control a person without creating the likelihood of death or serious physical
injury.

Section 504.420. Definitions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Conduct has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
Deadly weapon has the meaning given in Section 515.1501(3)(b).
Detention facility has the meaning given in Section 553.5306(2)(a).
Element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(1).
Escape has the meaning given in Section 553.5306(2)(a).
Force likely to cause death or serious physical injury has the meaning given in
Section 504.419(2).
(7) Forcible felony has the meaning given in Section 504.414(4).
(8) Minor has the meaning given in Section 541.4104(2).
(9) Peace officer has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(10) Penal custody has the meaning given in Section 553.5306(2)(c).
(11) Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(12) Serious physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(13) Unjustified has the meaning given in Section 504.416(2).

Con: Homeowners would have the right to use force to defend their property under proposed Section
504.417. They also would have a right to use deadly force to defend themselves or another person under this
provision, proposed Section 504.419. They should not, however, have a right to use deadly force to defend
property when life or limb is not in danger. Having such a limitation on the use of deadly force is one mark of
a civilized society: putting the value of all human life over that of property. The threat to persons that
commonly is inherent in a burglary will typically authorize the use of deadly force against a burglar. The only
burglary cases where the use of deadly force would be barred under the draft would be those where no danger
to persons exists, as where a burglar is running off with property taken from an attached garage.
Reporter: No recommendation.
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CHAPTER 505. EXCUSE DEFENSES
Section 505.501.
Section 505.502.
Section 505.503.
Section 505.504.
Section 505.505.
Section 505.506.
Section 505.507.
Section 505.508.
Section 505.509.
Section 505.510.
Section 505.511.
Section 505.512.

General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses.
Involuntary Acts; Involuntary Omissions
Impaired Consciousness
Insanity
Immaturity; Transfer to Juvenile Court
Involuntary Intoxication
Duress
Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law
Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law
Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence
Mistake as to a Justification
Definitions

__________________
Section 505.501. General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses
(1) Conduct for Which a Person Is Excused Is Not Justified; Assistance of, Resistance to,
and Interference With Excused Conduct. Except as otherwise provided by law, conduct for
which a person is excused is not justified and lawfully may be resisted and interfered with as
justified by law. A person who assists conduct for which another is excused, is not excused for his
assistance solely because the principal actor is excused.
(2) Causing the Excusing Conditions No Bar to an Excuse Defense. The fact that a
person has caused the conditions giving rise to an excuse under this Chapter, shall not prevent him
from being excused for his offense.
(3) Liability for Culpably Causing Excusing Conditions.
(a) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), a person commits an offense if, acting with
the culpability required by the offense definition, he causes the conditions that excuse
himself or another for engaging in the offense.
(b) Defense. A person may have a general defense to his conduct giving rise to
liability under Subsection (3)(a).
(4) Mistake as to an Excuse Is No Defense. Except as otherwise provided by law, it is no
defense that a person mistakenly believes he has an excuse defense.
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(5) Burden of Persuasion. Unless this Chapter expressly provides otherwise, the defendant carries the burden of persuasion on all excuse defenses by a preponderance of the evidence.9

Section 505.502. Involuntary Acts; Involuntary Omissions
(1) Involuntary Act. A person is excused for his offense if his liability is based upon an act
and the act is not a product of the persons effort or determination.
(2) Involuntary Omission. A person is excused for his offense if his liability is based upon
an omission, and:
(a) the person is mentally or physically incapable of performing, or otherwise
cannot reasonably be expected under the circumstances to perform the omitted act; or
(b) the person would be liable for an offense, and would be denied a justification
defense, if he performed the omitted act.

Section 505.503. Impaired Consciousness
A person is excused for his offense if, at the time of the offense:
(1) he suffers a physiologically confirmable disease or defect not specifically recognized or
rejected as a basis for exculpation by another excuse provision in this Chapter, and
(2) as a result, he lacks substantial capacity either:
(a) to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or
(b) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

Issue: Should the defendant bear the burden of persuasion for excuse defenses (i.e., the defenses
defined in this Chapter)?
Pro: Excuses apply only to conduct that is unjustified and otherwise criminal. Further, all excuses
involve information and evidence uniquely in the possession of the defendant. For both of these reasons, it is
appropriate to shift the burden to the defendant for excuses. Current law places the burden of persuasion on
the defendant for the excuse of insanity. See KRS 504.020(3). The same arguments in favor of such a practice
would seem to apply equally to all other excuses.
Con: Because excuses are defenses of exculpation, the prosecution should bear the burden of
disproving excuses beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reporter: Recommends the proposed provision, under which the defendant bears the burden of
persuasion.
9
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Section 505.504. Insanity 10
A person is excused for his offense if, at the time of the offense:
(1) he suffers from a mental illness or retardation, and
(2) as a result, he lacks substantial capacity either:
(a) to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or
(b) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(3) Definition. Mental illness or retardation does not include:
(a) an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct, or
(b) intoxication itself.

Issue: Should the Code include a provision allowing for a guilty but mentally ill verdict?
Pro: The GBMI verdict provides a useful middle ground for juries who believe a defendant is mentally
ill, and in need of treatment, but not criminally insane. The verdict does not undermine the insanity defense; the
jury retains the authority to find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity in appropriate cases. Jury
confusion could be addressed by changes in jury instructions.
Con: The GBMI verdict responds to a false concern that the insanity defense is being successfully
abused, which substantial empirical evidence rebuts. Further, even if the insanity excuse were subject to
abuse, a more rational response would be to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant, a step that
Kentucky has already taken. GBMI is not a middle position in terms of its consequences; it has the same
sentencing consequences as a guilty verdict (see KRS 504.150(1); cf. KRS 532.055(2)), even in terms of the
defendants receiving a psychological evaluation and/or treatment, which are generally available. See KRS
532.050(3) (allowing court to order psychiatric examination of any person convicted of felony); 532.050(5)
(presentence report for felony shall identify the counseling treatment, educational, and rehabilitation needs of
the defendant and identify community-based and correctional-institutional-based programs and services
available to meet those needs).
If a determination needs to be made of a convicted offenders need for psychological treatment, it can
be more efficiently and effectively made by the court (or correctional officials) than by the jury. Having such
criminal justice professionals make the determination would also eliminate the risk of confusion and distraction
that exists in the current GBMI system, which intertwines the distinct issues of criminal blameworthiness for a
past offense and present or future clinical treatment needs. Jury confusion between the two issues is particularly
troublesome because it may induce juries to think about preventive detention issues when they should be
thinking about deserved criminal punishment. (Further, the focus on preventive detention will itself be poorly
informed, as the jury is not likely to know that an insanity acquittal does not lead to a release from custody, but
to mandatory psychological evaluation and treatment. See KRS 504.030.)
Reporter: Recommends against including a GBMI verdict.
10
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Section 505.505. Immaturity; Transfer to Juvenile Court 11
A person is excused for his offense if, at the time of the offense, he is less than [12] years
of age, or:
(1) he lacks the maturity of an adult, and
(2) as a result, he lacks substantial capacity either:
(a) to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or
(b) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(3) Presumptions. A person less than [16] years of age at the time of the offense shall
be conclusively presumed to have satisfied the requirements of Subsection (1) of this Section,
and shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal by proof, to have satisfied the requirements of
Subsection (2) of this Section.
(4) Remand to Juvenile Court. Unless required otherwise by KRS 635.020, a person
excused under this Section who is less than [18] years of age shall be referred to Juvenile Court,
which shall have jurisdiction over all further proceedings in the matter.

Section 505.506. Involuntary Intoxication
A person is excused for his offense if, at the time of the offense:
(1) he is involuntarily intoxicated, and
(2) as a result, he lacks substantial capacity either:
(a) to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or
(b) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(3) Definition. Involuntary intoxication means any intoxication that is not voluntary
intoxication as defined in Section 503.302(3).
(4) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to preclude liability under Section 505.501(3)
(Liability for Culpably Causing Excusing Conditions).

Issue: Should the proposed immaturity defense replace current law?
Pro: Current law has the criminal accountability of a youthful offender depend on fixed age cut-offs
and/or the transfer determination of a Juvenile Court judge (see the somewhat irrational complexities of KRS
635.020); if a transfer is authorized, the immaturity issue is no longer available for consideration by the adult
court. But the moral credibility of the criminal justice system demands that juries be able to excuse offenders
who lack a minimum degree of cognition and ability to control behavior. The proposed provision would insure
that all persons, without regard to chronological age, will be held to the same standard of excusing conditions
 that is, the same degree of required dysfunction  as is required by all other disability excuses, such as
insanity or involuntary intoxication. (The proposed provision governs only the availability of a defense in
adult court; it has no effect on the operation of the Juvenile Court.)
Con: Current law contains thorough rules governing the exclusion of juveniles from prosecution in
adult court, and there is no reason to modify those rules. See KRS 635.020. Juries in the criminal justice system
should not be able to consider evidence of immaturity as an excuse.
Reporter: No recommendation.
11
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Section 505.507. Duress
A person is excused for his offense other than an intentional homicide if, at the time of the
offense, he:
(1) was coerced to perform the conduct by an unlawful threat [of physical force] 12 that a
person of reasonable firmness in the persons situation would have been unable to resist, and
(2) as a result, he is not sufficiently able to resist committing the offense conduct so as to be
justly held accountable for it.
(3) Factors to be Considered in Determining Whether a Person of Reasonable Firmness
in the Persons Situation Would Have Been Unable to Resist the Threat. In determining whether a
person of reasonable firmness in the persons situation would have been unable to resist the threat
coercing the person, as required by Subsection (1), the following factors are among those that
shall be considered:
(a) [relating to the extent of the threat] the imminence of the threat, the seriousness
of the harm threatened, the nature of the harm threatened (e.g., physical, economic,
emotional, or other), the object of the threat (e.g., the person himself, a relative, or business
associate), the unlawfulness of the threat, and the source of the threat (e.g., another person
or natural forces);
(b) [relating to the extent of harm caused by person] the seriousness of the harm
caused in relation to the harm threatened and the availability of less harmful but equally
effective alternatives to avoiding the threat.

Issue: Should the bracketed language  limiting the excuse to cases of coercion by threat of
physical force  be removed, thus allowing a jury to consider a defense in cases of threats of other than
physical force?
Con: Retention of current law to include only threats of force prevents expansion of the defense to
threats, for example, of economic harm, which may expand the risk of fabricated claims. Only a threat of
unlawful physical force sufficiently deprives a person of reasonable firmness of self-control, permitting a
duress claim. Threats to property or reputation do not cause persons of reasonable firmness to engage in
criminal behavior as a result of the coercion.
Pro: As long as the defendant meets the other excusing condition requirements  for example, that
a person of reasonable firmness in the persons situation would have been unable to resist the coercion 
the defendant merits an excuse. This would be an issue in cases where the offense committed was minor and
the coercion applied was great, but psychological, rather than physical, in nature. Thus, for example, a threat
to reveal a humiliating family secret might be grounds for an excuse for a minor theft if the defendant can
persuade the jury that a person of reasonable firmness in the defendants situation would have been similarly
unable to resist the coercion. The point is, the jury ought to be allowed to take account of all relevant evidence
in making a judgement about whether the defendant deserves criminal liability and punishment.
Reporter: No recommendation.
12
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Section 505.508. Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law
A person is excused for his offense if:
(1) before the conduct constituting the offense, the law relating to the offense was not
made available in a way that would give notice to the reasonable person, and
(2) he makes a reasonable mistake regarding that law, and
(3) as a result, at the time of the offense, he does not know his conduct is criminal.
(4) Factors to be Considered in Determining Whether the Law was Not Made Available
to the Reasonable Person. In determining whether a law was not made available in a way that
would give notice to the reasonable person and whether the persons mistake was reasonable, as
required by Subsections (1) and (2), the following factors are among those that shall be considered:
whether the law was published, the nature of the publication, whether the law imposes an
unpredictable duty, the length of the period between enactment of the law and the commission of
the offense, and the diligence exercised by the person to determine the law.

Section 505.509. Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law
A person is excused for his offense if:
(1) he reasonably relies upon an official misstatement of law, and
(2) he makes a reasonable mistake as to that law, and
(3) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his conduct is criminal.
(4) Factors to be Considered in Determining the Reasonableness of the Persons Reliance.
In determining whether a person made a reasonable mistake of law because he relied upon an
official misstatement of law, as required by Subsections (1) and (2), the following factors are
among those that shall be considered: whether the official statement of law was a statute or judicial
decision later overruled, whether the person whose statement the defendant relied upon had the
authority to interpret the law, whether the person relied upon was responsible for administration or
enforcement of the law, whether the persons reliance was upon a specific grant of permission from
an authorized official, and whether the overall circumstances demonstrate that it was reasonable
for a person exercising due diligence to rely on the statement of the law.
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Section 505.510. Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence 13
A person is excused for his offense if:
(1) he pursues with due diligence all reasonably viable means available to ascertain the
meaning and application of the offense to his conduct, and
(2) he honestly and in good faith concludes that his conduct is lawful in circumstances
where a law-abiding and prudent person would also so conclude, and
(3) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his conduct is criminal.

Section 505.511. Mistake as to a Justification
A person is excused for his offense if:
(1) he makes a reasonable mistake as to the maximum harm authorized by a justification
contained in Chapter 504 to protect or further the interests at stake, or
(2) he makes a mistake as to whether his conduct is justified, other than a mistake governed
by Subsection (1) of this Section, which is:
(a) a reasonable mistake, or
(b) is less culpable than the primary culpability required by the offense charged,
and
(3) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his conduct is criminal.
(4) Definition. The primary culpability required by the offense charged means:
(a) the culpability required for a result element of the offense charged, or
(b) if there is no result element, the culpability required for the circumstance element
most central to the harm or evil sought to be prohibited by the offense.
(5) Burden of Persuasion. Notwithstanding Section 505.501(5), the prosecution carries
the burden of persuasion for disproving this defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Issue: Should Section 505.510, which would provide an excuse defense for reasonable mistakes of
law, be deleted?
Pro: Allowing this defense would only invite abuse. Defendants would commonly assert this
defense based on a claim that they did not know their conduct amounted to an offense. Further, the principle
behind this defense conflicts with the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Con: Persons who satisfy the fairly rigorous requirements of this provision do not merit criminal
liability and punishment for their conduct. New Jersey has had the same defense in its Code for decades, and
there are no indications that it has been abused, or even that it has been asserted in more than a handful of
cases. The legality principle, which requires the government to provide a clear statement of exactly what the
law prohibits before it may enforce the prohibition, is at least as powerful a guiding principle as the ignorance
of the law is no excuse maxim. Where the law is unclear enough that its rules cannot be ascertained even after
exercise of reasonable diligence, the legality principle is not satisfied.
Reporter: No recommendation.
13
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Section 505.512. Definitions
(1) Act has the meaning given in Section 501.204(4).
(2) Circumstance element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(4).
(3) Conduct has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(4) Intoxication has the meaning given in Section 503.302(3)(a).
(5) Involuntary intoxication has the meaning given in Section 505.506(3).
(6) Mental illness or retardation has the meaning given in Section 505.504(3).
(7) Primary culpability required by the offense charged has the meaning given in
Section 505.511(4).
(8) Reasonable mistake has the meaning given in Section 501.207(3)(d).
(9) Result element has the meaning given in Section 501.202(3).
(10) Voluntary intoxication has the meaning given in Section 503.302(3)(b).
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CHAPTER 506. NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSES
Section 506.601.
Section 506.602.
Section 506.603.
Section 506.604.
Section 506.605.
Section 506.606.
Section 506.607.
Section 506.608.
Section 506.609.

General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses
Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time Limitation Period
Entrapment
Incompetency to Stand Trial or be Sentenced
Former Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present Prosecution
Former Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to Present Prosecution
Former Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to Present Prosecution
Prosecution Not Barred Where Former Prosecution Was Before Court
Lacking Jurisdiction or Was Fraudulently Procured by Defendant
Definitions

__________________
Section 506.601. General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses
(1) Mistake as to a Nonexculpatory Defense Is No Defense. Unless this code expressly
provides otherwise, it is no defense that a person mistakenly believes he has a nonexculpatory
defense.
(2) Conduct Under a Nonexculpatory Defense Is Not Privileged. Except as otherwise
provided by law, conduct for which a person has a nonexculpatory defense is not justified, and
may be resisted and interfered with as justified by law. A person who assists conduct for which the
principal actor has a nonexculpatory defense, does not have a defense based solely upon the
nonexculpatory defense of the principal actor.
(3) Burden of Persuasion on Defendant. The defendant has the burden of persuasion for
a nonexculpatory defense and must prove such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.14

Issue: Should the defendant bear the burden of persuasion for nonexculpatory defenses (i.e., the
defenses defined in this Chapter)?
Pro: Like excuse defenses, nonexculpatory defenses apply to conduct that is unjustified and criminal.
But unlike excuses, nonexculpatory defenses involve no claim by the defendant that he is not blameworthy or
deserving of punishment. Rather, nonexculpatory defenses prevent liability in the service of some other social
goal, such as curbing police misconduct or preventing prosecution of old offenses. Accordingly, the case for
placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant is even stronger for these defenses than it is for excuses.
Con: The burden of persuasion for these defenses currently rests with the State, and it should remain
there. Because these defenses frequently operate to prevent misconduct by State officials, the State should be
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no misconduct has occurred.
Reporter: Recommends having the defendant bear the burden of persuasion.
14
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(4) Definition. A nonexculpatory defense is any defense or bar to prosecution, pleading,
trial, or sentencing described in this Chapter.
(5) Determination by Court. Unless otherwise provided, the defenses in this Chapter are
to be determined by the Court.

Section 506.602. Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time Limitation
Period
(1) Time Limitations. A prosecution is barred unless commenced within the following time
periods from the time the offense is committed:
[(a) a prosecution for a felony may be commenced at any time;]15
(b) a prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within [1 year].
(2) Start of the Limitation Period. The period of limitation starts to run on the day after the
offense is committed. An offense is committed either when every element occurs, or, if a legislative
purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of
conduct or the defendants complicity therein is terminated.
(3) Commencement of Prosecution. A prosecution is commenced either when an indictment,
information, or complaint is filed, or a warrant or other process is issued, provided that such
warrant or process is executed without unreasonable delay.
(4) Period of Limitation Tolled. The period of limitation does not run during any time
when:

Issue: Should a limitation period be introduced for the less serious felonies? (On the other side,
should the limitation period for misdemeanors be extended from 1 year to 2 years?)
Pro: Most other states have some statutes of limitation for most felonies. It is a useful device to allow
a community and its members to move on with their lives and to not be preoccupied with the distant past. At
very least the less serious felonies should have some limitation period, even if it is a long one. The current 1
year limitation for misdemeanors should not be lengthened.
Con: Statutes of limitation may have made sense back when they were first created several hundred
years ago, but no longer do. The fear of conviction based on old, and therefore unreliable, evidence is gone.
The rules of evidence now allow defense counsel to demonstrate the weakness of old evidence; the natural
degradation of evidence over time naturally works to make prosecution more difficult for the prosecution,
which carries the burden of persuasion for the offense elements. If the prosecution has sufficient evidence to
prosecute an old case despite the passage of time, it ought to be able to do so, for this is what justice demands.
The potential for finding reliable evidence even in an old case is increasingly possible because of advances in
forensic science. Thus, if a limitation period were provided, it would produce an increasing number of cases in
which a known blameworthy offender would escape the punishment he deserves. Current law has no limitation
period for felonies.
Given the minor nature of misdemeanors, a limitation period for misdemeanors does not present the
same offense to justice, although it might be best to extend the limitation period to two years.
Reporter: Recommends no limitation period for felonies, and lengthening the misdemeanor limitation
period to two years.
15
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(a) the defendant is not usually and publicly resident within this Commonwealth; or
(b) the defendant is a public servant, if the offense charged is theft of public funds
while in public office; or
(c) a prosecution against the defendant for the same conduct is pending in this
Commonwealth.

Section 506.603. Entrapment
(1) A person has a defense if the person engages in an offense:
(a) because he is induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement authority,
or agent acting in knowing cooperation with such an authority, and
[(b) the authoritys or agents conduct creates a substantial risk that a reasonable
law-abiding person in the actors situation would have been induced to commit the offense,
and] 16
(c) the person was not predisposed to commit the offense.
(2) The defense afforded by Subsection (1) is unavailable when causing or threatening
physical injury is an element of the offense charged.

Issue: Should Subsection (1)(b), which narrows the current entrapment defense, be deleted?
Pro (in opposition to the proposed draft): The need to combat police overreaching is such that the
entrapment defense should not be as narrow as the proposed provision suggests. If limiting language is
desired, the Code should bar the defense where the police inducement goes beyond merely afford[ing] the
defendant an opportunity to commit an offense, as current law provides. KRS 505.010(2)(a).
States typically formulate their entrapment defense to require either (1)(b) or (1)(c) but not both.
Con (in support of the proposed draft): The entrapment defense ought to be seen as a disfavored
defense because it commonly allows blameworthy offenders to escape the liability and punishment they
deserve, which is why this primarily American invention does not exist in most of the rest of the world. The
defense allows culpable offenders to escape deserved punishment in order to deter improper police conduct
(much as the Exclusionary rule can exclude reliable evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure).
The defense ought to be limited to those situations where it is most needed, where the police conduct is most
egregious. The current laws merely affording an opportunity language is ambiguous and in apparent
conflict with the current laws other entrapment provisions  it purports to say what entrapment is not, but
does not say what it is.
Both (1)(b) and (1)(c) serve an important purpose. Subsection (1)(b) serves to limit the defense to
those instances where the police conduct really is egregious  where it risks causing a reasonable law-abiding
person to commit an offense. Subsection (1)(c) excludes from the defense the career criminal who commits the
offense while on the prowl. Both of these are important necessary limitations.
Reporter: Recommends narrowing the defense, as provided in the current draft.
16
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[(3) Factfinder Determination. The defense afforded by Subsection (1) is an issue to be
determined by the factfinder.] 17

Section 506.604. Incompetency to Stand Trial or be Sentenced
A person may not be required to stand trial or be sentenced if, because of his mental or
physical condition, he is unable to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist in his defense.

Section 506.605. Former Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present
Prosecution
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same statutory provision and is based upon
the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by the former prosecution if:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in:
(a) an acquittal, or
(b) a conviction that has not subsequently been set aside; or
(2) the former prosecution resulted in a determination by the Court that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant a conviction; or
(3) the former prosecution was terminated by a final order or judgment that:
(a) has not subsequently been set aside, and
(b) required a determination inconsistent with any fact or legal proposition necessary
to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution; or
(4) the former prosecution was improperly terminated after the first witness was sworn but
before findings were rendered by a trier of fact.

Issue: Should the entrapment defense be determined by the jury rather than the judge?
Pro: The entrapment defense should continue to be a jury issue. The jury is at its best when deciding
factual issues that have an equitable component. The entrapment decision involves consideration of whether
the government overreached and whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense. Both of these
are factual issues with an equitable component, and thus would better be determined by a jury. Further, the jury
is often the only part of the process standing between the government and a citizen accused. If the judge
verifies offensive police misconduct, the judge may be adjudged to be a part of the same government; if the jury
verifies the police conduct as not entrapment, then the ultimate verdict has more credibility.
Con: The entrapment defense does not exculpate a defendant. Rather, it is a means of reining in
improper police overreaching by denying a conviction of an improperly entrapped defendant. Because the
defense does not concern issues of exculpation  as exist with respect to excuse defenses, for example  a
jury determination is unnecessary. Indeed, jurors are likely to be confused into thinking that the entrapment
defense is some form of excuse. The defense is more akin to exclusionary-rule based defenses, which similarly
seek to control police overreaching, and ought to be decided by the judge before trial, as those issues are.
Reporter: No recommendation.
17
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(5) Improper Termination. For the purposes of Subsection (4), termination is not improper:
(a) the defendant expressly consents to the termination or by motion for mistrial or
in some other manner waives his right to object to the termination; or
(b) the Court, in exercise of its discretion, finds that the termination is manifestly
necessary.

Section 506.606. Former Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to Present
Prosecution
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different statutory provision from a former
prosecution or for a violation of the same provision but based on different facts, it is barred by the
former prosecution if:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, a conviction that has not subsequently
been set aside, or a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, and
the subsequent prosecution is for:
(a) an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted at the first
prosecution; or
(b) an offense involving the same conduct as the first prosecution, unless each
prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other prosecution or unless the
offense was not consummated when the former prosecution began; or
(2) the former prosecution was terminated by a final order or judgment that:
(a) has not subsequently been set aside, and
(b) required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in
the subsequent prosecution; or
(3) the former prosecution was improperly terminated, as that term is used in Section
506.605(5), and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have
been convicted had the former prosecution not been improperly terminated.

Section 506.607. Former Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to
Present Prosecution
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this
Commonwealth and of the United States or another state, a prosecution in such other jurisdiction
is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this Commonwealth if:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, a conviction that has not subsequently
been set aside, or a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, and
the subsequent prosecution is for an offense involving the same conduct, unless:
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or

(a) each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other prosecution;

(b) the offense involved in the subsequent prosecution was not consummated
when the former prosecution began; or
(2) the former prosecution was terminated in a final order or judgment that:
(a) has not subsequently been set aside, and
(b) required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in
the subsequent prosecution.

Section 506.608. Prosecution Not Barred Where Former Prosecution Was
Before Court Lacking Jurisdiction or Was Fraudulently Procured by
Defendant
A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of Sections 506.605 to 506.607 if:
(1) it was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the proper prosecuting
officer and with the purpose of avoiding the sentence which otherwise might be imposed; or
(2) it was before a court that lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.

Section 506.609. Definitions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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Law enforcement authority has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
Nonexculpatory defense has the meaning given in Section 506.601(4).
Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
Prosecution has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
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CHAPTER 507. LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER NON-HUMAN ENTITIES
Section 507.701.
Section 507.702.
Section 507.703.

Liability of Corporation or Unincorporated Association
Relationship to Corporation or Unincorporated Association No
Limitation on Individual Liability or Punishment
Definitions

____________

Section 507.701. Liability of Corporation or Unincorporated Association 18
(1) A corporation or unincorporated association may be held liable for an offense if the
conduct constituting the offense:
(a) consists of a failure to discharge a specific duty imposed upon corporations by
law; or
(b) is engaged in, authorized, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of
directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment in behalf
of the corporation or association; or
(c) is engaged in by a corporate agent of the corporation or association acting
within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation or association, and:
(i) the offense is a misdemeanor or violation; or
(ii) the offense is one defined by a statute that clearly indicates a legislative
intent to impose such criminal liability on a corporation or unincorporated
association.
(2) Definitions.
(a) Corporate agent means any officer, director, servant, or employee of the
corporation or association, or any other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation
or association.

Issue: Should Chapter 700s provisions apply to unincorporated associations as well as to
corporations?
Pro: Unincorporated associations should merit criminal liability to the same extent as corporations, as
such associations often resemble corporations in every respect except for the fact they have not formally
incorporated. The concerns with deterrence of criminal conduct and punishment of a collective criminal
enterprise are present with unincorporated associations no less than with corporations.
Con: The imposition of liability on a corporation is based on a legal fiction  corporations are not
independent, autonomous entities, and thus cannot have criminal culpability, even assuming they may engage
in conduct  and should be narrowly drawn. The current corporate-liability provision, KRS 502.050, does
not refer to unincorporated associations.
Reporter: No recommendation.
18
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(b) High managerial agent means an officer of a corporation or association or
any other corporate or association agent who has duties of such responsibility that his
conduct reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or
association.
(c) Association means a trust, partnership, government or governmental
subdivision or agency, or two or more persons having a joint or common economic interest.

Section 507.702. Relationship to Corporation or Unincorporated Association
No Limitation on Individual Liability or Punishment
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense that he performs, or causes
to be performed, in the name of or in behalf of a corporation or unincorporated association to the
same extent as if the conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.

Section 507.703. Definitions
(1) Corporate agent has the meaning given in Section 507.701(2)(a).
(2) High managerial agent has the meaning given in Section 507.701(2)(b).
(3) Association has the meaning given in Section 507.701(2)(c).
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CHAPTER 508. INCHOATE OFFENSES
Section 508.801.
Section 508.802.
Section 508.803.
Section 508.804.
Section 508.805.
Section 508.806.
Section 508.807.
Section 508.808.
Section 508.809.

Criminal Attempt
Criminal Solicitation
Criminal Conspiracy
Unconvictable Confederate No Defense
Defense for Victims and Conduct Inevitably Incident
Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the Offense
Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy
Possessing Instruments of Crime
Definition

____________
Section 508.801. Criminal Attempt
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of attempt to commit an offense if, acting with the
culpability required for commission of the offense and intending to engage in the conduct that
would constitute the offense if the circumstances were as he believed them to be, he takes a
substantial step toward commission of the offense.
(2) Conduct Constituting a Substantial Step.
(a) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step toward commission
of the offense under Subsection (1) unless it is strongly corroborative of the persons
intention to engage in the offense conduct.
(b) Where a person believed he has completed the conduct constituting the offense
or believed that he has completed the last act needed to cause the criminal result, he
satisfies the substantial step requirement contained in Subsection (1).

Section 508.802. Criminal Solicitation
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of solicitation to commit an offense if, acting with
the culpability required for commission of the offense and intending that the person solicited should
engage in the conduct that would constitute the offense if the circumstances were as he believes
them to be, he intentionally commands, encourages, or requests the other person to engage in such
conduct or in an attempt to commit such conduct.
(2) Uncommunicated Solicitation. It is immaterial under Subsection (1) of this Section
that the person fails to communicate with the person he solicits to commit an offense, if his conduct
is designed to effect such communication.
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Section 508.803. Criminal Conspiracy
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit an offense if, acting with
the culpability required for commission of the offense and intending that one of the conspirators
engage in the conduct that would constitute the offense if the circumstances were as he believes
them to be, he agrees with another person or persons that one or more of them will engage in such
conduct or an attempt or solicitation to commit such conduct.
(2) Conspiracy With Multiple Criminal Objectives. If a person conspires to commit a
number of offenses, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple offenses are the
object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship.
(3) Overt Act. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense, unless
an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by
a person with whom he conspired.

Section 508.804. Unconvictable Confederate No Defense
It is no defense for a person who solicits or conspires with another to commit an offense
that such other person:
(1) has not been prosecuted or convicted, or
(2) has been convicted of a different offense or grade, or
(3) lacked the capacity to commit an offense, or
(4) has been acquitted.

Section 508.805. Defense for Victims and for Conduct Inevitably Incident
Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, it is a defense
to soliciting or conspiring to commit an offense that:
(1) the person is the victim of the offense; or
(2) the offense is so defined that the persons conduct is inevitably incident to its commission.

Section 508.806. Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the
Offense
(1) In any prosecution for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy in which the offense
contemplated was not in fact committed, it is a defense that, under circumstances manifesting a
voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the person prevented the commission
of the offense.
(2) Whether a renunciation is voluntary and complete within the meaning of this Section
is governed by Section 301(2)(d).
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(3) Burden of Persuasion on Defendant. The defendant has the burden of persuasion for
this defense and must prove such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 508.807. Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy
Unless otherwise provided by this Code, attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy are offenses
of one grade lower than the most serious offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object of the
conspiracy.

Section 508.808. Possessing Instruments of Crime
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits a Class A misdemeanor if he possesses any
instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally.
(2) Definition. Instrument of crime means:
(a) anything specially made or specially adapted for criminal use; or
(b) anything commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed by
the person under circumstances consistent with unlawful intent.

Section 508.809. Definition
Instrument of crime has the meaning given in Section 508.808(2).
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CHAPTER 509. OFFENSE GRADES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Section 509.901.
Section 509.902.
Section 509.903.
Section 509.904.
Section 509.905.
Section 509.906.

Classified Offenses
Unclassified Offenses
Authorized Terms of Imprisonment; Death
Authorized Fines
General Adjustment to Offense Grade for Prior Offense
Authorized Sentence for Multiple Offenses

____________
Section 509.901. Classified Offenses
Each offense in this Code shall be classified as:
(1) a Class X felony; or
(2) a Class A felony; or
(3) a Class B felony; or
(4) a Class C felony; or
(5) a Class D felony; or
(6) a Class E felony; or
(7) a Class A misdemeanor; or
(8) a Class B misdemeanor; or
(9) a Class C misdemeanor; or
(10) a violation.
Section 509.902. Unclassified Offenses
An offense outside of the Code:
(1) that declares itself to be a felony, is a Class E felony;
(2) that declares itself to be a misdemeanor, is a misdemeanor of the class specified in the
offense, or if no class is specified, is a Class B misdemeanor;
(3) that provides a sentence of imprisonment of:
(a) one year or more is a Class E felony;
(b) less than a year but more than 6 months is a Class A misdemeanor;
(c) 6 months or less but more than 30 days is a Class B misdemeanor;
(d) 30 days or less is a Class C misdemeanor.
(4) that does not declare itself to be a felony or misdemeanor, or provide a sentence of
imprisonment, is a violation.
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Section 509.903. Authorized Terms of Imprisonment; Death 19
Except as otherwise provided, the maximum authorized sentence for:
(1)
a Class X felony is [death or life imprisonment];
(2)
a Class A felony is not more than [50 years and not less than 20 years];
(3)
a Class B felony is not more than [20 years and not less than 10 years];
(4)
a Class C felony is not more than [10 years and not less than 5 years];
(5)
a Class D felony is not more than [5 years and not less than 2 years];
(6)
a Class E felony is not more than [2 years and not less than 1 year];
(7)
a Class A misdemeanor is not more than [1 year];
(8)
a Class B misdemeanor is not more than [6 months];
(9)
a Class C misdemeanor is not more than [30 days].
(10) No term of imprisonment is authorized for a violation.

Section 509.904. Authorized Fines
Except as otherwise provided, the authorized fine for an offense is the greater of:
(1) twice the harm caused or the gain derived, or
(2) for a:
(a)
Class X felony, not more than [$250,000];
(b)
Class A felony, not more than [$150,000];
(c)
Class B felony, not more than [$80,000];
(d)
Class C felony, not more than [$40,000];
(e)
Class D felony, not more than [$20,000];
(f)
Class E felony, not more than [$10,000];
(g)
Class A misdemeanor, not more than [$5,000];
(h)
Class B misdemeanor, not more than [$3,000];
(i)
Class C misdemeanor, not more than [$2,000];
(j)
Violation, not more than [$1,000].
(3) Corporate Fines. The authorized fine for a corporation is twice that authorized for an
individual.

Important Note: All of the prison terms and fine amounts noted here are for illustrative
purposes only. A final determination of the specific numbers to be used will obviously be a matter of some
discussion at a later point in the process. The point here is simply to illustrate the need for an offense grading
system with a sufficient number of offense grade categories to make distinctions between cases that are
importantly different and a system that offers a full range of punishment possibilities.
19
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Section 509.905. General Adjustment to Offense Grade for Prior Offense
The authorized sentence for an offense shall be that available if the offense were one grade
higher, if:
(1) a person is convicted of any offense,20
(2) after having been previously convicted in this Commonwealth or any other jurisdiction
of a similar class offense or greater class offense that was committed when the person was 18
years old or older,
(3) when such conviction has occurred within 5 years after the previous conviction, excluding
time spent in custody, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different
series of acts.

Section 509.906. Authorized Sentence for Multiple Offenses 21
When an offender is being sentenced for more than one offense, the cumulative authorized
sentence for all of the offenses of which he has been convicted is equal to:
(1) the sentence for the most serious offense,
(2) plus one-half the sentence for the next most serious offense,
(3) plus one-quarter the sentence for the next most serious offense,
(4) plus one-eighth the sentence for the next most serious offense,
(5) continuing in like manner for all offenses for which the offender has been convicted,
thereby causing each additional offense to increase the total authorized cumulative sentence, but
by a decreasing increment.
Issue: Should Section 905 be limited to apply only to felony convictions, rather than convictions for
any offense?
Pro: While it may make sense to enhance a Class B misdemeanor to a Class Amisdemeanor, the effect
of enhancing Class A misdemeanors to felonies would result in a large influx of felons which we as a state
simply cannot afford. Although the statute should retain the proposed 1-grade enhancement, the enhancement
should apply to felonies only.
Con: There is no abstract, objectively valid distinction between felonies and misdemeanors for
purposes of recidivism enhancements. If we are serious about enhancing penalties for repeat offenders, we
should apply those enhancements across the board. Further, some Class A misdemeanors in the proposed
Code are fairly serious and involve the type of harms typically subject to a recidivism enhancement.
Reporter: No recommendation.
20

Note: While there has been no challenge to this Section, and therefore no pro-con footnote, it
marks a significant departure from current law and merits special mention. The Section is premised on the
principle that there ought to be no free offenses, that every additional offense ought to result in some
additional punishment. It rejects as flawed the common current practice of imposing concurrent sentences,
which trivializes one or more offenses. At the same time, the Section acknowledges that our shared intuitions
of justice do not envision the same degree of punishment for an offense when it is part of a group of offenses
21
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as when that offense is punished alone. Rather, while every offense ought to trigger additional punishment,
each additional offense ought to add increasingly less punishment. It is also worth noting that this provision
is meant to apply only to multiple offenses that are truly independent of one another, and not to offenses that
are simply different forms of the same harm or evil. This independence is insured by Section 254, which
prevents conviction for wholly overlapping offenses.
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PART II. DEFINITION OF SPECIFIC OFFENSES
CHAPTER 511. HOMICIDE OFFENSES
Section 511.1101. Murder in the First Degree
Section 511.1102. Murder in the Second Degree
Section 511.1103. Manslaughter in the First Degree
Section 511.1104. Manslaughter in the Second Degree
Section 511.1105. Grossly Negligent Homicide
Section 511.1106. Causing or Aiding Suicide
Section 511.1107. Definition

______________

Section 511.1101. Murder in the First Degree
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he knowingly causes the death of
another person.
(2) Grading. Except as provided in Section 511.1103, the offense is a Class X felony.

Section 511.1102. Murder in the Second Degree 22
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he recklessly causes the death of
another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
(2) Grading. Except as provided in Section 511.1103, the offense is a Class A felony.
Issue: Should the conditions defined in Section 1102 as second-degree murder be treated as
equivalent to those in Section 1101, first-degree murder, thereby eliminating the two degrees of murder and
making all such killings Class X felonies for which the death penalty is available?
Pro: Current Kentucky law allows the death penalty for most unintentional murders (reckless with
extreme indifference to human life) when accompanied by aggravating circumstances. In Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed on those who
kill with extreme indifference to human life.
Con: The criminal law ought to distinguish between those who intend to kill and those who only
create a risk of death. There is a growing consensus that the death penalty ought to be reserved for the most
egregious of offenses: intentional killings. The Constitution Project, a nonpartisan group including members
from both sides of the death penalty debate, has urged States to narrow their death penalty laws to ensure that
capital punishment is reserved only for the very worst offenses. While it may not be unconstitutional to treat
intentional killings the same as risk-taking killings, it is bad policy and undercuts the moral credibility of the
criminal law. The vast majority of jurisdictions distinguish between these two kinds of killings. Even without
the death penalty, those who commit second-degree extreme indifference murder would still be subject to a
severe penalty (currently proposed to be 20-50 years) for committing a Class A felony.
Reporter: No recommendation.
22
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Section 511.1103. Manslaughter in the First Degree
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he causes the death of another
person under circumstances that would otherwise be murder under Section 511.1101 or Section
511.1102:
(a) under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
(b) for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of
which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendants situation under
the circumstances as the defendant believes them to be.
(2) Burdens of Proof. Notwithstanding Section 500.106, the defendant bears the burdens
of production and persuasion in establishing the requirements of Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of
this Section.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class B felony.

Section 511.1104. Manslaughter in the Second Degree
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he recklessly causes the death of
another person.

(2) Grading. The offense is a Class C felony.

Section 511.1105. Grossly Negligent Homicide
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he grossly negligently causes the
death of another person.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 511.1106. Causing or Aiding Suicide
(1) Lack Of Causal Accountability No Defense. A person who satisfies the requirements
of an offense under this Chapter for causing anothers suicide or attempted suicide is not exempt
from liability for a failure of causal accountability if he brought about the suicide or attempted
suicide by force or duress.
(2) Aiding or Soliciting Suicide: Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he
knowingly aids or solicits another to commit suicide.
(3) Exception: Health Care Professionals. A licensed health care professional does not
commit an offense under Subsection (2) if he:
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(a) withholds or withdraws a life-sustaining procedure in compliance with KRS
311.622 to 311.644 or KRS 311.970 to 311.976; or
(b) administers, prescribes, or dispenses medications or procedures to relieve
another persons pain or discomfort, even if doing so may hasten or increase the risk of
death, unless he intends to cause the persons death thereby.
(4) Definition. Suicide means intentionally causing ones own death.
(5) Grading. The offense defined in Subsection (2) is:
(a) a Class D felony if the persons conduct causes a suicide, or
(b) a Class E felony if the persons conduct causes an attempted suicide.
(c) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 511.1107. Definition
Suicide has the meaning given in Section 511.1106(4).
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CHAPTER 512. ASSAULT, ENDANGERMENT, AND THREAT OFFENSES
Section 512.1201.
Section 512.1202.
Section 512.1203.
Section 512.1204.
Section 512.1205.
Section 512.1206.

Assault; Causing Physical Injury
Endangerment
Terroristic Threats; Menacing
Stalking; Intimidation
Criminal Abuse
Definitions

______________

Section 512.1201. Assault; Causing Physical Injury
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) recklessly causes physical injury to another person, or
(b) grossly negligently causes physical injury to another person with a dangerous
instrument.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor, except that the grade of the offense
under Subsection (1)(a):
(a) is increased one grade for each of the following: 23
(i) the person caused serious physical injury; or
(ii) the person either:
(A) intentionally caused the injury, or
(B) recklessly caused the injury under circumstances manifesting
an extreme indifference to the value of human life and created a grave risk
of death; or

Issue: Should Section 1201(2) employ the proposed approach of aggravating or mitigating by one
grade where any of several factors are present, rather than the current law approach of specifying offenses or
suboffenses for certain factors or combinations of factors?
Pro: The advantage of the proposed approach is that it increases both consistency and efficiency.
The drafts approach of applying each specific factor as a general grading adjustment to a single assault
offense, rather than defining a variety of assault offenses, each for a particular combination of factors, enables
the Code to consistently aggravate for all factors. Current law, in contrast, takes a drafting approach that
obliges it to select certain combinations of factors to define each degree of the offense, and thereby omit other
combinations. Thus, for example, there is an aggravation for causing physical harm to a police officer (thirddegree assault), but no similar aggravation for causing serious physical harm to an officer. If the status of the
victim (or the extent of injury caused) is considered relevant in some cases, why not in all of them?
Con: The increase/decrease approach of the proposal is confusing.
Reporter: No recommendation.
23
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and

(iii) the person caused the injury by use of a dangerous instrument; or
(iv) the person assaulted is a peace officer or correctional worker acting
in the line of duty;
(b) is decreased one grade if the person causes the injury:
(i) while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
(ii) for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness
of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendants
situation under the circumstances as the defendant believes them to be.

Section 512.1202. Endangerment
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he engages in conduct by which he
recklessly creates a substantial risk of physical injury to another person.
(2) Grading.
(a) If the person creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life, the offense is
a Class D felony.
(b) If the person creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury, the
offense is a Class E felony.
(c) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 512.1203. Terroristic Threats; Menacing
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) with the purpose of, or in reckless disregard of the risk of, causing the
unnecessary evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transport, or
otherwise causing unnecessary serious public inconvenience, he falsely reports a threat of
catastrophe; or
(b) he threatens to commit any crime likely to cause serious physical injury or
substantial property damage to another; or
(c) he intentionally places another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent
physical injury.
(2) Grading.
(a) Terroristic Threats.
(i) The offense under Subsection (1)(a) is a Class E felony.
(ii) The offense under Subsection (1)(b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) Menacing. The offense under Subsection (1)(c) is a Class B misdemeanor.
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Section 512.1204. Stalking; Intimidation
(1) Offense Defined: Intimidation. A person commits an offense if he engages in conduct:
(a) by which he intentionally causes serious alarm, annoyance, intimidation, or
harassment of another person,
(b) under circumstances in which a reasonable person would suffer substantial
mental distress,
(c) and such conduct serves no legitimate purpose.
(2) Offense Defined: Stalking. A person commits an offense if he commits an offense
under Subsection (1) by engaging in an intentional course of conduct, directed at a specific person
or persons, which conveys an explicit or implicit threat with the intent to place that person or those
persons in reasonable fear of:
(a) sexual contact, or
(b) serious physical injury, or
(c) death. 24
(3) Grading.
(a) The offense under Subsection (1) is a Class E felony if:
(i) a protective order for the victim has been entered against the person,
or
(ii) the person knows that a criminal complaint is currently pending against
him for an offense against the same victim, or
(iii) the person has been convicted of a crime against the same victim
within the past five years, or
(iv) the person had a dangerous instrument on his person at the time of the
offense.
(b) Otherwise the offense under Subsection (1) is a Class B misdemeanor
(c) The offense under Subsection (2) is one grade higher than the offense under
Subsection (1).

Issue: Should the proposed stalking offenses threat requirement be reduced to require only a
threat to the physical safety of the person or an immediate family member, rather than a threat of sexual
contact, serious physical injury, or death?
Pro: The stalking offense should aggravate criminal liability for conduct calculated to intimidate or
emotionally injure another, even when the threats are less serious than the extremely serious threats now
required by the proposed provision. (Note that the offense would not punish the offenses conduct as a felony
unless one of the specified aggravating conditions exists.)
Con: The more narrow threat requirement is necessary to narrow the offense so that it avoids a claim
of vagueness, and so that only the most serious threats will be addressed. Too broad a range of conduct might
be considered to constitute a threat to physical safety, especially given that the threat can be only implicit.
Reporter: No recommendation.
24
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(4) Definitions.
(a) Course of conduct means a pattern of conduct composed of two (2) or
more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not
included within the meaning of course of conduct. If the defendant claims that he was
engaged in constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of that
claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude that activity from evidence.
(b) Protective order means:
(i) an emergency protective order or domestic violence order issued under
KRS 403.715 to 403.785,
(ii) a foreign protective order, as defined in KRS 403.7521(1),
(iii) an order issued under KRS 431.064,
(iv) a restraining order, or
(v) any condition of a bond, conditional release, probation, parole, or
pretrial diversion order designed to protect the victim from the offender.

Section 512.1205. Criminal Abuse
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he causes (i) a person under 12
years old, or (ii) a physically or mentally helpless person, to be:
(a) subjected to cruel confinement or cruel punishment, or
(b) deprived of services necessary to maintain the persons health and welfare.
(2) Definition. A physically or mentally helpless person means a person who lacks
substantial capacity to defend himself or solicit protection from law enforcement authorities.
(3) Grading.
(a) The offense committed knowingly is a Class D felony.
(b) The offense committed recklessly is a Class E felony.
(c) The offense committed grossly negligently is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 512.1206. Definitions
(1) Catastrophe has the meaning given in Section 2205(4)(a).
(2) Correctional worker has the meaning given in Section 513.1304(2).
(3) Dangerous instrument has the meaning given in Section 515.1501(3)(a).
(4) Peace officer has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(5) Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(6) Physically or mentally helpless person has the meaning given in Section 512.1205(2).
(7) Protective order has the meaning given in Section 512.1204(3).
(8) Serious physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
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CHAPTER 513. SEXUAL ASSAULT OFFENSES
Section 513.1301.
Section 513.1302.
Section 513.1303.
Section 513.1304.
Section 513.1305.
Section 513.1306.

Aggravated Rape
Rape
Aggravated Sexual Abuse
Sexual Abuse
Sexual Misconduct
Definitions

______________
Section 513.1301. Aggravated Rape
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he engages in sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual intercourse with another person:
(a) who is less than 12 years old, 25 or
(b) by forcible compulsion, or
(c) who is physically incapacitated.
(2) Definitions.
(a) Deviate sexual intercourse means any act of sexual gratification involving the
sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another; or penetration of the anus of
one person by a foreign object manipulated by another person. Deviate sexual intercourse
does not include penetration of the anus by a foreign object in the course of the performance
of generally recognized health-care practices.

Issue: Should Section 1301(1)(a), and the similar provision in Section 1303(1)(a), add a requirement
that the offender be at least 4 years older than the victim?
Pro: One of the most difficult issues currently being addressed in juvenile court is sexual activity
between two children. There have been instances of males being prosecuted in juvenile court for consensual
sexual encounters with females the same age, or older. This provision will ensure that society expresses its
distaste toward sexual behavior between children where there is a significant difference in power between the
individuals, and thus a significant effect on the ability of the younger child to genuinely consent. Consensual
sexual relations between children near the same age should be addressed by the family, church, and social
welfare system, rather than criminalizing the behavior.
Con: While there is a place for limiting liability according to the age difference between the offender
and victim, this is not that place. Children under the age of 12 are so clearly inappropriate as sexual partners that
even teenagers ought to be liable for serious criminal liability for such conduct.
Young offenders who are too immature to understand the nature or criminality of their conduct are
protected from criminal liability by the immaturity defense proposed in Section 505.
Reporter: No recommendation.
25
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(b) Forcible compulsion means physical force or threat of physical force, express
or implied, [that would place a reasonable person in fear of immediate death or physical
injury to self or another person, fear of the immediate kidnap of self or another person, or
fear of any offense under this Chapter.] 26 Physical resistance on the part of the victim is
not necessary to meet this definition.
(c) Foreign object means anything used in commission of a sexual act other than
the person of the actor.
(d) Physically incapacitated means unconscious or for any other reason physically
unable to communicate ones unwillingness to engage in an act.
(e) Sexual intercourse means sexual intercourse in its ordinary sense and includes
penetration of the sex organs of one person by a foreign object manipulated by another
person. Sexual intercourse occurs upon any penetration, however slight; emission is not
required. Sexual intercourse does not include penetration of the sex organ by a foreign
object in the course of the performance of a generally recognized health-care practice.
(3) Grading. The offense:
(a) under Subsection (1)(a) is a Class A felony, or
(b) under Subsection (1)(b) and (1)(c) is a Class A felony if the person causes
serious physical injury, or
(c) otherwise is a Class B felony.

Section 513.1302. Rape
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he engages in sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual intercourse with another person who:
(a) is not his spouse and is:
(i) less than 14 years old, if the defendant is at least 4 years older, or
(ii) less than 16 years old, if the defendant is at least 4 years older, or

Issue: Should this provision require that the force used actually place the victim in fear?
Pro: This is a serious offense. We ought to be sure of both the offenders culpability and the harm to
the victim before we impose liability for it. The draft already eliminates the previous clause in the current
definition of forcible compulsion requiring that it must overcome earnest
resistance. To further eliminate the bright line would reduce rape to the threat of physical force, however
slight, or however it is perceived by the victim. A Class B felony carrying 10-20 years in prison, a violent
offender designation, 3 years conditional discharge, and Megans Law ramifications, should not rest on such
an ambiguous definition.
Con: If force or the threat of force is already required, there seems little reason to require more.
Intercourse compelled by threat of force is unambiguously rape; an additional requirement of proof of a
particular belief in the victim hardly seems necessary, or even relevant.
Reporter: No recommendation.
26

64

Chapter 513: Sexual Assault Offenses

(iii) less than 18 years old, if the defendant is 21 years old or older and
provides a foster family home, as defined in KRS 600.020, for the victim, or
(iv) mentally retarded; or
(b) is mentally incapacitated.
(2) Definitions.
(a) Mentally incapacitated means rendered temporarily incapable of appraising
or controlling ones own conduct as a result of the influence of a controlled or intoxicating
substance administered without ones consent or as a result of any other act committed
without ones consent.
(b) Mentally retarded means having significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during
the developmental period, as defined in KRS Chapter 202B.
(3) Grading.
(a) The offense under Subsection (1)(a)(i) is a Class C felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class D felony.

Section 513.1303. Aggravated Sexual Abuse
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he: (i) engages in sexual contact
with, or (ii) causes sexual conduct by, another person:
(a) who is less than 12 years old, 27or
(b) by forcible compulsion, or
(c) who is physically incapacitated.
(2) Definition.
(a) Sexual contact means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a
person done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party.
(b) Sexual conduct means:
(i) acts of masturbation, homosexuality, lesbianism, bestiality, sexual
intercourse, or deviant sexual intercourse, actual or simulated, or
(ii) flagellation or excretion for the purpose of sexual stimulation or
gratification, or
(iii) the exposure, in an obscene manner, of the unclothed or apparently
unclothed human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, or the female
breast, whether or not subsequently obscured by a mark placed thereon or
otherwise altered in any resulting motion picture, photograph, or other visual
representation.
(3) Grading.
(a) The offense under Subsection (1)(a) is a Class D felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class E felony.
27

See footnote accompanying Section 1301.
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Section 513.1304. Sexual Abuse
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he: (i) engages in sexual contact
with, or (ii) causes sexual conduct by, another person:
(a) who is mentally retarded or mentally incapacitated, or
(b) who is in the penal custody of the Department of Corrections, if the defendant
is a correctional worker, or
(c) who is less than 14 years old, if the defendant is at least 4 years older, or
(d) who is less than 16 years old, if the defendant is at least 4 years older, or
(e) without consent.
(2) Definition. Correctional worker means an employee, contractor, vendor, or volunteer
of the Department of Corrections or of a detention facility, or of an entity under contract with either
the Department or a detention facility for the custody, supervision, evaluation, or treatment of
offenders.
(3) Grading.
(a) The offense under Subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) is a Class E felony.
(b) The offense under Subsection (1)(c) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) Otherwise the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 513.1305. Sexual Misconduct
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he engages in sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual intercourse with another person without the persons consent.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 513.1306. Definitions
(1) Correctional worker has the meaning given in Section 513.1304(2).
(2) Detention facility has the meaning given in Section 553.5306(2)(a).
(3) Deviate sexual intercourse has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(a).
(4) Forcible compulsion has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(b).
(5) Foreign object has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(c).
(6) Mentally incapacitated has the meaning given in Section 513.1302(2)(a).
(7) Mentally retarded has the meaning given in Section 513.1302(2)(b).
(8) Penal custody has the meaning given in Section 553.5306(2)(c).
(9) Physically incapacitated has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(d).
(10) Sexual conduct has the meaning given in Section 513.1303(2)(b).
(11) Sexual contact has the meaning given in Section 513.1303(2)(a).
(12) Sexual intercourse has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(e).
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CHAPTER 514. KIDNAPPING, COERCION, AND RELATED OFFENSES
Section 514.1401.
Section 514.1402.
Section 514.1403.
Section 514.1404.

Kidnapping and Unlawful Restraint
Interference with Custody
Criminal Coercion
Definitions

______________

Section 514.1401. Kidnapping and Unlawful Restraint
(1) Offense Defined: Kidnapping. A person commits an offense if he knowingly restrains
another person unlawfully with the intent to:
(a) hold the victim for ransom or reward, or
(b) advance the commission of a felony, or
(c) inflict physical injury on, or terrorize, the victim or another, or
(d) interfere with the performance of a governmental function, or
(e) use the victim as a shield or hostage.
(2) Offense Defined: Unlawful Restraint. A person commits an offense if he knowingly
restrains another person unlawfully.
(3) Grading.
(a) Aggravated Kidnapping. The offense under Subsection (1) is a Class X
28
felony if the victim is not released alive, or if the victim dies after release as a result of:
(i) serious physical injury suffered during the kidnapping, or
(ii) being released in an unsafe place, or
(iii) being released under circumstances in which the person was grossly
negligent as to a risk of the victims death.

Issue: Should aggravated kidnapping be eligible for the death penalty? If not, should it continue
to be a Class X felony or should it be reduced to a Class A felony?
For Class X felony, death eligible: Aggravated kidnapping is currently eligible for the death penalty
under KRS 509.040(2).
For Class X felony, not death eligible: This offense is less serious than first-degree murder and,
therefore, ought to be distinguished from that capitol offense. However, it ought not be reduced to a Class A
felony. If it were, then all other kidnapping grades would have to be similarly reduced if the grading distinctions
are to be maintained.
For Class A felony: This offense is not more serious than causing a death under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference, which is graded as a Class A felony under Section 1102.
Reporter: No recommendation.
28
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(b) The offense under Subsection (1) is a Class A felony if the victim suffers
serious physical injury:
(i) during the kidnapping, or
(ii) as a result of being released in an unsafe place, or
(iii) as a result of being released under circumstances in which the person
was grossly negligent as to a risk of serious physical injury to the victim.
(c) Kidnapping. Otherwise the offense under Subsection (1) is a Class B felony.
(d) Aggravated Unlawful Restraint. The offense under Subsection (2) is a Class
D felony if the restraint exposes the victim to a risk of serious physical injury.
(e) Unlawful Restraint. Otherwise the offense under Subsection (2) is a Class A
misdemeanor.
(4) Definitions.
(a) Relative means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.
(b) Restrain means to restrict another persons movements without consent in
such a manner as to cause a substantial interference with his liberty:
(i) by moving him from one place to another, or
(ii) by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or
in a place to which he has been moved.
(c) A person is moved or confined without consent when the movement or
confinement is accomplished by physical force, intimidation, or deception, or by any means,
including acquiescence of a victim if he:
(i) is less than 16 years old, or
(ii) is substantially incapable of appraising or controlling his own behavior.
(5) Exemption: Restraint Ordinarily Incident. It is not an offense under this Section if the
unlawful restraint is no more than that which is ordinarily incident to the commission of another
offense for which the offender is convicted.
(6) Defense. It is a defense to an offense under this Section that:
(a) the person was a relative of the victim, and
(b) his only purpose was to assume custody of the victim.

Section 514.1402. Interference with Custody
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) knowing that he has no legal right to do so,
(b) he takes, entices, or keeps from lawful custody
(c) any person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or to
an institution.
(2) Grading.
(a) If the person returns the victim voluntarily and before arrest or the issuance of
a warrant for arrest, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class D felony.
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Section 514.1403. Criminal Coercion
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, with intent to compel another
person to engage in or refrain from conduct, he unlawfully threatens to:
(a) commit an offense, or
(b) accuse any person of an offense, or
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule,
or to impair anothers credit or business repute, or
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold
action.
(2) Defense. It is a defense under any Subsection other than (1)(a) that:
(a) the defendant believed the accusation or secret to be true, or the proposed
official action to be justified, and
(b) his sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to desist from misbehavior,
or to make good a wrong done by the victim.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 514.1404. Definitions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Governmental function has the meaning given in Section 553.5301(2).
Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
Relative has the meaning given in Section 514.1401(4)(a).
Restrain has the meaning given in Section 514.1401(4)(b).
Serious physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
Without consent has the meaning given in Section 514.1401(4)(c).
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CHAPTER 515. ROBBERY OFFENSES
Section 515.1501.

Robbery

______________

Section 515.1501. Robbery
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, in the course of committing theft, he
uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person with intent to accomplish
the theft.
(2) Grading.
(a) Aggravated Robbery. The offense is a Class B felony if the person:
(i) causes physical injury to any person other than a participant in the
crime, or
(ii) uses or threatens to use a dangerous instrument upon any person, or
(iii) is armed with a deadly weapon other than an ordinary hunting knife
that the person regularly carries.
(b) Robbery. Otherwise the offense is a Class C felony
(3) Definitions.
(a) Dangerous instrument means any instrument, article, or substance that,
under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be
used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury, including:
(i) any part of the human body when serious physical injury is a direct
result of the use of that part of the human body, and
(ii) any deadly weapon.
(b) Deadly weapon means:
(i) any weapon from which a shot, capable of producing death or other
serious physical injury, may be discharged, or
(ii) any knife other than an ordinary pen knife, or
(iii) a billy, nightstick, club, blackjack, slapjack, nunchaku karate sticks,
shuriken or death star, or artificial knuckles made from metal, plastic, or other
similar hard material.
(c) Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
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CHAPTER 521. THEFT AND RELATED PROVISIONS
Section 521.2101.
Section 521.2102.
Section 521.2103.
Section 521.2104.
Section 521.2105.
Section 521.2106.
Section 521.2107.
Section 521.2108.
Section 521.2109.
Section 521.2110.
Section 521.2111.
Section 521.2112.
Section 521.2113.

Consolidation of Theft Offenses
Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition
Theft by Deception
Theft by Extortion
Theft of Services
Theft by Unauthorized Sale of Copyrighted Material
Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of Funds Received
Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake
Receiving Stolen Property
Grading of Theft
Claim of Right
Unauthorized Use of Automobiles and Other Vehicles
Definitions

______________
Section 521.2101. Consolidation of Theft Offenses
Conduct denominated theft in this Chapter constitutes a single offense. An accusation of
theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft under
this Chapter.

Section 521.2102. Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition
(1) Movable Property. A person commits theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful
control over, movable property of another with intent to deprive him thereof.
(2) Permissive Inference. The factfinder may infer that a person who intentionally conceals
unpurchased merchandise of any mercantile establishment on the premises of such establishment
has the intent to deprive the owner of his property without paying the purchase price for it.
(3) Immovable Property. A person commits theft if he unlawfully transfers immovable
property of another or any interest therein with intent to benefit himself or another not entitled
thereto.
(4) Definitions.
(a) Deprive means:
(i) to withhold property of another permanently or for so extended a
period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value, or with intent to
restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation; or
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(ii) to dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will
recover it.
(b) Immovable property is all property other than movable property.
(c) Movable property means property the location of which can be changed,
including things growing on, affixed to, or found in land, and documents although the rights
represented thereby have no physical location. Immovable property is all other property.
(d) Owner means a person who has title, license, or other lawful possession of
the property, a person who has the right to restrict access to the property, or a person who
has a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.
(e) Property means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible
personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other interests in or claims to
wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and drink,
electric or other power, personal services, telephone service, access to electronic services,
programs, or data, recorded sounds or images, and lottery tickets.
(f) Property of another is any property in which any person other than the actor
has an interest that the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor
also has an interest in the property. Property in possession of the actor shall not be
deemed property of another who has only a security interest therein, even if legal title is in
the creditor pursuant to a conditional sales contract or other security arrangement.

Section 521.2103. Theft by Deception
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits theft if he obtains property of another by deception
with intent to deprive the person thereof.
(2) A person deceives if he [intentionally]: 29
(a) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law,
value, intention, or other state of mind;

Issue: Should the culpability requirement of intentionally be reduced to knowingly for theft
generally, that is, here and in the bracketed portions of Sections 2104, 2105, and 2107?
Pro: If a person knows that property belongs to another and that he is acting to obtain that property,
he is sufficiently culpable for theft liability to be appropriate, especially where he is doing so through the
inherently wrongful means of a deception or threat. In those few cases where a person might have knowledge,
but not intent, as to deceiving another person or obtaining anothers property, he is still committing a
conscious wrong and bringing about the harm with which the offense is concerned. Particularly in the area of
theft by deception, it may be unclear whether the person has the intent to deceive, as opposed to the intent
to achieve some other benefit by means of a knowing deception, thus an intent requirement produces
inappropriate proof difficulties for prosecutors.
Con: Intention is the traditional culpability requirement for theft offenses. A knowing, but not
intentional, deprivation of anothers property should be resolved through the civil arena. We should punish
mere deprivation of property (as opposed to injury to person) with felony imprisonment only where the
offender is acting intentionally.
Reporter: No recommendation.
29
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(b) prevents another from acquiring information that would affect judgment of a
transaction;
(c) fails to correct a false impression that the deceiver previously created or
reinforced, or that the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom the person
stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship;
(d) fails to disclose a known lien, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the
enjoyment of property that the person transfers or encumbers in consideration for the
property obtained, whether the impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of
official record; or
(e) issues or passes a check or similar sight order for the payment of money,
knowing that it will not be paid by the drawee.
(3) Definition. Obtain means:
(a) in relation to property, to bring about a transfer or purported transfer of a legal
interest in the property, whether to the obtainer or another; or
(b) in relation to labor or service, to secure performance thereof.
(4) Exception. This offense is not committed if the deception concerns only matters
having no pecuniary significance, or is puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in
the group addressed.
(5) Inference Not Permitted. Deception as to a persons intention to perform a promise
shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise.
(6) Permissive Inference Regarding No Account and Refused Payment Check. For
purposes of Subsection (1) of this Section, the factfinder may infer that a maker of a check or
similar sight order for the payment of money knew that the check or order, other than a postdated
check or order, would not be paid, if:
(a) the maker had no account with the drawee at the time the check or order was
issued; or
(b) upon presentation within thirty (30) days after issue, payment was refused by
the drawee for lack of funds, and the maker failed to make good within ten (10) days after
receiving notice of that refusal.
(7) Permissive Inference Regarding Failure to Return Leased Property. The factfinder my
infer the intent to commit theft by deception by a person who has leased or rented the personal
property of another:
(a) if the person fails to return the personal property to its owner within ten (10)
days after the lease or rental agreement has expired; or
(b) if the person presented to the owner identification that is false, fictitious, or not
current as to name, address, place of employment, or other items of identification for the
purpose of obtaining the lease or rental agreement.
(c) Demand for Return Required. Nothing in this Subsection relieves the owner
from making demand for the return of the property leased or rented. A notice addressed
and mailed to the lessee or renter at the address given at the time of the making of the lease
or rental agreement shall constitute proper demand.
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Section 521.2104. Theft by Extortion
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits theft if he [intentionally] obtains property of
another by threatening to:
(a) commit an offense; or
(b) accuse any person of an offense; or
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule,
or to impair his credit or business repute; or
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold
action; or
(e) bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other collective action, if the
property is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the
person purports to act; or
(f) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect
to anothers legal claim or defense; or
(g) inflict any other substantial harm that would not benefit the defendant.
(2) Defense. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under Subsection (1)(b), (1)(c),
or (1)(d) that the property obtained by threat of accusation, exposure, lawsuit, or other invocation
of official action or inaction was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm done in
the circumstances to which such action or inaction relates, or as compensation for property or
lawful services.

Section 521.2105. Theft of Services
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits theft if:
(a) by deception or threat, by false monetary instrument, token, or note, or by
other means to avoid payment for the service, he [intentionally] obtains services that he
knows are available only for compensation; or
(b) having control over the disposition of services of others to which he is not
entitled, he [intentionally] diverts such services to his own benefit or to the benefit of
another not entitled thereto.
(2) Definition. Services includes labor; professional service; transportation; telephone,
electricity, gas, water, or other public service; accommodation in hotels, restaurants, or elsewhere;
admission to exhibitions; use of vehicles or other movable property; use of data or a computer or
computer system, network, software, or program to perform tasks; or access to cable television,
the internet, or any other electronic service.
(3) Permissive Inference. Where compensation for service is ordinarily paid immediately
upon the rendering of such service, as in the case of hotels and restaurants,
the factfinder may infer from the persons refusal to pay, or his absconding without payment or
offer to pay, that he obtained the service by deception as to his intent to pay.
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Section 521.2106. Theft by Unauthorized Sale of Copyrighted Material
A person commits theft if, with intent to deprive the owner of the proceeds from the sale,
he sells any copyrighted material.

Section 521.2107. Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of Funds
Received
(1) Offense Defined. A person who obtains property upon agreement, or subject to a
known legal obligation, to make a specified payment or other disposition, whether from such
property or its proceeds or from his own property to be reserved in equivalent amount, commits
theft if he [intentionally] deals with the property obtained as his own and fails to make the required
payment or disposition.
(2) Application to Commingled Property. The requirements of Subsection (1) are satisfied
even if it is impossible to identify particular property as belonging to the victim at the time of the
persons failure to make the required payment or disposition.
(3) Permissive Inference. The factfinder may infer that a public servant, an officer or
employee of a financial institution, a lawyer, or an accountant or other financial professional:
(a) has the requisite knowledge of any legal obligation relevant to his criminal
liability under this Section, and
(b) has dealt with the property as his own if he fails to pay or account upon lawful
demand, or if an audit reveals a shortage or falsification of accounts.
(4) Definition. Financial institution means a bank, insurance company, credit union,
building and loan association, investment trust, or other organization held out to the public as a
place of deposit of funds or medium of savings or collective investment.

Section 521.2108. Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake
Offense Defined. A person who comes into control of property of another that he knows
to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property
or the identity of the recipient, commits theft if, with intention to deprive the owner thereof, he fails
to take reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to have it.
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Section 521.2109. Receiving Stolen Property
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of movable
property of another while reckless as to whether*30 it has been stolen, unless the property is
received, retained, or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner.
(2) Definition. Receiving means acquiring possession, control, or title, or lending on the
security of the property.
(3) Permissive Inference. The factfinder may infer the requisite recklessness where the
person has property in his possession:
(a) that was recently stolen, or
(b) for which he knows the serial number or other identification number or mark
has been removed, covered, altered, or obscured.

Section 521.2110. Grading of Theft
(1) Theft constitutes a Class [B]*31felony if the amount involved is in excess of $1,000,000.
(2) Theft constitutes a Class [C]* felony if:
(a) the amount involved is in excess of $10,000, or
(b) the property stolen is a firearm, or
(c) in the case of theft by receiving stolen property, if the receiver is in the business
of buying or selling stolen property.
Issue: Should the culpability requirement for receiving stolen property be increased from recklessness
to knowledge?
Pro: We should not criminalize the mere possession of stolen property unless it is clear that the
person possessing the property knew it was stolen. The permissive inference in Subsection (3) can be crafted
to address the more difficult cases.
Con: Current law, 514.110(1), requires that a person receive property knowing that it has been stolen,
or having reason to believe that it has been stolen. That requirement is essentially a negligence requirement,
which is even lower than the recklessness requirement in the proposed provision. The proposed language
thus already reflects an increase in the culpability requirement, which is one reason the permissive inference in
Subsection (3) has been included.
Reporter: No recommendation.
30

Issue: Should the grade of all but the least serious theft offense be reduced one grade? (The
analogous issue exists with regard to the grading of property damage offenses, in Section 2206(2).)
Pro: Such property offenses rarely merit felony grading. It is offenses that involve injury to persons
that deserves serious punishment.
Con: Theft (and property damage offenses) clearly are less serious that many if not most offenses
against the person, but they nonetheless are serious offenses because such violations influence the quality of
life, creating anxiety and fear, and often lead to danger and injury to persons.
Reporter: No recommendation.
31
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(3) Theft constitutes a Class [D]* felony if the amount involved is in excess of $1,000.
(4) Theft constitutes a Class [E]* felony if the amount involved is in excess of $300.
(5) Theft constitutes a Class [A]* misdemeanor if the amount involved is $300 or less,
except that
(6) theft constitutes a Class C misdemeanor if:
(a) the property was not taken from the person or by threat, or in breach of a
fiduciary obligation, and
(b) the amount involved was less than $50.
(7) Valuation. The amount involved in a theft is the fair market value of the property or
services involved. Amounts involved in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the
grade of the offense.

Section 521.2111. Claim of Right
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for theft that the person:
(1) acted under an honest claim of right:
(a) to the property or service involved, or
(b) to acquire or dispose of it as he did; or
(2) took property exposed for sale:
(a) intending to purchase and pay for it promptly, or
(b) reasonably believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.

Section 521.2112. Unauthorized Use of Automobiles and Other Vehicles
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he knowingly operates, exercises
control over, or otherwise uses anothers automobile or other propelled vehicle without consent of
the owner.
(2) Definition. Propelled vehicle means any vehicle, including but not limited to motor
vehicles, aircraft, boats, or construction machinery, that is propelled otherwise than by muscle
power, or that is readily capable of being towed otherwise than by muscle power.
(3) Defense. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this Section that the
person reasonably believed that the owner would have consented to the operation had he known
of it.
(4) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
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Section 521.2113. Definitions
(1) Deprive has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(a).
(2) Financial institution has the meaning given in Section 521.2107(4).
(3) Government has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(4) Immovable property has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(b).
(5) Movable property has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(c).
(6) Obtain has the meaning given in Section 521.2103(3).
(7) Owner has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(d).
(8) Propelled vehicle has the meaning given in Section 521.2112(2).
(9) Property has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(e).
(10) Property of another has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(f).
(11) Receiving has the meaning given in Section 521.2109(2).
(12) Services has the meaning given in Section 521.2105(2).
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CHAPTER 522. PROPERTY DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION PROVISIONS
Section 522.2201.
Section 522.2202.
Section 522.2203.
Section 522.2204.
Section 522.2205.
Section 522.2206.
Section 522.2207.
Section 522.2208.

Arson in the First Degree
Arson in the Second Degree
Endangering by Fire or Explosion
Failure to Control or Report a Dangerous Fire
Causing or Risking Catastrophe
Criminal Damage
Consent Defense
Definitions

______________

Section 522.2201. Arson in the First Degree
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage a
building, 32 and
(b) is reckless as to whether any person sustains serious physical injury as a result
of the fire or explosion or the firefighting as a result thereof.
(2) Definition. Building, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, hotel,
commercial structure, trailer, sleeping car, railroad car, or any structure with a valid certificate of
occupancy.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class A felony.

Issue: Should the offenses in Sections 2201 and 2202 apply more broadly to efforts to damage or
destroy property, rather than only buildings, by fire or explosion?
Pro: Setting fire to, for example, a forest should be treated very severely, because of the destruction
of the environment and the risk to those who fight the fires. Forest fires cause enormous loss in this state, to
individuals as well as to the state. Indeed, setting forest fires is a more serious problem in this state than
conventional arson. Though many of the fires are set in the Daniel Boone National Forest and are subject
to federal prosecution, that is not a compelling reason to ignore such offenses in the Penal Code. Anyone
who tries to burn down the forest  it should be kept in mind that the offense requires intent to destroy or
damage  should be treated at least as severely as one who burns a building.
Con: It is agreed that starting fires on non-building property can be very harmful, but it is typically
less harmful than starting a fire in a building. Class A felony status should be reserved for
the most serious threats to human life. In instances where great damage, injury, or death is caused by a forest
fire, there are other serious offenses available for prosecution. For example, if the fire results in more than
$1,000,000 of property damage, the offense would be a Class B felony under Section 2206.
Reporter: No recommendation.
32
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Section 522.2202. Arson in the Second Degree
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he starts a fire or causes an explosion
with intent to destroy or damage a building: 33
(a) of another; or
(b) of his own or of another, to collect or facilitate the collection of insurance
proceeds for such loss; or
(c) being reckless as to whether the building is inhabited or occupied.
(2) Defense. It is a defense to a prosecution under this Section that the persons sole
intent was to destroy or damage the building for a lawful purpose.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class B felony.

Section 522.2203. Endangering by Fire or Explosion
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he knowingly starts a fire or causes
an explosion, whether on his own property or anothers, and thereby recklessly
(a) creates a risk of death or physical injury to another person; or
(b) creates a risk of damage or destruction to a building of another.
(2) Grading.
(a) The offense is a Class B felony if the person creates a risk of another persons
death under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class C felony.

Section 522.2204. Failure to Control or Report a Dangerous Fire
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he knows that a fire creates a risk of death to, or damage to a substantial
amount of property of, another; and
(b) he fails:
(i) to give a prompt fire alarm, or
(ii) to take reasonable measures to put out or control the fire, when he can
do so without substantial risk to himself; and
(c)
(i) he knows that he is under an official, contractual, or other legal duty to
prevent or combat the fire, or
(ii) the fire was started, even if lawfully, by him or with his assent, or on
property in his custody or control.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

33
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Section 522.2205. Causing or Risking Catastrophe
(1) Causing Catastrophe.
(a) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he causes a catastrophe by
explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, bridge, or tunnel, release of poison
gas, radioactive material, or other harmful or destructive force or substance, or by any
other means of causing potentially widespread injury or damage.
(b) Grading. The offense is:
(i) a Class A felony if committed knowingly, and
(ii) a Class B felony if committed recklessly.
(2) Risking Catastrophe.
(a) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he recklessly creates a risk
of catastrophe in the employment of fire, explosives, or other dangerous means, as
described in Subsection (1)(a).
(b) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.
(3) Failure to Prevent Catastrophe.
(a) Offense Defined. A person who recklessly fails to take reasonable measures
to prevent or mitigate a catastrophe commits an offense if:
(i) he knows that he is under an official, contractual, or other legal duty to
take such measures; or
(ii) he did or assented to the act causing or threatening the catastrophe.
(b) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
(4) Definitions.
(a) Catastrophe means:
(i) serious physical injury to five or more persons, or
(ii) substantial damage to five or more buildings, or
(iii) substantial damage to a vital public facility that seriously impairs its
usefulness or operation.
(b) Vital public facility includes a facility maintained for use as a bridge (whether
over land or water), dam, tunnel, wharf, communications or radar installation, power station,
or any other facility that is necessary to ensure or protect the public health, safety, or
welfare.

Section 522.2206. Criminal Damage
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) damages property of another; or
(b) negligently damages property of another in the employment of fire, explosives,
or other dangerous means described in Section 522.2205(1)(a); or
(c) tampers with property of another and thereby creates a risk of physical injury
or property damage; or
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(d) causes another to suffer pecuniary loss by deception or threat.
(2) Grading. Criminal damage knowingly caused is:
(a) a Class [B] 34 felony if the pecuniary loss is in excess of $1,000,000;
(b) a Class [C]* felony if:
(i) the pecuniary loss is in excess of $10,000, or
(ii) the person causes a substantial interruption or impairment of public
communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other public
service, or
(iii) the person substantially damages or destroys a firearm or propelled
vehicle;
(c) a Class [D]* felony if the pecuniary loss is in excess of $1,000;
(d) a Class [E]* felony if the pecuniary loss is in excess of $300;
(e) a Class [A]* misdemeanor if the pecuniary loss is in excess of $50.
(f) Otherwise the offense is a Class C misdemeanor.
(g) Recklessly Causing Criminal Damage. Criminal damage caused recklessly is
an offense one grade lower than the grade it would be if caused knowingly.

Section 522.2207. Consent Defense
Whenever in sections 522.2201 to 522.2206 it is an element of the offense that the property
is of another, it is a defense to a prosecution for that offense that the owner has consented to the
persons conduct with respect to the property.

Section 522.2208. Definitions
(1) Building has the meaning given in Section 522.2201(2).
(2) Catastrophe has the meaning given in Section 522.2205(4)(a).
(3) Government has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(4) Owner has the meaning given in Section 521.2102(4)(d).
(4) Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(5) Property has the meaning given in Section 522.2102(4)(d).
(6) Property of another has the meaning given it in Section 521.2112(8).
(7) Serious physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(8) Vital public facility has the meaning given in Section 522.2205(4)(b).

34
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CHAPTER 523. BURGLARY AND OTHER CRIMINAL INTRUSION PROVISIONS
Section 523.2301.
Section 523.2302.
Section 523.2303.

Burglary
Criminal Trespass
Definitions

______________
Section 523.2301. Burglary
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, knowing he has no license or
authority, he:
(a) enters or
(b) remains surreptitiously 35
in a building at a time when the premises are not open to the public, with the intention to commit an
offense therein.
2) Grading.
(a) Burglary in the First Degree. Burglary is a Class B felony if:
(i) the offender is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon other than an
ordinary hunting knife that the person regularly carries; or
(ii) causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the
crime; or
(iii) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against any person
who is not a participant in the crime.

35

deleted?

Issue: Should the requirement that one who remains in a building do so surreptitiously be

Pro: This element is unnecessary. A person who remains in a building without authority to be there,
and with the intent to commit an offense, merits liability regardless of whether his behavior is surreptitious.
Con: To the extent cases like Bowling v. Com., 942 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997), suggest that any entry or
remaining with intent to commit a crime is automatically without authority, such an expansive view of
burglary is a bad idea. It would turn every shoplifter into a burglar and undercut the expression of greater
seriousness that the burglary offense is meant to contain. Further, the specific harm of the burglary offense is
the fear and danger created by an unknown and unwanted intruder. Where a person remains in a building, but
does so openly, there is no such harm.
Nor should the conditions of burglary be expanded to situations where the offender is asked to leave.
Such cases are simple cases of trespass and theft (or whatever the underlying offense). They do not create the
special kind of fear of silent intrusion against which burglary offense in aimed.
Con (with amendment): The surreptitiously requirement should be kept but the conditions that
trigger burglary should be expanded to also include cases where the offender is explicitly told to leave and
refuses. That is, after surreptitiously the following words should be added: or after explicit revocation of
license or authority.
Reporter: No recommendation.
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(b) Burglary in the Second Degree. Burglary is a Class C felony if committed in
a dwelling.
(c) Burglary in the Third Degree. Otherwise burglary is a Class D felony.

Section 523.2302. Criminal Trespass
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he enters or remains in a place
where he knows he has no license or authority to be.
(2) Defenses. It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that:
(a) the premises were at the time of entry open to the public and the person
complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises; or
(b) the person reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person
empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain.
(3) Grading.
(a) Trespass in the First Degree. Trespassing in a dwelling or in highly secured
premises is a Class E felony.
(b) Trespass in the Second Degree. Trespassing in any building, storage structure,
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, or in any place so enclosed as manifestly
to exclude intruders is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) Trespass in the Third Degree. Otherwise trespassing is a Class C misdemeanor.
4) Definitions.
(a) Highly secured premises means any place that is continuously guarded and
where display of visible identification is required of persons while they are on premises.
(b) Storage structure means any structure, truck, railway car, vessel, or aircraft
that is used primarily for the storage or transportation of property.

Section 523.2303. Definitions
(1) Building has the meaning given in Section 522.2201(2).
(2) Dangerous instrument has the meaning given in Section 515.1501(3)(a).
(3) Deadly weapon has the meaning given in Section 515.1501(3)(b).
(4) Dwelling has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(5) Highly secured premises has the meaning given in Section 523.2302(4)(b).
(6) Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.420(3).
(7) Reasonable belief has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(8) Storage structure has the meaning given in Section 523.2302(4)(b).
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CHAPTER 524. INVASION OF PRIVACY OFFENSES
Section 524.2401.
Section 524.2402.
Section 524.2403.
Section 524.2404.
Section 514.2405.

Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance
Unlawfully Acquiring Information
Unlawfully Divulging Information
Exceptions to Chapter 524 Offenses
Definition

______________

Section 524.2401. Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, except as authorized by law, he:
(a) trespasses on property with intention to subject anyone in a private place to
eavesdropping or other surveillance; or
(b) installs or uses in any private place, without the consent of the person or
persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing, photographing, recording,
amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events in such place; or
(c) installs or uses outside a private place any device for hearing, recording,
amplifying, or broadcasting sounds originating in such private place that would not ordinarily
be audible or comprehensible outside the private place, without the consent of the person
or persons entitled to privacy there.
(d) uses any device to intercept, record, amplify, or broadcast any part of a wire
or oral communication of others without the consent of at least one (1) party thereto.
2) Definition. Private place means a place where a person reasonably would expect to
be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance. A private place does not include an area to
which the public or a substantial group thereof has access, but does include areas within public
places where people reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class E felony. 36

36

Issue: Should the grade of this offense be raised to Class D felony?
Pro: The corresponding current offense in 526.020 is a Class D felony. The relevant conduct, which
usually involves both trespassing and surveillance, should be graded more seriously than mere trespassing
(first degree), which is a Class E felony under Section 2302(3)(a).
Con: The Section 2302(3)(a) offense involves trespass within a dwelling, whereas the peeping Tom
situation this offense covers will usually involve surveillance of the building from outside, which presents a
less immediate threat of placing a resident in fear or danger. This offense is not more serious than trespassing
inside someone elses home and should not be graded higher. Where both offenses occur, multiple liability may
be appropriate.
Reporter: No recommendation.
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Section 524.2402. Unlawfully Acquiring Information
so, he:

(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, knowing he is not privileged to do

(a) opens or reads a sealed letter or other sealed private communication; or 37
(b) gains access to information or electronic programs or data; or
(c) obtains in any manner from an employee, officer, or representative of a
communications common carrier information with respect to the contents or nature of a
communication.
(2) Exception. The offense defined in Subsection (1)(a) does not apply to the censoring
of sealed letters or sealed communications for security purposes in official detention or penal
facilities.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 524.2403. Unlawfully Divulging Information
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of an offense if he knowingly divulges:
(a) or uses information obtained in violation of Sections 524.2401, 524.2402, or
524.2403, or
(b) information learned in the course of employment with a communications common
carrier engaged in transmitting the information, or
(c) information held by the governmental, the disclosure of which is unlawful under
the laws of the Commonwealth.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Issue: Should subsection (1)(a), prohibiting unauthorized tampering with mail, be deleted?
Pro: Opening a letter when you are not privileged to do so should not be a crime. The offense as
written could apply to the curious, or individuals who are estranged and vengeful. Industrial espionage and
other serious violations of privacy interests are addressed elsewhere in the Code.
Con: The proposed Subsection (1)(a) is identical to KRS 526.050(1)(a). More generally, all subsections
of Section 2402 have antecedents in current law (434.855, 526.050, 434.685, 434.845, 434.850) that deal with
various specific ways of acquiring information or interference with specific modes of communication
(computers, mail, etc.). It seems inconsistent to cover some forms of improper acquisition of private information
but not others. This form of tampering with sealed communications is no less serious than other forms of
improper acquisition of private information. The underlying interest in protecting privacy is significant and
merits protection under the criminal law. Note that the offense is only a Class B misdemeanor.
Reporter: No recommendation.
37
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Section 524.2404. Exceptions to Chapter 524 Offenses
only:

A person does not commit an offense defined in this Chapter if his offense conduct constitutes

(1) inadvertently overhearing a communication through a regularly installed telephone party
line or on a telephone extension, and he does not divulge the communication; or
(2) intercepting, disclosing, or using a communication transmitted through a communications
common carrier for a purpose necessary for mechanical or service quality control checks, while
acting in the course of employment with the communications common carrier.

Section 524.2405. Definition
Private place has the meaning given in Section 524.2401(2).
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CHAPTER 531. FORGERY AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES
Section 531.3101.
Section 531.3102.
Section 531.3103.
Section 531.3104.
Section 531.3105.
Section 531.3106.
Section 531.3107.
Section 531.3108.
Section 531.3109.
Section 531.3110.
Section 531.3111.
Section 531.3112.
Section 531.3113.
Section 531.3114.
Section 531.3115.
Section 531.3116.
Section 531.3117.
Section 531.3118.
Section 531.3119.

Forgery and Counterfeiting
Tampering with Writing, Record, or Device
Criminal Simulation
Unauthorized Impersonation
Deceptive Practices
False or Bait Advertising
Falsifying Business Records
Defrauding Secured Creditors
Fraud in Insolvency
Issuing False Financial Statement
Receiving Deposits in Failing Financial Institution
Misapplication of Entrusted Property
Operating a Misrepresented Company
Commercial Bribery
Tampering with a Publicly Exhibited Contest
Ticket Scalping
Bad Checks
Fraudulent Use of Credit or Debit Card
Definitions

______________
Section 531.3101. Forgery and Counterfeiting
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud, deceive, or
injure another, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, or transfers any writing so
that it purports:
(i) to be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or
(ii) to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence
other than was in fact the case, or
(iii) to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.
(c) offers any writing that he knows to be forged in a manner specified in
Subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b).
(2) Definition. Writing includes printing, electronically recorded data, or any other
method of recording information, money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, digital signatures or other encrypted identifiers, electronic mail routing information,
and other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.
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(3) Grading. The offense is:
(a) a Class C felony if the writing is or purports to be part of an issue of:
(i) paper money, stamps, securities, or other valuable instruments issued
by a government or governmental agency, or
(ii) stock, bonds, or other instruments representing interests in or claims
against a corporate or other organization or its property;
(b) a Class D felony if the writing is or purports to be:
(i) a deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial instrument, credit
card, or other instrument that does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or
otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status, or
(ii) a public record or an instrument filed or required or authorized by law
to be filed in or with a public office or public servant, or
(iii) a writing officially issued or created by a public office, public servant,
or governmental agency.
(c) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 531.3102. Tampering with Writing, Record, or Device
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, knowing that he has no privilege to
do so, he:
(a) tampers with, falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any writing, record, or
device, with intent to deceive or injure anyone or to conceal any wrongdoing; or
(b) offers a writing, record, or device, knowing that it has been altered in a manner
prohibited by Subsection (1)(a).
(2) Grading.
(a) The offense is a Class D felony if the writing is or purports to be:
(i) a deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial instrument, credit
card, or other instrument that does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate, or
otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or status, or
(ii) a public record or an instrument filed or required or authorized by law
to be filed in or with a public office or public servant, or
(iii) a writing officially issued or created by a public office, public servant,
or governmental agency.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 531.3103. Criminal Simulation
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud, he makes or
alters any object in such manner that it appears to have an antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship
that it does not in fact possess.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
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Section 531.3104. Unauthorized Impersonation
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, without the persons consent, he:
(a) represents himself to be another person, being reckless as to whether his
misrepresentation will:
(i) deprive the other person of anything of value, or
(ii) injure the other persons reputation, or
(iii) give himself a benefit to which he is not entitled; or
(b) represents himself to be another person or to have a characteristic of legal
significance that he knows he does not have, with intent to obtain service or property to
which he is not entitled; or
(c) manufactures, transfers, sells, or purchases any part of the personal identity or
financial information of another person with intent to bring about any result listed in
Subsections (1)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii).
(2) Definition. The personal identity of a person includes any identifying information of
that person, such as ones name, Social Security number, birth date, personal identification number
or code, and any other information that could be used to identify the person, including unique
biometric data.
(3) Grading.
(a) Trafficking in Stolen Identities. The offense under Subsection (1)(c) is a Class
D felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 531.3105. Deceptive Practices
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, [in the course of engaging in a
business, occupation, or profession,] 38 he knowingly:
(a) uses or possesses for use a false weight or measure or any other device for
falsely determining or recording any quality or quantity; or
(b) sells, offers, or exposes for sale, or delivers less than the represented quantity
of any commodity or service; or

Issue: Should the bracketed language be deleted, thereby broadening the offense to include the
delineated deceptive practices when they are performed in other than a business context?
Pro: The defined conduct is inherently dishonest. There seems little reason to prohibit such conduct
when businesspeople engage in it, but fail to criminalize the same conduct when others engage in it.
Con: The criminal law ought not intrude itself into the private affairs of people in the way that this
offense would do if the bracketed language were omitted. Regulating the conduct of business is a proper
government function. Attempting to regulate the private conduct of neighbors would trivialize criminal liability.
Reporter: No recommendation.
38
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(c) takes or attempts to take more than the represented quantity of any commodity,
thing or service when as a buyer, agency, or receiver he furnishes the weight, measure, or
weighing or measuring device by means of which the amount of the commodity, thing, or
service is determined; or
(d) sells, offers, or exposes for sale adulterated or mislabeled commodities.
(2) Definition.
(a) Adulterated means varying from the standard of composition or quality
prescribed by statute or lawfully promulgated administrative regulation or, if none, as set
by established commercial usage.
(b) Mislabeled means:
(i) varying from the standard of truth or disclosure in labeling prescribed
by statute or lawfully promulgated administrative regulation or, if none, as set by
established commercial usage; or
(ii) represented as being another persons product, though otherwise labeled
accurately as to quality or quantity.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 531.3106. False or Bait Advertising
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, in any advertisement or other means
of communication addressed to the public or to a substantial number of persons:
(a) he knowingly makes or causes to be made a false or misleading statement, or
(b) he offers property or services as part of a scheme or plan with the intent to sell
or provide the advertised property or services:
(i) at a higher price than that at which he offered them, or
(ii) in a quantity insufficient to meet the reasonably expected public demand,
unless the quantity is specifically stated in the advertisement, or
(iii) not at all.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 531.3107. Falsifying Business Records
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud, he:
(a) makes or causes a false entry to be made in the business records of an enterprise;
or
(b) alters, erases, obliterates, deletes, removes or destroys a true entry in the
business records of an enterprise; or
(c) omits to make a true entry in the business records of an enterprise in violation
of a duty to do so which he knows to be imposed upon him by law or by the nature of his
position; or
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(d) prevents the making of a true entry or causes the omission thereof in the business
records of an enterprise.
(2) Definitions.
(a) Business record means any writing or article kept or maintained by an
enterprise for the purpose of evidencing or reflecting its condition or activity.
(b) Enterprise means any entity of one or more persons, corporate or otherwise,
public or private, engaged in business, commercial, professional, industrial, eleemosynary,
social, political, or governmental activity.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 531.3108. Defrauding Secured Creditors
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he destroys, removes, conceals,
encumbers, transfers, or otherwise deals or disposes with property subject to a security interest or
payment of a judgment with intent unlawfully to hinder enforcement of that interest or judgment.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor or is the grade that would be provided
under Section 521.2110 for theft under the same circumstances, whichever is higher.

Section 531.3109. Fraud in Insolvency
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, knowing that proceedings have
been or are about to be instituted for the appointment of a receiver or other person entitled to
administer property for the benefit of creditors, or that any other composition or liquidation for the
benefit of creditors has been or is about to be made, he:
(a) destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise deals with
any property with intent to defeat or obstruct the claim of any creditor, or otherwise to
obstruct the operation of any law relating to administration of property for the benefit of
creditors; or
(b) knowingly falsifies any writing or record relating to the property; or
(c) knowingly misrepresents or refuses to disclose to a receiver or other person
entitled to administer property for the benefit of creditors, the existence, amount, or location
of the property, or any other information that the actor would be legally required to furnish
to such administrator.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor or is the grade that would be provided
under Section 521.2110 for theft under the same circumstances, whichever is higher.
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Section 531.3110. Issuing False Financial Statement
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud, he:
(a) knowingly makes or utters a writing that purports to describe the financial
condition or ability to pay of himself or of some other person and that is inaccurate in some
material respect; or
(b) represents in writing that a writing purporting to describe a persons financial
condition or ability to pay as of a prior date is accurate with respect to that persons
financial condition or ability to pay, knowing the writing to be materially inaccurate in that
respect.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 531.3111. Receiving Deposits in Failing Financial Institution
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) as an officer, manager, or other person participating in the direction of a financial
institution, or a broker of financial instruments,
(b) he knowingly receives or permits the receipt of a deposit or other
investment, knowing that the institution is insolvent
(2) Definition. A financial institution is insolvent if it is unable to pay its obligations in the
ordinary or usual course of business for any reason.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 531.3112. Misapplication of Entrusted Property
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he applies or disposes of property
that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of the government or of a financial
institution, in a manner that he knows is unauthorized and involves substantial risk of loss or detriment
to the owner of the property or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.
(2) Definition. Fiduciary means a trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, receiver, or
any other person subject to a similar duty of fidelity to a principal, investor, or beneficiary.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor or is the grade that would be provided
under Section 521.2110 for theft under the same circumstances, whichever is higher.
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Section 531.3113. Operating a Misrepresented Company
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he knowingly establishes or operates
a business that falsely represents itself to be a minority business enterprise, or disadvantaged
business enterprise, as defined in 79 C.F.R. 23.5 or 15 C.F.R. 1400.2, operated or operating for
the purpose of obtaining funds, contracts, subcontracts, services, or other benefits from any
government entity.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 531.3114. Commercial Bribery
(1) Commercial Bribery. A person commits an offense if:
(a) as an employee, agent, or fiduciary, he knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees
to accept any benefit from another person; and
(b) such solicitation, acceptance, or agreement is made:
(i) without the consent of his employer, principal, or beneficiary, and
(ii) with the understanding that he will engage in conduct contrary to his
employers, principals, or beneficiarys best interests, or otherwise contrary to
his legal duty.
(2) Offering Bribe. A person commits an offense if he knowingly offers, confers, or
agrees to confer any benefit the acceptance of which would be criminal under Subsection (1).
(3) Definition. Benefit means gain or advantage to the recipient or to a third person
pursuant to the desire or consent of the recipient.
(4) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 531.3115. Tampering with a Publicly Exhibited Contest
(1) Tampering with a Publicly Exhibited Contest. A person commits an offense if, with
intent to prevent a publicly exhibited contest from being conducted in accordance with the rules
and usages purporting to govern it, he:
(a) offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon, or threatens any injury to
a participant, official, or other person associated with the contest or exhibition; or
(b) tampers with any person, animal, or thing.
(2) Soliciting or Accepting Benefit for Tampering. A person commits an offense if he
knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit the giving of which would be criminal
under Subsection (1).
(3) Participation in Improperly Conducted Contest. A person commits an offense if he
knowingly engages in, sponsors, produces, judges, or otherwise participates in a publicly exhibited
contest knowing that the contest is not being conducted in compliance with the rules and usages
purporting to govern it, by reason of conduct that would be criminal under this Section.
(4) Grading. Each of the offenses defined in this Section is a Class D felony.
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Section 531.3116. Ticket Scalping 39
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he intentionally sells a ticket to a
public performance at a price greater than that charged at the place of admission or printed on the
ticket, unless authorized by the issuer or by law.
(2) Definition. Public performance means any form of entertainment involving machines,
persons, animals, or objects that is viewed by the public, including a sports contest.
(3) Grading. The offense is a violation.

Section 531.3117. Bad Checks
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he issues or passes a check or
similar sight order for the payment of money, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee.
(2) Permissive Inference. The trier of fact may infer that an issuer knew that the check or
order (other than a postdated check or order) would not be paid, if:
(a) the issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check or order was
issued; or
(b) payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon presentation
within 30 days after issue, and the issuer failed to make good within 10 days after receiving
notice of that refusal.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 531.3118. Fraudulent Use of Credit or Debit Card
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he uses a credit or debit card with
the intent of obtaining property or services knowing that:
(a) the card is stolen or forged; or
(b) the card has been revoked or cancelled; or
(c) for any other reason his use of the card is unauthorized by the issuer or
cardholder.

Issue: Should Section 3116, defining an offense of ticket scalping, be deleted?
Pro: The current law on this subject is winked at, enforced inconsistently, and contains a hypocritical
exception that allows the issuer to sell at more than face value. Many states dont have scalping laws.
Con: If the offense were abolished, scalpers would be encouraged to buy up tickets to high-demand
events, and the public would be unable to buy tickets from the box office, and thus forced to deal with scalpers,
which would mean paying more and dealing in an uncertain and unregulated market.
Reporter: No recommendation.
39
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(2) Definitions.
(a) Credit card means a writing or other evidence of an undertaking to pay for
property or services delivered or rendered to or upon the order of a designated person or
bearer.
(b) Debit card means any instrument or device for the use of the cardholder in
obtaining money, goods, services, and anything else of value, payment of which is made
against funds previously deposited by the cardholder.
(3) Defense.
(a) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (1)(c) that the person had the
intent and ability to meet all obligations to the issuer arising out of his use of the card.
(b) The defendant carries the burden of persuasion on the defense in Subsection
(3)(a) and must prove such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
(4) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 531.3119. Definitions
(1) Adulterated has the meaning given in Section 531.3105(2)(a).
(2) Benefit has the meaning given in Section 531.3114(2).
(3) Business record has the meaning given in Section 531.3107(2)(a).
(4) Credit card has the meaning given in Section 531.3118(2)(a).
(5) Debit card has the meaning given in Section 531.3118(2)(b).
(6) Enterprise has the meaning given in Section 531.3107(2)(b).
(7) Fiduciary has the meaning given in Section 531.3112(2).
(8) Financial institution has the meaning given in Section 521.2107(4).
(9) Government has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(10) Mislabeled has the meaning given in Section 531.3105(2)(b).
(11) Personal identity has the meaning given in Section 531.3104(2).
(12) Public performance has the meaning given in Section 531.3116(2).
(13) Required or authorized by law has the meaning given in Section 52.5201(5)(d).
(14) Writing has the meaning given in Section 531.3101(2).

99

Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project

100

Chapter 541: Offenses Against the Family

CHAPTER 541. OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY
Section 541.4101.
Section 541.4102.
Section 541.4103.
Section 541.4104.
Section 541.4105.
Section 541.4106.
Section 541.4107.
Section 541.4108.
Section 541.4109.
Section 541.4110.

Bigamy
Incest
Concealing Birth of Infant
Abandonment of Minor
Nonsupport
Endangering the Welfare of a Minor
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
Unlawful Adoption Fees and Representation
Abortion
Definitions

______________

Section 541.4101. Bigamy
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if the person:
(a) purports to marry another person knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing
the other person has a husband or wife; or
(b) cohabits in this Commonwealth after such a purported marriage, whether the
purported marriage was conducted in this Commonwealth or elsewhere.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 541.4102. Incest
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he has sexual intercourse or deviate
sexual intercourse with a person he knows to be related to him, without regard to legitimacy, as:
(a) by blood relationship of either the whole or half blood or by adoption,
(i) his ancestor or descendant,
(ii) his brother or sister,
(iii) his uncle or aunt, or
(iv) his nephew or niece; or
(b) his stepchild or stepparent, while the marriage creating that relationship lasts.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class C felony.

Section 541.4103. Concealing Birth of Infant
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he conceals the corpse of a newborn
child with intent to conceal the fact of its birth or to prevent a determination of whether it was born
dead or alive.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
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Section 541.4104. Abandonment of Minor
(1) Offense Defined. A person is commits an offense if:
(a) as a parent, guardian, or other person legally charged with the care or custody
of a minor,
(b) he deserts the minor in any place:
(i) under circumstances endangering his life or health, and
(ii) with intent to abandon him.
(2) Definition. Minor means any person who has not reached the age of majority as
defined in KRS 2.015.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 541.4105. Nonsupport
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) persistently fails to provide support:
(i) to a minor, a child adjudged mentally disabled or an indigent spouse,
(ii) that he can reasonably provide, and
(iii) that he knows he has a duty to provide; or
(b) being subject to a court order to pay an amount for the support of a minor
child:
(i) is delinquent in meeting the full obligation established by such order,

(ii) has been so delinquent for a period of at least two (2)
months duration.

(2) Duty to Child and Spouse. A person has a duty to provide support for an indigent
spouse, a minor child, or a child adjudged mentally disabled.
(3) Grading.
(a) The offense is a Class D felony if the person is in arrears by more than one
thousand dollars ($5,000).
(b) The offense is a Class E felony if:
(i) the person is in arrears by more than one thousand dollars ($1,000); or
(ii) the person has made no support payment for six (6) consecutive months;
or
(iii) the persons nonsupport has placed the dependent in destitute circumstances.
(c) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
(4) Permissive Inferences.
(a) The factfinder may infer that, if the person satisfies the requirements of duty
under Subsection (2), the person knows he has such duty and satisfies Subsection (1)(a)(iii).
(b) For the purposes of Subsection (3)(a)(iii), the factfinder may infer that a
dependent is in destitute circumstances if the dependent is a recipient of public assistance
[as defined in KRS 205.010].
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Section 541.4106. Endangering the Welfare of a Minor
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) is a parent, guardian, or other person legally charged with the care or custody
of a minor, and
(b) fails or refuses to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such child to
prevent him from becoming a neglected, dependent, or delinquent child.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 541.4107. Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) not being a retail licensee or a parent or guardian of the minor, he knowingly
sells, gives, purchases, or procures any alcoholic or malt beverage for a minor; or
(b) knowingly induces, assists, or causes a minor to commit an offense; or
(c) knowingly induces, assists, or causes a minor to become a habitual truant; or
(d) persistently and knowingly induces, assists, or causes a minor to disobey his
parent or guardian.
(2) Defense. It is an affirmative defense to liability under Subsection (1)(a) that:
(a) the sale was induced by the use of false, fraudulent, or altered identification
papers or other documents, and
(b) the appearance and character of the purchaser were such that his age could
not have been ascertained by any other means, and
(c) the purchasers appearance and character indicated strongly that he was of
legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages.
(3) Grading.
(a) An offense under Subsection (1)(b), where the illegal activity is any felony, is
a Class D felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 541.4108. Unlawful Adoption Fees and Representation
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) represents both the biological parents and the prospective adoptive parents in
an adoption proceeding, or
(b) being an adoptive parent, proposed adoptive parent, agency, or intermediary,
pays the attorneys fees of a biological parent for any purpose related to an adoption
action except as approved by the court.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
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Section 541.4109. Abortion
A person violating the requirements of KRS Sections 311.715 through 311.820 shall be
subject to the penalties provided in KRS Sections 311.990 and 311.992.

Section 541.4110. Definitions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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Deviate sexual intercourse has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(a).
Minor has the meaning given in Section 541.4104(2).
Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
Sexual intercourse has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(d).
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CHAPTER 551. BRIBERY AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT OFFENSES
Section 551.5101.
Section 551.5102.
Section 551.5103.
Section 551.5104.
Section 551.5105.

Bribery
Unlawful Compensation of a Public Servant
Official Misconduct
Misuse of Confidential Information
Definitions

______________

Section 551.5101. Bribery
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a public
servant with the intent to influence the public servants vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of
discretion, or other action in his official capacity as a public servant; or
(b) while a public servant, he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary
benefit upon an agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of
discretion, or other action as a public servant will thereby be influenced.
(2) Definitions
(a) Pecuniary benefit means benefit in the form of money, property, commercial
interests, or anything else the primary significance of which is economic gain.
(b) Public servant means:
(i) any employee who is authorized to perform any official function on
behalf of, and is paid by, the United States or this Commonwealth or any of its
political subdivisions or governmental instrumentalities; or
(ii) any officer who is elected to office pursuant to statute, or who is
appointed to an office which is established, and the qualifications and duties of
which are prescribed, by statute, to discharge a public duty for the United States
or this Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions or governmental
instrumentalities; or
(iii) any person exercising the functions of any public employee or officer
described in Subsections (a) or (b); or
(iv) any person participating as advisor, consultant, or otherwise for any
governmental unit or instrumentality, but not including witnesses; or
(v) any person elected, appointed, or designated to become a public servant
although not yet occupying that position.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class C felony.
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Section 551.5102. Unlawful Compensation of a Public Servant
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if (i) he offers or pays a pecuniary
benefit to a public servant for, or (ii) being a public servant, he requests or accepts a pecuniary
benefit for:
(a) the performance of an official action knowing that the public servant is required
to perform that action without compensation or at a lower level of compensation, or
(b) giving advice or other assistance in preparing a bill, contract, claim, or other
transaction or proposal as to which he knows that the public servant is likely to have an
official discretion to exercise.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 551.5103. Official Misconduct
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, being a public servant, he knowingly:
(a) commits an act relating to his office that constitutes an unauthorized exercise of
his official functions; or
(b) refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law or clearly inherent in
the nature of his office; or
(c) violates any statute or lawfully adopted rule or regulation relating to his office.
(2) Grading.
(a) The offense is a Class D felony if the public servant intends:
(i) to obtain or confer a benefit, or
(ii) to injure another person, or
(iii) to deprive another person of a benefit.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor

Section 551.5104. Misuse of Confidential Information
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, being a public servant, in
contemplation of official action by himself or by a governmental unit with which he is associated, or
in reliance on information to which he has access in his official capacity and which has not been
made public, he:
(a) accepts or agrees to accept a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction or
enterprise that may be affected by such information or official action; or
(b) speculates or wagers on the basis of such information or official action.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.
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Section 551.5105. Definitions
(1) Benefit has the meaning given in Section 531.3114(2).
(2) Pecuniary benefit has the meaning given in Section 551.5101(2)(a).
(3) Public servant has the meaning given in Section 551.5101(2)(b).
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CHAPTER 552. PERJURY AND OTHER OFFICIAL FALSIFICATION OFFENSES
Section 552.5201.
Section 552.5202.
Section 552.5203.
Section 552.5204.
Section 552.5205.
Section 552.5206.

Perjury and False Swearing
Unsworn Falsification to Authorities
False Reporting
Impersonating a Public Servant
Tampering with Public Records
Definitions

______________

Section 552.5201. Perjury and False Swearing
(1) Offense Defined: Perjury. A person commits an offense if he makes a material false
statement that he does not believe to be true:
(a) in any official proceeding under an oath required or authorized by law, or
(b) in a subscribed writing for which an oath is required or authorized by law, with
the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official functions.
(2) Offense Defined: False Swearing. A person commits an offense if he makes a false
statement under oath, required or authorized by law, that he does not believe to be true.
(3) Exception: Retraction. The offense under Subsection (1) is not committed if the
person retracted the falsification in the course of the proceeding in which it was made before such
false statement substantially affected the proceeding and before it became manifest that its falsity
was or would be exposed.
(4) Exception: Denial of Guilt. The offense is not committed if the defendants false
statement is a plea of not guilty in a previous criminal trial.
(5) Definitions.
(a) Material false statement means any false statement, regardless of its
admissibility under the rules of evidence, that could have affected the outcome of the
proceeding.
(b) Oath means an affirmation or other legally authorized manner of attesting to
the truth of a statement. A written statement shall be treated as if made under oath when:
(i) the statement was made on or pursuant to a form bearing notice, required
or authorized by law, that false statements made therein are punishable; or
(ii) the document recites that the statement was made under oath, and:
(A) the declarant was aware of such recitation at the time he made
the statement, or
(B) the declarant intended that the statement be represented as
sworn, or
(C) the statement was in fact so represented by its delivery or
utterance with the signed jurat of an officer authorized to administer oaths
appended thereto.
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(c) Official proceeding means a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial,

administrative, or other governmental agency or official authorized to hear evidence under
oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking
testimony or depositions in any such proceeding.
(d) Required or authorized by law means the oath is provided for by statute,
regulation, court rule, or otherwise by law.
(e) Statement means any representation, but includes a representation of opinion,
belief, or other state of mind only if the representation clearly relates to state of mind apart
from or in addition to any facts that are the subject of the representation.
(6) Inconsistent Statements. The offense is committed if a person makes [irreconcilably]40
inconsistent statements under oath, even if the prosecution cannot prove which statement was false
and not believed to be true by the defendant. If the nature of the different statements would
provide different grades of the offense under Subsection (9), the grade of an offense proven under
this Subsection shall be the lesser of the grades.
(7) Corroboration. Except as provided by Subsection (6), falsity of a statement may not
be established solely through contradiction by the testimony of a single witness.
(8) Certain Irregularities No Defense. It is not a defense to prosecution under this Section
that:
(a) the oath or affirmation was administered or taken in an irregular manner or that
the declarant was not competent to make the statement, or
(b) the court in which the acts constituting the offense were committed lacked
jurisdiction over the person of the accused or the subject matter.
(9) Grading.
(a) The offense under Subsection (1)(a) is a Class D felony.
(b) The offense under Subsection (1)(b) is a Class E felony.
(c) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Issue: Should Subsection 5201(6), which explicitly allows liability where two or more mutually
inconsistent statements are made under oath, be limited to instances where the statements are irreconcilably inconsistent?
Con: Where a witness makes two or more statements under oath that are inconsistent with one
another, one of them must be a lie and therefore perjury. The prosecution should not be required to prove
which of the statements is a lie. If the inconsistent statements are made in the course of a single proceeding,
the witness would have the opportunity to retract one of the statements and thus avoid liability, as Section
5201(3) provides. If the witness does not avail himself of this opportunity, he should be liable for perjury.
Pro: Inconsistent statements are the norm in the trial of a case, including police officer witnesses.
Prosecutors should not be allowed to simply put up two inconsistent statements in order to be able to prove
perjury. If this shortcut to prosecution is allowed, it ought to be limited to situations where it is clear that there
is no way to reconcile the statements that are in apparent conflict.
Reporter: No recommendation.
40
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Section 552.5202. Unsworn Falsification to Authorities
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, with an intent to mislead a
public servant in the performance of his duty, he:
(a) makes a material false written statement that he does not believe to be true in
an application for any pecuniary or other benefit or in a record required by law to be
submitted to any governmental agency, or
(b) submits or invites reliance on any writing that he knows to be forged, or
(c) submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map, boundary mark, or
other object he knows to be false.
(2) Exception: Denial of Guilt. The offense is not committed if the defendants false
statement is a plea of not guilty in a previous criminal trial.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 552.5203. False Reporting
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a)
(i) after having been warned that giving a false name or address would be
criminal,
(ii) he gives a false name or address to a peace officer who has asked for
the same in the lawful discharge of his official duties,
(iii) with the intent to mislead the officer as to his identity; or
(b) he knowingly causes a false alarm of fire or other emergency to be transmitted
to or within any organization, official or volunteer, that deals with emergencies involving
danger to life or property; or
(c) he reports to law enforcement authorities an offense or incident within their
official concern knowing that it did not occur; or
(d) he furnishes law enforcement authorities with information allegedly relating to
an offense or incident within their official concern when he knows he has no information
relating to such offense or incident; or
(e) he knowingly gives false information to any law enforcement authority with
intent to implicate another; or
(f) he initiates or circulates a report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending
occurrence of a fire or other emergency under circumstances likely to cause public
inconvenience or alarm when he knows the information reported, conveyed, or circulated
is false or baseless.
(2) Grading.
(a) The offense under Subsection (1)(a) is a Class B misdemeanor.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
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Section 552.5204. Impersonating a Public Servant
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if
(a) he pretends to:
(i) be a public servant, or
(ii) represent a public agency, or
(iii) act with the authority or approval of a public agency,
(b) with intent to induce another to:
(i) submit to such pretended official authority, or
(ii) otherwise act in reliance upon that pretense to his prejudice
(2) Grading.
(a) If the person impersonates a peace officer, the offense is a Class D felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 552.5205. Tampering with Public Records
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he knowingly makes a false entry in or falsely alters any public record, or
(b) knowing he lacks the authority to do so, he intentionally destroys, mutilates,
conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the availability of any public record, or
(c) knowing he lacks the authority to retain it, he intentionally refuses to deliver up
a public record in his possession upon proper request of a public servant lawfully entitled
to receive such record for examination or other purposes.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 552.5206. Definitions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
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Law enforcement authority has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
Material false statement has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(a).
Oath has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(b).
Official proceeding has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(c).
Peace officer has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
Public servant has the meaning given in Section 551.5101(2)(b).
Required or authorized by law has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(d).
Statement has the meaning given in Section 552.5201(5)(e).
Writing has the meaning given in Section 531.3101(2).
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CHAPTER 553. INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
Section 553.5301.
Section 553.5302.
Section 553.5303.
Section 553.5304.
Section 553.5305.
Section 553.5306.
Section 553.5307.
Section 553.5308.
Section 553.5309.
Section 553.5310.
Section 553.5311.
Section 553.5312.
Section 553.5313.
Section 553.5314.
Section 553.5315.
Section 553.5316.

Obstructing Governmental Operations
Compounding a Crime
Hindering Prosecution or Apprehension
Fleeing or Evading Police
Interfering with or Resisting a Police Officer
Escape
Promoting or Possessing Contraband
Failure to Appear
Bribing a Witness
Intimidating, Harassing, or Tampering with a Participant in the Legal
Process
Retaliating Against a Participant in the Legal Process
Bribery of, or Improper Communication With, a Juror
Tampering with Physical Evidence
Simulating Legal Process
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Definitions

______________

Section 553.5301. Obstructing Governmental Operations
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he intentionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders the performance of a lawful
governmental function
(b) by using or threatening to use violence, force, or physical interference.
(2) Definition. Governmental function means any activity that a public servant is legally
authorized to undertake on behalf of the governmental unit that he serves.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.41

Section 553.5302. Compounding a Crime
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit upon an agreement or
understanding that he will refrain from initiating a prosecution for a crime; or

The Working Group determined that the specialized offense of Assault on a Service Animal was
unnecessary because the conduct was already covered by a variety of other offenses in this Chapter. If such
41
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(b) he confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon another person upon
agreement or understanding that such other person will refrain from initiating a prosecution
for a crime.
(2) Defense. It is a defense that the benefit did not exceed an amount that the defendant
reasonably believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused by the offense.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

an offense were added to the Penal Code, it might look something like the following:

Section 553.53__. Assault on a Service Animal
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he intentionally causes physical injury
to what he knows is a service animal, whether the animal is on or off duty at the time of the offense.
(2) Definition. Service animal includes a:
(a) bomb detection dog, which means a dog that is trained to locate bombs or
explosives by scent;
(b) narcotic detection dog, which means a dog that is trained to locate narcotics
by scent;
(c) patrol dog, which means a dog that is trained to protect a peace officer and to
apprehend a person;
(d) tracking dog, which means a dog that is trained to track and find a missing
person, escaped inmate, or fleeing felon;
(e) search and rescue dog, which means a dog that is trained to locate lost or
missing persons, victims of natural or man-made disasters, and human bodies;
(f) accelerant detection dog, which means a dog that is trained for accelerant
detection, commonly referred to as arson canines;
(g) cadaver dog, which means a dog that is trained to find human remains;
(h) assistance dog, which means any dog that is trained to meet the requirements
of KRS 258.500;
(i) Any dog that is trained in more than one (1) of the disciplines specified in
paragraphs (a) to (h) of this subsection; or
(j) Police horse, which means any horse that is owned, or the service of which is
employed, by a law enforcement agency for the principal purpose of aiding in detection of
criminal activity, enforcement of laws, and apprehension of offenders.
(3) Grading.
(a) If the person intentionally causes the death of the service animal, or causes
such physical injury that it becomes physically incapable of ever returning to service, the
offense is a Class E felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
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Section 553.5303. Hindering Prosecution or Apprehension
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) with the intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment
of another who is being sought in connection with the commission of an offense,
(b) he:
(i) harbors or conceals such person; or
(ii) warns such person of impending discovery or apprehension, except
that this does not apply to a warning given in connection with an effort to bring
another into compliance with law; or
(iii) provides such person with money, transportation, dangerous instrument,
disguise, or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension; or
(iv) prevents or obstructs, by means of force, deception, or intimidation,
anyone from performing an act that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of
such person; or
(v) provides false information to a law enforcement authority; or
(vi) suppresses by an act of concealment, alteration, or destruction any
physical evidence that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person.
(2) Defense. It is a defense that the accused is the spouse, parent, child, brother, sister,
grandparent, or grandchild of the person whose discovery or apprehension he sought to prevent.
(3) Grading.
(a) If the person assisted is being sought in connection with a Class X felony or
Class A felony, the offense is a Class D felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 553.5304. Fleeing or Evading Peace Officer
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) with intent to elude or flee,
(b) he recklessly disobeys a direction to stop, given by a person he knows to be a
peace officer.
(2) Grading.
(a) The offense is a Class D felony if, by fleeing or eluding, the person is the cause
of, or creates a substantial risk of, serious physical injury or death to another person or
substantial damage to anothers property.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor, except that
(c) the offense is a Class C misdemeanor if the persons conduct involves only
failing to comply with a directive of a traffic control officer.
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Section 553.5305. Interfering with or Resisting a Peace Officer
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) knowing a peace officer is acting within the scope of his official duties,
(b) he intentionally acts to interfere with or resist the performance of such duties
by:
(i) using or threatening to use physical force or violence against the peace
officer or another, or
(ii) using any other means to create a substantial risk of causing physical
injury to the peace officer or another, or
(iii) any other means.
(2) Grading.
(a) If the conduct includes removing from or depriving the officer of use of a
firearm or other deadly weapon, the offense is a Class D felony.
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(a), the offense under Subsections (1)(b)(i)
and (ii) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) Otherwise the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 553.5306. Escape
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he escapes from a detention facility
or from penal custody.
(2) Definitions.
(a) Detention facility means any building and its premises used for the confinement
of a person:
(i) charged with or convicted of an offense; or
(ii) alleged or found to be delinquent; or
(iii) held for extradition or as a material witness; or
(iv) otherwise confined pursuant to an order of court for law enforcement
purposes.
(b) Escape means departure from penal custody or the detention facility in
which a person is held or detained when the departure is not permitted, or failure to return
to penal custody or detention following a temporary leave granted for a specific purpose
or for a limited period.
(c) Penal custody means restraint by a law enforcement authority pursuant to
lawful arrest, detention, or an order of court for law enforcement purposes, but does not
include supervision of probation or parole or constraint incidental to release on bail.
(3) Grading.
(a) If the escape is by use of force or threat of force, the offense is a Class C
felony.
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(b) If the escape is from a detention facility other than a residence used to impose
home incarceration, the offense is a Class D felony.
(c) If the escape is from penal custody based upon charge or conviction for a
felony, the offense is a Class E felony.
(d) Otherwise the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 553.5307. Promoting or Possessing Contraband
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he knowingly introduces contraband into a detention facility; or
(b) being a person confined in a detention facility, he knowingly makes, obtains, or
possesses contraband.
(2) Definitions.
(a) Contraband means any article or thing that a person confined in a detention
facility is prohibited from obtaining or possessing by statute, departmental regulation, or
posted institutional rule or order.
(b) Dangerous contraband means contraband that is capable of use to endanger
the safety or security of a detention facility or persons therein, including dangerous
instruments, any controlled substances, any quantity of an alcoholic beverage, any quantity
of marijuana, and saws, files, and similar metal cutting instruments.
(3) Grading.
(a) If involving dangerous contraband, the offense is a Class D felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 553.5308. Failure to Appear
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) having been released from penal custody by court order, with or without bail,
upon condition that he subsequently appear at a specified time and place,
(b) he intentionally fails to appear at that time and place.
(2) Defense. It is a defense that the defendant proves that his failure to appear was
unavoidable and due to circumstances beyond his control.
(3) Grading.
(a) If release is from a felony charge, the offense is a Class D felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 553.5309. Bribing a Witness
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he:
(i) offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a witness
or a person he believes may be called as a witness in any official proceeding, or
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(ii) being a witness or a person who may be called as a witness in any
official proceeding, he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit,
(b) upon an agreement or understanding that such will:
(i) influence testimony; or
(ii) induce the avoidance of legal process summoning the person to testify;
or
(iii) induce the person to absent himself from an official proceeding to
which he has been legally summoned.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 553.5310. Intimidating, Harassing, or Tampering with a Participant
in the Legal Process
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) with intent to:
(i) influence the testimony, vote, decision, or opinion of the participant in
the legal process, or
(ii) induce the participant in the legal process to avoid legal process
summoning him to testify, or
(iii) induce the participant in the legal process to absent himself from an
official proceeding to which he has been legally summoned, or
(iv) induce the participant in the legal process to withhold a record,
document, or other object from an official proceeding, or
(v) induce the participant in the legal process to alter, destroy, mutilate, or
conceal an object in order to impair the objects integrity or availability for use in
an official proceeding, or
(vi) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement
authority or judge of information relating to the possible commission of an offense
or a violation of conditions of probation, parole, or release pending judicial
proceedings, or
(vii) hinder, delay, or prevent law enforcement authorities from seeking
the arrest of another person in connection with an offense,
(b) he:
(i) uses physical force or makes a threat of violence against:
(A) a participant in the legal process, or
(B) a person he believes may be called as a witness in any official
proceeding, or
(C) an immediate family member of a person described in
Subsection (1)(b)(i)(A) or (B); or
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(ii) induces the participant in the legal process to absent himself or otherwise
avoid appearing or testifying at the official proceeding in order to influence the
outcome thereby; or
(iii) knowingly makes any false statement, practices any fraud or deceit,
or engages in misleading or unlawful conduct.
(2) No Defense. It is no defense that:
(a) an official proceeding is not pending or about to be instituted at the time of the
offense; or
(b) the testimony, record, document or other object is not admissible in evidence
or free of a claim of privilege.
(3) Definitions.
(a) Judge means:
(i) any current justice or judge of the Court of Justice, or
(ii) a trial commissioner of the Court of Justice, or
(iii) any person serving as a judge at a trial or judicial proceeding of or
authorized by the Court of Justice.
(b) Juror means a person who is a member of any impaneled jury, including a
grand jury, or any person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective
juror.
(c) Participant in the legal process means any judge, prosecutor, attorney
defending a criminal case, juror, or witness, and includes persons who have been elected
or appointed, but have not yet taken office.
(d) Prosecutor means a Commonwealths attorney, assistant Commonwealths
attorney, county attorney, assistant county attorney, attorney general, deputy attorney
general, assistant attorney general, or special prosecutor appointed pursuant to law.
(e) Threat of violence means any direct threat to cause the death of, or physical
injury to, a person.
(f) Witness means any person who has testified, has been called to testify, is
testifying, or may be called to testify, in an official proceeding.
(4) Grading.
(a) The offense under Subsection (1)(b)(i) is a Class D felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class E felony.

Section 553.5311. Retaliating Against a Participant in the Legal Process
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he engages or threatens to engage in conduct causing or intended to cause
(i) physical injury to, or
(ii) damage to the tangible property of, a current or former participant in
the legal process or a person he believes may be called as a witness in any official
proceeding,
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(b) because of the current or former participants or the potential witnesss:
(i) attending an official proceeding, or giving or producing any testimony,
record, document, or other object produced at such a proceeding, or
(ii) giving information to a law enforcement authority relating to the possible
commission of an offense or a violation of conditions of probation, parole, or
release pending judicial proceedings, or
(iii) vote, decision, or opinion, or
(iv) performance of his or her duty.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 553.5312. Bribery of, or Improper Communication with, a Juror
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) with intent to influence the persons vote, opinion, decision, or other action as
a juror, he offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a juror; or
(b) he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit upon an agreement
or understanding that his vote, opinion, decision, or other action as a juror will thereby be
influenced; or
(c) with intent to influence the persons vote, opinion, decision, or other action as
a juror, he communicates, directly or indirectly, with a juror other than as part of the
proceedings in the trial of the case.
(2) Grading.
(a) The offense under Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) is a Class D felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class E felony. 42

Section 553.5313. Tampering with Physical Evidence
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters physical evidence that he
believes is to be used in an official proceeding, with intent to impair its verity or availability
in the official proceeding; or

Issue: Should all forms of this offense be graded the same, as a Class D felony?
Con: Cases involving conferring a pecuniary benefit, under Subsection (1)(a), are more serious
offenses than communications to influence that do not involve conferring a pecuniary benefit. They present
a greater danger to the integrity of the system and are a more crass attempt to manipulate than use of nonpecuniary means, such as an appeal to friendship.
Pro: All forms of improper influence undercut the integrity of jury process and reflect an equally
harmful violation.
Reporter: No recommendation.
42
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(b) fabricates any physical evidence with intent that it be introduced in an official
proceeding or offers any physical evidence, knowing it to be fabricated or altered.
(2) Definitions. Physical evidence means any article, object, document, record, or
other thing of physical substance.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class D felony.

Section 553.5314. Simulating Legal Process
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he delivers to another a request for the payment of money on behalf of a
creditor,
(b) knowing that in form and substance it simulates a legal process issued by a
court of this state.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 553.5315. Unauthorized Practice of Law
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he engages in the practice of law in
violation of the rules by which the Supreme Court authorizes the practice of law.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 553.5316. Definitions
(1) Benefit has the meaning given in Section 531.3114(2).
(2) Contraband has the meaning given in Section 531.5307(2)(a).
(3) Dangerous contraband has the meaning given in Section 531.5307(2)(b).
(4) Dangerous instrument has the meaning given in Section 515.1501(3)(a).
(5) Deadly weapon has the meaning given in Section 515.1501(3)(b).
(6) Detention facility has the meaning given in Section 531.5306(2)(a).
(7) Escape has the meaning given in Section 531.5306(2)(b).
(8) Governmental function has the meaning given in Section 531.5301(2).
(9) Judge has the meaning given in Section 531.5310(3)(a).
(10) Juror has the meaning given in Section 531.5310(3)(b).
(11) Law enforcement authority has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(12) Official proceeding has the meaning given in Section 531.5201(5)(c).
(13) Participant in the legal process has the meaning given in Section 531.5310(3)(c).
(14) Peace officer has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(15) Pecuniary benefit has the meaning given in Section 551.5101(2)(a).
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(16) Penal custody has the meaning given in Section 531.5306(2)(c).
(17) Physical evidence has the meaning given in Section 531.5313(2).
(18) Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(19) Prosecutor has the meaning given in Section 531.5310(3)(d).
(20) Public servant has the meaning given in Section 551.5101(2)(b).
(21) Reasonable belief has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(22) Serious physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(24) Threat of violence has the meaning given in Section 531.5310(3)(e).
(25) Witness has the meaning given in Section 531.5310(3)(f).
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CHAPTER 561. PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY OFFENSES
Section 561.6101.
Section 561.6102.
Section 561.6103.
Section 561.6104.
Section 561.6105.
Section 561.6106.
Section 561.6107.
Section 561.6108.
Section 561.6109.
Section 561.6110.
Section 561.6111.
Section 561.6112.
Section 561.6113.

Rioting
Inciting to Riot
Unlawful Assembly
Failure to Disperse
Disorderly Conduct
Harassment
Harassing Communications
Loitering
Public Intoxication
Obstructing a Highway or Other Public Passage
Disrupting Meetings and Processions
Interfering with Communications
Definitions

______________

Section 561.6101. Rioting
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of an offense if he knowingly participates in a riot.
(2) Riot means a public disturbance involving an assemblage of 5 or more persons that
by tumultuous and violent conduct:
(a) creates grave danger of physical injury to persons or damage to property, or
(b) substantially obstructs law enforcement or other governmental function.
(3) Grading.
(a) The offense is a Class D felony if in the course of, and as a result of, such riot:
(i) a person other than one of the participants suffers physical injury or
(ii) substantial property damage occurs.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 561.6102. Inciting to Riot
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he incites or urges 5 or more
persons to create or engage in a riot.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 561.6103. Unlawful Assembly
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he assembles with 5 or more persons for the purpose of engaging or preparing
to engage with them in a riot, or
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(b) being present at an assembly that either has or develops such a purpose, he remains there with intent to advance that purpose.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
Section 561.6104. Failure to Disperse
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he participates with 2 or more persons in a course of disorderly conduct likely
to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, and
(b) intentionally refuses to disperse when ordered to do so by a law enforcement
authority.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 561.6105. Disorderly Conduct
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, in a public place, while reckless as
to causing public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, he:
(a) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior, or
(b) makes unreasonable noise, or
(c) refuses to obey an official order to disperse issued to maintain public safety in
dangerous proximity to a fire, hazard, or other emergency, or
(d) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act that serves no
legitimate purpose.
(2) Definition. Public place means a place to which the public or a substantial group of
persons has access and includes highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusements, parks, places of business, playgrounds, and hallways, lobbies, and other portions of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence. An act
is deemed to occur in a public place if it produces its offensive or proscribed consequences in a
public place.
(3) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 561.6106. Harassment
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, with intent to harass, annoy, or
alarm another person, he:
(a) strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects the person to physical contact, or
(b) attempts or threatens to strike, shove, kick, or otherwise subject the person to
physical contact, or
(c) in a public place, makes an offensively coarse utterance, gesture, or display, or
addresses abusive language to any person present, or
(d) follows a person in or about a public place or places, or
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(e) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts that alarm or seriously
annoy such other person and that serve no legitimate purpose.
(2) Grading.
(a) The offense under Subsection (1)(a) is a Class B misdemeanor.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a violation.

Section 561.6107. Harassing Communications
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, with intent to harass, annoy, or
alarm another person he:
(a) communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telegraph,
mail, or any other form of communication in a manner that causes annoyance or alarm and
serves no purpose of legitimate communication, or
(b) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, with no purpose
of legitimate communication.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 561.6108. Loitering
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) loiters or remains in a public place for the purpose of unlawful gambling with
cards, dice, or other gambling paraphernalia, or
(b) loiters or remains in a public place for the purpose of unlawfully using a controlled
substance, or
[(c) loiters or remains in or about a school, not having any reason or relationship
involving custody of or responsibility for a pupil or student or any other specific legitimate
reason for being there, and not having written permission from anyone authorized to grant
the same, or]
[(d) loiters or remains in any transportation facility, unless specifically authorized
to do so, for the purpose of soliciting or engaging in any business, trade or commercial
transactions involving the sale of merchandise or services.] 43
Issue: Should Subsections 6108(1)(c) and (1)(d) be deleted?
Con: These subsections embody current law. See KRS 525.090(1)(c)&(1)(d). Presumably the legislature
judged that these public places were of special concern and/or deserving of special protection. Also, the
offense is only a violation.
Pro: Unlike the preceding two subsections, subsections (1)(c) and (1)(d) are problematic in that they
require no specific unlawful purpose.
Further, one might question why these two specific locations are singled out. As a policy matter, there
may be many other places that similar in relevant respects to a university or transportation facility, but are not
identified as locales at which for criminal liability will attach. Without an accompanying criminal trespass, the
conduct identified in these subsections should not (and perhaps cannot constitutionally) be criminalized.
Reporter: No recommendation.
43
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(2) Definition. Transportation facility means any conveyance, premises, or place used
for or in connection with public passenger transportation by air, railroad, motor vehicle, or any
other method. It includes aircraft, watercraft, railroad cars, buses, and air, boat, railroad, and bus
terminals and stations and all appurtenances thereto.
(3) Grading. The offense is a violation.

Section 561.6109. Public Intoxication
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) he appears in a public place manifestly under the influence of alcohol, a controlled
substance, or other intoxicating substance, not therapeutically administered,
(b) to the degree that he may endanger himself or other persons or property, or
unreasonably annoy persons in his vicinity.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class C misdemeanor. 44

Section 561.6110. Obstructing a Highway or Other Public Passage
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:

(a) having no legal privilege to do so, he, alone or with other persons, recklessly
renders any highway or public passage impassable without unreasonable inconvenience or
hazard, or
(b) being a person in a gathering, he refuses to obey a reasonable official request
or order to move:
(i) to prevent obstruction of a highway or other public passage, or
(ii) to maintain public safety by dispersing those gathered in dangerous
proximity to a fire or other hazard.

Issue: Should the offense be mitigated if the source of the intoxication is alcohol?
Against an alcohol mitigation: No matter what the source of the public intoxication  whether it is
caused by alcohol or something else  the societal injury is the same. Grading as a Class C Misdemeanor
seems appropriate because it would authorize brief incarceration, if needed. (Note that chronic offenders can
be dealt with more severely, because Section 905 authorizes them to dealt with as a Class B Misdemeanor.)
For an alcohol mitigation: Alcohol intoxication ought to be less serious than other intoxications
because, rightly or wrongly, our society has authorized the use of intoxicating alcohol.
For exempting alcohol intoxication from the offense altogether: Most of those who come before the
courts for public alcohol intoxication are alcoholics and should be treated for the disease rather than punished.
Such intoxication should not be an offense, as long as there is some other means by which the police may take
custody of such persons for their own safety.
Reporter: No recommendation.
44
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(2) Exception. No person shall be deemed guilty of recklessly rendering a passage
impassable in violation of Subsection (1)(a) solely because of a gathering of persons to hear him
speak or otherwise communicate, or solely because of being a member of such a gathering.
(3) Reasonableness of Order to Move. An order to move, addressed to a person whose
speech or other lawful behavior attracts an obstructing audience, shall not be deemed reasonable
if the obstruction can be readily remedied by control by peace officers of the size or location of the
gathering.
(4) Grading.
(a) If the person persists after warning by a peace officer, the offense is a Class B
misdemeanor.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a violation.

Section 561.6111. Disrupting Meetings and Processions
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if:
(a) with intent to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, procession, or gathering,
(b) he:
(i) does any act tending to obstruct or interfere with it physically, or
(ii) makes any utterance, gesture, or display designed to outrage the
sensibilities of the group.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 561.6112. Interfering with Communications
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he knowingly prevents, obstructs, or
delays the sending, transmission, conveyance, or delivery of any message, communication, or data
through any telegraph, telephone, internet, or any other mode of communication.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor

Section 561.6113. Definitions
(1) Governmental function has the meaning given in Section 553.5301(2).
(2) Law enforcement authority has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(3) Peace officer has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(4) Physical injury has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(5) Public place has the meaning given in Section 561.6105(2).
(6) Riot has the meaning given in Section 561.6101(2).
(7) School has the meaning given in Section 500.107.
(8) Transportation facility has the meaning given in Section 561.6108(2).

127

Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project

128

Chapter 562: Public Indecency Offenses

CHAPTER 562. PUBLIC INDECENCY OFFENSES
Section 562.6201.
Section 562.6202.
Section 562.6203.
Section 562.6204.
Section 562.6205.
Section 562.6206.
Section 562.6207.
Section 562.6208.
Section 562.6209.

Indecent Exposure
Causing or Promoting a Sexual Performance by a Minor
Distribution of Obscenity
Prostitution or Patronizing a Prostitute; Loitering for a Sexual Act
Permitting Prostitution
Promoting, Supporting, or Profiting from Prostitution
Cruelty to Animals
Desecration of Venerated Objects
Definitions

______________

Section 562.6201. Indecent Exposure
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he intentionally exposes his genitals
under circumstances in which he knows or should know his conduct is likely to cause affront or
alarm.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 562.6202. Causing or Promoting a Sexual Performance by a Minor
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) employs, authorizes, or induces a person under the age of 18 years to engage
in, or
(b) produces, directs, or promotes,
a public performance that he knows includes sexual conduct by the minor.
(2) Definitions.
(a) Public performance has the meaning given in Section 531.3116(2).
(b) Sexual conduct has the meaning given in Section 513.1303(2)(b).
(3) Grading. If the minor involved in the sexual performance is:
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(a) less than 16 years old at the time, the offense is a Class [D] 45 felony; or
(b) less than 18 years old at the time, the offense is a Class [E]* felony.

Section 562.6203. Distribution of Obscenity
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he prepares, publishes, advertises,
prints, exhibits, distributes, promotes the distribution, or possesses with intent to distribute or
exhibit any obscene matter.
(2) Definitions.
(a) Distribute means to transfer possession of, whether with or without
consideration.
(b) Matter means any book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed or written
material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial representation
or any statue or other figure, or any recording transcription or mechanical, chemical, or
electrical reproduction or any other articles, equipment, machines, or materials.
(c) Obscene means:
(i) to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the predominant appeal of the matter taken as a whole is to prurient interest in
sexual conduct; and
(ii) the matter depicts or describes the sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way; and
(iii) the matter taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
(iv) Sexual Performance by a Minor. Obscene matter includes any material
portraying sexual conduct by a minor.

45

Issue: Should the grading of this offense be increased one or more grades? Should it be reduced

one grade?
Pro: The offenses are more serious than Class D and E felonies; they should be graded as B and C
felonies.
Con: B felonies include manslaughter and rape. C felonies include reckless killing. A B/C felony
grading is much too high for this offense. It is important to remember that this offense is not the offense that
punishes the damaging effect of such conduct on the minor. That harm is punished by the sexual abuse
offenses in Chapter 513, which take into account the exact nature and effect of the abuse. Those offenses can
be charged and punished in addition to this offense, if their abuse requirements are satisfied. The only point
of this promoting-performance offense is to punish the coarsening of public life that such conduct entails. In
other words, the offense is simply an aggravated form of indecent exposure and distribution of obscenity,
both of which are graded as Class B misdemeanors.
Reporter: No recommendation.
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(d) Promoting the distribution of matter includes:
(i) knowingly requiring, as a condition to a sale, allocation, consignment,
or delivery for resale of any merchandise, that the purchaser or consignee receive
any matter reasonably believed by the purchaser or consignee to be obscene, or
(ii) denying or revoking or threatening to deny or revoke a franchise, or
imposing any penalty, financial or otherwise, because a person fails to accept such
matter or returns such matter.
(3) Permissive Inference. The factfinder may infer from the possession of more than one
copy of obscene matter an intent to distribute that matter.
(4) Exemption. The offense does not include conduct by a person having a bona fide
scientific, educational, governmental, or other similar justification for his offense conduct.
(5) Grading.
(a) If the material portrays the sexual performance of a person that the defendant
knows or reasonably should know is under the age of 18 years, the offense is a Grade D
felony.
(b) If the person:
(i) has in his possession more than one copy of a piece of obscene matter,
or
(ii) distributes obscene matter to a person he knows to be under the age
of 18 years, or
(iii) uses a person he knows to be under the age of 18 years to distribute
obscene matter,
the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
(c) Otherwise the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 562.6204. Prostitution or Patronizing a Prostitute; Loitering for a
Sexual Act
(1) Offense Defined: Prostitution or Patronizing a Prostitute. A person commits an
offense if he pays, accepts, offers, or solicits a fee to perform sexual intercourse or to have sexual
contact.
(2) Offense Defined: Loitering for a Sexual Act. A person commits an offense if he loiters
or remains in a public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution.
(3) Grading.
(a) An offense under Subsection (1) is a Class B misdemeanor.
(b) An offense under Subsection (2) is a Class C misdemeanor.
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Section 562.6205. Permitting Prostitution
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if, having possession or control of
premises and being grossly negligent as to the fact that they are being used for prostitution purposes,
he fails to make reasonable and timely effort to halt or abate such use.
(2) Grading. The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 562.6206. Promoting, Supporting, or Profiting from Prostitution
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he knowingly:
(a) causes or aids a person to engage in prostitution, or
(b) procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, or
(c) provides persons or premises for prostitution purposes, or
(d) operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a prostitution
enterprise, or
(e) engages in any conduct designed to institute, aid, or facilitate an act or enterprise
of prostitution, or
(f) accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement or
understanding that he will share in the proceeds of prostitution activity.
(2) Grading.
(a) If the prostitution is by a person less than 16 years old, the offense is a Class
*46
[C] felony.
(b) If the prostitution is by a person less than 18 years old, the offense is a Class
*
[D] felony.
(c) If the person manages, supervises, controls, or owns, either alone or in
association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business or enterprise
involving prostitution activity by two or more prostitutes, the offense is a Class D felony.
(d) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
(e) If, prior to the commission of the crime, the person knew or had been informed
that he tested positive for the human immunodeficiency virus and could possibly
communicate such disease to another person through sexual activity, the offense is one
grade higher than it would otherwise be.

46
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See the pro-con footnote attached to Section 6202(3).
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Section 562.6207. Cruelty to Animals
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) subjects any animal to cruel or injurious mistreatment, including mutilation,
beating, torturing, tormenting, failing to provide adequate food, drink, space, or health
care, or by any other means, or
(b) participates in any way, including as a spectator or vendor, in a fight among
animals that is arranged for pleasure or profit, or
(c) knowingly causes the death of any animal.
(2) Exceptions. The offense does not include:
(a) causing the death of an animal:
(i) pursuant to a license to hunt, fish, or trap, or
(ii) incident to the processing as food or for other commercial purposes,
or
(iii) for humane purposes, or
(iv) for any other purpose authorized by law; or
(b) activities of animals engaged in hunting, field trials, dog training, or other activities
authorized either by a hunting license or by the Department of Fish and Wildlife.
(3) Grading.
(a) For the owner of the animal, the owner of the property on which a fight is
conducted if the owner knows of the fight, and anyone who participates in the organization
of the fight, a violation under Subsection (1)(b) is a Class E felony.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 562.6208. Desecration of Venerated Objects
(1) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he:
(a) intentionally excavates or disinters human remains for the purpose of commercial
sale or exploitation of the remains themselves or of objects buried contemporaneously
with the remains, or
(b) intentionally treats a corpse in a way that would outrage ordinary family
sensibilities, or
(c) mutilates the graves, monuments, fences, shrubbery, ornaments, grounds, or
buildings in or enclosing any cemetery or place of sepulture, or
(d) violates the grave of any person by destroying, removing, or damaging the
headstone or footstone, or the tomb over the enclosure protecting any grave, or
(e) digs into or plows over or removes any ornament, shrubbery, or flower placed
upon any grave or lot, or
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(f) desecrates any public monument or object or place of worship, including a
military heritage site or object, or
(g) desecrates in a public place the national or state flag or other patriotic or
religious symbol that is an object of veneration by the public or a substantial segment
thereof.
(2) Exception. It is not an offense under this Section to engage in conduct that is specifically
authorized by law.
(3) Grading.
(a) The offense is a Class D felony if:
(i) it violates Subsection (1)(a), or
(ii) it violates Subsection (1)(b) and involves sexual intercourse or deviate
sexual intercourse with the corpse, or
(iii) the desecration is motivated by the race, color, religion, sexual
orientation, or national origin of another individual or group of individuals.
(b) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 562.6209. Definitions
(1) Deviate sexual intercourse has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(a).
(2) Distribute has the meaning given in Section 562.6203(2)(a).
(3) Matter has the meaning given in Section 562.6203(2)(b).
(4) Minor has the meaning given in Section 541.4104(2).
(5) Obscene has the meaning given in Section 562.6203(2)(c).
(6) Public performance has the meaning given in Section 531.3116(2).
(7) Promoting the distribution has the meaning given in Section 562.6203(2)(d).
(8) Public place has the meaning given in Section 561.6105(2).
(9) Sexual conduct has the meaning given in Section 1303(2)(b).
(10) Sexual contact has the meaning given in Section 513.1303(2).
(11) Sexual intercourse has the meaning given in Section 513.1301(2)(d).
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED OFFENSES
ARRANGED BY GRADE
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Kentucky Penal Code:
Table of Proposed Offenses Grouped by Grade

Section

Felony — Class X

511.1101

intentional or knowing killing (1st degree murder)

514.1401 (3)(a)

knowingly restraining another unlawfully (kidnapping), victim dies as a
result

Section

Felony — Class A

511.1102

reckless killing manifesting extreme indifference to human life (2nd degree
murder)

513.1301 (3)(a)

sexual intercourse, victim under 12 years old (aggravated statutory rape)

513.1301 (3)(b)

sexual intercourse by force, or where victim is physically incapacitated, and
serious injury results (aggravated rape)

514.1401 (3)(b)

knowingly restraining another unlawfully (kidnapping), victim suffers
serious injury

522.2201

using fire with intent to damage building while reckless as to building
being inhabited or occupied or serious injury resulting (arson 1st)

522.2205 (1)(b)(i)

knowingly causing catastrophe

137

Section

Felony — Class B

511.1103

acting under extreme emotional disturbance to commit what otherwise
would be murder (manslaughter)

513.1301 (3)(c)

sexual intercourse by force or where victim is physically helpless (rape)

514.1401 (3)(c)

knowingly restraining another unlawfully (kidnapping); intent to ask for
ransom, commit a felony, or use the victim as a hostage

515.1501 (2)(a)(i)

using or threatening use of force in the course of committing a theft
(robbery), victim suffers injury

515.1501 (2)(a)(ii),
(iii)

using or threatening use of force in the course of committing a theft
(robbery), defendant is armed or uses dangerous instrument

521.2110 (1)

theft greater than $1,000,000

522.2202

using fire with intent to (damage another’s building) or (damage any
building to collect insurance) or (being reckless as to occupancy) (arson 2nd)

522.2203 (2)(a)

knowingly using fire and recklessly placing another in danger of death,
manifesting extreme indifference to value of human life

522.2205 (1)(b)(ii)

recklessly causing catastrophe

522.2206(2)(a)

knowingly damaging property of another, loss is greater than $1,000,000

523.2301 (2)(a)

entering building with intent to commit crime (burglary); defendant
(armed with deadly weapon), (causes injury), or (threatens use of dangerous
instrument)

531.3108 (2)

Hiding/destroying property (greater than $1,000,000) subject to a security
interest in order to hinder the enforcement of the interest

531.3109

knowingly trying to keep property (greater than $1,000,000) from creditors
in insolvency

531.3112

fiduciary using property (greater than $1,000,000) in unauthorized manner
involving substantial risk of loss
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Section

Felony — Class C

511.1104

reckless killing (second degree manslaughter)

512.1201

recklessly (or grossly negligently with a deadly weapon) causing injury to
another, four additional aggravating factors (assault)

513.1302 (3)(a)

sexual intercourse, victim is less than 16 and defendant is at least four
years older (statutory rape)

515.1501 (2)(b)

using or threatening use of force in the course of committing a theft
(robbery)

521.2110 (2)

theft greater than $10,000, or property was a firearm, or receiver was in the
business of receiving stolen property

522.2203 (3)(b)

knowingly using fire and recklessly placing (another in danger of injury) or
(building in danger of damage)

522.2206 (2)(a), (g)

recklessly damaging property of another or negligently damaging property
of another with fire, loss is greater than $1,000,000

522.2206 (2)(b)

knowingly damaging property of another, loss is greater than $10,000

523.2301 (2)(b)

entering dwelling with intent to commit crime (burglary)

531.3101 (3)(a)

with intent to deceive, altering the writing of another without authority,
writing is part of an issue of stamps or money (counterfeiting)

531.3108 (2)

Hiding/destroying property (greater than $10,000) subject to a security
interest in order to hinder the enforcement of the interest

531.3109

knowingly trying to keep property (greater than $10,000) from creditors in
insolvency

531.3112

fiduciary using property (greater than $10,000) in unauthorized manner
involving substantial risk of loss

541.4102

sexual intercourse with one known to be an ancestor, descendant, sibling,
or uncle, aun, niece, nephew - includes half / step / adopted children
(incest)

551.5101

offering / accepting pecuniary benefit in exchange for influence with
respect to public official (bribery)

553.5307 (3)(a)

escaping from detention facility or custody (escape), using or threatening
use of force
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562.6202 (3)(a)

inducing a minor to engage in a performance known to include sexual
conduct, victim is under 16 (D felony?)

562.6206 (2)(a)

aiding or facilitating or operating an act or enterprise of prostitution
(promoting prostitution), prostitute is less than 16
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Section

Felony — Class D

511.1105

grossly negligently causing the death of another (grossly negligent murder)

511.1106 (5)(a)

Knowingly aiding or soliciting a suicide and such suicide occurs

512.1201

recklessly (or grossly negligently with a deadly weapon) causing injury to
another, three additional aggravating factors (assault)

512.1202 (2)(a)

recklessly, with extreme indifference to human life, creating a risk of death
or serious injury (aggravated endangerment)

512.1204 (3)(a), (c)

two or more acts of intentional harassment under circumstances that
would cause a reasonable person mental distress, with threat of sexual
contact, injury, or death, if (i) in violation of a protective order, or (ii)
against a former crime victim, or (iii) if previously convicted of crime
against same victim, or (iv) while in possession of a weapon (stalking)

512.1205 (3)(a)

knowingly causing person under 12 or helpless person to suffer cruel
confinement or punishment or be deprived of necessary services

513.1302 (3)(b)

sexual intercourse, victim is mentally incapacitated (rape)

513.1303 (3)(a)

sexual contact, victim is less than 12 (aggravated sexual abuse)

514.1401 (3)(d)

knowingly restraining another unlawfully (unlawful restraint), victim is
exposed to the risk of serious injury

514.1402(2)(b)

knowingly taking or keeping from lawful custody any person entrusted by
authority of law to the custody of another

521.2110 (3)

theft greater than $1,000

522.2205 (2)(b)

recklessly creating a risk of catastrophe with fire or other dangerous means

522.2206 (2)(b),
(g)

recklessly damaging property of another or negligently damaging property
of another with fire, loss is greater than $10,000

522.2206 (2)(c)

knowingly damaging property of another, loss is greater than $1,000

523.2301 (2)(c)

entering building with intent to commit crime (burglary)

531.3101 (3)(b)

with intent to deceive, altering the writing of another without authority
(forgery), writing is a public record

531.3102 (2)(a)

knowingly tampering with a writing with intent to deceive; writing was a
deed, will, contract, or public record

531.3104 (3)(a)

manufacturing or selling of personal identity of another

531.3108 (2)

Hiding/destroying property (greater than $1000) subject to a security
interest in order to hinder the enforcement of the interest
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531.3109

knowingly trying to keep property (greater than $1000) from creditors in
insolvency

531.3111

director of a financial institution knowingly receives investment knowing
that the institution is insolvent

531.3112

fiduciary using property (greater than $1000) in unauthorized manner
involving substantial risk of loss

531.3113

knowingly establishing or operating a business that falsely represents itself
to be a minority business

531.3114

knowingly offering or accepting benefit with understanding that benefit
will influence conduct contrary to employer’s best interests

531.3115

tampering with a publicly exhibited contest

541.4101

person purports to marry another knowing he already is married (bigamy)

541.4104

parent or guardian deserts a minor under circumstances endangering
health with intent to abandon

541.4105 (3)(a)

persistently failing to provide support when under a duty to do so (flagrant
nonsupport), person owes over $5,000

541.4107 (3)(a)

knowingly inducing minor to engage in felony other than sexual or
controlled substances activity

551.5102

offering a pecuniary benefit to public servant for performance of official
act or provision of improper assistance

551.5104

in contemplation of official action, public servant uses nonpublic
information for his benefit

552.5201 (9)(a)

making a material false statement that one does not believe to be true in
an official proceeding (perjury)

552.5204 (2)(a)

impersonating a peace officer

552.5205

knowingly making a false entry on or destroying a public record

553.5303 (3)(a)

with intent to hinder arrest or prosecution, harboring or helping someone
sought in connection with the commission of Class X or Class A felony

553.5304 (3)(a)

with intent to elude, recklessly disobeying order to stop from known police
officer, causing substantial risk of death or injury to another

553.5305 (2)(a)

intentionally resisting arrest (resisting arrest), defendant deprives officer of
his firearm

553.5306 (3)(b)

escaping from detention facility (escape)

553.5307 (3)(a)

knowingly introducing dangerous contraband into a detention facility
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553.5307 (3)(a)

inmate makes or possesses dangerous contraband

553.5308 (3)(a)

intentionally failing to appear after released from custody with a condition
to later appear, defendant in custody on a felony charge

553.5309

offering or accepting a benefit to influence testimony of a witness

553.5310 (4)(a)

with intent to influence witness or other participant in legal process, using
or threatening force against the witness

553.5311

causing or threatening to cause injury to a witness or damage to his
property

553.5312 (3)(a)

threatening a juror or his family in order to influence the juror

553.5312 (2)(a)

offering or accepting a benefit in exchange for influencing a juror’s vote or
decision

553.5313

altering, destroying, or making up physical evidence

561.6101 (3)(a)

knowingly participating in a riot, if someone other than a participant
suffers injury or substantial property damage occurs

562.6202 (3)(b)

inducing a minor to engage in a performance known to include sexual
conduct, victim is under 18 (E felony?)

562.6203 (6)(a)

dissemination of obscene material, material depicts sexual performance by
a minor

562.6206 (2)(b)

aiding or facilitating or operating an act or enterprise of prostitution
(promoting prostitution), prostitute is less than 18

562.6206 (2)(c)

aiding or facilitating or operating an act or enterprise of prostitution
(promoting prostitution), person manages activity by 2 or more prostitutes

562.6208 (3)(a)

intentionally excavating human remains for future sale, or sexually
desecrating a corpse, or desecration based on race or religion
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Section

Felony — Class E

511.1106 (5)(b)

Knowingly aiding or soliciting an attempted suicide

512.1201

recklessly (or grossly negligently with a deadly weapon) causing injury to
another, two additional aggravating factors (assault)

512.1202 (2)(b)

recklessly creating a risk of death or serious injury (endangerment)

512.1203 (2)(a)(i)

falsely reporting a catastrophe in order to terrorize another

512.1204 (3)(a)

intentional harassment under circumstances that would cause a reasonable
person mental distress, if (i) in violation of a protective order or (ii) against
a former crime victim or (iii) if previously convicted of crime against same
victim or (iv) while in possession of a weapon (harassment)

512.1205 (3)(b)

recklessly causing person under 12 or helpless person to suffer cruel
confinement or punishment or be deprived of necessary services

513.1303 (3)(b)

sexual contact by forcible compulsion or where victim is physically
incapacitated (sexual abuse)

513.1304 (3)(a)

subjecting another (excluding spouse) to sexual contact, victim is mentally
retarded or incapacitated

513.1304 (3)(a)

subjecting another (excluding spouse) to sexual contact, victim an inmate
and defendant is an employee of Corrections

521.2110 (4)

theft greater than $300

522.2206 (2)(c), (g)

recklessly damaging property of another or negligently damaging property
of another with fire, loss is greater than $1,000

522.2206 (2)(d)

knowingly damaging property of another, loss is greater than $300

523.2302 (3)(a)

entering or remaining without authority (criminal trespass), in a dwelling
or highly secured premises

524.2401

without consent from at least one party, trespassing on property to
eavesdrop, or installing surveillance equipment to record events in a
private place (eavesdropping)

531.3108 (2)

Hiding/destroying property (greater than $300) subject to a security
interest in order to hinder the enforcement of the interest

531.3109

knowingly trying to keep property (greater than $300) from creditors in
insolvency

531.3112

fiduciary using property (greater than $300) in unauthorized manner
involving substantial risk of loss
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541.4105 (3)(b)

persistently failing to provide support when under a duty to do so (flagrant
nonsupport), person owes over $1,000 or is 6 months behind or places
child in destitute circumstances

551.5103 (2)(a)

public servant intentionally committing an unauthorized official act, if
done to obtain, confer, or deprive another of a benefit

552.5201 (9)(b)

making a material false statement that one does not believe to be true in a
subscribed written instrument for which an oath is required (perjury)

553.5306 (3)(c)

escaping from penal custody on felony charge (escape)

553.5310 (4)(b)

with intent to influence a witness or other participant in legal process,
misleading or inducing a witness to be absent, or alter testimony or vote,
or withhold document

562.6207 (3)(a)

defendant is owner of animal or property used for fight among animals or
participates in fight organization
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Section

Misdemeanor — Class A

511.1106 (5)(c)

Knowingly aiding or soliciting a suicide and such suicide is not attempted

512.1202 (2)(c)

recklessly creating a risk of injury (endangerment)

512.1203 (2)(a)(ii)

threatening to commit a crime likely to cause serious injury or property
damage

512.1204 (3)(c)

intentional harassment directed at a specific person under circumstances
that would cause a reasonable person mental distress, with threat of sex,
serious injury, or death (stalking)

512.1205 (3)(c)

grossly negligently causing person under 12 or helpless person to suffer
cruel confinement or punishment or be deprived of necessary services

513.1304 (3)(b)

subjecting another (excluding spouse) to sexual contact, victim is less than
14 and the defendant is at least 4 years older

513.1305

sexual intercourse without consent (sexual misconduct)

514.1401 (3)(e)

knowingly restraining another unlawfully (unlawful restraint)

514.1403

to compel another to take action or refrain from action, unlawfully
threatening to commit a crime, accuse another of a crime, expose a secret,
take or withhold official action (criminal coercion)

521.2110 (5)

theft of $300 or less, except as provided in 521.2110(6)

522.2204

failing to give alarm or put out or control fire when duty to do so

522.2205 (3)(b)

recklessly failing to prevent or mitigate catastrophe when under a duty to
do so

522.2206 (2)(d),
(g)

recklessly damaging property of another or negligently damaging property
of another with fire, loss is greater than $300

522.2206 (2)(e)

knowingly damaging property of another, loss is greater than $50

523.2302 (3)(b)

entering or remaining without authority (criminal trespass) in a place
enclosed so as to exclude intruders

524.2402 (1)(a), (c)

knowingly, and without consent, opening or reading a sealed private
communication, or obtaining from a communications common carrier
information about contents of a communication

524.2402 (1)(b)

knowingly gaining access to electronic data without being privileged to do
so
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524.2403

knowingly divulging information gained by illegal surveillance, learned as
an employee of a communications common carrier, or learned as employee
of the Commonwealth

531.3101 (3)(c)

with intent to deceive, altering the writing of another without authority
(forgery)

531.3102 (2)(b)

knowingly tampering with a writing, or device with intent to deceive

531.3103

with intent to defraud, altering object such that it appears to have
antiquity or rarity that it does not have

531.3104 (3)(b)

representing oneself as another or representing oneself to have a
characteristic of legal significance that one does not have

531.3105

knowingly selling mislabeled, adulterated, or less than the represented
quantity of commodity or service; using false weight or measure (deceptive
practices)

531.3106

knowingly making false statement in an advertisement (bait advertising)

531.3107

with intent to defraud, falsifying a business record

531.3108 (2)

Hiding/destroying property (less than $300) subject to a security interest in
order to hinder the enforcement of the interest

531.3109

knowingly trying to keep property (less than $300) from creditors in
insolvency

531.3110

issuing false financial statement with intent to defraud

531.3112

fiduciary using property (less than $300) in unauthorized manner
involving substantial risk of loss

531.3117

knowingly issuing bad check

531.3118

using stolen, forged, revoked, canceled, or otherwise unauthorized credit
or debit card with intent to obtain property or services

541.4103

concealing the corpse of a newborn in order to conceal its birth

541.4105 (3)(c)

persistently failing to provide support when under a duty to do so
(nonsupport)

541.4106

person charged with care of minor fails to exercise reasonable diligence to
prevent minor from becoming neglected, dependent, delinquent

541.4107 (3)(b)

knowingly giving alcohol to minor or knowingly inducing minor to
become habitual truant or disobey parent
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541.4108

representation of both sets of parents, or unlawful payment of fees, in
adoption proceeding

551.5103 (2)(b)

public servant knowingly commits an act that is an unauthorized exercise
of his official functions

552.5201 (9)(c)

making a material false statement that one does not believe to be true

552.5202

misleading a public servant via materially false written statement or other
forged or false writing

552.5203 (2)(b)

giving false alarm or false information to a peace officer with intent to
implicate

552.5204 (2)(b)

impersonating a public servant other than a peace officer

553.5301

intentionally hindering a government function through threat of violence
or force

553.5302

accepting or giving a benefit in exchange for initiating prosecution for a
crime

553.5303 (3)(b)

with intent to hinder arrest or prosecution, harboring or helping someone
sought in connection with the commission of a crime

553.5304 (3)(b)

with intent to elude, recklessly disobeying order to stop from known peace
officer

553.5305 (2)(b)

intentionally resisting arrest, where defendant uses or threatens force
against the officer or another creating risk of injury

553.5307 (3)(b)

inmate makes or possesses contraband

553.5307 (3)(b)

knowingly introducing contraband into a detention facility

553.5308 (3)(b)

intentionally failing to appear after released from custody with a condition
to later appear

553.5312 (2)(b)

communicating with a juror other than as part of proceedings

553.5314

delivering a request for money on behalf of a creditor such that it
simulates legal process issued by a court

561.6101 (3)(b)

knowingly participating in a riot

561.6102

urging 5 or more people to riot

561.6112

knowingly preventing or hindering any communication

562.6203 (6)(b)

dissemination of obscene material, if person has more than one copy or if
distributed by or to a minor
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562.6206 (2)(d)

aiding or facilitating or operating an act or enterprise of prostitution

562.6207 (3)(b)

injurious maltreatment of an animal, including fights among animals
arranged for pleasure or profit

562.6208 (3)(b)

desecrating a grave, corpse, church, or religious symbol
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Section

Misdemeanor — Class B

512.1201

recklessly (or grossly negligently with a deadly weapon) causing injury to
another (assault)

512.1203(2)(b)

intentionally placing another in reasonable apprehension of imminent
injury

512.1204 (3)(b)

intentional harassment under circumstances that would cause a reasonable
person mental distress

513.1304 (3)(c)

subjecting another (excluding spouse) to sexual contact, if without consent
or victim is less than 16 and the defendant is 4 years older

522.2206 (2)(e), (g)

recklessly damaging property of another or negligently damaging property
of another with fire, loss is greater than $50

522.2206 (2)(f)

knowingly damaging property of another, loss is equal to or less than $50

552.5203 (2)(a)

giving false name or address to peace officer after having been warned that
it is an offense to do so

553.5305 (2)(c)

intentionally resisting arrest

553.5306 (3)(d)

escaping from detention facility or custody (escape)

553.5315

unauthorized practice of law

561.6103

assembling with 5 or more others in preparation to riot, or remaining in
such an assembly with intent to advance purpose

561.6104

participating with 2 or more others in disorderly conduct and refusing to
disperse when ordered to do so by police

561.6105

being reckless as to causing public inconvenience, fighting, creating a
hazard, or refusing to obey official at an emergency

561.6106 (2)(a)

intentional harassment involving physical contact

561.6107

intentional harassment involving telephone, mail, or other form of
communication

561.6109(2)(a)

appearing at a public place while under the influence of drugs, to such a
degree that one is unreasonably annoying

561.6110 (4)(a)

recklessly rendering highway impassible without legal privilege to do so
after a warning by a law officer

561.6111

intentionally obstructing a meeting or procession or making a gesture or
utterance designed to outrage members in the meeting or procession

562.6201

intentionally exposing one’s genitals under conditions likely to cause alarm
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562.6203 (6)(c)

dissemination of obscene material

562.6204 (3)(a)

offering or accepting a fee to have sexual contact (prostitution)

562.6205

person having possession of premises that he knows is being used for
prostitution fails to take measures to stop it
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Section

Misdemeanor — Class C

521.2110 (6)

theft less than $50 and not taken by threat or in breach of fiduciary duty

523.2302 (3)(c)

entering or remaining in a place without authority (criminal trespass)

553.5304(3)(c)

with intent to evade or flee, failing to comply with directive of traffic
control officer

561.6109(2)(b)

appearing at a public place while under the influence of alcohol, to such a
degree that one is unreasonably annoying

562.6204(3)(b)

Loitering in a public place for the purpose of offering or accepting a fee to
have sexual contact (prostitution)

Section

Violation

531.3116

intentionally selling a ticket to an event at a cost greater than face value of
ticket (scalping)

561.6106 (2)(b)

intentional harassment, no physical contact

561.6108

loitering around a school or transportation facility without authorization

561.6108

loitering in a public place to gamble or engage in business

561.6110 (4)(b)

recklessly rendering highway impassible without legal privilege to do so
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Chapter 500: Preliminary Provisions

PENAL CODE OFFICIAL COMMENTARY
CHAPTER 500. PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
COMMENTARY**
**When the Commentary to any part of the Draft Code notes that a proposed Section is
identical or substantially identical to a provision in the current Penal Code, the reader
should consult the Commentary to the 1974 Penal Code for that provision for a more
complete explanation of its meaning and, thus, the proposed Sections meaning.

Section 500.101. Short Title and Effective Date
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

500.010

Comment:
Generally. This provision gives a name for the Code and specifies the date on which it
becomes legally effective.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 500.101(1), which provides the Codes title,
is similar to current KRS 500.010.
Section 101(2), which states the Codes effective date, has no corresponding provision in
the current Penal Code.

Section 500.102. Principle of Construction
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

500.030; 500.100

Comment:
Generally. This provision states the principle of construction that should guide interpretation of the Code.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 500.102(1) and (2) are identical to current
KRS 500.030 and 500.100, respectively. The Kentucky Supreme Court has read those provisions to mean that doubts in construction of the Code should be resolved in favor of lenity and
against a construction that would produce extremely harsh or incongruous results. Boulder v.
Com., 610 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Ky. 1980).
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Section 500.103. Applicability
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

500.020

Comment:
Generally. This provision prohibits common-law offenses by requiring that offenses be
defined in the Code or another statute. At the same time, the provision recognizes and preserves
the courts inherent powers to punish for contempt and to enforce orders and civil judgments.
Section 500.103 also provides that the Codes General Part applies to offenses defined by statutes
other than the Code, unless the Code otherwise provides.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 103(1) and (3) are identical to current
500.020(1) and (2), except that the phrase designated a crime or violation in 500.020(1) has
been replaced with defined as an offense to be consistent with the proposed Codes terminology,
which uses the word offense rather than crime.
Section 103(2)  which ensures that the Codes culpability terms, defenses, and other
general provisions apply to any offense, whether defined in the Code or elsewhere  is consistent
with Kentucky Supreme Court opinions applying Penal Code definitions and defenses to cases
arising under statutes outside the Penal Code. See, e.g., Powell v. Com., 843 S.W.2d 908 (Ky.
App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Houston v. Com., 975 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1998)
(definition of possession in KRS 500.080(14) is proper definition for jury instructions for cases
arising under KRS Chapter 218A); Farris v. Com., 836 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. App. 1992), overruled
on other grounds by Houston v. Com., 975 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1998) (applying Penal Code
definition of entrapment to non-Code drug trafficking offense). In addition, KRS 532.005 applies
the penalty provisions of the Penal Code to all classes of crimes committed outside the provisions
of the penal code.

Section 500.104. Restrictions on Applicability
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

500.040

Comment:
Generally. This provision recognizes the transition from the existing Code to the criminal
law established by the Code as amended. However, the provision makes clear that the Code, and
its application, does not affect rights or liabilities in civil actions.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 500.104(1) is identical to current 500.040(1).
This provision ensures that the Code will not be applied retroactively. See Cole v. Com., 553
S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1977). Offenses committed prior to the effective date must be construed and
punished according to the law as it existed at the time the offense was committed. See Kimbrough
v. Com., 550 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1977).
Section 104(2) is identical to current 500.040(3).
Section 104(3) is identical to current 500.040(2).
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Section 500.105. Criminal Jurisdiction
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

500.060

Comment:
Generally. This provision provides the rules for determining whether a person is subject
to prosecution in the Commonwealth for an offense.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 500.105 is substantially similar to current
500.060.
Section 105(1)s introductory language is similar to that in current KRS 500.060(1), but
replaces the phrase may be convicted with is subject to prosecution, and adds that a person
may be prosecuted for an offense he committed while either within or outside the Commonwealth.
The introductory language also eliminates as unnecessary the limitation [e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this section.
Section 105(1)(a) and (2) restate the current concept in KRS 500.060(1)(a): jurisdiction
exists over a person who commits an offense either wholly or partly within the Commonwealth,
meaning that either conduct or a result that forms an element of the offense occurs in the
Commonwealth. KRS 500.060(1)(a) refers to the conduct and the result; the proposed
Section recognizes that an offense may have more than one conduct or result element. The proposed
provision is consistent with case law. See, e.g., Hayes v. Com., 698 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1985)
(noting that a defendant may be convicted of receiving stolen property any place where he is
found with the stolen property in his possession even if the theft occurred in another jurisdiction).
Section 105(1)(a) and (2) eliminate the exception contained in current KRS 500.060(2),
which bars liability for conduct outside Kentucky that causes a result prohibited in Kentucky but
not in the state where the conduct occurs, unless the person knew the result would occur in
Kentucky. The comity interest that presumably supported the exception would not seem to outweigh
Kentuckys interest in prosecuting a person who causes a criminal result in this Commonwealth.
Section 105(1)(b), (c), (d) and (e) are substantially similar to current KRS 500.060(1)(b),
(c), (d), and (f), respectively. The phrase is sufficient to constitute has been replaced with
constitutes in (b) and (c). Current 500.060(1)(d)s reference to conduct establishing complicity
in the commission of an offense has been deleted as superfluous; proposed 105(1)(a), couple
with the introductory language regarding conduct . . . of another for which [one] is legally
accountable, would establish jurisdiction for such conduct.
Section 105(3) is substantively similar to the second sentence of current KRS 500.060(3),
but states that the relevant fact shall sustain the Commonwealths burden of production instead
of stating that it provides prima facie evidence. Section 105 does not retain 500.060(3)s rule
that the bodily impact causing death counts as a result element for homicide. That special rule
creates criminal jurisdiction for a specific, very unusual fact pattern  where the offenders conduct
and the victims death occur outside Kentucky, but the physical contact causing death occurs in
Kentucky. Because the rule would be of extremely limited applicability and does not serve any
significant policy interest, there is no reason to carve out a specific exception to the generally
applicable rules of jurisdiction to cover this one situation.
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Section 105(4), establishing jurisdiction for omission liability, is substantively similar to current
KRS 500.060(1)(e).

Section 500.106. Burdens of Proof; Affirmative Defenses; Permissive Inferences
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

500.070

Comment:

Generally. This provision sets forth the presumption that a defendant is innocent until
proven guilty, establishes two distinct burdens of proof, and provides rules for the consequences
of permissive inferences established elsewhere in the draft Code.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 500.106(1), establishing the presumption of
innocence, has no corresponding provision in the Kentucky Constitution, statutes, or rules of
criminal procedure (except in the context of military courts-martial and the content of jury
instructions).
Sections 106(2) and (3) establish two distinct evidentiary burdens for different stages of a
criminal proceeding. Section 106(2) sets forth the ultimate burden of persuasion. The
Commonwealth must prove: (1) the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; (2)
unless there is an express exception, the absence of any defense, exception, exemption, or mitigation
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) unless there is an express exception, all other facts required
for liability by a preponderance of the evidence.1 (Significantly, such an express exception
exists for two entire categories of defenses: excuses and nonexculpatory defenses, as to which the
defendant bears the burden of persuasion under the proposed Code. See proposed Sections
501(5), 601(3).) The scope of the States burden of persuasion remains the same with respect to
elements of the offense and defenses as under current KRS 500.070(1) and (3), but Section
106(2) provides a default rule that all other facts  such as jurisdiction and venue  need only be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Cf. Rounds v. Com., 139 S.W.2d 736 (1940)
(Venue must be proved, but since it does not affect the issue of guilt or innocence, although the
instructions submit it as one of the elements to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in this
jurisdiction it has been consistently held that slight evidence, supported by inferences and reasonable
presumptions of knowledge by local jurors, is sufficient.).

Cf. Peak v. Com., 34 S.W.3d 80 (Ky. App. 2000) (burden of proof on defendant to establish choice of
evils defense).
1
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Section 106(3) sets forth the burdens of production for the Commonwealth and the defendant.
The burdens of production define the requisite threshold amount of evidence the burdened party
must present to have an issue sent to the jury. The current Code does not include a provision
dealing explicitly with the burden of production, but Section 106(3)(a) imposes the same burden
of production on the Commonwealth as exists under current Kentucky law. See KRS 500.070(1),
(3); Com. v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 316-20 (1979).
Section 106(3)(b) states that for affirmative defenses and mitigations,2 the defendant has
the burden of production (although the Commonwealth typically retains, under Section 106(2)(b),
the burden of persuasion to disprove the defense). Section 106(3)(b) imposes a more rigorous
burden of production on the defendant with respect to affirmative defenses than exists under
current law. Under current Kentucky law, a defendant who has properly raised an affirmative
defense by presenting some evidence supporting the defense may receive a jury instruction thereon.3
To be entitled to a jury instruction under Section 106(3)(b), in contrast, there must be sufficient
evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the defendant and all reasonable inferences
therefrom, to allow a rational factfinder to find that all requirements of the defense are proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. Section 106(3)(b)s burden of production follows the constitutional
requirement that a conviction must be reversed if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced
at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. Section 106(3)(b) prevents defendants from being able to obtain a
jury instruction for any frivolous defense, no matter how weak the supporting evidence.

The provision explicitly mentions mitigations as well as defenses to make clear that it may apply to
rules that reduce liability as well as to rules that exonerate the defendant entirely. See, e.g., proposed Section
511.1103 (defining statutory mitigation to reduce liability from murder to manslaughter).
2

See Jewell v. Com., 549 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Com., 623
S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981) (A defense is so raised by the presentation of evidence that could justify a reasonable
doubt of the defendants guilt. The sufficiency of the evidence to accomplish that purpose is a question of law
for the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis.).
3
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Section 106(3)(c) defines affirmative defense as any defense that does not operate by negating
an offense element. See Chapters 504 (justification defenses); 505 (excuse defenses); and 506
(nonexculpatory defenses). Nearly all affirmative defenses receive the same evidentiary treatment
under Section 106(3), coupled with Section 106(2)(b), that they receive under current KRS
500.070(3). (The burden of persuasion for the insanity defense and other excuses, and for
nonexculpatory defenses, is addressed elsewhere. The proposed Code places the burden of
persuasion on the defendant for such defenses, whereas under current law, the defendant bears the
burden of persuasion only for insanity. See proposed Sections 505.501 and 506.601 and
corresponding commentary.)
Section 106(4) explains the significance of permissive inferences established elsewhere in
the draft Code. Section 106(4)(a), which sets forth the circumstances under which courts are
obligated to submit the issue of the existence of an inferred fact to the jury, has no corresponding
provision under current law. The proposed rule clarifies one aspect of the significance of a permissive
inference: it enables a party to satisfy its burden of production as to the inferred fact by giving
evidence of the facts supporting the inference. Such a rule serves to prevent judges from dismissing
cases without jury involvement, unless the evidence clearly negatives the inferred fact.
Section 106(4)(b)  authorizing instruction to the jury that it may, but need not, make the
inference in question based on the supporting facts  is consistent with Patterson v. Com., 556
S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1977) (adopting the view from Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973))
(If a statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the
reasonable doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for
a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the
more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process.)
A permissive inference in a jury instruction differs from a presumption, which invades the
province of the jury by requiring rather than merely allowing a certain finding as to the inferred
fact. See, e.g., Wells v. Com., 561 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1978) (invalidating use of a presumption as
a jury instruction); County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156-57 (1979).

Section 500.107. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

500.080

Comment:
Generally. Section 500.107 provides general definitions for terms that appear elsewhere
in the draft Code.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 107s initial statement that the terms defined
therein have the designated meanings [u]nless a particular context clearly requires a different
meaning is substantively similar to current KRS 500.080.
For discussion of the relationship between current law and the defined terms for which
Section 107 provides a cross-reference, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the
term in question is defined.
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The definitions of Commonwealth and this Commonwealth differ in function from the
definition of Commonwealth in KRS 453.255(1). The proposed definitions relate to the
Commonwealth as a geographic entity, whereas the definition in KRS 453.255(1) is used to
define the Commonwealth in terms of its constituent political entities. The definition of other
state is comparable to KRS 446.010(30).
The term conduct is not defined in the current Code, although the current definitions of
culpable mental states refer to conduct. See, e.g., KRS 501.020(1)-(2). See also proposed
Section 501.202 and corresponding commentary.
The definition of dwelling is the same as that in current 503.010(2), which is superior to
the slightly different definition in current KRS 511.010(2). The latter definition has produced
litigation about the meaning of usually occupied.4
The definition of government is identical to current KRS 500.080(6).
The term he is defined to equate with person to make clear that both sexes, and
nonhuman entities, may be included within that pronoun where it is used. The definition differs
slightly from the current definition in KRS 500.080(7), as it includes governments as well as natural
persons, corporations, and unincorporated associations. Cf. infra discussion of person.
The term inchoate offense is used, but not defined, in current KRS Chapter 506. This
definition clearly identifies the particular offenses the term comprehends.
The term included offense is defined in current KRS 505.020(2). Subsection (1) of
Section 107s definition is nearly identical to current KRS 505.020(2)(a), but the word charged
has been deleted. Subsection (2) is similar to KRS 505.020(2)(b), but excludes the current
provisions reference to attempts toward commission of an included offense  which is instead
reflected in the language of proposed Section 254(2)(c)(ii)  and covers all inchoate offenses,
rather than merely attempts. See also proposed Section 502.254 and corresponding commentary.
Subsection (3) is nearly identical to current KRS 505.020(2)(c)-(d), but reorganizes these
provisions.
The terms includes and including are not defined in the current Code.
The term law enforcement authority is not defined in the current Code, and is used for
provisions for which it seems appropriate to include authorities in addition to peace officers, such
as prosecutors.

The proposed definition is also consistent with cases like Shackleford v. Com., 757 S.W.2d 193 (Ky.
App. 1988), which held that a home is not fit for usual occupation after being irreparably damaged by a tornado.
See proposed Section 2305 and corresponding commentary.
4
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The definition of peace officer is substantively similar to KRS 431.005(3)(a)-(b). Nothing
in this definition is intended to alter the grant of authority and powers contained in KRS 196.037.
The definition of person is comparable to KRS 500.080(12).
The definition of physical injury differs from the current definition in KRS 500.080(13)
only in that it explicitly includes illness and throwing or causing to be thrown upon the person
feces, or urine, or other bodily fluid.
The definition of place of worship has no analogue in current law.
The term prosecution is used, but not defined, in the current Code.
The terms reasonable belief and reasonably believes are used, but not defined, in the
current Code. See, e.g., KRS 514.020(1)(c), 519.030(2), 531.060(1), 531.330(2).
The definition of school is comparable to KRS 160.345.
The definition of serious physical injury is similar to that in KRS 500.080(15), but does
not refer to prolonged impairment of health.
The definition of statute has no analogue in current law.
The term substantive offense is introduced to distinguish a completed offense from an
inchoate offense toward commission of a completed offense.
The following terms that appear in KRS 500.080 are omitted from Section 500.107:
crime; felony; law; misdemeanor; offense; possession; unlawful; and violation.
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CHAPTER 501. BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF OFFENSE LIABILITY
COMMENTARY
Section 501.201. Basis of Liability
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

None

Comment:
Generally. This provision establishes the bases of liability for an offense under the criminal
code. Section 501.201 makes clear the relevance and function of the other Chapters of the Code
in relation to the determination of criminal liability for both Code and non-Code offenses. Section
201(1) provides that an actor may be liable for an offense only if he or she satisfies all of its
elements, except where a provision in Chapter 300 operates to impute a missing element. Section
201(1)(a) also clarifies that liability may not be imposed where the defendant satisfies the requirements
of a bar to liability (whether defined as a defense, exception, or other rule) set out in Chapter
800,5 in the Codes Special Part,6 or outside the Code. Section 201(2) provides that the defenses
set forth in Chapters 502, 504, 505, and 506 will preclude liability even though all of an offenses
elements are satisfied or imputed. Such provisions differ from the bars to liability covered by
Section 201(1)(a) in that they present general, rather than special, defenses (and thus apply to any
offense, rather than to a particular offense or group of offenses).
Relation to current Kentucky law. The principles expressed in Section 201 reflect the
current understanding of the basis of criminal liability. No current Penal Code provision contains
an explicit statement of the material in Section 201.

See proposed Section 508.805 (providing defense to solicitation and conspiracy for victims and
conduct inevitably incident to offenses commission); proposed Section 508.806 (providing renunciation defense
for inchoate offenses).
6
See, e.g., proposed Section 521.2104(2) (providing defense to theft by extortion); proposed Section
521.2111 (providing claim-of-right defense for theft offenses); proposed Section 523.2302(2) (providing defense
to criminal trespass); proposed Section 531.3118(3) (providing defense to fraudulent use of credit or debit
card).
5
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Section 501.202. Offense Elements
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

None

Generally. This provision categorizes and defines offense elements in terms of conduct,
circumstances, results, and culpability requirements. Defining offense elements in this manner
enables a systematic and clear approach to offense definition. Specifically, the offense element
definitions aid in defining culpability requirements, which can be more precisely elaborated by
reference to their application to each type of offense element.
As Section 501.202(1) makes explicit, offense elements may appear not only in the offense
definition itself, but also in the provisions that define the offense grade or otherwise specify a
specific level of liability that will attach to the offense. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000) (establishing constitutional rule that facts affecting defendants potential maximum punishment
are offense elements and must be proved to jury beyond reasonable doubt).
Section 202(2) to (5) define the terms conduct element, result element, circumstance
element, and objective elements.
Section 202(2) defines a conduct element as any element
of an offense that requires an offenders act (as defined in Section 501.204(1)) or failure to
perform a legal duty. For example, the offense of arson requires that a person starts a fire or
causes an explosion property; any physical act or failure to perform a legal duty leading to such
damage will satisfy the conduct element. (See proposed Section 522.2201.) (The causation and
culpability requirements, however, will operate to limit the range of conduct for which a person will
be criminally liable.)
Section 202(3) defines a result element as any change of circumstances caused by a
persons conduct. For example, the offense of arson requires the result of damage. (See proposed
Section 522.2201.)
Section 202(4) defines a circumstance element as any objective element of an offense that
is not a conduct or result element. Most offenses will have one or more circumstance elements that
define the requisite conditions for a given act and result to generate criminal liability. For example,
one form of first-degree arson requires damage to a building [that is] inhabited or occupied.
(See proposed Section 522.2201(1)(a).)
Section 202(5) defines an offenses objective elements. This term distinguishes an
offenses conduct, circumstance, and result elements from its culpability requirements. The distinction
makes it clear that the culpability requirements set out in proposed Section 205 apply only to an
offenses objective elements and not its specified culpability requirements themselves.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Current Kentucky law discusses conduct, circumstance,
and result elements (see, e.g., KRS 501.020), but does not define them.
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Section 501.203. Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

501.060

Comment:

Generally. This provision specifically defines the minimum causal nexus between given
conduct and its attendant results that will allow imposition of criminal liability for the conduct.
Section 501.203(1)(a) establishes that the conduct must be the factual or but-for cause of the
result an offense prohibits. Section 203(1)(b) imposes an additional proximate cause requirement, holding that the manner of occurrence of the result [must be] rendered substantially more
probable by the [defendants] conduct. Section 203(1)(c) requires satisfaction of any additional
causation requirements imposed elsewhere (including in the offense definition itself). Section
203(1)(c) makes clear that the legislature would be free to require, for example, that a particular
offenses result element occur within a certain amount of time.
Section 203(2) provides that in cases where more than one person contributed to the
prohibited result and each persons conduct alone would have caused the result, each person is
considered to have caused the result. This provision prevents equally blameworthy persons from
escaping liability due to the fortuity that someone else independently caused the prohibited result.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 203 corresponds to current KRS 501.060,
which deals with issues of causation. The current section, however, discusses causal relationships
in terms of particular culpable mental states. For example, KRS 501.060(2) addresses causation
issues in situations where intent is the applicable culpable mental state. Section 203, on the other
hand, does not address causation as a function of mental states. Causation is an objective issue
regarding the relationship between an act and a result; its inherent complexity is only further muddied
by the introduction of subjective mental-state issues into the definition of causation itself. The
definitions of the culpability requirements independently discuss the required level of culpability
regarding the likelihood of a result flowing from ones conduct. In addition, a separate provision,
proposed Section 303, deals with the logically discrete issue (currently addressed in KRS
501.060(2)(a) and (3)(a)) of imputing a persons culpable mental state as to one potential result to
impose liability where another harmful, and prohibited, result occurs.
The requirements of Section 203(1) are consistent with Kentucky statutory law, which
requires both but-for causation and proximate causation for criminal liability to be imposed. Section
203(1)(a) substitutes the phrase but for for KRS 501.060(1)(a)s phrase without which. Section
203(1)(b) adopts the approach to proximate causation reflected in KRS 501.060(2)(b) and (3)(b)
by stating that the prohibited result must be rendered substantially more probable by the conduct.
Section 203(2) is consistent with Kentucky court holdings that a persons conduct need only be
a contributing cause of a prohibited result. See, e.g., Adcock v. Com., 702 S.W.2d 440 (Ky.
1986) (finding that defendants conduct need not be sole and immediate cause of victims injury;
defendant may be found guilty if he contributed to the injury)
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Section 203 eliminates as unnecessary and confusing KRS 501.060(4), which states that
the issue of whether a person knew or should have known that the result he caused was rendered
substantially more probable by his conduct is a fact issue. Any culpability requirement, including
the requisite culpability as to causing a prohibited result, will be included within an offenses definition
and will have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 501.204. Requirement of an Act; Omission Liability; Possession
Liability
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

501.030; 501.010(3)

Comment:
Generally. This section sets the minimum conduct requirements for criminal liability. Section
501.204(1) prohibits liability absent an overt act or the failure to perform a legal duty.7 A fundamental
principle of criminal law holds that it is inappropriate to punish mere thoughts unaccompanied by
a physical act or failure to discharge a specified legal duty. Section 204(2) provides that, in the
absence of clear language to the contrary, an offenses conduct element may be satisfied by either
an affirmative act or a failure to perform a legal duty. Section 204(3) defines the circumstances
under which possession is considered an act for purposes of criminal liability. Section 204(4)
defines the term act.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 204(1) is substantively similar to current
KRS 501.030(1). The requirement in KRS 501.030(1) that the act must be voluntary is addressed
by proposed Section 505.502 (which also requires, like KRS 501.030(1), that the person who
has failed to perform a legal duty must be physically capable of performing that duty). Like
501.030(1), Section 204(1) specifies that omission liability is appropriate only in certain specific
situations  where one is bound by a legal duty to act.
Section 204(2) explicitly recognizes that, in the absence of clear language stating otherwise,
an offense definition will not preclude omission liability even if it uses terms (such as active verbs)
that may appear to require an affirmative act. Current Kentucky law contains no such explicit
declaration of this point. For example, a person may be liable for homicide by engaging in conduct
causing death. The defendant may also be liable for homicide through an omission causing death,
if he had a legal duty and capacity to act but did not.

Section 204(1) authorizes omission liability based on a failure to perform any legal duty. Such
duties may arise, for example, from statutes imposing criminal liability for omitting to act, from civil statutes
requiring certain conduct, from contractual obligations, or from case law (including civil decisions). Although
an offenses conduct element may be satisfied, under Section 204, by the failure to perform various sorts of
legal duties, omission liability may be imposed only if the defendant also satisfies the offenses remaining
elements  including its culpability requirements.
7
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Section 204(3) establishes when possession counts as an act. Section 204(3)(a) states
that possession is an act when a person knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed. This
rule is added to Section 204(3)(b)s rule treating possession as an act when the person was
aware of his control . . . for a sufficient time to have been able to terminate his possession, which
is identical to the latter part of current KRS 501.010(3).
Section 204(4)s definition of act is broader than KRS 501.010(3)s definition of a
voluntary act, as it includes both voluntary and involuntary bodily movement. This provision
merely establishes the basic act requirement of criminal law, which may be satisfied by any
objective conduct. The issue of voluntariness, on the other hand, relates to the separate question
of whether a person who performed an act had a blameworthy mental state as to that act.
Accordingly, involuntary acts  and involuntary omissions  are the subject of an excuse defense,
set out in proposed Section 505.502.

Section 501.205. Culpability Requirements
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

501.030, .040, .050(1)

Comment:

Generally. This provision establishes rules governing the application of culpability
requirements to objective elements. Section 501.205(1) specifies that some level of culpability is
normally required as to each objective element of an offense. (This rule, and Section 205s other
requirements, apply to those elements defined in the grading provisions as well as to elements
appearing in the offense definition itself. Cf. proposed Section 202(1) (defining element to
include issues appearing in grading provisions).) Section 205(2) provides a general rule that a
stated culpability requirement for one objective element governs subsequently elaborated objective
elements as well, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition. Section 205(3) provides a read-in
culpability requirement of recklessness where no culpability level is specified (either through direct
statement or through application of the rule of Section 205(2)), to avoid excess verbiage and
ensure that offenses, or offense elements, do not allow absolute liability for want of an explicit
culpability term for each element. Section 205(4) sets prerequisites for imposition of absolute
liability or liability based on ordinary negligence. Section 205(5) establishes that culpability as to
the criminality of ones conduct is not required unless the offense definition so provides. For
example, one need not know specifically that one is committing a crime, or intend to commit a
crime per se, to be subject to liability. Section 205(6) points out that the requirement of a given
culpability level may be satisfied by proof of a more serious culpability level.
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Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 205(1) is substantively similar to current
KRS 501.030(2), but makes clear that culpability requirements apply only to objective elements,
and not to stated culpability elements themselves. (For example, a person need not be consciously
aware that he is acting recklessly, or know that he is acting knowingly.) Section 205(1)
explicitly requires culpability as to every objective element of an offense (except where Section
205(4) would allow absolute liability). Section 205(1) requires some level of culpability as to each
objective element of the offense, regardless of whether it appears in an offense definition, grading
provision, or other provision establishing the extent of liability.8 See proposed Section 202(1)
(defining elements of an offense to include its grading provisions); cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000) (establishing constitutional rule that facts affecting defendants potential
maximum punishment are offense elements and must be proved to jury beyond reasonable doubt).
Section 205(2) clarifies the application of a stated culpability requirement within an offense
definition, and has no analogue in current law. Section 205(2) makes clear that sentence structure
will govern application; a stated culpability requirement applies to all subsequent objective elements
in the same grammatical clause, and any other subsequent objective elements where the legislature
has suggested an intent to apply the same requirement.
Section 205(3) establishes recklessness as the read-in culpability requirement for offense
elements that otherwise have no specified culpability requirement. This read-in rule would apply
to elements appearing in the grading provision as well as to elements in the offense definition itself.
Cf. proposed Section 202(1) (defining element to include issues appearing in grading provisions).
Generally, setting a default culpability level keeps offense definitions readable and ensures that
absolute liability is avoided.9 Specifically, recklessness is set as the default level in Section 205(3),
because it is the minimum level of culpability normally considered appropriate for criminal liability.
The default rules of Section 205(2) and (3) differ from KRS 501.040, which states that if
an offense does not prescribe a particular mental state, one of the four mental states is applicable
to some or all of the material elements of the offense if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves
such culpable mental state. The current formulation is troublesome in at least three respects: (1)
it does not indicate which mental state to apply where one or more might be applicable; (2) it does
not say whether any culpability level is needed for conduct that does not necessarily involve
culpability, or how to tell whether conduct necessarily involves culpability; and (3) it does not
indicate what to do for circumstance or result elements if no culpability level is prescribed.

Section 205(1)s rule applies, for example, to grading provisions in the proposed Code that enhance
punishment based on the existence of certain objective elements. With Section 205(3), Section 205(1) requires
that a culpability requirement of recklessness be read in as to all objective elements in grading provisions for
which a culpability requirement is not otherwise specified. See, e.g., proposed Section 512.1201(2)(a)(iv)
(authorizing grade adjustment for assault based on victim being law-enforcement authority); proposed Section
513.1301(3)(b) (aggravating sexual assault offense where offender causes serious physical injury).
9
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has applied KRS 501.040 to avoid the use of absolute liability. See
Covington v. Com., 849 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. App. 1993) (In effect, the culpable mental state required for assault in
the third degree is written into KRS 508.025(1)(b) by KRS 501.040.)
8
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Section 205(4) is narrower than current KRS 501.050(1) as to when absolute liability
may be imposed. (Unlike KRS 501.050(1), Section 205(4) also imposes similar restrictions on
the imposition of liability for ordinary negligence.) The current provision allows absolute liability
whenever a provision specifies no mental state and is a violation or misdemeanor; proposed Section
205(4)(a) allows such liability only for violations or misdemeanors not punishable by incarceration
or by a fine exceeding $500. Section 205(4)(b), however, also allows for absolute or ordinarynegligence liability where the legislature clearly expresses its intent for such liability to apply in a
specific case.10 Section 205(4)(b) is similar to KRS 501.050(2), except that the proposed provision
would apply to offenses within the Penal Code as well as offenses outside the Code.
Section 205(5) employs a different approach from current KRS 501.070(3) regarding the
significance of culpability as to the criminality of ones acts. The current law fails to state a general
proposition on the subject, but rather sets out four limited circumstances in which ignorance of the
legal prohibition may operate as a defense. Rather than relying on a list of circumstances from
another statutory section, as in current law, Section 205(5) sets out a general principle that awareness
of the law is relevant to criminal liability only if the particular offense definition itself expressly
provides. The proposed provision is very similar to Model Penal Code § 2.02(9), which has been
adopted by several states. See, e.g., Ill. Stat. Ann. 5/4-3(c); Minn. Stat. § 609.02(9)(5); N.J.
Stat. § 2C:2-2(d); Pa. Cons. Stat. tit. 18, § 302(h). See also Sections 505.508 to .510 for
provisions addressing ignorance due to unavailable law, mistakes due to an official misstatement of
law, and reasonable mistakes of law unavoidable by due diligence.

Section 205(4)(b)s requirement of a clear indication of legislative purpose to impose absolute
liability is typically satisfied by employing the phrase in fact in place of a culpability requirement for a specific
element of an offense. The offense would refer, for example, to in fact causing injury rather than, say,
knowingly causing injury.
10

167

Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project

Section 205(6), which specifies that proof of a more culpable mental state will satisfy an
element definition requiring a less serious one, has no corresponding provision in current law.
Failure to define criminal mental states as constituting a hierarchy  so that proof of deliberate
intent will satisfy an objective element requiring only recklessness  will either lead to absurd
results, or force the criminal code to define multiple culpability requirements for each objective
element (thus becoming awkward and unwieldy), or both.11

Section 501.206. Culpability Requirements Defined
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

501.020

Comment:

Generally. This section defines five culpability requirements  intent, knowledge,
recklessness, gross negligence, and negligence  as they relate to each type of offense element:
conduct, circumstance, and result.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 501.206 is generally similar to current KRS
501.020. However, for each of the defined culpability levels, Section 206 breaks the definition
into subsections for each of the three element types: conduct, circumstance, and result. This
formulation provides a consistent and precise structure for defining the culpability requirement for
each offense. These elements are used in current law and made explicit by Section 202. Moreover,
with respect to the conduct element of each culpability level definition, Section 206 adds language
to cover situations, like conspiracy, where the actor enlists another to engage in the prohibited
conduct.

Cf. Com. v. Wolford, 4 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Ky. 1999) (The jury was not required to believe that the
circumstantial evidence offered to prove intent in this case was sufficient to support a conviction of murder.
That does not mean that in order to convict of an offense requiring a less culpable mental state, the
Commonwealth was required to prove alternative circumstances indicating wantonness or recklessness.).
But cf. Fields v. Com., 12 S.W.3d 275, 287-88 (Ky. 2000) (It is important to realize that, unlike at common law, the
culpable mental states defined at KRS 501.020 are fully and clearly defined so as to be mutually exclusive. . . .
Although the draft Model Penal Code included a provision which defined less culpable mental states as fully
encompassed within its definition of purposely (what the Kentucky Penal Code refers to as intentional
conduct in an identical definition), the General Assembly did not adopt this subsection, and defined the
culpable mental states so that a given act is undertaken either intentionally or knowingly or wantonly or
recklessly. The trial court should only instruct the jury on both intentional murder and second-degree
manslaughter, offenses with conflicting mental states, when the evidence presents a question as to whether a
given act was accomplished intentionally or wantonly. However, when all of the evidence proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that someone acted intentionally, as is the case here, the requirements of another competing
mental state, as a matter of law, cannot be established.).
11
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Other than the differences explained above, Section 206(1) is similar to current KRS
501.020(1). However, Section 206(1)(b) further specifies that intent as to a circumstance requires
hope or belief that such circumstance exists. In addition, Section 206(1)(d) adds language to
clarify that conditional intent satisfies an offenses requirement of intention, unless the condition
eliminates the harm sought to be prevented by the offense. This conditional-intent provision
makes clear that a person whose intent is predicated on some factual situation (e.g., the burglar
who intends to steal from the premises, but only if he finds something valuable there) will satisfy an
intent requirement.12 Section 206(1)(d) is very similar to Model Penal Code § 2.02(6), which has
been adopted by several states. See, e.g., Del. Stat. tit. 11, § 254; Haw. Stat. § 702-209; Pa.
Cons. Stat. tit. 18, § 302(f).
Section 206(2) is substantively similar to current KRS 501.020(2), but adds a definition
for acting knowingly with respect to a result: the person must be practically certain that his
conduct will cause such result. The current provision fails to provide a definition for the culpability
level of knowing as it applies to result elements. The proposed definition with respect to results
is very similar to Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b)(ii), which has been adopted by numerous states.
Section 206(2) also slightly softens the requirements of the knowing culpability level as it relates
to circumstances: whereas current 501.020(2) requires a person to be aware . . . that the
circumstance exists, Section 206(2)(b) requires only that the person believes there is a high
probability that such circumstance exists. This language would enable liability in cases where the
defendant is mistaken as to his actual circumstances, or where he recognizes that something is
probably the case even though he is not fully certain or aware of it.
Section 206(3) is substantively similar to current KRS 501.020(3), but uses the term
recklessly for what currently is termed wantonly. It also addresses the issue of recklessness as
to conduct.
Section 206(4) is substantively similar to current KRS 501.020(4), but uses the term
with gross negligence for what is currently known as recklessly. It also addresses the issue of
gross negligence as to conduct. As with current law, Section 206(4) requires that the departure
from the standard of care must be gross, thereby distinguishing criminal negligence from mere
tort negligence, and holds that an actors failure to be aware of something may be sufficiently
blameworthy to warrant the criminal laws condemnation.
Section 206(5) also is substantively similar to current KRS 501.020(4), but uses the term
negligently for a slightly diluted form of what is currently known as recklessly. (Negligence
does not require the departure from the standard of care to be gross.) It also addresses the issue
of negligence as to conduct. The Code recognizes that the legislature may impose criminal liability
for ordinary negligence with regard to one or more offense elements.

A recent example of the use of conditional intent was noted in Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S.
1 (1999), in which the Court held that the intent requirement in the federal carjacking statute is satisfied by proof
that, at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the drivers automobile, he possessed the
conditional intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car.
12
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Section 206(6) makes explicit that the proposed Codes change in terminology regarding
culpability requirements  from wantonly to recklessly and from recklessly to with gross
negligence  is not intended to make any substantive change in and of itself.

Section 501.207. Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

501.070

Comment:

Generally. This section makes explicit that when a persons ignorance or mistake as to
fact or law negates a required culpability level, the requirements of an offense definition are not
satisfied.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 501.207 is similar to current KRS
501.070(1)(a), providing that a mistake may negate a required culpability level, but is more
specific and precise.
Section 207(1) explicitly recognizes that in some cases  such as where one mistakenly
believes that he is committing a more serious offense  proposed Sections 303 and 304 will
permit imputation of an offenses culpability requirement in spite of the actors ignorance or mistake
as to an objective element.
Section 207(2) refines current law by explaining the conditions under which a mistake
negatives an offenses culpability requirement. Section 207(2) categorizes mistakes as reckless,
grossly negligent, negligent, or reasonable.13 Just as there are different levels of culpability as to
conduct, there are different categories of mistakes  some innocent, some not  and a mistake
at which a person arrives through culpability equal to, or greater than, the requirement of the
offense itself should not exonerate the person. In other words, a persons recklessness as to
forming a mistaken belief should not prevent liability where the crime itself requires only recklessness
for liability. Accordingly, Section 207(2) states that a reckless mistake may negate only intention
or knowledge; a grossly negligent mistake negates intention, knowledge, and recklessness; a negligent
mistake negates intention, knowledge, recklessness, and gross negligence; and a reasonable mistake
negates any culpability level.
Section 207(3) defines the terms reckless mistake, grossly negligent mistake, negligent
mistake, and reasonable mistake. Section 207(3)(a) and (3)(b)s definitions of reckless mistake
and negligent mistake require, respectively that the actor be reckless or negligent in forming
or holding an erroneous belief. Section 207(3)(c)s definition of reasonable mistake applies to
erroneous beliefs that an actor forms or holds neither recklessly nor negligently. Section 207(3)s
definitions are intended to incorporate by reference Section 206s definitions of the culpability
levels of recklessness and negligence; whether a mistake is reckless, negligent, or reasonable is to
be determined with reference to the standards set forth in Sections 206(3) and (4).
13

mistake.
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Section 501.208. Mental Illness or Retardation Negating Required
Culpability
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

None

Comment:

Generally. This provision recognizes that a mental illness or retardation, like ignorance or
mistake, may negate culpability for an offense. The defense this provision provides does not
change in any way what would otherwise already be the case under the current or proposed Code
 if a person lacks the culpability required by an offense, he cannot be held liable for that offense.
The defense does nothing but confirm that evidence relevant to the required mental state may be
introduced on that issue. To adopt a contrary rule  maintaining that culpability is required for an
offense, yet excluding evidence relevant to the issue of culpability  would be inconsistent, if not
disingenuous.
At the same time, it should be noted that many commonly offered forms of evidence 
such as psychiatric testimony, or evidence regarding disorders that impair ability to control conduct
 do not truly relate to whether the defendant acted with the required culpability. Accordingly,
such evidence may be rejected on strict relevance grounds, which provide the most sound and
consistent basis for determining whether the issue may be litigated and what evidence may be
introduced.
Relation to current Kentucky law. No provision in the current Penal Code generally
deals with mental impairment negating culpability, but Kentucky courts have read specific defense
provisions of the Code to implicitly recognize that mental illness or retardation may negate the
culpability requirement for an offense element. Cf. McGuire v. Com., 885 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Ky.
1994) (Intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a defense to an intentional crime if the
effect of the intoxication is to completely negate the element of intent; it causes the defendants
mental state to equate with insanity.).

Section 501.209: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

[various]

Comment:

Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Chapter 501.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For discussion of the relationship between Chapter
501s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term in
question is defined.

171

Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project

172

Chapter 502: Defenses Relating to the Offense Harm or Evil

CHAPTER 502. DEFENSES RELATED TO THE OFFENSE HARM OR EVIL
COMMENTARY
Section 502.251. Consent
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

[Various]

Comment:

Generally. Section 251 establishes rules governing when the consent of one who would
otherwise be the victim of an offense will preclude criminal liability. Section 251(1) defines the
general rule; Section 251(2) provides special rules for offenses involving bodily harm; and Section
251(3) defines the circumstances under which a persons agreement will not constitute valid legal
consent.
Relation to current Kentucky law. There is no general consent defense corresponding
to Section 251(1), but consent is defined as a defense  or the lack of consent as an offense
element  for many specific offenses. See, e.g., KRS 510.040, 510.060, 510.110, 510.140.
Current laws repeated use of the phrase without consent fails to clearly articulate the rules
required to properly determine liability. Section 251 recognizes that a persons agreement will not
always constitute valid legal consent (for example, where the person is incompetent or the consent
is coerced), and ensures that the proposed Code is both clear in explaining when consent precludes
liability and consistent in its treatment of consent from one offense to another.
Section 251(1) provides that a victims consent will preclude liability, as a general matter,
if it negatives either an offense element or the harm or wrong at which the offense is aimed. For
example, several offense definitions in the proposed Code14explicitly include the absence of a
persons consent as an offense element. Less obviously, Section 251(1) would also apply to
offenses requiring that the defendant accomplish something by force or threat of force, against
anothers will, or without authority.15

See, e.g., proposed Sections 513.1304(1)(e) (sexual abuse); 513.1305(1) (sexual misconduct);
514.1401(4)(b) (unlawful restraint); 521.2112(1) (unauthorized use of vehicle; requiring conduct be performed
without consent of the owner); proposed Section 524.2401(1) (surveilling or eavesdropping without consent
of persons entitled to privacy).
14

See, e.g., proposed Section 513.1301(1)(b), (2)(b) (sexual assault committed where one uses forcible
compulsion, meaning force or threat of force); proposed Section 1501(1) (robbery committed where one
uses or threatens immediate use of physical force); proposed Section 531.3101(1)(a) (forgery committed
where one alters anothers writing without his authority).
15
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Section 251(1) also provides a defense for situations where consent does not negative an
offense element, but nevertheless precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prohibited
by an offense. For example, proposed Chapter 2200 includes several offenses that criminalize
damaging or endangering the property of another. See, e.g., proposed Sections 522.2202(1)(a),
2203(1)(b), 2204(1)(a), 2206. Although a victims consent does not negative such offenses
requirement that the property involved belong to another, it does negative the harm at which the
offenses are aimed.
Section 251(2) creates special rules for consent to bodily harm, because in limited
circumstances, consent to such harm may be valid even though it does not negate an element or
preclude the harm the offense seeks to punish. Current law includes no such provision, but appears
to support this principle. (For example, with some forms of infliction of physical attacks, as in
legitimate athletic contests like boxing and football, the willingness of the participants will prevent
liability.) Section 251(2)s special rules for consent to bodily harm operate independently of
Section 251(1)s general rules regarding consents effectiveness as a defense. Consent to conduct
causing or threatening bodily harm may, therefore, provide a defense even if it does not negative an
offense element or preclude the harm or wrong at which an offense is aimed.
Section 251(3) recognizes that a victims agreement may not always constitute valid legal
consent. Consent is not a defense where the person giving it is one who is obviously, or is known
by the offender to be, incompetent or lacking the mental capacity to consent; or against whose
imprudent consent the law seeks to protect; or who is coerced into giving consent.

Section 502.252. Customary License; De Minimis Infraction; and Conduct
Not Envisaged by Legislature as Prohibited by the Offense
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

None

Generally. This provision sets out defenses for persons whose conduct was within a
customary license, was too insignificant to merit criminal punishment, or did not cause the harm
contemplated by the offenses existence. These provisions enable the court to dismiss prosecutions
on these bases, creating an additional safeguard beyond the usual reliance on prosecutorial discretion.
These defenses are to be presented to, and ruled on by, the court prior to trial, rather than to the
jury at trial.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Current Kentucky law does not explicitly recognize
these defenses. Section 252s defenses are in keeping, however, with the well-accepted rule of
construction that a statute should not be interpreted to produce an absurd result.
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Section 252(1) provides that conduct may be exempt from liability if it is within a customary
license. For example, Section 252(1) would provide a defense to trespassing where a landowner
has never previously objected to neighbors using his yard as a shortcut, even though it is posted
against trespassing. Section 252(1)s defense is not available, however, where a license has been
expressly negatived by the person whose interest was infringed or is inconsistent with the relevant
offense.
Section 252(2) recognizes a defense for conduct that, although technically constituting an
offense, is too trivial to fairly warrant a criminal conviction. For example, one might technically
commit an offense for being less than a minute late in reporting for periodic detention. See proposed
Section 5307(1), (2)(b).
Section 252(3) provides a defense where one did not actually cause the harm or wrong at
which the offense is aimed. Sections 252(3) also provides that the court may not dismiss a charge
on the basis of a defense set forth in Section 252 without filing a written statement of its reasons for
doing so.

Section 502.253. Prosecution When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements
of More than One Offense
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

505.020

Comment:

Generally. This provision sets out the rules for prosecuting persons whose conduct may
violate two or more offenses at the same time. Sections 502.253 and .254 attempt to ensure that
convictions for multiple related offenses are logical, that they track the legislatures intention as
what are different harms, and that comport with constitutional double jeopardy requirements.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 253 is the same as the first sentence of
current KRS 505.020(1), except that the phrase single course of conduct in KRS 505.020(1)
has been replaced with the phrase same conduct.

Section 502.254. Conviction When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements
of More than One Offense or Grade
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

505.020; 506.110

Comment:
Generally. Section 254 defines the circumstances under which a person may receive
multiple convictions when he satisfies the requirements of more than one offense. Significantly, this
Section does not restate (or even directly relate to) the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy,
but is more comprehensive, addressing broad general issues regarding the appropriateness of
multiple liability that go beyond the Constitutions minimum requirements. Moreover, this Section
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does not address any procedural issues relating to how, or when, a jury is to be instructed regarding
various offenses, such as included offenses of charged offenses. Section 254 speaks only to the
issue of when multiple liability is appropriate and allowed under the proposed Code.
Relation to current Kentucky law. No state has ever developed a clear statute seeking
to explain comprehensively the basis for punishing multiple offenses. Instead of making an effort to
set out underlying principles to guide judgment, legislatures almost always simply lean on the notion
of an included offense, an idea borrowed from constitutional double jeopardy law, which itself
is murky, if not incoherent. The included offense concept has not proven useful or clear as a
guide to determining when multiple liability is appropriate. Decisions regarding the propriety of
imposing multiple liability have, for the most part, been delegated to the courts, with predictably
unpredictable results.16 This issue is too critical to allow ad hoc decision-making rather than at
least attempting to provide legislative guidelines or an explanation of suitable criteria.
This issue is critical given that the proposed Code also seeks to define a new liability
scheme that would eliminate concurrent sentences. Currently, the issue of multiple liability can
effectively be swept under the rug, as a court can enter additional convictions that have no practical
consequence in terms of the defendants total liability. But if we take seriously the project of
imposing additional liability for all the distinct harms (and only the distinct harms) a defendant has
caused, we also need to take care in describing the conditions under which multiple liability is, or
is not, allowed.
Consider the case where an offense has both a base offense and an aggravating factor,
such as causing physical injury, that increases the offenses grade, and there is another offense that
prohibits the aggravating factor (causing injury) specifically. Although it may be true that the second
offense and the aggravated form of the first offense (considered as awhole, rather than considering
the aggravator specifically) each requires something that the other does not. Even so, counting the
same harm toward both the aggravator and a distinct offense may amount to double counting of
a single harm. See, e.g., Grundy v. Com., 25 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2000), (allowing convictions for
both first-degree burglary, based on physical injury aggravator, and second-degree assault, under
intentional physical injury with a dangerous instrument theory, as each required proof of a fact or
facts unique to each charge); McClain v. Com., 607 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1980) (affirming convictions
for first-degree escape and first-degree assault).

For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently overturned a line of double-jeopardy precedent.
See Com. v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 422 (overruling Ingram v Com., 801 S.W.2d
321; Walden v. Com., 805 S.W.2d 102; Hall v. Com., 819 S.W.2d 3; Jones v. Com., 756 S.W.2d 462; Hellard v.
Com., 829 S.W.2d 427; Hamilton v. Com., 659 S.W.2d 201; Denny v. Com., 670 S.W.2d 847).
16
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At the same time, there may be cases where one offense is technically an included offense
of another, but under the facts of the case, each offense represents a distinct harm or wrongful act.
Cf. Bush v. Com., 839 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1992) (disallowing conviction for both DUI and wanton
murder). One difficult issue under included offense analysis is whether there can be liability for
two offenses where one includes efforts toward the other: for example, burglary (which requires
an intent to commit a felony) and the subsequent felony. The purpose of the burglary offense is to
punish the intrusion itself, which represents an independent harm from the later felony; it makes
sense, then, that the later felony should not be discounted or merged into the burglary offense. The
same is true of the current Codes definition of robbery, which punishes the discrete harm of
intimidation and fear created in the course of committing theft and does not require a completed
theft, but only the intent to accomplish the theft. KRS 515.020, 515.030. But see, e.g., Jordan
v. Com., 703 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. 1985) (where defendant who has pled guilty to theft is subsequently
found guilty of first-degree robbery arising out of same circumstances, theft plea must be eliminated);
cf. Marshall v. Com., 625 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1981) (pointing gun at certain persons prior to
seizure of loot, which gave rise to wanton endangerment charge, was in reality part of elements of
robbery and could not be punished separately); Watson v. Com., 579 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1979)
(terroristic threat is included in wanton endangerment).
Section 254 defines a comprehensive statutory provision addressing the propriety of multiple
convictions for separate offenses. Importantly, Section 254 does not alter current law regarding
when a jury may be instructed on, or find a defendant guilty of, multiple offenses or included
offenses.17 Section 254 imposes limitations on multiple judgments of conviction by the court, as
opposed to multiple guilty verdicts by the jury, where an offender satisfies the requirements of
more than one offense.
Section 254(1) does not employ the concept of an included offense, which is significant
in the context of jury instructions, but is conceptually separable from the question of when multiple
liability should be allowed. The rules established in Section 254 do not depend on consideration
of the particular facts of specific cases. Rather, they present issues of law18 regarding how defined
offenses relate to each other  specifically, whether their relation is such that multiple liability is
appropriate, or whether imposing liability for one offense would needlessly and improperly duplicate
liability already imposed by a conviction for another offense. Accordingly, a courts finding regarding
the appropriateness of multiple convictions for two separate offenses would be binding on all
future cases involving those same offenses, enhancing predictability, stability, and evenhandedness
in the imposition of multiple liability.
As to that issue, see, e.g., Com. v. Day, 983 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1999) (An instruction on a lesser
included offense is required only if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury could have a reasonable
doubt as to the defendants guilt of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is
guilty of the lesser offense.).
17

The propriety of multiple convictions under Section 254 is question of law for the court, rather than
a question of fact for the jury. In some instances, the court may be able to withhold jury instructions for an
offense because Section 254 would preclude a conviction. To avoid the risk of a reversal requiring a new trial,
however, the court might be wise to postpone such determinations until after the jury has returned its verdicts.
18
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Section 254(1)(a) defines rules to limit liability for multiple offenses when those offenses
are based on the same conduct. Importantly, Section 254(1)(a) does not in any way limit
convictions for related offenses arising out of different conduct. For example, Section
254(1)(a)(i)(A) would preclude assault liability where the bodily harm involved consists solely of
sexual penetration that is accounted for by a sexual assault conviction. Multiple liability would be
appropriate, however, where the bodily harm involved is independent of the sexual penetration 
such as where the defendant hits the victim in the course of a sexual assault. Similarly, Section
254(1)(a)(i)(B) would preclude convictions for both homicide and assault where the defendant
shot the victim with a single bullet, but would not bar convictions for both offenses where the
defendant caused bodily harm with one shot and death with another.
Section 254(1)(a) imposes additional requirements, however, so that multiple liability is
not barred for all situations where the same conduct may constitute multiple offenses. Section
254(1)(a)(i)(A) precludes liability for two offenses arising out of the same conduct where one
offense is concerned with a harm or wrong that is entirely accounted for by the other offense.
Rather than considering the theoretical possibility of committing one offense without committing
another, the proposed standard calls for a consideration of the relevant offenses purposes. Consider
the following examples:
·
The proposed multiple-conviction provision would preclude convictions for both
sexual assault by the use of force and unlawful restraint based on the same conduct. Cf.
proposed Section 513.1301(1)(b) (defining sexual assault by force); proposed Section
1401(2) (defining unlawful restraint). Nevertheless, multiple liability would be appropriate
where the sexual assault and unlawful restraint are based on different conduct. For example,
an unlawful restraint conviction could be based on a lengthy detention that was independent
of, and occurred before or after, a sexual assault.
·

·
Convictions would not be permitted, based on the same conduct, for both
aggravated sexual assault under proposed Section 513.1301(3)(b) and assault under
proposed Section 512.1201. Section 1301(3)(b)s aggravation fully accounts for the
assault offenses focus on bodily harm. A conviction for assault would be permitted,
however, where a factor other than bodily harm (such as the victims age) aggravates the
sexual assault offense, or where the sexual-assault aggravation is based on different conduct.

·

Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for both sexual assault and
incest based on a single act of sexual penetration, insofar as sexual assault does not in any
way account for the harm to families at which the incest offense is aimed. Cf. proposed
Section 513.1301 (defining sexual assault); proposed Section 541.4102 (defining incest).
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·
Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would bar convictions for both criminal coercion and
terroristic threats based on the same threat to commit an offense, insofar as the coercion
offense accounts for the harm of causing fear that is criminalized by the threat offense. Cf.
proposed Section 512.1203 (defining terroristic threats); proposed Section 514.1403
(defining criminal coercion).

·

Where a defendant obtains property by conduct that is itself criminal, Section
254(1)(a)(i)(A) will often permit liability for both theft and the other offense. For example,
liability for both theft by deception and forgery would be appropriate where one acquires
property by passing a counterfeit bill, insofar as the offense of theft does not account for
the forgery offenses harm of undermining public confidence in paper currency and the
monetary system. See proposed Section 521.2103 (defining theft by deception); proposed
Section 531.3101 (defining forgery).

·

Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would bar convictions for both burglary and trespassing
based on the same entry into a building. Cf. proposed Section 523.2301 (defining burglary);
proposed Section 523.2302 (defining criminal trespass). The harm addressed by the
offense of trespassing (interfering with property, and perhaps privacy, interests by physical
intrusion) is fully accounted for by the offense of burglary  which, after all, is essentially
a compound offense consisting of trespassing and an attempt to commit another offense.

·

In like manner, Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would also preclude liability for both burglary
and attempted theft where the burglary charge is premised on the defendants intention to
steal property upon entering a building. Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not preclude liability
for both burglary and attempted theft, however, where a burglary conviction is premised
upon the defendants intention to commit a second offense. Liability for both burglary and
theft would also be appropriate where a burglar actually steals property, given that the
offense of burglary does not account for the completed theft offenses harm of actually
taking anothers property. The same would be true of robbery and theft: liability for both
robbery and an attempted theft would not be allowed, but liability for both robbery and a
completed theft would be allowed.
·
Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not prevent convictions for both contributing to the
delinquency of a minor and the inchoate offense of solicitation based on the same solicitation
to commit an offense. Cf. proposed Section 541.4107(1) (defining offense of contributing
to delinquency of minor). In such a case, the inchoate offense does not account for the
harm of corrupting a juvenile, while the contribution offense does not account for the harm
of the underlying offense. The proposed Codes contribution offense operates, rather, as
an add-on offense that provides additional punishment beyond that imposed for soliciting
an adult to commit an offense.
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·
The proposed multiple-conviction provision would also not bar liability for both
official misconduct and any other offense the misconduct constitutes. Liability for official
misconduct may, but need not, arise from conduct that is itself criminal. Cf. proposed
Section 551.5103 (defining official misconduct). The proposed misconduct offense punishes
the harm of abusing authority by certain conduct, but does not account for any independent
harm caused by such conduct. For example, an official-misconduct conviction premised
on embezzlement of public funds would not account for the wrongful taking of property
addressed by the theft offense.

·

Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not preclude liability for both escape and the offense
for which the offender was originally in custody. Cf. proposed Section 5307 (defining
escape). The offense of escape punishes the harm of interfering with governmental
operations, but of course does not account for the harm of the underlying offense  for
which, in a great number of escape cases, the offender will already be under sentence.
Section 254(1)(a)(i)(B), which is substantively similar to KRS 505.020(2)(d), prevents
convictions for two offenses based on the same conduct where the harm or wrong of one offense
is of the same kind, but lesser degree than the harm or wrong of the other offense. This provision
would, for example, prevent liability for both sexual assault and sexual abuse based on the same
conduct. Cf. proposed Section 513.1301 (defining sexual assault); proposed Section 513.1302
(defining sexual abuse). Section 254(1)(a)(i)(B) also precludes convictions for both homicide
and assault based on the same conduct. Cf. proposed Section 511.1101 (defining first-degree
murder); proposed Section 512.1201 (defining assault).
Sections 254(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) prevent multiple convictions for specific and general offenses
punishing the same conduct, or offenses that differ only in their culpability requirements, or offenses
defined as a continuing course of conduct. Section 254(1)(a)(ii)(A) precludes multiple convictions
where two offenses differ only in that one prohibits a kind of conduct generally and the other
criminalizes a specific kind of such conduct.
Section 254(1)(a)(ii)(B), which is substantively similar to KRS 505.020(2)(c), provides
that multiple liability may not be imposed where two offenses differ only in that one requires a
lesser kind of culpability than the other. Where one causes the death of a single person, for
example, convictions would not be permitted for both first-degree murder (which requires knowingly
causing death) and second-degree manslaughter (which requires recklessly causing death). The
Kentucky courts have similarly held that multiple homicide convictions may not obtain from a
single death.
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Section 254(1)(a)(iii), which is nearly identical to current KRS 505.020(1)(c), limits multiple
liability for offenses defined as a continuing course of conduct based on uninterrupted conduct.
For example, the proposed offense definition for bigamy reaches one who resides in the State
after a second marriage. Section 254(1)(a)(iii)s rule makes it clear that multiple bigamy convictions
would not appropriate based on a defendants single, uninterrupted residence in Kentucky. Cf.
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile
guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single
crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.). (Section 254(1)(a)(iii) allows the legislature to
circumvent this general rule against multiple convictions, however, by expressly providing that
specific periods of continuing conduct constitute separate offenses.)
Section 254(1)(b)(i) adopts the current rule of KRS 506.110(1) prohibiting convictions
for both an inchoate offense and the completed offense, but expands that rule to all inchoate
offenses, rather than only attempt. Section 254(1)(b)(ii) prohibits simultaneous convictions for
both (1) an inchoate offense toward commission of a target offense, and (2) any offense that is so
closely related to the target offense that Section 254(1)(a) would bar liability for both the target
offense and that other offense. For example, 254(1)(b)(ii) would preclude convictions (based on
the same conduct) for both battery and attempted aggravated battery, or for attempted battery
and aggravated battery.
Section 254(1)(c), preventing convictions for multiple inchoate offenses toward a single
substantive offense, adopts the same substantive rule as exists in current KRS 506.110(3).
Section 254(1)(d) states that a person cannot be convicted of the same offense twice
where one conviction is based on his own conduct and one is based on his complicity for the
conduct of another participant in the offense. Thus, where two people jointly commit the offense
of home invasion, each may be convicted on one count of home invasion, but not for another count
based solely on the accountability of each for the conduct of the other. The current Code contains
no such explicit rule, although the proposed rule seems to be consistent with Kentucky law.
Section 254(1)(e), prohibiting legally inconsistent simultaneous convictions, is identical to
KRS 505.020(1)(b).
Section 254(2) makes clear that where multiple convictions conflict and only one may be
entered into judgment, the court must enter a conviction for the most serious of those offenses (or
the more serious of two grades of the same offense). This rule is consistent with current Kentucky
law.
Section 254(3) defines inchoate offense and substantive offense.
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Section 502.255: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

[various]

Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Chapter 502.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For discussion of the relationship between Chapter
502s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term in
question is defined.
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CHAPTER 503. IMPUTATION OF OFFENSE ELEMENTS
COMMENTARY
Many traditional doctrines inculpate a person despite the absence of a required
element of the offense definition. For example, if a person causes another to engage
in conduct constituting a criminal offense, the person may be liable for the offense
even though he has not performed the required conduct himself. The person is liable
despite the absent element(s) because the conduct of the other person (the principal)
is imputed to him under the doctrine of complicity. Similarly, a culpable mental state
(typically, recklessness  the conscious disregard of a known risk) commonly is imputed to a person if he lacked such a mental state because of his voluntary intoxication.
Under these doctrines, although the person does not satisfy the required offense element, some other behavior on the persons part makes it appropriate to impute that
element and hold him liable for the offense.
Section 503.301. Accountability for the Conduct of Another
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

502.010-040; 506.020-.040, .080-.100

Comment:

Generally. This provision sets forth the circumstances in which one person may be held
accountable for the conduct of another person.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Sections 503.301(1)(a) and (b) are substantively
similar to KRS 502.010(1) and 502.020, respectively, in defining complicity liability. However,
Section 301(1)(a) imposes complicity liability generally for causing another to commit an offense,
rather than only for causing an innocent or irresponsible person to do so, as current 502.010(1)
does. One who causes another person to commit an offense should be held accountable whether
the other person was innocent or not. Section 301(1)(b), like KRS 502.020, defines a second
standard of liability where the defendant intentionally assists in planning or committing the offense.
(Note that the intent requirement applies only to the persons conduct; as to the offenses
circumstances or result, the person must have the culpability required by the offense definition.)
The term conspire, as used in this Section, has the same meaning as in Chapter 508. Section
301(1)(c), allowing for complicity liability if an offense definition specifically provides for it, has no
corresponding provision in the current Code.
Section 301(2)(a), providing an exception to accountability if the person in question is a
victim of the offense, has no corresponding provision in the Penal Code. Section 301(2)(b) is
substantively similar to KRS 502.040(1). Section 301(2)(c) is similar to current 502.040(2).
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Section 301(3) is substantively similar to KRS 502.030(1). Section 301(3) adds the
phrase upon proof that the objective elements of the offense are satisfied, clarifying that the
accomplice still is liable even if the person assisted lacks the requisite mental state or has an
excusing condition. In such a situation, all the objective elements for liability are satisfied, although
the principal may not be held liable for an offense. Section 301(3) also finds support in current
502.010, which explicitly provides for complicity liability where the person performing the offense
conduct may not be convicted.
Section 301(4) and (5) are substantively similar to KRS 506.010(3), imposing attempt
liability for attempt to aid in an offense.
Section 301(6) is comparable to KRS 506.080(1) for knowing complicity, also referred
to as facilitation. (The exemptions in KRS 506.090 and 506.100 are covered by Section 301(2)
and (3).) The grading of the offense in Section 301(6)(a)-(b) is similar to KRS 506.080(2). The
grading differences in current law give facilitation more of a discount from the substantive offenses
than they give for attempt liability.

Section 503.302. Voluntary Intoxication
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

501.080(1); 501.010(2) and (4)

Generally. This provision defines what constitutes voluntary intoxication and governs the
imputation of culpability to a person who commits an offense after becoming voluntarily intoxicated.
(For rules governing conduct performed under the influence of involuntary intoxication, see proposed
Section 505.506 and corresponding commentary.)
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 503.302(1) is substantively similar to current
KRS 501.080(1). Both recognize the prevailing idea that intoxication generally does not provide
a defense to a criminal charge, except where the intoxication negates an element of the offense.
The commentary to current KRS 501.080(1) indicates that the element to which the statute
refers typically is the capacity to form the required culpable mental state. Thus, where a person
successfully demonstrates he did not know what he was doing because he was intoxicated, this
defense precludes conviction for an offense that requires a showing of intent. Section 302(1)
expresses this more clearly by requiring within the statute itself that intoxication negative a required
culpability element of the offense.
Section 302(2) creates a rule specifying that voluntary intoxication allows imputation of
recklessness even if the persons intoxication prevented him from actually having a reckless mental
state (i.e., prevented him from being aware of a substantial risk he should have recognized). This
parallels the rule set out in the last sentence of KRS 501.020(3). (In keeping with that provision,
Kentucky judicial decisions have allowed a voluntary intoxication defense only for offenses that
require intent or knowledge. See Brown v. Com., 575 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1978).)
Section 302(3)(a) and (b), defining intoxication and voluntary intoxication, are identical
to current KRS 501.010(2) and (4), respectively, except that 302(3)(b) replaces the word duress
with circumstances.
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Section 503.303. Divergence Between Consequences Intended or Risked and
Actual Consequences
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

501.060

Comment:

Generally. This provision addresses the problems of legal causation that arise where the
actual (harmful) results of a persons conduct vary from the (harmful) results the person intended,
foresaw, or risked. This is sometimes described as the transferred intent situation. Where a
person intends, foresees, or risks one result that would be an offense and ends up causing or
risking another result that is also an offense, liability may be imposed for the unintended offense
that actually results. (Where a person causes both the intended result and another result that is
also an offense, he may be held liable for both offenses. Where the intended result does not occur,
the person may be held liable for attempting to commit the intended offense as well as for committing
the unintended offense.)
Section 503.303(1) uses the term consequence instead of result because in some
cases, it may be ambiguous whether an offense element is a circumstance element or a result
element, as those terms are defined in proposed Section 202. For example, if an offense prohibits
causing injury to a police officer, it is unclear whether the result requirement is injury and the
police officer element is merely an attendant circumstance of that result, or whether the result
requirement is injury to a police officer specifically. Section 303(2) avoids this ambiguity by
including attendant circumstances within the definition of consequence.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 303 is substantively similar to current KRS
501.060(2)(a) and (3)(a) in its application of the doctrine of transferred intent to intentional, reckless,
and negligent offenses. Section 303(1)(a) and (b) set forth the circumstances in which the required
culpability of a particular result is deemed established, notwithstanding the variance between actual
results and the results intended or created by defendants risk-taking. The first of these circumstances
is the situation where the results differ only in the respect that a different person or property is
injured or affected. Thus, where an actor intends to kill one person but kills another, liability may
be imposed. See Smith v. Com., 734 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1987) (intentional context); Lofthouse
v. Com., 13 S.W.3d 236 (Ky. 2000) (reckless or negligent context). The second circumstance
occurs where the intended harm was as or more serious than the actual resulting harm, as where an
actor intends to kill a person but only injures him.
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Section 503.304. Mistaken Belief Consistent with a Different Offense
Corresponding Current provision(s):

501.070(2)

Comment:

Generally. This provision applies to those situations where a person has a mistaken
belief, but is not entitled to a defense because even under his mistaken view, he was committing an
offense. The provision imputes culpability as to the committed offense based on the persons
culpability as to the intended offense.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 503.304 is substantially the same as current
501.070(2), but has been restated for clarity. The phrase another offense has been changed to
another offense of the same or higher grade. This change highlights that it is inappropriate to
impute culpability as to a more serious offense based on actual culpability as to a less serious one.

Section 503.305: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

[various]

Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Chapter 503.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For discussion of the relationship between Chapter
503s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term in
question is defined.
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CHAPTER 504. JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES
COMMENTARY
Chapters 504, 505, and 506 address affirmative defenses of justification, excuse, and
nonexculpatory defenses, respectively. Justifications and excuses are similar, because both exculpate
a person, that is, they are defenses based on the defendants blamelessness. Justified conduct
adheres to the criminal laws rules of conduct and should be encouraged, or at least tolerated, in
similar future situations. Deciding whether conduct is justified requires that one focus on the
persons act and its circumstances, rather than on the person. Under special justifying circumstances,
the harm caused by justified behavior is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or
to promote a greater societal interest. For example, for the justification of self-defense, the
defenders right to bodily integrity, combined with the wrongfulness of the physical harm threatened,
entitle a person to use physical force against another even though such force is normally not condoned.

Section 504.400. General Defenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

503.020

Comment:

Generally. This provision explains the implications of the existence of a defense for a
persons possible criminal or civil liability. Section 504.400(1) states a principle implicit in the
notion of a defense: it applies even if one has done something that would otherwise constitute an
offense. Section 400(2) explains that a defense to criminal liability is not necessarily a defense to
civil liability. The determination that a persons conduct does not merit criminal liability does not
automatically shield that person from bearing the costs of that conduct.
Relation to current Kentucky law. This provision is substantively similar to KRS 503.020
and reflects current law. See Holbrook v. Com., 925 S.W.2d 191 (Ky. App. 1995) (directed
verdict of acquittal should be granted when the evidence conclusively establishes justification).

General Comment Regarding Justifications:

Justifications differ from excuses in that they relate to specific conduct, not specific persons
 although sometimes, only particular persons are authorized to perform the justified conduct. In
other words, an act is (or is not) justified, whereas an actor is (or is not) excused. Justifications
exist independently of an actors state of mind: in common-law legal terms, a justification negates
the existence of an actus reus, not the existence of a mens rea.
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This distinction is important because a defenses status as a justification, an excuse, or a
nonexculpatory defense has significant legal implications. For example, a person acting in selfdefense may be assisted by others, and may not legally be interfered with. On the other hand, an
aggressor is entitled to resist a person who mistakenly believes himself to be acting in self-defense;
such a person, even if excused, is not justified. Moreover, because justifications recognize conduct
that is socially acceptable, and often desirable, it is sensible to require the prosecution to prove that
conduct was not justified. Excuses and nonexculpatory defenses, by contrast, operate to prevent
liability for harmful conduct that would ordinarily constitute an offense. Accordingly, and because
the state-of-mind or other evidence relevant to an excuse or nonexculpatory defense is frequently
within the control of the defendant, it is sensible to shift the burden of proof to the defendant for
those defenses. (See Sections 504.411, 505.501, and 506.601 and corresponding commentary.)

Section 504.411. General Provisions Governing Justification Defenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

None

Generally. This provision sets forth the general rules governing the use of justification as a
defense. Section 504.411(1) creates a specific provision mandating the supremacy of specific
justification defenses over more general ones. This reflects the fact that the more specific justifications
represent the legislative determinations that have been made concerning liability for specific types
of conduct. At the same time, Section 411(2) makes clear that conduct may relate to several
justification rules at once  for example, an aggressors conduct may threaten both a persons life
and his property. Where this is the case, the actor may act according to the allowances of any
relevant justification  for example, in the above situation, if the self-defense provision authorizes
deadly force, the person may employ such force even though the defense-of-property provision
standing alone would not allow it.
Section 411(3) makes clear that where conduct is justified, a person may not unlawfully
impede, and may lawfully assist, such conduct. Finally, Section 411(4) and (5) govern circumstances
where the actor seeking to use justification has caused the situation that gives rise to the justification
for his conduct. Section 411(4) clarifies that such circumstances will not necessarily prevent a
person from making use of the justification. However, Section 411(5) qualifies the applicability of
411(4) in those circumstances where the person causing the situation has acted with culpability.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 411(1) maintains the principle in current
KRS 503.030(1) and KRS 503.040(1) that allows the choice-of-evils and execution-of-publicduty justifications only when they are not inconsistent with other justifications or with other parts of
the Code. This is also in keeping with Kentucky law regarding statutory construction, which
provides that the specific provisions of statutes take precedence over general provisions. See
Hughes v. Com., 875 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. 1994).
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Sections 411(2) to (4) have no corresponding provisions in the current Code. However,
Kentucky courts have recognized the principle, reflected in Section 411(2), that a defendant is
entitled to an instruction on any relevant defense he seeks to assert. See Springer v. Com., 998
S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999) (defendant in homicide is entitled to both self-protection and intoxication
instructions if competent evidence is produced that would establish such defenses). See also
Taylor v. Com., 995 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. 1999).
Section 411(5) is substantively similar to KRS 503.030(2) and 503.060(2). This provision
makes clear that where a person was culpable in causing the circumstances that give rise to the
justification, he may not rely on justification as a defense.
Section 504.412. Lesser Evils

Corresponding Current Provision(s):

503.030(1)

Comment:

Generally. This provision ensures that conduct will not give rise to criminal liability where
the conduct is objectively necessary to avoid a threatened harm even greater than that caused by
the conduct itself. For example, a druggist may dispense drugs without a prescription to alleviate
suffering in an emergency, and an ambulance may exceed the speed limit or pass through a traffic
light.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Sections 504.412(1) and (2) are substantively similar
to current KRS 503.030(1), except that the proposed Section refers to avoiding a harm or evil
instead of a public or private injury, and also shifts the requirement of immediacy from the
perceived threat to the persons need to respond to the threat. Some threats, although foreseeable,
may not become imminent for some time  at which point it may be too late to respond and
prevent the threat. For example, the crew on a ship that is leaking or has low rations, but whose
captain refuses to return to port, may not face the imminent threat of capsizing or starvation for
some time, at which point the ship may be too far out to return to shore. At the same time,
forbidding the crew to mutiny until such action becomes immediately necessary  until they have
reached the point of no return  gives the captain time to relent.
Like Section 411(1), Section 412(3) follows the principle of statutory construction recognized by Kentucky law that specific provisions of statute take precedence over general provisions.
See Hughes v. Com., 875 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. 1994). As such, Section 412(3) denies the use of
lesser evils as a justification where the legislature has evidenced plain intent to impose criminal
liability, notwithstanding the possibility that the conduct may satisfy the requirements of lesser
evils.
A Kentucky court has stated, inconsistent with the current statute, that the defendant has
the burden of proving a lesser evils defense. See Peak v. Com., 34 S.W.3d 80 (Ky. App.
2000); proposed Section 500.106(2) and its commentary.
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Section 504.413. Execution of Public Duty
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

503.040

Comment:

Generally. This provision creates a justification for conduct explicitly permitted by a
governmental institution with the lawful power to authorize such conduct.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 504.413(1) is similar to KRS 503.040(1)
 and also to 503.040(2)(b), except that 413(1) justifies only objectively authorized conduct and
does not cover mistakes as to authorization. Section 413(1) is consistent with current case law,
which authorizes the public-duty defense for third parties whose actions are at the direction of a
public officer. See Baird v. Com., 709 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. App.1986) (convicted felon entitled to
instruction as to defense where he admitted possession of a handgun, but sought justification
because he was doing undercover work for a police officer).
Section 413(2) is similar to KRS 503.040(2)(a), but justifies only objectively authorized
conduct and does not cover mistakes as to authorization.
Section 413(3) and (4) are similar to KRS 503.040(1).
Current KRS 503.040(2)s mistake components are addressed by proposed Section
505.511.

Section 504.414. Law Enforcement Authority
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

503.090(1)-(3); 431.005

Generally. This provision sets forth the requirements for the use of force, by a peace
officer or private citizen, necessary to bring a person into lawful custody, or to prevent a persons
escape from custody.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 504.414(1)(a) is substantively similar to
KRS 503.090(1), but differs in two respects. First, it merges the language of KRS 503.090(1)(a)
and (c). Second, it clarifies the application of the provision to those who assist a peace officer at
such officers direction. This is in keeping with the extent of the justification provided by Section
413(1).
Section 414(1)(b) is substantively similar to KRS 503.090(2) and the relevant portion of
503.090(3), although it amends the language deadly physical force to force likely to cause
death or serious physical injury and felony to forcible felony. This change reflects the language and reasoning used elsewhere in this Chapter.
Section 414(1)(c) tracks KRS 503.090(1)(c) in allowing the justification even where the
underlying warrant is unlawful, as long as the officer did not know it was unlawful.
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Section 414(2), regarding a private persons use of force in making an arrest, has no
corresponding provision in the current Penal Code, although KRS 431.005 addresses a private
persons power to make an arrest on his own volition.
Section 414(3) is substantively similar to KRS 503.090(3).
Section 414(4), defining forcible felony, has no corresponding provision in the current
Code. The limitation on effecting an arrest through deadly force to those arrests involving offenders
who have committed or will commit a forcible felony is consonant with the restrictions imposed by
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Section 504.415. Use of Force by Persons with Special Responsibility for Care, Discipline, or Safety of Others

Corresponding Current Provision(s):

503.110

Comment:

Generally. The provision sets forth the circumstances in which the use of force by those
with a special duty of care for others may be justified. This conduct  including parents or
teachers authority to protect or discipline children, wardens authority to impose order on a prison
population, and medical professionals need to administer care or restrain those posing a danger to
others or themselves  might not otherwise fall within the scope of the justifications set out in this
Chapter.19 Each part of the provision specifies the categories of person to whom it applies and the
range of conduct allowed. For example, Section 415(1) applies to any of the persons specified in
subsections (a) and (b), but imposes in subsection (c) a general limitation on the acceptable use of
force by such persons.20

Section 415 does not justify the use of force against a justified actor; the provision may not be used
to circumvent Section 416s rule that the use of force in defense of another is justified only to the extent that it
is immediately necessary to defend against an aggressors use of unjustified force. For example, Section
415(1)(a) does not justify a fathers use of force against a police officer who is using justified force against his
son.
20
Note that, as with Chapter 504s other defenses, an excuse defense may be available for one who
makes a mistake as to a justification set forth in Section 415. One who makes a reasonable mistake as to the
necessity of his force, for example, may be excused under Section 511. See proposed Section 511 and corresponding commentary.
19
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Relation to current Kentucky law. This section is substantively similar to KRS 503.110,
recognizing that for persons who have a responsibility for the welfare of others, moderate physical
force in the satisfaction of such responsibility has traditionally been allowed. For example, a
teacher is privileged to use whatever force is necessary so long as it is not designed to cause a
serious risk of death or injury. See Holbrook v. Com., 925 S.W.2d 191 (Ky. App. 1995)
(teacher did not use excessive force in paddling student). Section 415(2) eliminates as redundant
current KRS 503.110(2)(b), requiring that the use of force by a corrections official must not be
forbidden by any other statute. Use of force exceeding an officials authority would be unlawful,
and thus unjustified.
As with the other provisions of this Chapter, defense for mistake as to a justification under
this Section is addressed in Section 505.511.

Section 504.416. Defense of Person
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

503.050(1) and 503.070(1)

Generally. This provision justifies a persons use of force to protect himself or another
from physical attack.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 504.416 merges the substantively similar
provisions in KRS 503.050(1) (governing protection of self) and KRS 503.070(1) (governing
protection of a third person). KRS 503.050(3) is not included within the proposed Code, as it
relates to evidentiary issues.
As in Section 412, the requirement that the threatened use of force be imminent has been
replaced with a requirement that the need to use force be immediately necessary to afford a
defense. This change recognizes that in some instances, responses to a less than imminent threat
may not only be appropriate, but also necessary.
Section 416(2), defining unjustified, has no corresponding provision in the current Penal
Code. This term is used to make clear that, as Section 411(3) states, only unjustified conduct may
lawfully be resisted or interfered with. A person may not, for example, use force in self-defense
against a peace officer who is arresting him, as the peace officers conduct would be justified
under Section 414.
The use of deadly force to defend oneself or a third person, currently found in KRS
503.050(2) and 503.070(2), is addressed in Section 419. Mistakes as to the need to defend
oneself or a third person are covered by Section 505.511.
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Section 504.417. Defense of Property
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

503.080(1)

Comment:

Generally. This provision entitles the owner of property, or someone with a special
relation to the owner, to use force to protect such property from invasion, destruction, or theft.
Relation to current Kentucky law. This provision is substantively similar to, but more
general than, KRS 503.080(1). Section 504.417 streamlines KRS 503.080(1)(a)-(b), making a
general and cohesive rule rather than defining the justification by reference to the prevention of
different specific offenses. As in the provisions in proposed Sections 412 to 416, a mistaken belief
that the defense of property is justified is governed under proposed Section 505.511. The use of
deadly force to defend property is addressed in proposed Section 419.

Section 504.418. Use of Force by Aggressor
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

503.060

Comment:

Generally. This provision denies an aggressor the use of justification as a defense where
he provokes another into assault for the purpose of using the assault as an excuse to respond.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 504.418(1) expands the circumstances in
which a justification defense is unavailable to an aggressor. Currently, this applies most often to
situations where the aggressor is resisting arrest, whether or not the arrest is lawful. See, e.g.,
Baze v. Com., 965 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1997). Section 418(1) broadens the unavailability of
justification to include circumstances in which the aggressor is attempting to commit, or is committing,
a forcible felony.
Section 418(2)-(3) are substantively similar to KRS 503.060(2)-(3).

Section 504.419. Use of Force Likely to Cause Death or Great Bodily Harm
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
503.080(2)

503.050(2); 503.070(2);

Comment:

Generally. This provision limits the scope of this Chapters justifications by imposing
restrictions on the use of severe force.
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Relation to current Kentucky law. This provision merges the concepts in KRS 503.050(2)
and 503.070(2), governing the use of deadly force to defend oneself or another. It also replaces
KRS 503.080(2)s broader privilege for the use of such force in the protection of property, which
permits deadly force to prevent the commission or attempt of a burglary, arson, or dispossession.
Section 419(2), defining force likely to cause death or serious physical injury, replaces
KRS 503.010(1)s definition of deadly physical force, which is flawed to the extent it turns on
the intent or knowledge of the user. Section 419(2) instead bases its rule on the distinction between
force that is objectively likely to cause death or serious injury, regardless of the intent of the user,
and force that is not.

Section 504.420: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

[various]

Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Chapter 504.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For discussion of the relationship between Chapter
504s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term in
question is defined.
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CHAPTER 505. EXCUSE DEFENSES
COMMENTARY
Like justification defenses, excuses are general defenses applicable to all offenses and
available even though the person satisfies the offenses elements. However, excuse defenses
concentrate on the persons lack of subjective blameworthiness, while justification defenses focus
on the persons conduct. Excuses admit that the act may cause or threaten a harm the criminal law
normally disallows, but excuse the person because his characteristics or situation suggest that he
does not merit criminal liability. Criminal liability arises in part from the choice a person makes to
engage in conduct that constitutes a criminal harm. Without sufficient capacity to choose, blame is
improper. An excuse defense represents a legal conclusion that even though a persons conduct is
wrong, liability is inappropriate because some characteristic of the person or his situation vitiates
the persons blameworthiness.

Section 505.501: General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

504.020(3)

Comment:

Generally. Section 505.501 sets out general rules relating to all excuse defenses. These
rules are distinctly relevant to excuse defenses and may be articulated only in a Code that distinguishes
excuses from other defenses. (See general commentary preceding commentary to proposed
Section 504.411.)
Section 501(1) makes clear that excuses differ from justifications; justified conduct may
be assisted and may not be resisted, while neither of these collateral rules applies where a person
is excused but not justified. This is because it is not the act that is excused, but the actor; the act
is still considered improper and undesirable.
Sections 501(2) and 501(3) state that a persons excuse remains valid even if he created
the conditions giving rise to the excuse, unless he did so with the same level of culpability required
by the offense. In such a situation, the basis for criminal liability is not the conduct causing the
offense (because that conduct is excused), but the actors earlier conduct in causing the conditions
of his excuse. Accordingly, the relevant culpability requirement must be applied to that earlier
conduct, and not to the later offense conduct. For example, a young person may join a gang
knowing that it frequently engages in criminal activity and, indeed, has its own laws requiring
participation in criminal activity. Later, the person may be forced by other gang members at
gunpoint to commit a crime he would otherwise not commit. Though the person might normally be
eligible for a duress excuse because he was compelled to commit the crime,21 the fact that he
knew about the gangs customs and the likelihood that he would be forced into criminal activity
vitiates the rationale behind the defense and supports holding the gang member liable for his offense.
21

See infra proposed Section 507 and commentary.
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(This person, who knew of the gangs tendencies, could be held liable for an offense requiring
knowledge; a person who was reckless as to the gangs involvement in crime would, under Sections
501(3) and (4), be eligible for liability only for offenses requiring recklessness.)
Generally, one of three culpability rules is applied to a persons conduct creating an excusing
condition: a general culpability rule of negligence, a general culpability rule of recklessness, or a
culpability rule tracking the culpability requirement for the (excused) offense ultimately committed.
Section 501(3) follows the third rule, as it seems appropriate to require the culpability normally
required for the offense committed rather than some alternative, possibly conflicting requirement.
A contrary rule would operate to impute criminal responsibility to persons based on an actual level
of culpability lower than that usually required for the offense in question.
However, as Section 501(3)(b) provides, the actor may also have a defense for that
earlier conduct, notwithstanding the fact that he had the requisite culpability when he performed
that conduct. For example, the gang member in the above scenario might have an immaturity
defense, or might have a defense of duress if he were forced against his will to join the gang in the
first place.
Section 501(4) states that a mistaken belief in an excuse, unlike a mistaken belief in a
justification, cannot be a defense to criminal liability. While justifications relate to the context and
circumstances of an actors conduct, excuses relate to whether the actor suffers from a disability.
The actors own erroneous belief that such a disability exists (I thought I was insane) is not
relevant to a determination of criminal liability.
Section 501(5) states that the defendant has the burden of proving an excuse defense by
a preponderance of the evidence.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Sections 501(1), (3)(b), and(4) have no corresponding
provisions in current law.
Section 501(2) and (3)(a) differ somewhat from KRS 501.090(2), which denies the defense
of duress to a defendant who intentionally or wantonly places himself in a situation where it is
probable that he would be subjected to coercion. Kentucky courts have refused to allow a
compulsion defense when it arises from the defendants own fault. See Foster v. Com., 827
S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1991). Section 501(3)(a) defines a specific, but flexible, standard for what
constitutes fault in causing the conditions of ones own excuse: if ones culpability in creating the
conditions is equal to or greater than the culpability required for the offense itself, no excuse will be
allowed.
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Section 501(5) is consistent with KRS 504.020(3),which places the burden of persuasion
on the defendant on the issue of mental illness or retardation. Section 501(5) imposes on the
defendant the burden to prove all excuse defenses by a preponderance of the evidence.22
Under current law, the defendant must prove the insanity defense, but all other excuses
must be disproved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has introduced
some evidence on the issue. These evidentiary rules are inconsistent. Excuse defenses are all the
same in terms of both their underlying principles and their central evidentiary issue (the defendants
state of mind). Accordingly, they should be treated similarly with respect to the burden of proof.
Because excuses apply only to conduct normally considered criminal, and because all excuses
involve information and evidence uniquely in the possession of the defendant, the proposed draft
considers it appropriate to shift the burden to the defendant for excuses. In an excuse situation, the
defendant has admittedly caused an unjustified harm.

Section 505.502: Involuntary Acts; Involuntary Omissions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

501.030(1); 501.010(3)

Comment:

Generally. Section 505.502 creates a defense for persons whose conduct would normally
constitute an offense, but was not voluntary and could not be controlled by the actor. The involuntary
act defense in Section 502(1) is applicable in cases where the defendants conduct is not the
product of his effort or determination, as where the defendant is sleepwalking or suffers a seizure.
This defense differs from the defenses of impaired consciousness (Section 503) or insanity (Section
504) in that the defendants lack of control over his conduct at the time of the offense need not
result from a confirmable psychological or physiological disease or defect. At the same time, in
most cases addressed by proposed Sections 503 and 504, the defendants impairment will not be
so severe as to render his conduct completely involuntary. Section 502(2) provides a similar
defense in cases where liability is based on an omission.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 502 takes the voluntariness element from
current KRS 501.010(3)  the rest of which is addressed in proposed Section 501.204  and
creates a distinct provision treating involuntariness as an excuse, rather than describing voluntariness
as a basic offense requirement. Voluntariness does not describe the harm or evil of the offense, nor
is it a necessary component of the requirement of an act as opposed to an omission. Rather,
involuntariness indicates that a person is not blameworthy for his conduct, even though that conduct
satisfies all requirements of an offense. In other words, involuntariness is an excusing condition 

The court in Gall v. Com., 607 S.W.2d 97, 110 (Ky. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Payne v.
Com., 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981) found that the correct terminology for the evidentiary burden issue for an
insanity instruction is from the evidence rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 501(5),
by contrast, explicitly defines the defendants burden, clarifying what a defendant must prove in a case where
he relies on an excuse defense.
22
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it applies when special conditions or circumstances demonstrate an actors blamelessness for a
violation of the rules of conduct. Although current KRS 501.010(3) merges voluntariness with the
act requirement, Kentucky pre-Penal Code case law reflects a view of the voluntariness issue as a
potential excuse rather than an offense requirement. The courts have not treated voluntariness as
an element of the offense, but have seen its absence as an affirmative automatism defense rooted
in the absence of criminal responsibility, and regarding which the defendant is required to introduce
evidence. See Fain v. Com., 78 Ky. 183 (1879) (defendant who killed another while in
somnambulistic state exonerated because his conduct occurred while he was asleep).
Section 502(1) defines involuntary acts as acts that are not a product of the persons
effort or determination. Current KRS 501.010(3) offers a definition of voluntary which refers
to bodily movement performed consciously as a result of effort or determination.
Section 502(2)(a) provides a defense to persons who are incapable of performing a required
act. Imposing liability on such persons is inconsistent with any basis for criminal punishment;
granting a defense is consistent with similar provisions regrading incapacity to control ones conduct,
as set out in proposed Sections 503, 504, and 506. Section 502(2)(a) is broader than current
KRS 501.030(1). The former applies when a person is either mentally or physically incapable of
performing or otherwise cannot reasonably be expected under the circumstances to perform the
omitted act, while the current law applies to a legal duty which a person is physically capable of
performing.
Section 502(2)(b) recognizes the potential conflict that arises when an actor may be subject
to omission liability if he does not act, yet may be subject to liability for commission of another
offense if he does act: for example, where the defendant is charged with failing to pay mandated
benefits, but is in liquidation or in bankruptcy proceedings that prohibit such payments. Because
Section 502(2)(b) applies only if the avoided act is unjustified, that act must be one that the
legislature has found significant and blameworthy, and that does not satisfy the lesser evils provision.
Where this is the case, inaction is by definition a lesser or equal evil and therefore preferable to
action, even if the inaction would also normally constitute an offense. Section 502(2)(b) is necessary
to avoid the problem of conflicting liabilities. In the very limited (and perhaps only theoretical) set
of circumstances where the actors conduct is required by a legal duty, yet also constitutes an
offense and is not justified under a recognized justification defense, he should not be held liable for
his failure to act.

Section 505.503: Impaired Consciousness
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

None

Generally. This provision creates an excuse for cases where a persons consciousness is
altered due to a physiological disease, rather than mental illness or retardation as in insanity, that
negates the persons blameworthiness. This section recognizes that there can be physiologicalcauses
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of the kind of dysfunction that merits an excuse, like brain tumors, chemical imbalances, etc., that
may not qualify as mental illnesses and thus may not fall within the scope of the insanity defense.
Additionally, the terms of Section 502s voluntary act requirement are extremely strict and would
cover very few of these cases, as hardly any acts are not a product of the persons effort or
determination. Section 503 covers acts that involve some cognitive control, and therefore fall
outside Section 502, but where there is still sufficient impairment of control that the person should
not be held accountable for his acts.
Relation to current Kentucky law. No provision in the current Penal Code corresponds
to Section 505.503, whose form is very similar to proposed Sections 504 and 506. Kentucky
case law, however, hints at the desirability of a specific defense of this kind. Courts have either
struggled to fit cases of the type Section 503 covers within the confines of the automatism
defense or the insanity defense, or have denied an excuse altogether. See, e.g., Smith v. Com.,
268 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1954) (approving instruction submitting a defense of black outs caused by
epilepsy, but not holding failure to give such an instruction to be reversible error); McGuire v.
Com., 885 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1994) (erroneous to instruct jury on asserted temporary mental
incapacity that goes beyond Penal Codes statutory terms); Cooley v. Com., 459 S.W.2d 89
(Ky. 1970) (defendant who claimed that at time of fatal stabbing he did not know what he was
doing as result of psychomotor epilepsy not entitled to a specific instruction on epilepsy where
general instruction on insanity was given and adequately presented issue).

Section 505.504: Insanity
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

504.020, .120(4)

Comment:

Generally. This provision sets out a defense excusing persons who perform conduct
constituting an offense, but do so under the influence of an uncontrollable mental illness, making
criminal liability inappropriate.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Sections 505.504(1) and (2) are the same as KRS
504.020(1), but have been reorganized to enhance clarity.
Section 504(3)(a) is identical to KRS 504.020(2). Section 504(3)(b) explicitly excludes
from the definition of mental illness or retardation intoxication, which other proposed provisions
address. (See proposed Sections 503.302 and 505.506 and corresponding commentary.)
As to the burden of proof for insanity, see commentary for proposed Section 501(5).
Generally speaking, Section 504 does not incorporate, replace, or otherwise affect the
procedural provisions currently codified at KRS 504.030 to 504.150. It is anticipated that these
provisions will be retained, but relocated in the Revised Statutes by means of conforming amendments
legislation to be enacted with the proposed Code. Because those provisions relate to procedural
matters, they are properly addressed outside the Penal Code.
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One significant exception, however, is the guilty but mentally ill verdict (GBMI), which
the proposed Code eliminates. The underlying basis for the GBMI verdict  that the insanity
defense has been subject to abuse  is empirically unsound. In addition, allowing the verdict
raises significant concerns. It is problematic for the factfinder (often a lay jury) to make a clinical
determination of whether an offender is in need of psychiatric treatment. The GBMI verdict also
enables, and encourages, jurors to consider matters unrelated to guilt, when determination of guilt
is their sole responsibility. Finally, a jury faced with the choice between a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity and GBMI may select the latter, not because it finds the offender blameworthy,
but because it believes the offender needs confinement and treatment. Such insane-but-dangerous
offenders should be dealt with through civil commitment standards rather than the GBMI verdict.
In Brown v. Com., 934 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1996), the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that
the GBMI verdict raises significant policy concerns.

Section 505.505: Immaturity; Transfer to Juvenile Court
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

None

Comment:

Generally. This provision creates a defense for a defendant who can satisfy two
requirements: first, he must lack the maturity of an adult; and second, his immaturity must prevents
him from understanding the wrongfulness or nature of his criminal conduct. Any person under the
age of 18 who is found to be immature is automatically transferred to juvenile court.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Under Section 505.505, a defendant receives an
automatic immaturity defense until reaching the age of 12 years. Section 505 also provides a
conclusive presumption of immaturity for any defendant under age 16, and a rebuttable presumption
until that age that the defendants immaturity prevented him from appreciating the wrongfulness or
consequences of his actions. Defendants over age 16 are given no presumption (either as to
immaturity or as to inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of conduct), but may still litigate the
issue and obtain the defense if they can demonstrate (by a preponderance of the evidence, according
to proposed Section 501(5)) that they are entitled to it.

Section 505.506: Involuntary Intoxication
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

501.080

Generally. Section 505.506 provides a defense for a person who commits an offense
while under the influence of a state of intoxication that he did not voluntarily create.
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Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 506 is substantively similar to current KRS
501.080(2), but replaces its negative phrasing (is a defense only if . . . not voluntarily produced)
with a more direct statement (is excused if). As with insanity, the formulation of the excuse is the
same as under current law, but has been reorganized to enhance clarity. (The voluntary intoxication
rule of KRS 501.080(1) is in fact a rule of imputation and is addressed in proposed Section
503.302.)

Section 505.507: Duress
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

501.090

Comment:

Generally. Section 505.507 defines a defense for persons who were forced to perform
a criminal act under coercion that an ordinary person would not be able to resist.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 507 is similar to current KRS 501.090 
including that provisions rejection of duress as a defense to intentional homicide  but creates a
sliding scale for duress rather than a fixed standard for the necessary level of compulsion. Current
law requires coercion by the use of, or threat of the use of, unlawful physical force against him or
another person. That formulation fails to recognize the possibility that a reasonable person might
feel compelled to commit a minor offense based on a serious, but less severe, threat. Section 507
requires an unlawful threat that a person of reasonable firmness in the persons situation would
have been unable to resist. Under Section 507s formulation, if the offense the actor is coerced to
commit is not especially serious, a less serious degree of coercion is necessary to make the defense
available.
Section 507(3) provides a list of factors to consider in determining whether the level of
coercion was sufficient to provide a duress defense. This list has been placed in brackets, as the
Reporter takes no position regarding whether or not it should be included in the provision. The
advantage of such an approach is that it allows the factfinder to consider all relevant facts and
circumstances, and suggests to the factfinder what factors may be relevant, without requiring the
defendant to satisfy a rigid set of elements that may not be dispositive, or even significant, in every
case. Its possible disadvantage is that it may not list all relevant factors or may seem too much like
a strict checklist.
As to the rule of current KRS 501.090(2), under which persons who intentionally or
wantonly place themselves in a situation where duress is likely cannot claim the defense, see
Section 501(3) and corresponding commentary.
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Section 505.508: Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

None

Comment:

Generally. This provision upholds the legality principle of criminal law, which allows
criminal liability only where a written statement of the laws commands exists prior to the alleged
violation of those commands. While ignorance of the law is generally not an excuse, fairness
dictates that citizens not be punished for conduct if the government provided inadequate notice of
the conducts prohibition. The rationale for criminal liability does not apply where the defendant
did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that his conduct was criminal.
Section 505.508(3) requires that the defendant not know that the conduct in question is
criminal. This prevents exploitation of the laws unavailability by persons for whom that unavailability was irrelevant.
Section 508(4) provides a set of factors to consider in deciding whether the law was made
available to a reasonable person. These factors focus both on the governments efforts in making
the law available and on the defendants efforts in determining the actual state of the law. This list
has been placed in brackets, as the Reporter takes no position regarding whether it should be
included in the Code. (See commentary for proposed Section 507.)
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 508 does not correspond to any current
Kentucky statute.

Section 505.509: Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

501.070(3)

Generally. Section 505.509, like Section 508, upholds the legality principle, but instead
of applying in the case where no statement of the law is available, it applies where an existing
official statement of the law is inaccurate, and a person relies on that inaccurate statement.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 509 is substantively similar to KRS 501.070(3).
However, Section 509 reorganizes the elements of the defenses in KRS 501.070(3)(a)-(d) into a
set of factors for the court to consider. This approach does not draw fixed, arbitrary lines as
current law does. The list of factors has been placed in brackets, as the Reporter takes no position
regarding whether or not it should be included in the Code. (See commentary for proposed
Section 507.)
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Section 505.510: Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

None

Comment:

Generally. Section 505.510 creates a defense for persons who, even after affirmatively
seeking in good faith to determine the laws requirements, make a reasonable mistake as to those
requirements and unwittingly engage in prohibited conduct. The defense is allowed only if the
offender exercised due diligence in an effort to determine the laws requirements, and only if the
subsequent mistake is reasonable. There is little likelihood that the defense would be subject to
abuse, as (under proposed Section 501(5)) the defendant has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he exercised due diligence, that he was honestly mistaken, and
that the mistake was reasonable.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 510 has no corresponding provision in current
Kentucky law.

Section 505.511: Mistake as to a Justification
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

503.120; 501.070(1)(c)

Comment:

Generally. This provision sets out a defense for people who perform conduct that
constitutes a defense, but do so under the mistaken impression that the conduct is legally justified
in their situation. Under Section 505.511, a person could have an excuse even if his mistake were
unreasonable, if he is charged with an offense of greater level of culpability than the persons level
of culpability as to the mistake about the justification. Thus, a reckless mistake as to justification
would provide a defense to intentional murder, but not reckless homicide.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 511 reflects a rule comparable to KRS
503.120 and 501.070(1)(c), which allow a defense where a person believes himself to be
justified, unless his mistake involves culpability equal to that necessary to be liable for the offense
 for example, liability for reckless homicide would be allowed for a defendant who made a
reckless mistake as to whether he was justified. Section 511 has the same effect, but restructures
current provisions by dealing with all the mistake issues in one provision and treating mistake as an
excuse rather than a justification, thus leaving all of the justification defenses in purely objective
form to more clearly state the rule of conduct for persons to follow. A defense for some actors
who mistakenly believe themselves to be justified is appropriate, but is more properly addressed
by means of an excuse provision such as Section 511, as the rationale for this defense relates to the
actors mental state, not to whether the act itself is objectively justified.

203

Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project

Section 511(5) retains the current rule that the Commonwealth bears the burden of
disproving the mistake defense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an excuse, this defense would
otherwise be subject to Section 501(5)s burden-shifting rule.

Section 505.512: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

[various]

Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Chapter 505.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For discussion of the relationship between Chapter
505s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term in
question is defined.
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CHAPTER 506. NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSES
COMMENTARY
Nonexculpatory defenses involve a balancing of competing interests similar to the balancing
that occurs for justification defenses. However, the nature of the balancing is different. Justification
defenses weigh the harm from the persons act against the harm avoided or the benefit gained from
that conduct; a person can claim a justification defense when his conduct causes no net societal
harm. With nonexculpatory defenses, the persons conduct creates no social benefit and avoids
no societal harm. The societal benefit from these defenses arises not from the persons conduct,
but from forgoing imposition of liability for that conduct. The defenses further competing interests
that are deemed more important than imposing liability on guilty persons.

Section 506.601. General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

None

Comment:

Generally. Section 506.601 describes the rules that govern the operation of the nonexculpatory defenses set out in Chapter 506. Sections 601(1) and (2) parallel proposed sections
501(1) and (4). Conduct subject to a nonexculpatory defense (such as the use of force by an
incompetent person) may be resisted, whereas justified conduct (such as the use of force in selfdefense) may not. A person who is mistaken as to a nonexculpatory defense  who, for example,
thinks he has been entrapped by the police when he has not  is not entitled to any defense.
Section 601(3) provides that the defendant must prove all nonexculpatory defenses by a
preponderance of the evidence. Current Kentucky law shifts the burden of persuasion to the
defendant for the excuse defense of insanity. If such a burden-shifting rule is appropriate for an
excuse defense  under which the defendant would be considered blameless for committing the
offense  it should also apply to nonexculpatory defenses, under which the defendant makes no
assertion of a lack of responsibility for his offense. These defenses are not based on a judgment
that the underlying conduct is not harmful or that the actor is not blameworthy. They apply in
situations involving conduct ordinarily subject to liability, but where some alternative social interest
is deemed to override the assessment of criminal liability. Because these defenses do not exculpate,
the burden should be on the defendant to prove that one of them applies.
Section 601(4) defines nonexculpatory defense. Section 601(5) specifies that
nonexculpatory defenses are to be ruled on by the court rather than the jury. As noted above,
these defenses do not involve determinations of guilt, innocence, or moral blame, and accordingly
do not demand jury resolution. Resolution by the court will also be more expedient and may
render unnecessary a full trial of the facts.
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Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 601 has no corresponding provision in current
law. However, Kentucky courts have addressed the issue raised in Section 601(3) for one of the
specific nonexculpatory defenses: entrapment. In Com. v. Day, 983 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1999), the
Kentucky Supreme Court that [a]s with any other defense under the penal code, once the
defendant introduces enough evidence to create a doubt, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commonwealth. Thus under current law, unlike Section 601(3), the Commonwealth has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defenses do not exist. Moreover, Section
601(5) is inconsistent with Days statement that in entrapment cases it a question for the jury to
determine whose mind initiated the criminal intent.

Section 506.602. Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time
Limitation Period
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

500.050

Comment:

Generally. Section 506.602 sets time limitations for bringing prosecutions and provides
rules governing the operation of the limitations. Time limitations encourage prompt investigation of
crimes and prevent stale prosecutions. This goal must be balanced against the goal of prosecuting
blameworthy offenders, especially those who committed serious crimes.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 602(1) is consistent with KRS 500.050(1)(2) by setting no time limit within which a felony prosecution must commence and a one-year
period within which a misdemeanor must commence. See Reed v. Com., 738 S.W.2d 818 (Ky.
1987) (court refuses to declare a limitation period in face of contrary statute).
Section 602(2) defines the beginning of a limitations period, and restates KRS 500.050(3)
regarding when an offense is considered to have been committed.
Section 602(3)  stating that prosecution begins when an indictment, information, or
complaint is filed or a warrant issued  reflects current Kentucky law. See Reed v. Com., 738
S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1987) (The significant delay which occurred was prior to arrest, indictment or
the bringing of any formal charge.)
Section 602(4), tolling the limitation period in certain situations, has no analogue in current
Kentucky criminal law.

Section 506.603. Entrapment
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

505.010

Generally. Section 506.603 sets out a defense covering cases where the defendant likely
would not have committed the crime had the police not induced him to do so. This defense is
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meant to curb excessively coercive or manipulative police conduct. It does not, however, suggest
a lack of blameworthiness in the defendant, who has committed a crime under circumstances that
would not provide a truly exculpating defense such as duress. The entrapment defense uses the
threat of acquittal of the defendant as a means of deterring improper police conduct.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 603 is similar to current KRS 505.010, but
uses the narrower term law enforcement authority (which is defined in Section 107) rather than
public servant in referring to the person who might induce the defendant. Section 603(1)(a)
follows current law when it emphasizes the inducement or encouragement from a law enforcement
authority. But current 505.010(2)(a) also unnecessarily creates confusion by including an exception
when the authority merely affords the defendant an opportunity to commit an offense. Under
proposed 603(1)(a), merely afford[ing] an opportunity to commit an offense would not qualify
as induc[ing] or encourag[ing] the offense, so the defense would be unavailable in that situation.
Further, Section 603(1)(b) limits the definition of the defense itself to exclude cases where the
authority merely affords an opportunity, stating that the officials conduct [must create] a substantial
risk that a reasonable law-abiding person in the actors situation would have been induced to
commit the offense. While 601(1)(b) supplements Section 603(1)(a)s reference to the nature of
the officials conduct, Section 603(1)(c) also adds a subjective requirement that the defendant was
not predisposed to commit the offense.
Section 603(2)s limitation on the defense is somewhat broader than that in current law,
which restricts the exception for offenses involving physical injury to cases where the injury or
threat involved a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.

Section 506.604. Incompetency to Stand Trial or be Sentenced
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

504.090; RCr 8.06

Comment:

Generally. Section 506.604 sets the fitness standard under which defendants will not be
required to face criminal adjudication. This defense ensures that all criminal defendants will have
the mental capacity to exercise their constitutional rights to aid in their own defense, testify on their
own behalf, confront witnesses, and effectively communicate with counsel.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 604 is substantively similar to current Rule of
Criminal Procedure 8.06 and the principle in KRS 504.090. Section 604 differs from the procedural
rule in that the latter states more nebulously that there must be reasonable grounds to believe that
the defendant lacks capacity to understand the proceedings or assist in his own defense. The
proposed provision requires that the defendant must actually be found to lack capacity.
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Section 506.605. Former Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present
Prosecution
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

505.030

Comment:

Generally. Section 506.605 sets out the rules governing the effect of former prosecutions
for the same offense. This provision protects a defendants Fifth Amendment right not to be tried
or punished twice for the same offense.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 605 is practically identical to current KRS
505.030, except that the second sentence of subsection (4) has been made into subsection (5) and
subsection (3) has been reorganized to enhance clarity.

Section 506.606. Former Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to
Present Prosecution
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

505.040

Comment:

Generally. Section 506.606 sets out rules governing the effect on a criminal prosecution
of former prosecutions for a different offense. This provision requires, in certain circumstances,
that different crimes arising out of the same conduct be tried together. Like Section 605, this
provision protects a defendants Fifth Amendment rights by preventing the prosecution from
relitigating a factual issue decided in the defendants favor at a previous trial.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 606 is practically identical to current KRS
505.040, except that subsection (2) has been reorganized to enhance clarity.

Section 506.607. Former Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to
Present Prosecution
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

505.050

Generally. Section 506.607 sets out the rules governing the effect of former prosecutions
from different jurisdictions. Like Section 605, this provision protects defendants from multiple
prosecutions for the same acts. The rationale for this defense applies even though the prosecution
occurred in a different jurisdiction.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 607 is practically identical to current KRS
505.050, except that subsection (2) has been reorganized to enhance clarity.
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Section 506.608. Prosecution Not Barred Where Former Prosecution Was
Before Court Lacking Jurisdiction or Was Fraudulently Procured by Defendant
or Resulted in Conviction Held Invalid
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

505.060

Comment:

Generally. Section 506.608 excludes various cases where former prosecutions should
not act as a bar to subsequent prosecutions, because the original court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the case; the defendant surreptitiously obtained the prior prosecution with the intent of avoiding a
harsher sentence; or the prior conviction was invalidated on due process grounds unrelated to the
merits.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 608 is practically identical to current KRS
505.060.

Section 506.609: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

[various]

Comment:

Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Chapter 506.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For discussion of the relationship between Chapter
506s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term in
question is defined.
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CHAPTER 507. LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
NON-HUMAN ENTITIES
COMMENTARY

Section 507.701. Liability of Corporation or Unincorporated Association
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

502.050

Comment:

Generally. This provision sets forth the circumstances in which a corporation or
unincorporated association may be held criminally liable for its actions. The purpose of such a
provision is to deter a corporation or its agents from violating the law or failing to perform a legal
duty.
Relation to current Kentucky law. This provision reflects the principle that a corporation
may be indicted if authorized by statute. See Com. v. Fortner LP Gas Co., Inc., 610 S.W.2d
941 (Ky. App. 1980). Section 507.701(1) is practically identical to current 502.050(1) except
that, in keeping with proposed Section 501.206, it substitutes the term recklessly for the current
statutes use of wantonly.
Section 507.701(2)(a) and (b), defining corporate agent and high managerial agent, is
identical to current KRS 502.050(2), except that the term corporate agent rather than agent is
used to make clear that when the term agent is used elsewhere in the Penal Code, it may not
have the specific meaning given by this definition.
Section 701(2)(c) defines association as a trust, partnership, government or
governmental subdivision or agency, or two or more persons having a joint or common economic
interest. The current Penal Code does not define this term. Although the current corporateliability provisions do not explicitly include unincorporated associations, the current definitions of
such terms as actor, government, he, and person, refer to unincorporated associations.
See KRS 500.080(1), (6), (7), (12).
Section 507.702. Relationship to Corporation No Limitation on Individual Liability or
Punishment

Corresponding Current Provision(s):

502.060

Comment:

Generally. This provision ensures an individual cannot escape liability by virtue of having
acted on behalf of a corporation, and establishes that such individual may be punished in the same
manner as if his conduct had been on his own behalf.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 507.702 is identical to current KRS 502.060.
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Section 507.703. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

502.050(2)

Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Chapter 507.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For discussion of the relationship between Chapter
507s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term in
question is defined.
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CHAPTER 508. INCHOATE OFFENSES
COMMENTARY
Section 508.801. Criminal Attempt
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

506.010

Comment:

Generally. Section 508.801 defines the requirements for liability for an attempt to commit
an offense. Attempts are subject to liability because, like completed offenses, they involve a
culpable mental state and overt conduct. Yet attempts differ from completed offenses in that, due
either to fortuity of circumstance or the actors refraining from further conduct, the offenses resulting
harm does not occur, or occurs to a lesser extent.
As defined in Section 801(1), attempt liability requires that a person engage in some
conduct that would constitute a substantial step toward commission of the offense. Attempt
liability, like criminal liability generally, requires an overt act. The general requirement of an act
ensures that the criminal law does not punish mere thoughts. The specific requirement of a
substantial step ensures that the law does not punish mere preparation, where the actor still has
an opportunity to recant and abandon his criminal plan, and that only would-be criminals who have
shown a certain degree of firmness of criminal purpose are subject to liability. The performance of
an overt act amounting to a substantial step also supplies corroborative evidence that the actor did,
in fact, intend to engage in the offense conduct.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 801(1) is similar to current KRS 506.010(1)(a).
Like the current statute, Section 801(1) requires that a person must have intent as to his conduct,
but as to other elements he need only have the culpability required for commssion of the crime.23
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has found that the offense of attempted manslaughter in the first
degree, when based on an intent to cause serious physical injury, does not exist in Kentucky. See Prince v.
Com., 987 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. App. 1997) (no error in denying instruction on attempt to commit manslaughter in
first degree as defined in KRS 507.030(1)(a); cannot attempt to achieve unintended result). As first-degree
manslaughter is defined in KRS 507.030(1)(a), such an offense also would not exist under Section 801(1) 
where death did not result, a person who intended to cause serious physical injury would be guilty of battery
(or attempted battery) but not attempted homicide, as he would lack the inten[t] to engage in the conduct that
would constitute the offense.
As defined in KRS 507.030(1)(b), however, there could be attempted first-degree manslaughter under
Section 801(1), where a person acting under extreme emotional disturbance intended to engage in conduct
causing death, but death did not result. Section 801(1) would also allow attempt liability for crimes of recklessness where the offense was not completed; for example, a person stopped just before spilling a toxic chemical
into the water supply could be convicted of attempted reckless endangerment, because that person intended
to perform all of the conduct necessary for the offense of reckless endangerment, but was prevented from
doing so.
23
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Section 801(2) differs from KRS 506.010(2), in that it establishes alternative means for
measuring satisfaction of the substantial step requirement. KRS 506.010(2) states that conduct
satisfies the substantial step requirement only if it leaves no reasonable doubt as to the defendants
intention to commit the crime which he is charged with attempting.1 Section 801(2)(a) adopts a
similar but somewhat less strict approach, stating that the substantial-step element requires conduct
that is strongly corroborative of his criminal intent. The jury will ultimately be required to find that
the defendants culpability has been established beyond a reasonable doubt in any case, yet they
should be allowed to make this determination based on evidence other than the evidence establishing
that the offenses conduct requirement, the substantial-step test, has been satisfied.
Section 801(2)(b) states that a person satisfies the substantial step test if he either believes
he has completed the conduct constituting an offense, or believes he has committed the last act
needed to cause a prohibited result. Section 508.801(2)(b) does not alter the standard of Section
801(1), but merely establishes a bright-line rule that performing all of the requisite conduct toward
an offense will always meet the substantial step test.

Section 508.802. Criminal Solicitation
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

506.030

Generally. Section 508.802 provides for liability for a person who solicits another person
to commit an offense. The offense of solicitation recognizes that a person who intends to promote
an offense, and is willing to instigate such conduct, merits criminal liability. The independent act of
solicitation takes the place of the substantial step toward commission of the offense required for
attempt liability, or the overt act toward commission of the offense required for conspiracy
liability.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 802(1) is similar to current KRS 506.030,
with three modifications. First, as with the offense of attempt under proposed Section 801(1), for
offense elements other than conduct (which requires intent) the person need only act with the
culpability required by the underlying offense. This language prevents an elevation of culpability
levels for circumstance and result elements that could lead to undesirable outcomes. For example,
under current KRS 506.030, it could be argued that a person who encouraged another to engage
in conduct, knowing that such conduct would result in a persons death, would not be liable for
solicitation of murder because he did not intend anyone to die. Second, the offense definition
incorporates the idea that impossibility is not a defense; the solicited conduct need only constitute
the offense if the circumstances were as [the defendant] believes them to be. This idea is already
recognized by current attempt law, see KRS 506.010(1)(a) (using similar formulation), but its
application to solicitation is less clear. See 506.030(1) (prohibiting solicitation to engage in conduct
that would be crime or an attempt to commit that crime). Finally, Section 802 also adds the
appropriate term requests to the commands and encourages of the current statute. Persons
soliciting others for criminal activity typically make a request, rather than commanding or encouraging
others.
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Section 802(2) has no directly corresponding provision in the current Code. Section
802(2) makes clear that a person need not actually communicate with another to be held liable for
solicitation, provided the persons conduct is designed to effect such communication. The persons
endeavor to communicate his criminal intentions makes his culpability clear; it does not matter that
the person solicited does not respond affirmatively or that, by fortuity, the communication is never
received. Kentucky courts have not expressly ruled on whether a solicitation must be successfully
received in order for a defendant to be found guilty of solicitation, and have split on the issue of
whether the response is relevant. Compare Landrith v. Com., 709 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. App.
1986) (response does not matter), with Maynard v. Com., 558 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. App. 1977)
(proof of immediate rejection is necessary element of solicitation).

Section 508.803. Criminal Conspiracy
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

506.040; 506.050

Comment:

Generally. Section 508.803 establishes liability for the offense of conspiracy, which is
committed when a person enters an agreement with another to commit a crime. Conspiracy differs
from other inchoate offenses in that criminal enterprises are considered harmful in and of themselves,
rather than merely insofar as they are unsuccessful efforts to commit other substantive offenses.
Conspiracy liability, like attempt liability, requires more than mere intent to commit a crime; an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is also necessary.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 803 is similar to the current general conspiracy
provision, KRS 506.040, but includes the alterations reflected in the other proposed inchoate
offenses (see commentary to proposed Sections 801 and 802), focusing on the conduct and
culpability requirements defined in the underlying offense rather than imposing a uniform intent
requirement, and denying an impossibility defense. However, like proposed Section 801(1), Section
803(1) does maintain an intent requirement as to the conduct element of conspiracy  the formation
of an agreement. (See commentary to proposed Section 801(1).)
Section 803(1) is also consistent with KRS 506.040(1)(a)-(b) by allowing prosecution
for unilateral agreements: it imposes liability on any person who agrees with another to commit a
crime, even if the agreement is that only one person will engage in conduct constituting a crime, and
even if the other person does not actually agree to the conspiracy at all. Section 803(1) recognizes
that a conspirator who believes he is agreeing with another to commit a crime is as deserving of
liability as one whose agreement is actually reciprocated. Such a person has expressed his intent
to pursue a criminal objective and made steps in furtherance of that objective.
Section 803(2) corresponds to KRS 506.050(2), stating that an agreement with multiple
objectives should be charged as a single conspiracy. The remaining part of KRS 506.050(2),
which classifies the conspiracy as a function of the most serious offense that is the object of the
conspiracy, is addressed in Section 808.
Section 803(3) is nearly identical to KRS 506.050(1), and makes no substantive changes.
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Section 508.804. Unconvictable Confederate No Defense
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

506.070

Comment:

Generally. Section 508.804 makes clear that a person may not escape liability for
solicitation or conspiracy solely because his co-conspirator(s) are not subject to prosecution or
conviction for the same offense. One conspirators blameworthiness for his agreement to pursue
criminal objectives is not contingent on the status of any other members of the criminal enterprise.
For example, where one member of a conspiracy manipulates or coerces another person who
lacks the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, the manipulator should not escape
liability merely because the confederate cannot be found criminally liable. Indeed, the manipulative
co-conspirator is arguably even more culpable in such a situation. This rule is consistent with the
unilateral-agreement rule adopted in proposed Section 803. (See commentary to proposed Section
803(1).)
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 804 is similar to current KRS 506.070(1)
and (2). Section 804(1) and (2) allow no defense that the person solicited or conspired with was
not prosecuted or convicted, or was convicted of a different offense or grade.
Section 804(3) disallows any defense that the other person lacked the capacity to commit
an offense. This is comparable to KRS 506.070(1) and (2), which prohibit a defense if the other
person has a legal incapacity or exemption, or was unaware of the criminal nature of the conduct
contemplated, or due to any other factor precluding the mental state required for commission of
the crime.
Section 804(4) permits a prosecution against a conspirator or solicitor even though the
other person was acquitted. This explicitly differs from KRS 506.070(3), which prohibits a
conspiracy conviction if all co-conspirators have been acquitted or discharged under circumstances
amounting to an acquittal. The rule of KRS 506.070(3) is inconsistent with KRS 506.070(1) and
(2), as it is clear that any person with the lack of capacity contemplated by those provisions
should, if tried, obtain an acquittal. Whether or not the person solicited or the co-conspirator is
amenable to prosecution, or prosecuted but acquitted, is irrelevant to the defendants
blameworthiness.

Section 508.805. Defense for Victims and Conduct Inevitably Incident
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

506.050(4)

Generally. Section 508.805 provides a defense to the offenses of solicitation and
conspiracy where the defendant is a victim of the offense or his conduct is inevitably incident to its
commission. Section 805(1) protects people who are victims of the underlying offense  such as,
for example, a person who agrees to pay money to an extortionist, thereby technically entering
into a conspiracy with the extortionist.
216

Chapter 508: Inchoate Offenses

Section 805(2) covers situations where, because a persons conduct is ancillary to the
underlying crime, it is unclear whether the person should be held liable. (See commentary to
proposed Section 503.301(2).) For example, it is not clear whether an unmarried partner should
be liable for conspiracy to commit bigamy, or whether the purchaser should be liable for conspiracy
to traffic in stolen goods. Under Section 805(2), the legislature would still be free to decide on a
case-by-case basis that such people should be subject to liability by writing the specific underlying
offense to reflect that understanding.
Relation to current Kentucky law. No provision in current law directly corresponds to
Section 805(1).
Section 805(2) is practically identical to a portion of KRS 506.050(4), but the proposed
section applies to solicitation as well as conspiracy.

Section 508.806. Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the
Offense
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

506.020; 506.060

Comment:

Generally. Section 508.806 provides a defense for persons who, after committing an
inchoate offense, voluntarily renounce their criminal purpose and prevent the inchoate offense from
becoming a completed offense. As Section 806(2) makes clear, however, renunciation is not
voluntary when it is merely a response to a fear of being caught, or a tactical decision to pursue
the crime in a different way or at a different time. Under Section 806(3), the defendant would bear
the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 806 corresponds to KRS 506.020 and
506.060. Current law has slightly different rules for different inchoate offenses: to effectively
renounce a conspiracy or solicitation, the person must actually prevent commission of the offense;
but to effectively renounce an attempt, the person merely must take necessary affirmative steps to
prevent commission of the offense. Section 806(1) applies the current rule for conspiracy and
solicitation to all inchoate offenses. An actor who has risked attempt liability by taking a substantial
step toward the offense should still have sufficient time and power  at least as much as one who
solicits or conspires, and likely more  to renounce his criminal purpose and prevent the offense
from occurring.
The definition of a voluntary and complete renunciation appears in proposed Section
503.301(2)(d) and is identical to that in KRS 506.020(2) and 506.060(2).
There is no provision in the current Penal Code corresponding to Section 806(3), regarding
the burden of proof for renunciation.
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Section 508.807. Grading of Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

506.010; 506.030; 506.040

Comment:

Generally. Section 508.807 grades all inchoate offenses one grade lower than the most
serious offense attempted, solicited, or agreed to. This system relates the seriousness of the
inchoate offense to that of the underlying offense, but recognizes that the inchoate offense does not
generate the resulting harm with which the underlying offense is concerned.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 807 differs somewhat from current law
(KRS 506.010, 506.030, and 506.040), which usually grades an inchoate offense one grade
below the crime attempted, solicited, or contemplated by the conspiracy. The main differences
are that under current law, an inchoate offense toward a Class C felony is a Class A misdemeanor
(i.e., two grades lower), and an inchoate offense toward a capital offense is a Class B felony (also
two grades lower).

Section 508.808. Possessing Instruments of Crime
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

511.050

Comment:

Generally. Section 508.808 establishes an offense for the possession of instruments
of crime. Section 808(1) defines possession of an instrument of crime with the intent to use
itcriminally as a Class A misdemeanor. The prosecution would have to prove the defendants
intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 808(2) defines the term instrument of crime. See
also Section 204(3), which defines the act of possession.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 808 is similar in purpose to KRS 511.050,
which addresses the possession of burglars tools. KRS 511.050s inclusion of liability for possession
with knowledge that some other person intends to use the same in the commission of an offense
is simply an expression of complicity, and would subject the defendant to liability under proposed
Section 503.301.

Section 508.809: Definition
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

[various]

Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Chapter 508.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For discussion of the relationship between Chapter
508s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term in
question is defined.
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CHAPTER 509. OFFENSE GRADES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
COMMENTARY
Section 509.901. Classified Offenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

500.080(17); 532.010; 532.090

Comment:

Generally. This provision provides a classification of all criminal offenses into grades for
purposes of determining the extent of liability.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 509.901 is substantively similar to current
KRS 532.010 and reflects the additional categories in 532.090 and 500.080(17), but adds three
new offense categories: Class X felony for capital offenses, Class E felony, and Class C
misdemeanor.

Section 509.902. Unclassified Offenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

532.020

Comment:
Code.

Generally. This provision provides classifications for offenses that are defined outside the

Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 509.902 is substantively similar to current
KRS 532.020, but classifies the offenses according to the revised authorized terms of imprisonment
and/or fines in Sections 903 and 904. Unlike 532.020, Section 902 states that all felonies defined
outside the Code, regardless of their stated classification or term of imprisonment, will be treated
as Class E felonies. This ensures that all serious offenses must be included within the Penal Code.

Section 509.903. Authorized Terms of Imprisonment
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

532.030; 532.060; 532.090

Comment:

Generally. This provision establishes the maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment
for each class of offenses.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 509.903 consolidates the authorized terms
of imprisonment for felonies and misdemeanors, which currently appear in separate provisions in
KRS Chapter 532.
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Section 903(1) categorizes any offense with death or life imprisonment as a Class X
felony. Cf. KRS 532.030 (authorizing, for capital offenses, a maximum sentence of death, life
imprisonment with no parole for a minimum of 25 years, or life imprisonment, and a minimum
sentence of 20 years).
Section 903(2) to (4) are identical to KRS 532.060(2)(a)-(c), except that Section 903(2)
provides for a maximum of 50 years imprisonment rather than life imprisonment.
Section 903(5) is similar to KRS 532.060(2)(d), but prescribes a minimum sentence of
two years rather than one year.
Section 903(6) authorizes imprisonment for 1-2 years for the new category of Class E
felony.
Section 903(7) is comparable to KRS 532.090(1).
Section 903(8) is substantively similar to KRS 532.090(2), but prescribes a maximum
sentence of six months instead of 90 days.
Section 903(9) authorizes imprisonment up to 30 days for the new category of Class C
misdemeanor.
Section 903(10), like KRS 500.080(17), states that no imprisonment is authorized for
violations.

Section 509.904. Authorized Fines
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

534.030; 534.040; 534.050

Generally. This provision establishes the maximum fine for each class of offenses.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 509.904, like KRS 534.030-.040, provides
default rules for fines that may be modified by specific offense provisions.
Section 904 generally authorizes the greater of two amounts as the maximum fine for an
offense: (1) twice the amount of the harm caused thereby or gain derived therefrom; or (2) the
amount specified for its offense class. These methods are set out in Section 904(1) and (2),
respectively. Section 904(1) authorizes a fine of the greater of twice the harm cause or the gain
derived for any offense, or the amount authorized in Section 904(2). The first phrase is similar to
current KRS 534.030(1) for felonies and KRS 534.050 for corporations. KRS 534.040 authorizes only maximum fines.
Unlike current law, Section 904(2) closely tracks the seriousness of offenses and the
blameworthiness of offenders by authorizing a unique maximum fine for each offense class. Section 904(2), on the whole, also authorizes higher fines than current law. The authorized maximum
fines have been raised to account for inflation and to provide a viable alternative or supplement to
imprisonment, increasing the sanctioning options available for imposition of criminal liability.
Section 904(3) provides that the maximum authorized fine for corporations is twice that
authorized for individuals, but applies the rule to all offense classes rather than just felonies. That
differs significantly from KRS 534.050, which authorizes a maximum $20,000 for any felony, and
lesser amounts for classes of misdemeanors and violations.
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Section 509.905. General Adjustment to Offense Grade for Prior Offense
Corresponding Current Provision(s):

532.080

Comment:

Generally. This provision allows for extended terms of imprisonment by increasing the
grade of an offense by one grade, for sentencing purposes, where the defendant is a recidivist
offender.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 509.905 is similar in function and effect to
current KRS 532.080, which governs sentencing for persistent felony offenders. Section 905,
however, applies to second or subsequent convictions for any offense, rather than only felonies,
although it is limited to cases where the prior offense was at least as serious as the current offense.
Like current 532.080(2) and (5), Section 905 provides that where a person is convicted of a
second offense less than five years after a previous conviction of a similar or more serious offense,
the offense will be treated for sentencing purposes as if it were one grade higher. (The current
provision uses the phrase next highest degree, which makes it sound as if the sentence will be
reduced relative to the normal grade, but seems to intend what Section 905 provides.)
Section 905(2), like KRS 532.080, requires that the offense underlying the earlier conviction
must have occurred when the offender was at least 18 years old.
Section 905(3)s requirement that the second conviction must be within 5 years after the
previous conviction, excluding time spent in custody, employs one general rule that covers current
532.080(2)(c)s five specific rules regarding the relative timing of the prior and current convictions.
Section 905 does not include current 532.080(3) and (6)s rules regarding persistent
felony offenders in the first degree, i.e., those who have been convicted of two prior felonies. The
only distinction between the sentences available for such offenders under 532.080(6) and the
sentences available for one-time recidivists under 532.080(5) appears to be that a Class D felony
offense of conviction would be sentenced as a Class B felony, rather than a Class C felony, for
such an offender. That rule thus seems to impose additional, more severe sentencing rules only on
lower-graded felonies. Less serious felonies, however, should be of relatively lesser concern with
respect to recidivism rules, which are meant to address especially dangerous and incorrigible
offenders.

Section 509.906. Authorized Sentence for Multiple Offenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
533.060

KRS 532.110; see also 532.120,

Comment:

Generally. This provision establishes a rule for determining cumulative authorized sentences
for defendants convicted of more than one offense.
221

Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project

Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 906 provides a universal sentencing rule for
multiple offenses that authorizes neither consecutive nor concurrent sentences. Under Section
906, each additional offense of conviction increases the defendants total authorized sentence, but
the defendant serves a full sentence only for the most serious offense.25 As a defendants offenses
become more numerous and less serious, the defendants total authorized sentence continues to
increase, but in progressively smaller amounts.
Section 906s mechanism for sentencing multiple convictions provides fairer punishment
than the crude consecutive-or-concurrent dichotomy of current Kentucky law.26 Consecutive
sentencing often results in cumulative sentences that seem overly severe as measures of the total
harm caused. Concurrent sentencing, conversely, provides no punishment at all for a defendants
less serious offenses, thus trivializing to the point of total irrelevance any offenses other than the
most serious one. Section 906 provides an intermediate approach to sentencing for multiple
offenses, ensuring that each additional offense leads to some increase in overall punishment while
avoiding raw aggregation of offenses into an unduly severe cumulative sentence.

In the event that an offense is overturned on appeal, the defendant should be re-sentenced in
accordance with this scheme, re-applying the scheme using only those offenses that remain in effect. Thus, if
the most serious offense were overturned on appeal, on remand the court would give the full sentence for the
most serious remaining offense, and so on, rather than simply deleting that portion of the sentence represented
by the most serious offense without enhancing the punishment for the remaining offenses.
26
See KRS 532.055(2) (The jury shall recommend whether the sentences shall be served concurrently
or consecutively.); 532.110(1) (When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for
more than one (1) crime . . . the multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court shall
determine at the time of sentence.).
25
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CHAPTER 511. HOMICIDE OFFENSES
Section 511.1101: Murder in the First Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 507.010, 507.020
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines the offense of murder in the first degree, carrying a
maximum penalty of death.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Current Kentucky law does not divide the offense of
murder into two degrees. Instead, current KRS 507.020 contains both intentional murder and
wanton murder committed with extreme indifference to human life.
Section 511.1101 defines only the offense of knowingly (or intentionally, see proposed
Section 501.205(6)) causing the death of another person. The mitigating factor of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance is recognized in Section 511.1103(1). Section 1101 does not incorporate
the current reference to the defendant causing the death of a third person, as that language is
addressed by Section 503.304s rules relating to transferred intent.
Section 1101(2) grades murder in the first degree as a Class X felony. This grading
assumes that the procedures following a conviction for murder in the first degree allow for a
penalty phase which can result in a jury recommendation of a penalty less than death.
The definition of homicide, which originally appeared in the Model Penal Code for historical reasons
and is found in current KRS 507.010, has been deleted as unnecessary.

Section 511.1102: Murder in the Second Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 507.020
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense of murder in the second degree.
Relation to current Kentucky law. The proposed offense of murder in the second degree
includes the other current type of murder offense, recklessly causing the death of another under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
The extreme-indifference version of murder covers any conduct showing extreme
carelessness, therefore making it unnecessary to explicitly include the operation of a motor vehicle
(as exists in current KRS 507.020(1)(b)). The proposed culpability requirement of recklessness
can be imputed under the voluntary-intoxication provision. See proposed Section 503.302.
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Section 1102(2) grades the offense as a Class A felony, whereas first-degree murder is
graded as a Class X felony. Current 507.020(2) grades both forms of murder as a capital offense.
The proposed grading is based on the view that the criminal law ought to distinguish between those
who intend to kill and those who lack intent. The death penalty, for example, ought to be reserved
for the most egregious of offenses: intentional killings. The vast majority of jurisdictions distinguish
between intentional and other killings.
Moreover, if extreme-indifference murder were made death-eligible as a Class X felony, it
might be necessary to consider making other, apparently equally serious offenses death-eligible as
well. Indeed, most or all other Class A felonies, which generally require intentional or knowing
(rather than reckless) conduct, might seem to merit death eligibility if this offense does.

Section 511.1103: Manslaughter in the First Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 507.030
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates the offense of first-degree manslaughter.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Under current KRS 507.030, there are two forms of
manslaughter in the first degree. Section 1103 incorporates a version of the mitigation defined in
KRS 507.030(1)(b), which arises when a defendant intentionally causes the death of another
person while acting under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance.
The current concept of extreme emotional disturbance reappears in a modified form in
Section 1103(1)(a) as extreme mental or emotional disturbance. This additional language clarifies,
and is consistent with, Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1985), where the
Kentucky Supreme Court noted that mental illness can be relevant to show how a defendant
reacts to any circumstance causing an extreme emotional disturbance. A mental disturbance and
an emotional disturbance involve the same degree of dysfunction. In either case, the mitigation
provided by this section relates to the jurys assessment of the defendants reaction to the
circumstances. The jurys assessment of the presence or absence of a mitigating disturbance is not
confined to any specific category such as sudden heat of passion, nor is any triggering factor
necessary for the jury to conclude that an extreme disturbance existed.
In addition, Section 1103(1)(b) emphasizes that the important point is whether the
disturbance provides a reasonable explanation or excuse, and provides that reasonableness in
this context is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendants situation under
the circumstances as the defendant believes them to be. In other words, the jury is not to impose
a strictly objective standard as to what constitutes reasonable behavior, but is to consider the
specific actor and the context in which he acted. Similarly, under current law, the question is
whether the disturbance provoked this defendant at the time of the offense. See Smith v. Com.,
734 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1987).
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Section 1103(2) places the burdens of production and persuasion for the manslaughter
mitigation on the defendant. Current law is similar as to the burden of production, holding that the
presence or absence of the requisite distress is a matter of evidence, not an element of the crime.
Wellman v. Com., 694 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1985). Thus the prosecution currently has no burden to
establish the absence of the distress as part of its case-in-chief for an offense such as murder in the
first degree. The proposed provision also places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to
establish the mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the defendant has committed
the offense under circumstances that would normally constitute first-degree murder and is seeking
a mitigation based solely on a less blameworthy mental state, this mitigation is similar to an excuse
defense, for which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion under proposed Section
505.501(5).
The other current form of manslaughter in the first degree, set out in KRS 507.030(1)(a),
relates to causing the death of another when the defendant had the intent to cause serious physical
injury. The proposed Code does not incorporate that version of the manslaughter offense. Under
such an offense definition, an undesirable potential exists for the imposition of liability against a
defendant who lacks the typically required culpability as to the specific harm with which homicide
is concerned, namely, causing anothers death. The proposed formulation reflects the view that a
homicide offense should reach only those who satisfy a stated culpability requirement as to causing
anothers death. Although acting with intent to cause great bodily harm is certainly wrongful 
and in nearly all cases will at least satisfy the culpability requirements for second-degree manslaughter
or grossly negligent homicide under the proposed Code  there is a meaningful difference between
intending injury and knowingly killing another person. Further, where the persons acts can be
shown to reflect recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he may
be liable for second-degree murder under proposed Section 1102. Where such indifference is not
present, however, culpability as to injury should not be raised to the status of direct culpability as
to causing death.

Section 511.1104: Manslaughter in the Second Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 507.040
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates a second form of the offense of manslaughter, which is
committed when a person recklessly causes anothers death.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 511.1104s definition of second-degree
manslaughter uses the proposed Codes nomenclature for culpability terms, i.e., it defines the
offense in terms of recklessly rather than wantonly killing another person. Also, as with the
extreme-indifference form of murder, the proposed section removes, as superfluous, the specific
example of causing death during the operation of a motor vehicle.
If a person kills another while voluntarily intoxicated, an imputation rule in the proposed
Codes General Part may allow imposition of liability as if that person possessed the recklessness
necessary for this offense. See Section 503.302.
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Section 511.1105: Grossly Negligent Homicide
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 507.050
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense of grossly negligent homicide.
Relation to current Kentucky law. The proposed offense is identical to the current
offense of reckless homicide, except for a change in the stated culpability requirement that tracks
the proposed Codes general culpability terms. See proposed Section 501.206.

Section 511.1106. Causing or Aiding Suicide
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 216.302
Comment:

Generally. This provision sets out a rule in Section 1106(1) to govern homicide liability
for causing anothers suicide, and an offense in Section 1106(2) for assisting a suicide. (Aside
from their similar subject matter, Sections 1106(1) and (2) are not related to each other.)
Section 1106(1) does not define a distinct offense. Rather, it merely makes clear that a
person who causes another persons suicide (or attempted suicide) through force or duress may
be convicted of another defined homicide offense, such as murder or manslaughter  the offenders
culpability would determine the relevant offense  notwithstanding the situations potential conflict
with the usual causation rules, because of the suicides own intervening act. See proposed Section
502.251. In other words, Section 1106(1) merely clarifies the scope of the other homicide offenses,
stating explicitly that causing death includes death by suicide, where brought about by force or
duress. The other relevant Chapter 511 provision would set the culpability requirement and the
grade for the offense.
Section 1106(2), however, does define a new offense. The (2) offense addresses the
problem that the General Parts complicity and solicitation rules do not apply to suicide, because
suicide is not itself an offense.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 1106(1) adopts a slightly different form than
current KRS 216.302(1), in that it establishes liability for causing suicide by force or duress by
means of the standard homicide offenses, rather than by defining a distinct offense. In substance
and scope, however, Section 1106(1) and (2) are otherwise similar to current KRS 216.302,
except for the proposed provisions grading, which differs in two ways. First, Section 1106(1)
would have the effect of establishing different grades for the act of causing a suicide based on the
offenders culpability, as is the case with any other homicide offense (the underlying theory being
that this is just like any other homicide, but for the need to clarify the causation rule). Second, both
Sections 1106(1) and (2) reflect grading adjustments based on whether the resulting harm (the
others death) of the offense actually results. (Causing an attempted suicide under Section 1106(1)
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would be attempted murder or manslaughter.) The occurrence or non-occurrence of the victims
death is considered relevant in all other homicide situations, so it is sensible and consistent to retain
the relevance of that result in this context.
Section 1106(3) adopts the exceptions for licensed health professionals in current KRS
216.304.
Section 1106(4) defines suicide as intentionally causing ones own death, which is
similar to current KRS 216.300(2)s definition as the act or instance of taking ones own life
voluntarily and intentionally.
Section 1106(5) grades the offense under Section 1106(2), taking account of whether the
resulting death occurs. Aiding a suicide is a Class D felony if suicide results, a Class E felony if an
attempt results, and a Class A misdemeanor if neither a suicide nor an attempt results. Current
KRS 216.302(2) grades the analogous offense as a Class D felony whether death occurs or not.

Section 511.1107. Definition
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 511 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
511s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 512. ASSAULT, ENDANGERMENT,
AND THREAT OFFENSES
Section 512.1201: Assault; Causing Physical Injury
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 508.010, 508.020, 508.025, 508.030,
508.032, 508.040, 518.090
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates a general offense of assault for the infliction of physical
injury. Noninjury offenses, where physical contact occurs without a resulting injury, are addressed
by the proposed offenses of endangerment, terroristic threats, and harassment.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Current law has several assault offenses with varying
combinations of aggravating factors that increase the penalty to a more serious grade. For example,
a defendant who intentionally causes serous physical injury to another person is guilty of assault in
the fourth degree under KRS 508.030. If the assault is committed with a dangerous instrument or
causes a serious physical injury, the accused is guilty of assault in the second degree under KRS
508.020. If the assault is committed with a dangerous instrument and causes a serious physical
injury, the defendant is guilty of assault in the first degree under KRS 508.010. However,
intentionally causing physical injury to a state peace officer constitutes only assault in the third
degree under KRS 508.025, with no available further aggravation (other than that available for
any other assault) to address a serious injury or the means by which the injury was inflicted. When
particular facts do not exactly fit the specific aggravating factors included in the definition of a
specific offense, it becomes necessary to identify a less serious version of assault for prosecution,
so that any given factor, or combination of factors, will sometimes but may not always be relevant
to the extent of an offenders liability.
Section 512.1201(1) creates a general assault offense which may be committed either by
recklessly causing physical injury to another, or by grossly negligently causing such injury to another
with a dangerous instrument. Section 512.1201(2) provides a list of four aggravating categories
that increase the relevant penalty based on (1) the victim suffering serious physical injury, rather
than physical injury, (2) the defendant acting with intent or extreme indifference, rather than
recklessness, (3) the defendant using a weapon, and/or (4) the victim being a law-enforcement
official who is acting in the line of duty. While the baseline penalty for the general assault offense is
a Class B misdemeanor, the presence of any (or all) of the four categories of aggravators can result
in an increased penalty up to a Class C felony, or a Class B felony if proposed Section 905s
recidivism aggravation also applies.
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Section 1201 thus gives voice to the aggravators in all cases, rather than only in particular
combinations, as under current law. The advantage of the proposed approach is that it increases
both consistency and efficiency. Applying these specific factors as general grading adjustments to
a single assault offense, rather than defining a variety of assault offenses, each for a particular
combination of factors, enables the Code to consistently aggravate for all factors. The current law
approach, in contrast, takes a drafting approach that obliges it to select certain combinations of
factors to define each degree of the offense, and thereby omit other combinations. Thus, for
example, there is an aggravation for causing physical harm to a police officer (third-degree assault),
but no similar aggravation for causing serious physical harm to an officer. If the status of the victim
(or the extent of injury caused) is considered relevant in some cases, it seems appropriate to make
that factor relevant in all cases.
As to any of the four categories of grade increase in Section 512.1201(2)(a), there can be
only one grade increase for an offense per category. For example, even if it could be shown under
Section 512.1201(2)(a)(ii) that the accused both acted with intent and displayed extreme indifference
to human life, there could be only a one-grade increase to the overall offense grade.
The four aggravators listed in proposed Section 512.1201(2)(a)(i)-(iv) are elements of
the current assault offenses. The enhancement in Section 1201(2)(a)(iv) is similar to the
enhancements in current KRS 508.025(1)(a), but applies only to assaults against a peace officer
or correctional worker, and not to such other people as social workers. (The definition of
correctional worker in proposed Section 513.1304(2), however, is meant to include such figures
as probation and parole officers.) The narrow identified categories of law-enforcement authorities
include those people whose work most often entails front-line contact with offenders. If the
enhancement category is expanded beyond law-enforcement officials, it is unclear where the line
should be drawn for the aggravation: if it included prosecutors and advocates, for example, it
might seem sensible to also include public defenders, judges, and bail bondsmen  at which point,
it seems reasonable to include assaults against any public servant.
The recidivism enhancement in current KRS 508.032 has not been retained for assault
specifically, as there is a general enhancement for repeat offenders in proposed Section 509.905.
Section 1201(2)(b) allows for a decrease by one grade if the accused was acting under
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.
See the commentary to Section 511.1103 for the application of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance to the homicide offense. Under current law, such mitigation can be used for offenses
defined in KRS 508.010, 508.020, and 508.030, but not for the assault offense defined in KRS
508.025.
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Section 512.1202: Endangerment
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 508.060, 508.070, 530.080
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates a general offense of endangerment, i.e., criminalizing
behavior that creates a significant risk of injury or death.
Relation to current Kentucky law. As with the current assault offenses, the current
wanton endangerment offenses are defined using specific combinations of aggravating factors.
Section 512.1202 takes the elements in current KRS 508.060 and 508.070 and gives full voice to
all of these aggravators rather than limiting their impact to certain combinations. The endangerment
offense would also cover situations currently addressed by elements of, or aggravations for, other
specific offenses. For example, a person who has intercourse with another while knowing himself
to be infected with HIV, and without informing the other person of this fact, commits an endangerment
offense. See, e.g., KRS 529.090.
Section 512.1202(2) provides two aggravating categories, the presence of which increases
the relevant penalty based upon the injury risked and the indifference to human life displayed by
the defendant. While the baseline penalty for the general endangerment offense is a Class A
misdemeanor, the presence of the two aggravators can result in an increased penalty up to a Class
D felony.

Section 512.1203: Terroristic Threats; Menacing
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 508.050, 508.075, 508.078, 508.080
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates a general offense of terroristic threats and menacing.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 512.1203 expands the scope of the most
serious form of terroristic threatening beyond the school context to which current KRS 508.075 is
limited. The proposed offense includes unnecessary evacuation of any building, assembling place,
or public transport. The conduct elements of the proposed offense are similar to the current
terroristic threatening offenses. However, the grading of the offense as a Class E felony, or as a
Class A misdemeanor for threats to commit injury or property damage, represents a middle ground
among the current terroristic threatening offenses.
The proposed offense and grading of menacing is substantially identical to the offense in
current KRS 508.050.
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Section 512.1204. Stalking; Intimidation
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 508.130 to 508.155; 525.070, 525.080
Comment:
Generally. This provision defines an offense of intimidation, and an additional offense of
stalking which covers patterns of intimidation conduct of a specific type.
Relation to current Kentucky law. The proposed offenses are similar to the current
offenses of stalking in the first and second degrees, found in KRS 508.140 and 508.150.27 But in
addition to the current stalking offenses, which require a course of conduct, the proposed provision
also applies to single instances of intimidating behavior, which also have the potential to cause
serious alarm or fear.
Section 1204(1)s proposed intimidation offense has three requirements: (1) intentionally
causing serious alarm, annoyance, intimidation, or harassment of another person; (2) under
circumstances in which a reasonable person would suffer substantial mental distress; (3) with no
legitimate purpose. The proposed offense definition mirrors a part of the current definition of the
term stalk found in current KRS 508.130(1)(a) and (b). The current definition of stalking,
however, also requires a threat. The intimidation offense does not require a threat  such a
single threat would be covered by the terroristic threat offense in proposed 512.1203.
Section 1204(2)s pattern-based stalking offense, however, like the current stalking offenses,
retains the threat requirement, and also requires a course of conduct directed at a specific person
or persons. When combined with the requirements of Section 1204(1), which it explicitly
incorporates, Section 1204(2) imposes the same requirements as the current stalking offenses in
KRS 508.130 to .150.
Under Section 1204(3)(a) and (b), the baseline penalty for intimidation is a Class B
misdemeanor, but the presence of any of four aggravators can result in an increased penalty up to
a Class E felony. The four aggravators in proposed Section 512.1204(3)(a)(i)-(iv) track those in
current KRS 508.140(1)(b) (defining aggravators for first-degree stalking), with two minor
differences. First, Section 1204(3)(a)(ii) explicitly requires that the defendant knows a criminal
complaint is pending against him, rather than the substantively similar but unnecessarily specific
requirement that he have been given actual notice. Second, Section 1204(3)(a)(iii) applies
when the defendant has previously been convicted of any crime, rather than only a felony or Class
A misdemeanor, against the victim.

The proposed harassment offense, Section 561.6106, also addresses much of the conduct prohibited
by the current stalking offenses.
27
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Section 1204(3)(c) grades the stalking offense as a Class A misdemeanor, or a Class D
felony when one of the aggravating factors is present. These are the same grades as exist under
current KRS 508.140(2) and 508.150(2).
Section 1204(4)(a), defining course of conduct, is identical to current KRS 508.130(2).
Section 1204(4)(b), defining protective order, is identical to current KRS 508.130(3), except
that Section 1204(4)(b)(iv) refers to any restraining order and not just to restraining orders
issued under KRS 508.155.

Section 512.1205: Criminal Abuse
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 508.090, 508.100, 508.110, 508.120
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates a general offense of criminal abuse.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Current law has several criminal-abuse offenses that
share identical circumstance and conduct elements, but differ from one another based on the
culpability element. For example, a defendant who intentionally abuses another in his custody,
thereby causing serious physical injury, is currently guilty of criminal abuse in the first degree under
KRS 508.100, while a person who acts recklessly (wantonly in terms of current law) in the same
situation is guilty of a lesser degree of the offense under KRS 508.110. The proposed offense
similarly grades the seriousness of the offense as a function of culpability, but does so using one
general offense.
Section 512.1205 adjusts the scope and grading of the criminal-abuse offense to reflect
the fact that other offenses in the proposed Code cover the more serious conduct addressed by
the current provisions. For example, the current laws language addressing the results of the
defendants conduct (such as causing serious physical injury or torture) is covered under proposed
Section 512.1201, dealing with assault. Likewise, the result of placing the victim in a situation that
may cause him serious physical injury would fall under the definition of endangerment in proposed
Section 512.1202. The proposed provision, in contrast to the current scheme, captures only the
aspect of the current offenses that deals specifically with causing cruel confinement or cruel punishment
to the victim. Where physical injury or serious risk is also involved, the defendant could be
convicted of another offense under Chapter 1200 as well as an offense under Section 1205, and
would be subject to additional punishment for the other offense. See proposed Section 509.906.
Section 1205(1)(b) also adds language from the current definition of abuse, i.e., the
deprivation of services necessary to maintain the victims health or welfare, as a prohibited result.
The remaining part of the current definition of abuse in KRS 508.090(1) has not been incorporated,
as it would be duplicative of the proposed definition or of the assault offence in proposed Section
512.1201. Section 1205(2) defines physically or mentally helpless person similarly to current
KRS 508.090(2).
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Section 512.1206: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 508.090, 508.130
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 512 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
512s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 513. SEXUAL ASSAULT OFFENSES
General Comment Regarding Culpability:

Under the proposed Code, in cases requiring that the victim be below a certain age or
have a lack of capacity to consent, the required culpability as to the victims age or incapacity
would be recklessness. (As is generally true where no culpability term is explicitly stated, proposed
Section 501.205(3)s read-in rule operates here to impose a recklessness requirement.) Current
KRS 510.030 currently provides a defense where the offender did not have knowledge of the
victims age or mental infirmity. In certain contexts, however, the courts have held that no culpability
is required for rape. See Malone v. Com., 636 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1982). Imposing a general
requirement of recklessness as to age and/or incapacity reflects a compromise that harmonizes the
inconsistencies of current law.

Section 513.1301: Aggravated Rape
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 510.010, 510.015, 510.030, 510.035,
510.040, 510.070
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates the offense of aggravated rape.
Relation to current Kentucky law. The proposed offense of aggravated rape is currently
found in the Penal Code as rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree. Aggravated
rape is commonly understood to include any kind of sexual intercourse, deviate or otherwise. The
aggravated rape offense is committed in any of three circumstances: when a defendant has sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with another person (1) who is less than 12 years old, or
(2) by forcible compulsion, or (3) who is physically helpless.
Section 513.1301(2)s definitions of sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse,
forcible compulsion, foreign object,and physically incapacitated are identical to the current
definitions of the same terms in KRS 510.010(1)-(2), (6), (8), and (9), except for one modification
to the definition of forcible compulsion. Instead of requiring the offender to actually place the
victim in fear, the definition now requires such force as would place a reasonable person in fear.
This makes the definition more objective and less dependent on the victims own experience of the
encounter; accordingly, less reliance on the victims own testimony would presumably be needed
under the proposed standard. An objective standard places the focus where it belongs, on the
actual extent of the force used by the assailant, rather than on the victims personal state of mind.
An assailant who uses a sufficient level of force should not be able to argue that no liability is
warranted merely because the Commonwealth cannot prove subjective fear on the victims part.
Unlike the lower-graded offense of rape in proposed Section 513.1302, the aggravated
offense may be committed by a person against his spouse. The provision in current KRS 510.035
prohibiting sex offense prosecutions for married couples does not apply to the circumstances
described in the proposed aggravated rape offense.
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Issues relating to consent or the lack of consent are addressed in proposed Section 502.251.
Current KRS 510.030 provides that a defendant may prove that he did not know of the facts or
conditions responsible for a victims incapacity to consent. The current provision is probably
unconstitutional, as it negates the culpability requirement as to a required element of every offense
in this Chapter  lack of consent  thereby improperly shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant. The absence of the defense in the proposed Code does not convert the sexualassault offenses to strict-liability offenses, because, where no culpability requirement is stated as to
the offenders awareness of the victims incapacity, a culpability requirement of recklessness is to
be read in under proposed Section 501.205(3). In addition, use of the term know imposes a
higher culpability requirement than the default culpability of recklessness under the proposed Code
(equivalent to wantonly under the current Penal Code). Thus, shifting the burden to the prosecution
requires that it prove that the defendant was aware of the likelihood that the person was incapable
of consenting.
The grading of the offense is identical to the corresponding current Penal Code offenses.

Section 513.1302: Rape
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 510.010, 510.035, 510.050, 510,060,
510.080, 510.090
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates the offense of rape.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Each of the circumstances described in the rape
offense definition involves situations in which the consent of the victim is ineffective. This offense
tracks the current second- and third-degree offenses of rape and sodomy. The definitions of
mentally retarded and mentally incapacitated in proposed Section 513.1302(2) are substantially
identical to the definitions of the same terms in current KRS 510.010((4)-(5).
Unlike the aggravated rape offense, rape as defined in Section 1302(1)(a) cannot be
committed by a person against his spouse. Generally, this provision is similar to current KRS
510.035, which indicates that no sex offense is committed by a person against his spouse merely
because the latter is less than sixteen years old or mentally retarded. Under Section 1302(1)(b),
however, any intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated is rape, even if the victim
is the offenders spouse. Although minors and mentally retarded persons are allowed under Kentucky law to marry and must be permitted to have consensual sex with their spouses when they are
married, there is no reason to allow a person to engage in intercourse with a spouse who is
incapacitated and therefore is not a voluntary participant in the act.
More generally speaking, issues relating to consent or the lack of consent are addressed in
proposed Section 502.251. See the commentary to proposed Section 513.1301 for a discussion
of why the current defense of proving that a victim was incapable of consenting is not carried
forward in the proposed Code.
The grading of the offense is identical to the corresponding current Penal Code offenses.
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Section 513.1303: Aggravated Sexual Abuse
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 510.010, 510.035, 510.110
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates the offense of aggravated sexual abuse.
Relation to current Kentucky law. The proposed offense of aggravated sexual abuse is
currently found in the Penal Code as sexual abuse in the first degree (KRS 510.110).
The offense is committed when a defendant has sexual contact with, or causes sexual
conduct by,28 another person under the same conditions as for aggravated rape under proposed
Section 513.1301: the conduct occurs with a person who is less than 12 years old, or by forcible
compulsion, or with a person who is physically incapacitated. The definition of sexual contact in
Section 513.1303(2) is identical to the current definition of the same term in KRS 510.010(7).
The definition of sexual conduct in proposed Section 513.1303(2)(b) is identical to the definition
of sexual conduct by a minor in current KRS 531.300(4), with three slight differences: (1) it
omits an exception for private family exposures not intended for distribution; (2) it is not limited in
scope to acts by minors; and (3) it does not include the language referring to physical contact
with, or willful or intentional exhibition of the genitals, as that language is duplicative of the definition
of sexual contact and with Section 1303(2)(b)(iii), respectively.
Unlike the lower-graded offense of sexual abuse in proposed Section 513.1304, the
aggravated offense may be committed by a person against his spouse. The provision in current
KRS 510.035 prohibiting prosecutions for married couples does not apply to the circumstances
described in the proposed aggravated sexual abuse offense.
Issues relating to consent or the lack of consent are addressed in proposed Section 502.251.
See the commentary to proposed Section 513.1301 for a discussion of why the current defense
of proving that a victim was incapable of consenting is not carried forward in the proposed Code.
The grading for the offense is the same as the current offense of sexual abuse in the first
degree, except that the offense is a Class E felony when committed by forcible compulsion or
against someone who is physically helpless.

The causing sexual conduct language is designed to apply to situations such as that arising in
Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 838 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1991) (applying promoting sexual performance by minor
offense to defendant who required his daughter to disrobe in his presence). Although Gilbert probably read
the promoting performance offense too broadly, given that offenses basic concern with the public nature of
the performance, the case highlights the importance and desirability of including language within the sexual
abuse offenses to cover the conduct in question.
28
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Section 513.1304: Sexual Abuse
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 510.035, 510.110, 510.120
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates the offense of sexual abuse.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Each of the circumstances described in the sexual
abuse offense definition involves situations in which the consent of the victim is ineffective. This
offense generally tracks the current second- and third-degree offenses of sexual abuse in KRS
510.120 and 510.130. However, proposed Section 513.1304(1)(c) changes current law when it
defines the offense as having sexual contact with, or causing sexual conduct by,29 a person who is
less than 14 years old when the defendant is at least 4 years older. Current law defines the offense
being committed by a person of any age when the victim is less than 14 years old, which is not
symmetrical to the current provision for the offense of rape. Thus under current law, for persons
younger than 18, it is criminal to have sexual contact with a person under age 14, but not criminal
to have sexual intercourse.
In addition, Section 1304 defines the offense to include sexual contact or conduct involving
a person under age 16 when the defendant is at least 4 years older. Current law notes in KRS
510.130(1)(b)3 that it is a defense that the defendant was five years older than the victim. As
noted in the previous paragraph, current law thus creates the asymmetry of making it criminal for a
person younger than 21 to have sexual contact with a person under age 16, but not criminal to
have sexual intercourse.
Unlike the aggravated sexual abuse offense, sexual abuse cannot be committed by a person
against his spouse. Generally, this provision is similar to current KRS 510.035, which indicates
that no sex offense is committed by a person against his spouse merely because the latter is less
than sixteen years old or mentally retarded.
Issues relating to consent or the lack of consent are addressed in proposed Section 502.251.
See the commentary to proposed Section 513.1301 for a discussion of why the current defense
of proving that a victim was incapable of consenting is not carried forward in the proposed code.
The definition of correctional worker used in Section 513.1304(2) is substantially identical
to the description of the same term in current KRS 510.120(1)(c). The grading of the offense is
similar to the corresponding current Penal Code offenses, except that the grade for sexual abuse of
a mentally retarded or incapacitated person, or a person under the offenders custodial authority,
has been increased from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class E felony, on the view that the first case
involves a victim who is unusually and obviously unable to consent, and the second case involves
a breach of the offenders legal duty of appropriate treatment toward the victim. The general
aggravator in KRS 510.015 for a third misdemeanor sexual offense conviction has not been
incorporated, as the proposed Code has a general recidivism provision. See proposed 509.905.
As with the similar language in proposed Section 1303, this language is meant to reach cases like
Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 838 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1991). See supra note [2.]
29
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Section 513.1305: Sexual Misconduct
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 510.140
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates the offense of sexual misconduct, which is a default
sexual assault offense under the proposed Code.
Relation to current Kentucky law. This offense is substantially identical to the sexual
misconduct offense in current KRS 510.140. The general aggravator in KRS 510.015 for a third
misdemeanor sexual offense conviction has not been incorporated, as the proposed Code has a
general recidivism provision. See proposed 509.905.
Issues relating to consent or the lack of consent are addressed in proposed Section 502.251.
See the commentary to proposed Section 513.1301 for a discussion of why the current defense
of proving that a victim was incapable of consenting is not carried forward in the proposed Code.
The proposed offense applies residually to any form of non-consensual sexual intercourse
not otherwise covered by another offense. It differs in this respect from the description of current
KRS 510.140 in the earlier Codes commentary, which stated that the offense sought to preserve
the concept of statutory rape and statutory sodomy ¼ designed primarily to prohibit nonconsensual
sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse under two circumstances: when the victim is 14 or
15 and the defendant is less than 21; or when the victim is 12, 13, 14, or 15 and the defendant is
less than 18 years of age. In this context the ages of the defendant and the victim are critical.
Force is not an element of this offense. The victim is statutorily incapable of consent. In Cooper
v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W. 2d 478 (Ky. 1977), the current provision was held inapplicable to
cases where both persons are over the age of 21 and neither is physically or mentally incapacitated.
See also Spencer v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. 1977); Johnson v. Commonwealth,
864 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1993) (stating that the giving of an instruction on sexual misconduct in this
case would not have thwarted the long-standing rule that KRS 510.140 was intended to apply
only in cases where the victim is fourteen or fifteen and the defendant less than twenty-one, or
where the victim is twelve-to-fifteen and the defendant is less than eighteen years of age). Proposed
Section 1305 is not meant to apply only to offense involving persons in certain age groups; it
applies to any non-consensual sexual intercourse between any two persons.
The offense of indecent exposure, which does not involve a physical injury, is relocated in
proposed Section 562.6201 with the public indecency offenses.
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Section 513.1306: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 510.010
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 513 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
513s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined. The only definition that is not carried forward from current law is the definition of
mental illness in current KRS 510.010(3).

240

Chapter 514: Kidnapping, Coercion, and Related Offenses

CHAPTER 514. KIDNAPPING, COERCION, AND
RELATED OFFENSES
Section 514.1401: Unlawful Restraint and Kidnapping
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 509.020-.060
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates the offenses of unlawful restraint and kidnapping.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 514.1401 combines the current unlawful
imprisonment and kidnapping offenses and defenses found in current KRS 509.020-.060. The
basic offense is defined as knowingly restraining another unlawfully, which is the same as the
current offense of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree.
The other offenses relate to aggravators which require an increase in grading. The next
most seriously graded offense is aggravated unlawful restraint, which is substantially similar to the
current offense of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree found in current KRS 509.020.
Kidnapping is defined in the same manner as the current kidnapping offense in KRS
509.040(1)(a)-(e), except that term physical injury is substituted for the term bodily injury.
Aggravated kidnapping also is defined in proposed Section 514.1501(3)(a) in the same manner as
the grading aggravator is described in current KRS 509.040(2). See Brown v. Com., 890 S.W.2d
286 (Ky. 1994) (finding the language when the victim is not released alive is not overbroad and
vague).
The exemption in current KRS 509.050 is brought forward in a condensed form in proposed
Section 514.1401(5) and still constitutes a question of law. See Harris v. Com., 793 S.W.2d
802 (Ky. 1990). The other offense referred to in the exemption logically must be located
outside Chapter 514. See, e.g., Smith v. Com., 610 S.W.2d 602 (Ky. 1980). The ordinarily
incident language is consistent with the current law under Timmons v. Com., 555 S.W.2d 234
(Ky. 1977). That case interpreted the current phrase immediately with and incidental to to mean
that the other offense must be not only ordinarily incident to the other crimes commission, see
Miller v. Com., 925 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1996), but also close in distance and brief in time in
order for the exemption to apply. In assessing whether the interference was ordinarily incident to
the commission of another offense, issues of time and space may well be relevant, i.e., the closer in
time and space the interference is with the other offense, the more likely it is that the exemption will
apply. Even without the exemption, if the other offense dealt with restraint, conviction for both this
offense and the other offense would be precluded under proposed Section 502.254(2).
The proposed exemption language also eliminates the current exemptions inapplicability
to criminal escapes.
Section 514.1401(6) incorporates the defenses to these offenses in current KRS 509.060.
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The definitions of relative and restrain in current KRS 509.010 also are carried forward
in proposed section 514.1401(3)(b)-(c). The definition of physical injury is already found in
proposed Section 504.420(3).
The grading of the offenses is the same as under current law for comparable conduct.

Section 514.1402: Interference with Custody
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 509.070
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates the offense of interfering with custody.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 514.1402 is substantially identical to current
KRS 509.070. However, the defense provided in current law for returning the victim voluntarily is
carried forward, not as a defense, but as a mitigator for purposes of grading. Characterizing the
voluntary return of the victim as a complete defense may provide a person with the incentive to
take the victim repeatedly and return the victim only when there is a fear of imminent arrest.

Section 514.1403: Criminal Coercion
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 509.080
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates the offense of criminal coercion.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 514.1403 is substantially identical to current
KRS 509.080.

Section 514.1404: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

509.010

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 514 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
514s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 515. ROBBERY OFFENSES
Section 515.1501: Robbery
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 500.080, 515.010, 515.020, 515.030
Comment:
Generally. This provision creates the offense of robbery.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 515.1501 defines the basic offense of robbery,
along with aggravators that increase the grading of the offense. The basic offense is the same as
the current offense of robbery in the second degree (KRS 515.030), and is defined as using or
threatening the immediate use of physical force on another person in the course of theft with the
intent to accomplish the theft.
Section 1501(2)(a), enhancing the grade of the offense for aggravated robbery, is
substantially identical to the current offense of robbery in the first degree in KRS 515.020.
To support liability for robbery, the property need not be taken directly from the victim or
his presence, and the theft may be complete at the time the physical force was used or threatened.
See, e.g., Williams v. Com., 639 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. App. 1982).
The definitions of dangerous instrument and deadly weapon are carried forward from
the current Penal Code definitions in KRS 500.080, although instead of excluding a hunting knife
from the definition of deadly weapon itself, the proposed provision includes such items  instead
excluding only pen knives from the definition  but, in Section 1501(2)(a)(iii), defines the offense
to cover cases where the offender is armed with a weapon other than an ordinary hunting knife
that the person regularly carries. The definition of physical force in KRS 515.010 has not been
incorporated, as is it does not helpfully add to the term itself.
The grading of the offense is the same as under current law.
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CHAPTER 521. THEFT AND RELATED PROVISIONS
Section 521.2101: Consolidation of Theft Offenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:

Generally. Section 521.2101 assures that the offense definitions and grading provisions
in Chapter 521 are read together as applying to different forms of the same offense. The Code
could achieve the same result by having one very large theft section with many subsections, but
such an approach would be awkward. A consolidation provision avoids the problem of having to
charge several different offenses to make sure an indictment covers conduct that may fall into
different categories, such as theft, embezzlement, or receiving stolen property. In this way, the
provision preempts issues regarding offense liability or grading that stem from disputes as to which
kind of theft a defendants conduct constitutes. The consolidation of theft offenses also enables
Chapter 521 to have a unified grading provision and unified defense provisions.
A consolidation provision making theft a single offense does not preclude the possibility
of charging multiple counts of that offense  just as, for example, arson is a single offense but
may be charged in multiple counts. (See proposed Sections 502.253 to 502.255 and corresponding
commentary for rules governing the circumstances under which there may be a conviction for
multiple counts of the same offense.)
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2101 has no corresponding provision in
current KRS Chapter 514.

Section 521.2102: Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.030; 514.140; 217.181; 218A.1418,
433.234, 433.865, 434.580, 437.420(1)
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines the most straightforward form of theft: taking property
that belongs to another person.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2102(1) corresponds to current KRS
514.030. The key aspect of the offense is unauthorized transfer of possession or ownership, not
the particular method of transfer. Section 521.2102(1) covers the same conduct addressed by
other current provisions that prohibit theft by taking in the context of specific circumstances or
forms of property, such as theft of mail matter (KRS 514.140); theft of legend drugs (KRS 217.181);
and theft of controlled substances (KRS 218A.1418). The overlap created by such provisions
introduces unnecessary and undesirable confusion.
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Current KRS 433.234 provides a presumption of intent to deprive an owner of property
in shoplifting situations when there is willful concealment of unpurchased merchandise on the
premises of the store. Section 521.2102(2) substitutes a permissive inference for the current
presumption, which is consistent with constitutional principles. See proposed Section 500.106(4)
and corresponding commentary for a discussion of permissive inferences.
Section 521.2102(3) is substantively similar to current KRS 514.030(2) and adopts most
of its wording. Section 2102(3), however, replaces obtains with transfers to clarify that theft
of immovable property can occur without the need for the person to obtain the property. The
requirement that the person transfer the immovable property excludes a trespasser from theft
liability. The trespasser situation can be addressed by the trespass offense. See proposed Section
523.2302.
The use of the term unlawfully in proposed Sections 521.2102(1) and (3) has the effect
of providing a consent defense. Therefore, the general consent defense in proposed Section
502.251 would apply.
Section 2102(4)(e), like current law, broadly defines property as anything of value,
and provides a broader list of examples than current law. Section 2102(4)s other definitions are
similar to those in current law.

Section 521.2103: Theft by Deception
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 342.035, 342.335, 342.615, 434.650.655, 434.670 514.020(3); 514.040; 514.090; 514.120; 514.160; 514.170
Comment:

Generally. This provision covers situations where the offender knowingly obtains another
persons property by means of trickery or falsehood, rather than by taking it outright, as in
proposed Section 521.2102.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2103 addresses the offense of theft by
deception in one provision, replacing the general theft-by-deception provisions in current law,
KRS 514.040, as well as other specific deception-related sections in current law, such as KRS
514.120 (obscuring identity of machine or other property) and KRS 514.160 (theft of identity).
Theft by deception differs from theft by unlawful taking in that the offenders intent to
deprive the owner of the property is made clear by his deliberate deceptive act itself. Section
521.2103(1) is similar to current KRS 514.040, but eliminates the reference to deception regarding
services,30 which is addressed in Section 521.2112. Section 521.2103(1) serves as a general
description of the theft by deception offense. Current KRS 514.040(6)-(7) contain statements of
specific types of theft by deception, which undercut the force of the general offense description
and are unnecessarily confusing.
30
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Section 521.2103(2) incorporates the definition of deception from current KRS
514.040(1)(a)-(e). When an intentional deception involves forgery or fraud, the conduct may
violate forgery or fraud offenses. See generally Chapter 531 and corresponding commentary.
Section 521.2103(3) is comparable to current KRS 514.040(2), and limits the reach of
the offense of theft by deception in two areas. Section 521.2103(3) excludes from the offense
deceptions that are irrelevant to any pecuniary interest, such as when a salesman misrepresents his
personal opinions or beliefs to establish a better rapport with a customer. Section 521.2103(3)
also excludes puffing by statements that are unlikely to deceive an ordinary person in the group
addressed.
Section 521.2103(4) is comparable to KRS 514.040(3) by precluding any inference
about a persons intent to perform a promise merely from the later failure to perform the promise.31
For example, if a check turns out to be unsupported by sufficient funds, there is no necessary
connection between the lone fact that there are insufficient funds to cover the check and the
persons intent at the time the check was written. As Section 521.2103(5) makes clear, however,
the existence of other circumstances may permit a permissive inference about the persons
knowledge.
Section 521.2103(5) and (6) create permissive inferences about a persons knowledge
from the fact that a check would not be paid or the fact that leased property was not returned, as
opposed to the presumption in current KRS 514.040(4) and 514.020(3). (See proposed
Section 500.106(4) and corresponding commentary for a discussion of permissive inferences.)
Section 2103(6) does not incorporate the language from the second sentence of current KRS
514.040(4)(b) to 514.040(5), because the conduct in question does not support a permissive
inference of intent to deceive at the time a check was written.
Section 2103 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 342.035, 342.335, 342.615,
434.650-.655, and 434.670.

Section 521.2104: Theft by Extortion
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.080
Comment:

Generally. This provision covers situations where the offender obtains another persons
property by means of a threat rather than by outright taking (Section 521.2102) or deception
(Section 521.2103). Threats of immediate serious bodily harm constitute the offense of robbery,
see Chapter 515, while theft by extortion relates to other improper threats as well as threats of
future harm.

31

This is consistent with Com. v. Miller, 575 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1978).
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Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2104(1)(a)-(f) is similar to current KRS
514.080(1). Section 521.2104(1)(d) streamlines the language in KRS 514.080(1)(d), but makes
the same conceptual point.
Section 521.2104(1)(g) has no comparable section in current law. Its addition recognizes
that the specification of criminal threats found in current 514.080(1)(a)-(f) is insufficient to cover
all situations that may constitute extortion. Thus, the language inflict any other substantial harm
provides a residual category that broadens the scope of the provision to include other harms not
currently addressed. However, the language that would not benefit the defendant limits the
applicability of this type of extortion to the extent that the threat was made to secure a benefit for
which the defendant may have some legitimate claim. The Model Penal Codes commentary gives
several examples of cases that would fall within this catchall provision, but not any of the other
specific provisions in this Section:
One would be the case of the foreman in a manufacturing plant who requires
the workers to pay him a percentage of their wages on pain of dismissal or other
employment discrimination. Another would be the friend of the purchasing agent
of a large corporation who obtains money from an important supplier by threatening
to influence the purchasing agent to divert his business elsewhere, or the variation
where the purchasing agent himself insists on personal payments by means of the
same threat. The section would even apply to a law professor who obtains property
from a student by threatening to give him a failing grade or to influence a prospective
employer to hire someone else.
Model Penal Code § 223.4 cmt. at 223 (1980).
Section 521.2104(2) retains the defense set out in current KRS 514.080(2), but expresses
the defense in simpler language. The defense covers property obtained by an honest claim of
restitution or indemnification. This defense would protect, for example, property obtained in
settlement of a legitimate legal claim.

Section 521.2105: Theft of Services
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.060; 514.065
Comment:

Generally. This provision makes clear that, as with other forms of property, it is theft to
obtain unlawfully another persons labor or services.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2105(1)(a) and (b) are similar to KRS
514.060(1)(a) and (c). Section 521.2105(3), creating a permissive inference of intent for dineand-dash-type situations, is similar to the presumption found in current KRS 514.060(2). See
proposed Section 500.106(4) and corresponding commentary for a discussion of permissive
inferences.
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The presumption in current KRS 514.060(3) for theft of public services such as gas and
water is included within the general theft of services provision of Section 521.2105(1)(a). It is
clear from that general provision that the theft of services offense includes gas, water, etc., and
there is no special need for a permissive inference covering public utilities. The definition of services
includes computer data, computer software or hardware, and access to electronic media.
Several provisions from current law are omitted from the proposed Code. Specialized
provisions in KRS 514.060(1)(b) and 514.065 list several examples of theft of communications
services, which already are included in Section 521.2105(1)(a), without the need for specificity.
Other portions of KRS 514.060(1)(b) address privacy issues addressed in Chapter 524.

Section 521.2106: Theft by Unauthorized Sale of Copyrighted Material
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 434.445
Comment:

Generally. This provision covers the unauthorized sale of copyrighted matter.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2106 defines an offense for depriving
the owner of copyrighted material any proceeds from its sale. It is a streamlined version of current
KRS 434.445, which prohibits the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of such material.
The inchoate and accomplice aspects of current law are covered by proposed Sections 508.801
and 503.301, respectively.

Section 521.2107: Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of Funds
Received
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.070
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines as an offense the retention of funds received subject to
an agreement to transfer the funds to a third party. In some situations, one who promises to make
certain payments or other disposition of property should be punished for dealing with the property
as his own. Without such a provision, the conduct in question would constitute breach of contract,
but arguably not theft, as the offender has obtained control of the victims funds with the victims
agreement.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2107(1)-(2) are similar to current KRS
514.070(1)-(2). Section 521.2107(3) establishes a permissive inference that is comparable to
the presumption in current KRS 514.070(3). See proposed Section 500.106(4) and corresponding
commentary for a discussion of permissive inferences.
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Section 521.2108: Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Stolen by Mistake
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 434.590, 514.050; 365.710
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines as theft the unlawful retention of property that the
possessor knows to belong to someone else.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2108 is similar to current KRS 514.050(1).
The offenders knowledge or potential knowledge of the owners identity is a factor in determining
the reasonableness of his efforts to return the property. This standard, however, also allows
consideration of, and adjustment for, the nature of the property when deciding what measures are
reasonable. The person who accidentally comes into possession of an extremely valuable or
unique item should be required to undertake a more thorough search for the rightful owner than the
person who finds a $5 bill on a busy street corner. Section 521.2108 also adjusts for the elimination
of the knowledge-of-ownership requirement by requiring the offender to know that the property
was lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake. This requirement prevents the extension of the offense
to innocent conduct.
Current KRS 514.050 contains an exception for the provision in KRS 365.710, which
deals with receipt of unsolicited goods. The knowledge culpability requirement of proposed Section
521.2108 already takes care of this exception and is therefore unnecessary.
Section 2108 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 434.590.

Section 521.2109: Receiving Stolen Property
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 434.580, 434.690, 514.110; 514.120(2);
514.150
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing receipt or possession of stolen
property.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2109 addresses the offense of receiving
stolen property in one provision, replacing the general provision in current law, KRS 514.110, as
well as another specific section in current law, KRS 514.150 (possession of stolen mail matter).
Section 521.2109(1) is identical to current KRS 514.110(1), except that the culpability
requirement for the offense is recklessness. The current provision, 514.110(1), requires that a
person receive property knowing that it has been stolen, or having reason to believe that it has
been stolen. This requirement is lower than recklessness; the provision effectively imposes a
negligence standard. The proposed provision thus reflects an increase in the culpability requirement,
which is one reason the permissive inference in Section 521.2109(2)(a) has been added. That
inference replaces the presumption in current KRS 514.110(2) but is otherwise comparable, given
the change in culpability. 521.2109(2)(b)s permissive inference is comparable to the presumption
in current KRS 514.120(2). See proposed Section 500.106(4) and corresponding commentary
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for a discussion of permissive inferences.
Section 2109 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 434.580 and 434.690.

Section 521.2110: Grading of Theft
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.030(2);
514.060(4);
514.080(3);
514.120(4);
514.160(2);
Comment:

514.040(8);
514.065(4);
514.090(3);
514.140(2);
514.170(3)

514.050(2);
514.070(4);
514.110(3);
514.150(2);

Generally. Section 521.2110 provides a uniform set of offense grades for all forms of
theft defined in Chapter 521.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2110 provides a single grading scheme
for all forms of theft. Current law uses specific penalties for numerous theft offenses. Section
521.2110 eliminates these specific penalties, as there is no obvious reason for distinguishing these
specific forms of theft from other thefts for grading purposes.
Section 521.2110s general method of grading thefts according to the value of property
involved is similar to current law, except that Section 521.2110 adds additional layers to the
grading hierarchy, introducing new grading distinctions at the $1,000,000, $10,000, and $1,000
levels and a more limited distinction for certain thefts involving less than $50. The current scheme
alters the grade at only one cut-off value level: $300. Accordingly, any theft of more than $300
is typically a Class D felony under current law, whereas theft of more than $10,000 or $1,000,000
would be treated as a Class C or Class B felony, respectively, under the proposed Code.
Section 521.2110(2)(b) grades theft of a firearm as a Class C felony. Section
521.2110(2)(c) grades theft as a Class C felony in the case of theft by receiving stolen property,
if the receiver is in the business of buying or selling stolen property. In either case, a theft could be
punished at a higher level if it also satisfied the requirements of that level, so that a dealer in stolen
property worth more than $1,000,000 would be liable for a Class B felony.
Section 521.2110(7) sets the amount involved in a theft in terms of the fair market value
of the property or services acquired. By contrast, current law uses the term value for property
or services. Section 521.2110(7) further clarifies current law by establishing that amounts involved
in multiple thefts, whether committed against one or multiple persons, pursuant to one scheme or
course of conduct may be aggravated to determine the grade of the offense.
Section 521.2110 generally does not consider whether a theft was from the person in
assigning a grade. To the extent theft from the person involves an independent harm related to the
potential for injury or fright, that harm is addressed by the distinct offense of robbery defined in
proposed Section 515.1501.
Section 521.2110 does not contain a grading provision for repeat offenders as appears in
current KRS 514.030(2)(a), 514.065(4), and 514.110(3)(b). Proposed Section 509.905 includes
a general provision governing aggravation of offense grade for repeat offenders.
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Section 521.2110 also does not include specialized penalty provisions such as KRS
514.030(2)(b) and 514.110, when the property is anhydrous ammonia. No justification exists for
specifying this type of property but omitting other types of property. Higher grading provisions are
provided in Section 521.2110 whereby higher quantities of property will meet higher values.

Section 521.2111: Claim of Right
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.020(1)(b)-(c)
Comment:

Generally. This provision clarifies the state of mind that makes an act of theft suitable for
criminal sanction. A person acting under an honest claim of right to property may in one sense have
the intention to deprive another person of the property, in that, believing himself the rightful
owner, he wants to exert control over the property. He does not, however, have the unlawful
intent  the intent to take away property known to be another persons  that makes liability for
theft appropriate.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2111 is almost identical to KRS
514.020(1)(b)-(c). KRS 514.020(1)(a) is omitted from the proposed Code. It provided a
defense32 for theft if the person was unaware that the property or service was that of another. This
provision is unnecessary, because it would conflict with every theft offense that already has a
culpability requirement as to the property or services stolen belonging to another.

Section 521.2112: Unauthorized Use of Automobiles and Other Vehicles
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.100
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines as a criminal offense the use or retention of a vehicle
without consent. Section 521.2112 covers cases where the offender lacks the intent to permanently
deprive the owner of the vehicle and therefore has not committed theft.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.2112(1) is similar to current KRS
514.100(1) and covers joyriding cases.

See Smith v. Com., 587 S.W.2d 266 (Ky.Ct.App. 1979) (claim of right is not an element of theft). To
invoke a claim of right, a defendant must admit the act charged and seek to justify its commission. Howard v.
Com., 608 S.W.2d 62 (Ky.Ct.App. 1980).
32
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Section 521.2112(3) has no corresponding provision in current KRS Chapter 514. The
defense excludes from liability cases where the defendant had a reasonable belief that the owner
would have consented to his use of the vehicle. (The defendant would be required to advance
some evidence supporting this belief before the Commonwealth would be required to disprove it.
See proposed Section 500.107(3)(b).) For example, a person who borrowed a relatives car for
an afternoon, where the relative had freely allowed the defendants similar use in the past, would
not merit criminal liability. For the defense to apply, however, the jury would have to find not only
that the defendant held the belief, but that the belief was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances.
The penalty for violation of Section 521.2112(1) is separate from the theft offenses. It
grades each form of unauthorized use as a Class A misdemeanor. Under current law, the joyriding
offense is a Class A misdemeanor unless the person has a prior conviction for the offense, in which
case it is a Class D felony. See proposed Section 509.905 (providing enhancement for repeat
offender).

Section 521.2113: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.010; 514.020(2)
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 521 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
521s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 522. PROPERTY DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION
PROVISIONS
Section 522.2201. Arson in the First Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 513.020
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines the offense of arson in the first degree, a crime that
combines the harms of the two separate offenses of property damage and endangerment.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 522.2201 is comparable to current KRS
513.020, also known as arson in the first degree. Section 522.2201(1) differs from KRS 513.020(1)
only by requiring that the defendant is reckless about either of the conditions in (1)(a) or (1)(b).
Section 522.2201(1)(a) differs from current KRS 513.020(1)(a) by defining arson to
require recklessness as to causing serious physical injury, rather than providing arson liability when
the defendant has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied. In many cases,
the defendant will have the requisite recklessness as to injury where the building is likely to be
occupied. Defining the offense this way, however, ensures a focus on its fundamental concern: the
defendants creating a risk of serious injury. Where recklessness as to inhabitation or occupation,
but not injury, can be shown, the defendant will remain liable for arson in the second degree under
proposed Section 522.2202.
Section 522.2201(1)(b) is almost identical to current KRS 513.020(1)(b).
Section 522.2201 does not cover arson to property other than buildings. Such arson
typically does not involve the key element that motivates the creation of a distinct arson offense:
placing human life in jeopardy. For this reason, Section 2201(2)s definition of building does not
include vehicles (other than trailers or trains), as burning vehicles does not necessarily create the
same inherent risk to human safety. The current, more expansive definition applies in situations
involving no serious threat to safety  or at least, no threat to safety more serious than that posed
by other instances of recklessly starting a fire. See, e.g., Com. v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47 (Ky.
2002) (holding that KRS 513.010s definition of building includes bulldozers). Such conduct
may, however, be punishable as criminal damage (under proposed Section 522.2206) or, where
appropriate, endangerment (under proposed Section 522.2203), or both.
As with current law, there are no defenses to arson in the first degree. Section 522.2201(2),
like current KRS 513.020(2), categorizes arson in the first degree as a Class A felony.
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Section 522.2202. Arson in the Second Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 513.030
Comment:

Generally. Section 522.2202 is similar to current KRS 513.030. Sections 522.2202(1)(a)(b) are comparable to current KRS 513.030(1)(a)-(b), which also covers the current offense in
KRS 513.060 (burning personal property to defraud insurer). Section 522.2202(1)(c) retains the
offense covering cases where the defendant is reckless as to the building being inhabited or occupied.
See commentary for proposed Section 522.2201.
KRS 522.2202(2) provides a defense to second-degree arson that differs from current
KRS 513.030(2) in that the proposed defense is narrower than the current defense, deleting the
application of the defense to cases where the defendant is the only person with a possessory or
proprietary interest to the offense. The reference in the current version of the defense to the
others consent to the burning or explosion is addressed in Section 522.2207. See also Section
502.251.
As under current KRS 513.030, arson in the second degree is a Class B felony.

Section 522.2203. Endangering by Fire or Explosion
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 513.040; 512.070
Comment:

Generally. This offense more generally covers conduct that, like arson, creates a substantial
risk of harm to persons or property and is therefore socially undesirable and morally blameworthy.
Unlike arson, this offense does not require that damage to anothers property result from an
offenders dangerous activity. The offense also has a lower culpability requirement than arson 
recklessness, rather than intent.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 522.2203 differs substantially from current
KRS 513.040, arson in the third degree. It specifically punishes reckless endangerment through
the use of fire or explosives, rather than general reckless conduct. KRS 513.040 requires that
property damage result from the dangerous activity, while Section 522.2203 focuses instead on
the risk of danger, which does not require resulting harm to be undesirable and blameworthy.
Unlike KRS 513.040, Section 522.2203 addresses conduct that generates a specific set of more
serious threats  to personal safety or to buildings  that jeopardize more than mere monetary
value and therefore merit separate and additional punishment. If, on the other hand, the sole harm
threatened or caused by a persons conduct is property damage, that conduct would fall under the
general property damage provision. See proposed Section 522.2206 and commentary.
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Section 522.2203 grades the offense as a Class C felony, or a Class B felony if the
offender creates a risk of another persons death under circumstances manifesting an extreme
indifference to the value of human life. (Current KRS 513.040 punishes the defendants conduct
as a Class D felony.) The proposed liability places emphasis on the independent harm caused by
placing people or property in serious jeopardy. For example, a person who sets a fire that threatens
to burn down a neighbors occupied home, but that is put out by firefighters before doing so,
should not receive only trifling liability (or be completely exonerated) based on the fortuity that no
actual harm resulted.
Section 522.2203 also covers most offenses currently defined as criminal littering in
KRS 512.070(1)(a), (c)-(d). Despite their name, those offenses go beyond mere littering.

Section 522.2204. Failure to Control or Report a Dangerous Fire
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:

Generally. This provision imposes a duty on certain persons to report or control a fire for
which they bear legal responsibility. In general, imposition of criminal liability for failure to act
should be carefully limited. This provision creates omission liability, but the duty to act applies only
in especially grave circumstances, and only to persons responsible for dealing with those
circumstances: those who have a preexisting legal duty to do so (such as construction site managers),
or those who are responsible for the existence of the dangerous situation. The duty is further
limited in that it only requires one of two affirmative actions: giving a prompt alarm, or, if it can be
done without substantial risk to oneself, taking reasonable measures to put out the fire.
Section 522.2204(2) punishes the omission as a Class A misdemeanor.
A number of state codes, and the Model Penal Code, include a similar provision.
Relation to current Kentucky law. This section has no corresponding provision in the
current Penal Code.

Section 522.2205. Causing or Risking Catastrophe
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 438.240, 508.060-.070; 527.200-.210
Comment:

Generally. This provision imposes serious criminal liability for persons who cause or risk
severe harm to numerous individuals, numerous buildings, or a vital public facility.
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Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 522.2205 is far broader than current KRS
508.060, wanton endangerment. Most of the defined offenses have no corresponding offenses in
current law. It expands liability to include recklessly causing a catastrophe, creating a risk of
catastrophe, threatening to cause a catastrophe, or failure on the part of certain persons (specifically,
those who, as in proposed Section 522.2204, are bound by a legal duty) to prevent a catastrophe.
Recently enacted offenses in KRS 527.200-.210 for the use of a weapon of mass destruction are
similar in focus to Section 522.2205s concern with causing or risking catastrophic events.
Section 522.2205(1)(a) defines the offense of causing a catastrophe. The proposed
provision covers numerous means of causing a catastrophe. Under Section 522.2205(1)(b), the
grade of the offense depends on the level of the defendants culpable mental state. Section
522.2205(1)(b) includes a Class B felony penalty for cases where the offense is committed recklessly,
rather than knowingly (which is Class A felony). Like proposed Section 522.2203, this formulation
prohibits an aggravated form of reckless conduct, which under current law is only punished as a
Class D misdemeanor. (See proposed Section 522.2203 and commentary.)
Section 522.2205(2) defines a Class D felony for persons who recklessly create a risk of
catastrophe. This section punishes the risk of endangerment to buildings and vital public facilities
as well as people.
Section 522.2205(3) imposes a duty on certain persons to take reasonable measures to
prevent or mitigate a catastrophe. As in proposed Section 522.2204, this provision creates omission
liability, but the duty to act applies only in especially grave circumstances, and only to persons
responsible for dealing with those circumstances: those who have a preexisting legal duty to do so,
or those who are responsible for the existence of the dangerous situation. (See proposed Section
522.2204 and commentary.) Section 522.2205(3)(b) grades this offense as a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 522.2205(4)(a) defines the term catastrophe. Section 522.2205(4)(b) defines
the term vital public facility.
Section 2205 covers the conduct described in KRS 438.240.

Section 522.2206. Criminal Damage
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 149.380, 253.990, 433.750, 433.770,
433.873, 433.875, 437.420(2)-(3),
438.060, 512.020-.080
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines, and sets out the offense grades for, the offense of
criminal property damage.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Current KRS Chapter 512 contains various provisions that define different types of property damage; each provision has its own grading section.
These specific offenses cover such things as damage to criminal mischief (512.020-.040); use and
possession of noxious substances (512.050-.060); littering (512.070); and unlawfully posting advertisements (512.080). To the extent the offense grades for these various provisions are the
same, they are superfluous; to the extent they differ, they are inconsistent. Therefore, the proposed Code employs one general criminal damage offense.
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Section 522.2206 defines the prohibited conduct more generally than the offenses in current
KRS Chapter 512. Section 522.2206(1)(a) generally prohibits property damage; it substitutes
property of another for the current reference to property in KRS 512.020, although current law
assumes that the property damaged belongs to another person. If property of another is used,
there is no need for the language in current KRS 512.020-.040 regarding the defendant having no
right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right to destroy property.
Section 522.2206 also covers the current offenses in KRS 512.050-.060  if a noxious substance
damages property, it is an offense under Section 522.2206. For the traditional type of littering, as
well as for unlawfully posting advertisements in KRS 512.080, any damage caused by the littering
or posting would be covered by Section 522.2206.
Section 522.2206(1)(b) allows for negligence liability where the offender uses fire, explosive,
or other dangerous means. In cases involving such inherently dangerous activities, negligent behavior
will nearly always be objectively reckless. Reducing the culpability requirement to negligence,
however, ensures that a defendant cannot avoid liability merely by saying that he was not consciously
aware of the dangerousness of his activity. Such ignorance should not entirely exonerate a person
who engages in conduct that is objectively dangerous.
Section 522.2206(1)(c) prohibits tampering with anothers property and thereby creating
a risk of physical injury or property damage. This section covers cases where the offender has not
directly destroyed or even damaged property, but has tampered with or altered the property,
thereby creating a risk of harm. An offender who tampers with property is punished based on the
amount of damage or loss he causes or, where the risk does not lead to actual damage or loss,
would be subject to Class B misdemeanor liability. See infra commentary for proposed Section
522.2206(2).
Section 522.2206(1)(d) prohibits indirectly causing property damage by means of a
deception or threat. This section covers cases where the offender causes a loss, but has not
personally damaged (or stolen) the property. For example, a person who falsely tells another that
his winning lottery ticket has no value, leading the owner to tear up the ticket, has caused a loss and
merits criminal liability just as if he had torn or stolen the ticket himself.
Section 522.2206(2) grades the offense according to the value of the property loss. The
proposed formulation is similar to current law for degrees of criminal mischief, except that the
proposed section raises the penalties and values for grading, and also alters the penalty according
to the offenders culpability level with respect to the damage that results from his conduct. The
grading is almost identical to that for theft under proposed Section 521.2110.
Section 522.2206(2)(b)(iii) imposes Class C felony liability where the offender causes
serious damage to a propelled vehicle or firearm.
Section 522.2206(2)(f) provides a residual grade of Class B misdemeanor for offenses
not otherwise covered in Section 522.2206(2). This would include cases where the offender
knowingly or recklessly causes less than $50 in damage; negligently causes damage to property
(regardless of the extent of the loss); or tampers with property, thereby placing persons or property
in danger, but causes no actual loss or damage.

259

Kentucky Penal Code Revision Project

Section 522.2206(2)(g) reduces the penalty one grade at each value level for damage that
is caused recklessly.
Section 2206 covers the conduct defined in current KRS 149.380 (Setting fire on land
owned by another), KRS 253.990 (altering or defacing marks or brands on another persons
cattle); KRS 433.750 (Injuring public property or right of way), KRS 433.770 (Willfully removing
or damaging boundary marker), KRS 433.873 (Wrongful disturbance or damage to cave surfaces
or material found therein), KRS 433.875 (Unlawful dumping, disposal or burning within cave),
KRS 437.420 (animal offenses), and KRS 438.060 (contaminating a watercourse).

Section 522.2207. Consent Defense
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:

Generally. This provision makes clear that a person will not be criminally liable for conduct
that damages anothers property where the owner has consented to that conduct.
Relation to current Kentucky law. There is no corresponding provision in current law.
Classification of consent as a defense, rather than defining the absence of consent as an offense
element, has no impact on the ultimate burden of persuasion for the issue; the Commonwealth
would still have to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt. See proposed
Section 502.251 and corresponding commentary. The only significance of this approach is that
the defendant would have the burden of production, i.e., would be required to raise the issue at
trial, even though the Commonwealth would then be required to (dis)prove it. See proposed
Section 502.251 and corresponding commentary. It seems reasonable to infer the absence of
consent where one person damages anothers property, and to require the defendant to suggest
that consent existed. Information about consent, where it exists, will always be in the defendants
possession, and the defendant will know to raise the issue.

Section 522.2208. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 513.010; 512.010
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 522 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
522s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 523. BURGLARY AND
OTHER CRIMINAL INTRUSION PROVISIONS
Section 523.2301. Burglary
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 511.020-.050; 511.090, 437.420(4)
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines and grades the offense of burglary, which punishes
trespasses where the trespasser has an additional criminal intent. The distinct offense of burglary
recognizes the independent harm caused by the fear and intrusion created by an intruder who
invades anothers property to commit an offense.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 523.2301(1) consolidates the prohibitions
of current KRS 511.020-.040. KRS 511.020s principal purpose is to aggravate the grade of
burglaries when the person is armed33 or threatens or causes physical injury. Section 523.2301
accomplishes the same purpose by aggravating the grade for such burglaries in Section
523.2301(2)(a).34
Section 523.2301(1) continues current law by requiring that the person intend to commit
an offense, following the understanding that the intended offense is not of central importance to the
distinct offense of burglary. The provocation of fear and the invasion of ones sense of security that
the offense is meant to punish exist irrespective of the offense the burglar intends to commit. For
similar reasons, Section 523.2301(1) requires that one must surreptitiously remain on anothers
property to be liable for burglary. Without the specific harms that clandestine intrusion creates, the
person is guilty only of trespass and attempt to commit the other intended crime (and can be
charged with both of those offenses). To the extent cases like Bowling v. Com., 942 S.W.2d 293
(Ky. 1997), suggest that any entry or remaining with intent to commit a crime is automatically
without authority, the proposed Code would not track the current view. That view effectively
turns any would-be shoplifter into a burglar and undercuts the expression of greater seriousness
that the burglary offense is meant to contain. Where a person remains in a building, but does so
openly, the specific harm of the burglary offense  the fear and danger created by an unknown
and unwanted intruder  is not present.

See Baker v. Com., 860 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. 1993) (defendant need not be armed at every moment during
flight from dwelling); Jackson v. Com., 670 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1984) (defendant who enters unarmed and steals a
gun becomes armed with a weapon).
34
The term armed under Section 523.2301(2)(a)(i) is not meant to include every situation where a
person has a weapon in his possession. For example, a person whose gun is fake, or inoperable, or left in his
glove compartment while he invades the home, is not armed. The offender must be armed with a genuine,
operable weapon under circumstances that suggest its possible use.
33
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Section 523.2301(1) prohibits entering35 or remaining in a building,36 rather than using
KRS 511.010(1)s list of a structure, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft. The independent harms of
intrusion and provocation of fear are less likely to exist when the property is a vehicle rather than
a building. In most cases, a vehicle is not a dwelling.
Section 523.2301(1) requires a culpability level of knowledge with respect to each offense
element other than the intention to commit an offense. Current KRS 511.020-.040 also specify
knowingly.
Section 523.2301(1) imposes liability only if one enters or surreptitiously remains, knowing
he has no authority,37 at a time when the premises are not open to the public. This concept under
current law is located in general provision KRS 511.090, but it is preferable to place the concept
in the definition of the offense itself. Similarly, the same current section contains a provision defining
what it means to enter or surreptitiously remain. Again, the proposed section simply locates the
concept in the definition of the offense. The current reference to a person remaining unlawfully is
omitted to avoid the necessity of the Commonwealth having to prove that the defendant was
aware that he was not licensed to enter the place.
Section 2301 covers the conduct addressed by current KRS 437.420, relating to burglary
of an animal facility.
Section 523.2301(2) grades burglary in the same manner as current law. As mentioned,
first-degree burglary with its aggravators is a Class B felony. Like the robbery offense in Section
1501, and in keeping with the modification to the definition of deadly weapon in that provision,
the burglary aggravation for being armed with a deadly weapon does not include cases where the
offender is carrying an ordinary hunting knife that [he] regularly carries. See proposed Section
515.1501 and corresponding commentary. Second-degree burglary must be committed in a
dwelling and is a Class C felony. Any other burglary, much like the current third-degree offense, is
a Class D felony.
Possession of burglars tools (KRS 511.050) is treated under the proposed law as a
possessory offense for instruments of crime. See proposed Section 501.204.

Entry by any part of a defendants person or by an instrument suffices for an entry. See Stamps v.
Com., 602 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1980) (defendant broke through rear wall of store into air pockets of concrete blocks;
sufficient for entry).
36
See Funk v. Com., 842 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1992) (first-degree burglary applies to every structure
meeting the definition of a building, regardless of whether it is inhabited or inhabitable).
37
See Bowling v. Com., 942 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997) (license expires when defendants conduct is
inconsistent with purpose of business, such as committing criminal acts).
35
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Section 523.2302. Criminal Trespass
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 511.060-.080
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines, grades, and provides special defenses to the offense of
criminal trespass, which prohibits a persons unlawful presence on anothers property. Section
523.2302(2) provides offense grades, and Section 523.2302(3) defines two defenses.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 523.2302(1) merges the prohibitions of
three current trespass offenses into a single offense definition by prohibiting entering or remaining in
any place generally, whereas each of the current provisions prohibits entering or remaining in a
particular kind of place (first-degree: dwelling; second-degree: building or premises where notice
is given; third-degree: premises). Section 523.2302s general language covers the types of property
protected by current law and eliminates any need for additional specialized trespass offenses.
Section 523.2302(1) requires that one enter or remain in a place where he knows he has
no license or authority to be. Current KRS 511.070(1) defines the offense as entering or remaining
after receiving notice by fencing or other enclosure that such presence is forbidden. Current KRS
511.060(1) and 511.080(1) define trespass without regard to notice. Instead, what is important
to those two offenses is that a person has entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling or on
premises (which is currently defined to include a building). The notice aspect in current law does
not seem as important to culpability as the fact that a building or place is marked as an enclosure,
because the notice does not address the harm to persons or property. Section 523.2302(1)
requires recklessness with respect to entering or remaining in a place. Current law requires
knowledge of entering or remaining unlawfully. Section 523.2302 imposes recklessness under the
view that one who knows he lacks license or authority to be on certain property should bear the
burden of avoiding an unlawful presence on that property, and should be liable if (as recklessness
requires) he is consciously aware of a risk that he is on that property.
Section 523.2302(2) defines two defenses to criminal trespass, neither of which exists in
current law. Section 523.2302(2)(a) does not provide an absolute defense where one enters or
remains while the premises were at the time of entry open to the public. Instead, it notes that one
may not enjoy license if he fails to comply with lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining
in the premises. The use of the modifier lawful ensures that one may not be convicted of
trespass on the basis of an unlawfully discriminatory exclusion.
Section 523.2302(2)(b) provides a defense for those who enter or remain in a place
under a reasonable belief that another would have licensed them to do so. Such persons may
know their presence is formally unauthorized, but if they believe it would be condoned and the
circumstances indicate that such a belief is objectively reasonable, they lack the blameworthiness
of those who are fully aware that their presence is prohibited.
Section 523.2302(3)(a) grades criminal trespass of a dwelling or highly secured premises
as a Class E felony, in recognition of the special privacy and security interests at stake for such
property. Current KRS 511.060 grades residential trespass as a Class A misdemeanor and does
not aggravate for highly secured premises.
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Section 523.2302(3)(b) grades criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor when it occurs
in buildings, structures, and places where the owner has shown a clear intent to bar entry. This
reflects the understanding that such violations involve lower levels of intrusiveness than those covered
by (3)(a), but greater levels of intrusiveness than ordinary trespass, which Section 523.2302(3)(c)
grades as a Class C misdemeanor.
Section 523.2302(4) defines the terms highly secured premises and storage structure,
which are used to differentiate degrees of the trespass offense.

Section 523.2303. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 511.010
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 523 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
523s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 524. INVASION OF PRIVACY PROVISIONS
Section 524.2401. Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 526.020
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines the offense of unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance,
prohibiting improper intrusions made for the purpose of hearing or seeing things within private
places. Section 524.2401 covers improper intrusions into private physical spaces rather than
improper interceptions of private communications.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 524.2401(1)(a), prohibiting trespassing with
intention to subject anyone in a private place to eavesdropping or other surveillance, has no
directly corresponding provision in current KRS Chapter 526. Section 524.2401(1)(a) covers
the common peeping Tom case, which often involves visual surveillance performed without a
device.
The definition of eavesdrop in current KRS 526.010 is not carried forward in Chapter
524 offenses, but instead the language connoting eavesdropping is inserted into the various offenses
themselves.
Section 524.2401(1)(b) prohibits installing or using a device in a private place for hearing
or seeing occurrences therein, and essentially combines trespass and eavesdropping concerns.
This provision broadens current law, which is restricted to oral communications, not images. Section
524.2401(1)(c) prohibits installing or using a device outside a private place to hear sounds that
ordinarily cannot be heard or understood.
With respect to audio surveillance, Sections 2401(1)(b) and (1)(c) are similar to current
KRS 526.020, but address intrusions into private places rather than interceptions of communications,
and hence also sounds rather than communications or conversations. Sections 524.2401(1)(b)
and (1)(c) apply to any persons use or installation of a device to hear what is occurring in a
private place.
This offense does not carry forward the language in current KRS 526.020 that the offense
may be committed whether or not [the person] is present at the time. It is unnecessary and
confusing for the definition of the offense to state that the person need not be present, and that rule
remains in place under the proposed Code despite the absence of that specific language.
Section 524.2401(2) defines the term private place, which is not used in KRS Chapter
526.
Section 524.2401(3) grades the offense as a Class E felony, the same grade as is imposed
for first-degree trespass under proposed Section 2302(3)(a). That offense involves trespass
within a dwelling, whereas the peeping Tom situation this offense covers will usually involve
surveillance of the building from outside, which presents a less immediate threat of placing a resident
in fear or danger. Where both offenses occur, multiple liability for both the trespass and the
surveillance may be appropriate. See proposed Sections 502.254 and 509.906.
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The current offense for installing eavesdropping devices in KRS 526.030 is adequately
covered by the law of criminal attempts. See Proposed Section 508.801 and the corresponding
commentary.
The current offense for possession of eavesdropping device in KRS 526.040 is adequately
covered by the law of possessing instruments of crime. See Proposed Section 508.808 and the
corresponding commentary.

Section 524.2402. Unlawfully Acquiring Information
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 434.855, 526.050
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines and grades as a Class B misdemeanor the offense of
tampering with private communications, and complements proposed Section 524.2401s offense
for unlawfully eavesdropping. The offense prohibits opening or reading private communications,
and obtaining communications common carrier information.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 524.2402 is similar to current KRS 526.050
for knowingly tampering with private communications, as well as its exception, but grades the
offense as a Class B rather than a Class A misdemeanor. The current laws reference to a person
opening or reading a sealed letter or obtaining communications common carrier information
unlawfully is omitted to avoid the necessity of the Commonwealth having to prove that the
defendant was aware that he was not authorized to tamper with such communications.
The conduct prohibited by current KRS 434.855(1)(b) is included in proposed Section
524.2402(1)(a). The receipt of proceeds prohibited by current KRS 434.855(1)(a) is covered
by the accomplice liability provisions in proposed Section 503.301.

Section 524.2403. Unlawfully Divulging Information
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 6.734, 434.840, 526.060
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines, and grades as a Class A misdemeanor, the offense of
interception of unlawfully divulging illegally obtained information.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 524.2404 is almost identical to current KRS
526.060. The conduct prohibited by current KRS 6.734 is included in this proposed section.
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Section 524.2404. Exceptions to Chapter 524 Offenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 526.070
Comment:

Generally. This provision lists exceptions to criminal liability for Chapter 524 offenses.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 524.2405 is quite similar to current KRS
526.070. Section 524.2405(1) duplicates the exception in current KRS 526.070(1). Section
524.2405(2) is very similar to current KRS 526.070(2), but deletes the provision about conduct
the communications common carriers must avoid. Such rules are more properly included in
administrative regulations rather than as part of a penal code.

Section 524.2405. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 524 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
524s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 531. FORGERY AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES
General Comment Regarding Chapter 531:

Several of Chapter 531s offenses criminalize deceptive conduct that is usually undertaken
as part of an effort to wrongfully obtain property or services  that is, to steal. There is therefore
a close relationship between Chapter 531 and Chapter 521. In many, perhaps most, cases, a
single act or course of conduct will satisfy the requirements of both a fraud offense (or attempt)
and a theft offense (or attempt). In such situations, the propriety of multiple convictions would be
governed by the rules set forth in proposed Section 502.254, and their consequences in terms of
overall liability would be governed by proposed Section 509.906.

Section 531.3101: Forgery and Counterfeiting
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 116.047, 434.095, 434.155, 434.225(6),
434.442, 434.630-.640, 516.020,
516.030, 516.040, 516.120, 516.130
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for forgery and counterfeiting. It deals with
conduct not already included within the harms addressed by offenses such as theft by deception,
e.g., the method of the taking. Forgery and counterfeiting cause harm beyond what is caused by
theft, as the relevant conduct also destabilizes documents of value. For that reason, the grading of
forgery offenses is set; rather than being a function of the amount taken, as in theft by deception,
forgery grading focuses on the disruption caused by the misrepresentation.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3101 is similar to the three degrees of
forgery found in current KRS 516.020-.040. Section 531.3101(1)(a) makes clear that one way
in which the offense is committed occurs when the person alters the writing of another without the
latters permission. If another has consented to the alteration, the person is acting with authority
from the other, but a general grant of authority does not assure that there is consent to alter a
particular writing. See proposed Section 502.251 (providing general rules regarding consent).
The other way in which the offense is committed occurs when the person affects a writing
so that it purports to be something it is not. Proposed Section 531.3101(1)(b)(i)-(iii) identify the
effects of the persons misrepresentation in language analogous to current KRS 516.020(1),
516.030(1) and 516.040(1). The proposed section is expanded to include both forgery and
counterfeiting, such as the current offenses of using slugs in KRS 516.120 and 516.130. More
broadly than the use of slugs, proposed Section 531.3101(1)(b)(iii) deals with both coin and
paper, as well as any other situation in which the person is misrepresenting something to be something
that it is not.
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The definition of a written instrument in current KRS 516,010(1) is built into the offense
itself in Section 531.3101(2) as a writing. The proposed definition is explicitly broader than the
current definition, in order to include any method for recording any symbols of value, right, privilege
or identification.
The grading of the offense depends on the nature of the writing, i.e., whether it is or
purports to be of a particular character. If the writing is of one of the types enumerated in proposed
Section 531.3101(3)(a), the offense is a Class C felony. It is a Class D felony if the writing is one
of the types enumerated in 531.3101(3)(b). Otherwise, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Because Section 3101(3)(a) applies only to writings that purport to be paper money, cases
involving manipulation of coins or slugs would not fall into the Class C felony category. Counterfeiting
coins would now fall within the residual grading provision, Section 3101(3)(c), and be a Class A
misdemeanor, which falls in between 516.120s Class D felony for first-degree slug use and
516.130s Class B misdemeanor for second-degree slug use.
The possessory offenses in current KRS 516.050, 516.060, and 516.070 are inchoate
forms of the forgery offenses. Under the proposed attempt provision, liability requires only the
persons intent to complete the conduct that would constitute the offense, rather than the persons
intent as to all circumstances of the forgery offense. See proposed Section 508.801.
Possession of a forgery device under current KRS 516.090 likewise is not carried forward,
because it is a possessory offense covered by proposed Sections 501.204 and 508.808.
Section 531.3101 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 116.047, 434.095,
434.155, 434.225(6), 434.442, 434.630-.640, and 434.680.

Section 531.3102: Tampering with Writing, Record, or Device
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 342.400(2), 516.040
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for tampering with writing, record or device,
in order to deceive another or conceal wrongdoing.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3102 tracks much of current KRS
516.040, which rather than being a forgery offense is in reality more of a tampering offense. The
proposed offense is broader than current law, because the latters conduct elements include
concealment of a writing.
Section 3102(2) grades the offense as a Class D felony if the writing is, or purports to be,
a legal document or public record, and as a Class A misdemeanor otherwise. The grading of this
proposed offense somewhat differs from 531.3101, because tampering does not have the same
destabilizing effects as forgery and counterfeiting.
Section 3102 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 342.400(2).
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Section 531.3103: Criminal Simulation
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 516.110
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for altering an object with the effect that it
appears to have a quality that it does not in fact possess.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3103 is substantially similar to current
KRS 516.110(1)(a). However, KRS 516.110(1)(b) is not carried forward, because it constitutes
a possessory offense which is covered under proposed Sections 501.204 and 508.808.

Section 531.3104: Unauthorized Impersonation
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 365.015, 365.100, 434.570, 514.160,
514.170
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for one person representing himself to be
another or have the characteristic of another.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3104 is somewhat similar to current
KRS 514.160. Section 3104(1)(a) duplicates much of current KRS 514.160. Liability for
depriv[ing] a person of anything of value in Section 3104(1)(a)(i) carries forward the language in
current KRS 514.160(1)(a), (b), and (e). Section 3104(1)(a)(ii) is potentially broader than current
law, in that it allows liability for a person impersonating another to harm the latters reputation.
While current law prohibits hurting another by impersonating the latter and making financial
transactions, the proposed language broadens the reckless conduct to include any harm to the
other persons reputation. Section 3104(1)(a)(iii) is potentially broader than current law, prohibiting
an impersonation in which the person is reckless about whether the impersonation gives the person
any unjustified benefit. This phrasing is broader than, for example, using the impersonation to
avoidi detection, as in current KRS 514.160(1)(d).
Section 3104(1)(b) is somewhat broader than current KRS 514.160(1), addressing
impersonation of another person or of a characteristic that the person knows he lacks, with intent
to obtain service or property.
Section 3104(1)(c) repeats much of the conduct currently prohibited under the trafficking
in stolen identity offense in current KRS 514.170, and adds the requirement that the person has
the intent to do any of the reckless acts referred to in Section 3104(1)(a).
Section 3104(2) is substantially similar to the definition of personal identity in current
KRS 514.170(1). The prima facie provision in current KRS 514.170(2) is not carried forward,
as it is irrelevant to the offense.
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Section 3104(3) grades trafficking in stolen identities as a Class D felony, and otherwise
grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. The grading of the proposed offense is similar to
current law.
Section 3104 does not include the two sections of the current law which render it inapplicable to the use of the identity of another to obtain privileges such as tobacco and to credit or debit
card fraud under KRS 434.550-.730. Therefore, the proposed offense applies to those factual
situations. (The current statute also includes procedural provisions about venue and forfeiture.)
Section 3104 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 365.015 and 434.570. The
conduct prohibited by current KRS 365.100 would constitute an attempt to commit the offense
defined by this proposed section.

Section 531.3105: Deceptive Practices
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 217.175, 365.020-.050, 434.600,
517.010(1), (5); 517.020
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for deceptive practices.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3105 is similar to current KRS 517.020.
In many cases, the relevant conduct will also amount to theft by deception, or its attempt, under
proposed Section 521.2103. See also proposed Section 502.254 and 509.906 (providing rules
for imposition of liability for multiple offenses).
Definitions in current KRS 517.010(1) and (5) for adulterated and mislabeled are
incorporated verbatim into the offense in proposed Section 531.3105(2).
Section 3105 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 217.175, 365.020-.050,
434.600, and 434.610.

Section 531.3106: False or Bait Advertising
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 517.030, 517.040
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for misleading statements in advertising.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3106 is substantially similar to current
KRS 517.030 and 517.040. Section 531.3106(1)(a) defines the conduct for the current offense
of false advertising, while Section 531.3106(1)(b) is the same as the current offense of bait
advertising.
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Section 531.3107: Falsifying Business Records
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 342.265(2), 517.010(2)-(3), 517.050
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for creating or maintaining sham business
records.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3107 is substantially similar to current
KRS 517.050. In some cases, the conduct constituting the offense may also amount to an offense
under proposed Section 531.3103 or the offense of theft by deception, or its attempt, under
Section 521.2103. See also proposed Section 502.254 and 509.906 (providing rules for imposition
of liability for multiple offenses).
The definitions in current KRS 517.010(2) and (3) are incorporated verbatim into the
offense in proposed Section 531.3107(2).
The conduct prohibited by current KRS 342.265 is included in this proposed section.

Section 531.3108: Defrauding Secured Creditors
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 517.060, 517.070
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for defrauding different types of creditors.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3108 is substantially similar to current
statutory sections on defrauding secured and judgment creditors. The language of the proposed
section is phrased primarily in the language of current KRS 517.060 (defrauding secured creditors).
The offense is broader than current KRS 517.070, which requires that the defrauded party be a
judgment creditor. Section 3108(1) requires only that the property be subject to a security
interest or payment of a judgment  it would apply not only before attachment of a judgment,
but before the judgment had even been obtained, if the offender intended to hinder enforcement
of [the security] interest. The proposed language focuses the offense on the offenders efforts to
defraud, rather than imposing an additional requirement that the victim (the creditor) must have
obtained a judgment against the offender before it will apply. Like current KRS 517.070, the
proposed provision also covers the situation where a judgment debtor alienates unencumbered
property (not subject to a security interest) to keep it from being executed on, even if the judgment
has not yet attached.
The grading of the proposed offense has been modified to reflect the more sophisticated
grading scheme that has been developed for theft offenses. See proposed Section 521.2110 and
corresponding commentary. However, unlike a typical theft offense, the grading for Section 3108
imposes a floor of Class A misdemeanor liability for any offense. It some situations involving
violations of Section 3108, it will be possible, and entirely appropriate, to impose liability both for
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the Section 3108 offense and for theft, in which case the Section 3108 offense would be a Class
A misdemeanor, as the punishment for the theft would already reflect the value of the property
obtained. There may also be numerous cases, however, where it will be difficult or impossible to
impose theft liability because the offenders mishandling of the property may not demonstrate a
conversion of ownership. In other words, the defrauded person may still own the property (or
at least, the person committing the fraud may not have taken it for himself) even though the offender
has misappropriated or misused it in a way that greatly reduces its value or affects the proper
owners interest in the property. In such cases, the amount of liability for the Section 3108 offense
should track the amount of the property involved in the fraud.

Section 531.3109: Fraud in Insolvency
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 517.080
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for engaging in fraudulent conduct when the
person knows that insolvency proceedings have been or are about to be instituted.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3109 is almost identical to current KRS
517.080.
As with Section 3108, the grading scheme for Section 3109 has been modified to track
more closely the proposed grading scheme for theft. For a discussion of the relation between this
offense, its grading, and the proposed theft offenses, see proposed Section 531.3108 and
corresponding commentary.

Section 531.3110: Issuing False Financial Statement
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 342.465, 434.310, 434.570 517.090
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for misrepresentation of his or anothers
financial condition in a writing, which is defined in proposed Section 531.3101.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3110 is almost identical to current KRS
517.090, except that the term writing is substituted for written instrument. The definition of a
writing appears in proposed Section 531.3101(2).
Section 3110 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 342.465, 434.310, and
434.570.
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Section 531.3111: Receiving Deposits in Failing Financial Institution
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 434.320, 434.340, 517.100
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for anyone in a directorial position of a financial
institution permitting the receipt of a deposit when he knows that the institution is insolvent.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3111 is almost identical to current KRS
517.100, except that it is broadened by the inclusion of the conduct prohibited by current KRS
434.320.

Section 531.3112: Misapplication of Entrusted Property
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 517.010(4), 517.110
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for the unauthorized application or disposal
of entrusted property.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3112 is almost identical to current KRS
517.110. Section 531.3112(2)s definition of fiduciary is similar to that in current KRS
517.010(4).
As with Sections 3108 and 3109, the grading scheme for Section 3112 has been modified
to track more closely the proposed grading scheme for theft. For a discussion of the relation
between this offense, its grading, and the proposed theft offenses, see proposed Section 531.3108
and corresponding commentary.

Section 531.3113: Operating a Misrepresented Company
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 517.010(6), 517.120
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for operating a business that falsely represents
itself to be a minority or disadvantaged business enterprise.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3113 is similar to current KRS 517.120. The
term misrepresented company is substituted for sham or front company. The first part of the
current definition of sham or front company in KRS 517.010(6) is incorporated into the proposed
offense definition. However, the listing in the current definition to governmental units from which
the misrepresented company derives benefits is deleted in favor of referring to obtaining funds or
services from any government entity.
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Two of the four conduct elements of the current offense are not carried forward, because
they are in the nature of accomplice liability and therefore are already addressed by the proposed
section on complicity. See proposed Section 503.301. The other two conduct elements are
identical to the current law.

Section 531.3114: Commercial Bribery
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 518.020, 518.030
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for persons seeking with benefits to influence
employees, agents, or fiduciaries, or as the employees, etc., seeking or accepting benefits, contrary
to the best interests of the employer, principal, or fiduciarys beneficiary.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3114 is similar to current KRS 518.020
and 518.030. Section 3114 combines the current offenses of commercial bribery and receiving a
commercial bribe. The penalty for the proposed offense is the same as the current penalties.
As to the distinction between bribery and conspiracy, see commentary to proposed Section
551.5101.

Section 531.3115: Tampering with a Publicly Exhibited Contest
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 518.040, 518.050, 518.060
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for tampering with a publicly exhibited contest,
seeking or accepting a benefit for such tampering, or by knowing participation in such a contest.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3115 is similar to the current law on
sports bribery, receiving a sports bribe, and rigging a sports contest, except that it applies to more
than sports contests, which is the scope of current KRS 518.060. The proposed offense applies
to any publicly exhibited contest, which would include state fair competitions, beauty pageants,
etc.
As with the proposed offense of commercial bribery, proposed Section 531.3115 punishes
those who solicit or accept such benefits in return for tampering with a competition. Beyond the
scope of commercial bribery, this offense also punishes persons who participate in a rigged contest,
knowing that the contest is not being conducted by governing rules or customs. As to the distinction
between the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit the offense, see commentary to
proposed Section 551.5101.
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Section 531.3116: Ticket Scalping
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 518.010(2)-(3), 518.070
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for selling tickets to a public performance at
a price in excess of that charged or printed on the ticket.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 531.3116 is substantially similar to current
KRS 518.070.
Section 531.3116(2)s definition of public performance is similar to that in current KRS
518.010(3).

Section 531.3117: Bad Checks
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.040(6), (7); 514.090(2)
Comment:

Generally. This offense criminalizes passing bad checks. Although they are often used as
a means of avoiding paying for property or services, bad checks cause additional harm not addressed
by Chapter 521s theft offenses: they disrupt ordinary commerce by being negotiated by the
payee and subsequent holders for value, and undermine the publics confidence in checks and the
checking system generally.
Relation to current Kentucky law. This offense covers, among other things, the
conduct addressed by current KRS 514.040(6) and (7) and 514.090(2). Passing a bad check
may not count as a theft offense because the person may have already obtained the property or
service he is purchasing with the check, and may not have had the requisite intent to deprive
another person of property at that time. Further, issuing bad checks represents an independent
harm aside from the improper deprivation of property, as noted above.
Section 3117(2) establishes two permissive inferences with respect to the defendants
knowledge that the drawee would not honor a draft that was not postdated. (See proposed
Section 500.106(4) and corresponding commentary for a discussion of permissive inferences.)
Section 3117(2)(a) allows for an inference of knowledge where the defendant did not have an
account with the depository when he issued the draft. Section 3117(2)(a)s permissive inference
applies in a situation where it is extremely unlikely that the defendant issued a bad check due to an
innocent mistake.
Section 3117(2)(b)s permissive inference operates where the payee promptly presents
the draft, the drawee dishonors it due to insufficient funds, and the defendant fails to promptly
make good after learning of the refusal. Section 3117(2)(b)s requirements are designed to allow
for an inference of knowledge in appropriate cases while assuring that knowledge is not inferred
where the defendant makes a simple miscalculation or kites a check with the intent to promptly
cover it.
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Section 3117(3) is substantively similar to current KRS 514.040(6) and (7) and 514.090(2)
in grading the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, but does not aggravate it to a Class D felony
where one uses a bad check to obtain property worth more than $300. The value of property
obtained by means of bad checks will be used to determine the grading for theft where the
requirements of that offense are satisfied. See proposed Section 521.2110; see also proposed
Section 502.254 and 509.906 (providing rules for imposition of liability for multiple offenses).

Section 531.3118: Fraudulent Use of Credit or Debit Card
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 434.550 to .730
Comment:

Generally. This offense criminalizes the fraudulent use of a credit or debit card. Credit
and debit cards are often fraudulently used for the purpose of wrongfully acquiring property.
Nevertheless, credit and debit card fraud create harm not addressed by Chapter 521s prohibitions
against theft. As is the case with passing bad checks, credit and debit card fraud undermine
confidence in payment systems and are harmful to the ordinary operation of commerce.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 3118(1) prohibits using a credit or debit
card to obtain something of value with knowledge that the card is stolen, forged, revoked, or
cancelled, or that such use is unauthorized for any other reason. Section 3118(1)(c) applies where
ones use of a credit or debit card is not authorized by the issuer or cardholder, allowing for
liability for one, such as an agent, who obtains anothers card with consent, but knowingly exceeds
his authority in using it. Section 3118(1)(c)s language would not impose liability, however, where
one uses a card that was initially procured based on an inaccurate or exaggerated statement of the
cardholders financial security or ability to meet payment obligations, insofar as the cardholders
use in such a situation is authorized by the issuer.38
Section 3118(2) defines the terms credit card and debit card.
Section 3118(3) provides a defense where one knows that his use of a credit or debit card
is unauthorized, but intends and is able to meet his obligations to the issuer arising from such use.
Section 3118(3) does not apply where one uses a card he knows to be stolen, forged, revoked, or
cancelled. The knowing use of such instruments differs materially from the conduct Section 3118(3)
is designed to protect, such as using an expired card or exceeding a credit limit. Section 3118(3)
treats good-faith use as a defense for which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion 
rather than treating its absence as an offense requirement  in recognition that the defendant will
be uniquely in possession of evidence regarding his intent and ability to settle the matter with the
issuer.
Proposed Section 3118(1)(c) could, however, support liability for someone who uses a card that he
knows was issued to a fictitious person. A cardholder who does not exist cannot possibly authorize the
cards use.
38
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Section 3118(4) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. In addition to that liability,
the value of property or services obtained or sought would determine the grading for theft and
attempted theft where those offenses are also committed. See proposed Section 521.2110; see
also proposed Section 502.254 and 509.906 (providing rules for imposition of liability for multiple
offenses). Section 3118 punishes the independent harm that occurs where one fraudulently uses a
credit or debit card.

Section 531.3119: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 516.010, 517.010, 518.010
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 531 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
531s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 541. OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY
Section 541.4101: Bigamy
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 530.010
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for simultaneous marriages.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 541.4101 is substantially similar to current
KRS 530.010, but deletes the explicit defense recognized in current law.

Section 541.4102: Incest
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 530.020
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing sexual intercourse with a blood
relative or with a close relative by adoption or marriage.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 541.4102 is substantially similar to current
KRS 530.020. Importantly, ancestors [and] descendents . . . of either the whole or half blood
should include not only members of a persons direct lineage (such as parents or grandparents) but
also their siblings  thus, for example, sexual relations between an uncle and a niece would be
prohibited.

Section 541.4103: Concealing Birth of Infant
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 530.030
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for concealment of the corpse of a newborn.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 541.4103 is substantially similar to current
KRS 530.030.
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Section 541.4104: Abandonment of Minor
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 530.040
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing desertion of a minor by the person
charged with the minors care.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 541.4104 is substantially similar to current
KRS 530.040. In addition, the statutory definition of a minor is included for clarification.

Section 541.4105: Nonsupport
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 530.050
Comment:

Generally. This provision defines an offense for failure to provide support to persons to
whom a legal duty of support is owed.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 541.4105 is rewritten, but substantially similar
to current KRS 530.050. The proposed provision, however, eliminates the portion of the offense
imposing a duty to provide for an indigent parent. One may have a moral duty to care for ones
parents, but the criminal law generally hesitates to impose affirmative duties of this kind, especially
where, as here, the duty would likely be unenforceable or subject to highly selective enforcement.
Section 4105(3) grades the offense based on whether the nonsupport has exceeded a
specific dollar amount or period of time, or whether the nonsupport has resulted in a particular
condition, i.e., destitute circumstances. Section 4105(3)(a) grades the offense as a Class D felony
where the amount of nonsupport exceeds five thousand dollars, and Section 4105(3)(b) grades
the offense as a Class E felony where the amount exceeds one thousand dollars. Under current
law, the offense is a Class D felony whenever the amount exceeds one thousand dollars. The
grading modification has been proposed to reflect the fact that the proposed grading scheme
includes a new felony classification, Class E felony, that enables more nuanced categorization for
offenses such as this one. As under current law, all offenses involving nonpayment of more than
one thousand dollars are graded as the lowest level of felony, but the grade is enhanced slightly for
even more serious cases.
Section 541.4105(4)(a) creates permissive inferences about a persons knowledge about
his duty of support for child or spouse from the relationships described in proposed Section
541.4105(2), as opposed to the presumption in current KRS 530.050(3) and (4). (See proposed
Section 500.106(4) and corresponding commentary for a discussion of permissive inferences.)
Similarly, Section 541.4105(4)(b) creates a permissive inference that a dependent is in destitute
circumstances when the person receives public assistance, as opposed to the presumption about
the same subject in current KRS 530.050(2)(c).
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Section 541.4106: Endangering Welfare of Minor
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 530.060
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for failure of a person to use reasonable
diligence in controlling a minor in his care or custody.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 541.4106 is substantially similar to current
KRS 530.060.

Section 541.4107: Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 530.064, 530.065, 530.070
Comment:

Generally. This offense criminalizes conduct which encourages the delinquency of a minor.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 541.4107 is retitled and rewritten, but is
substantially the same as current KRS 530.064-530.070. The exception for criminal liability in
current KRS 530.064(1) for offenses involving minors in promotion of prostitution (KRS 529.030)
and pornography (KRS Chapter 531) offenses is deleted. See proposed Sections 502.253502.254.
Section 4107(3) does not aggravate the grade for specific offenses involving sex, drugs,
or victims under a specific age. Cf. KRS 530.064, 530-065. Where an offense results in physical
injury, cf. KRS 530.064(2)(c), the injury will constitute a separate offense under Chapter 1200
and may be charged as such. Any additional offense based on the injury will add to the defendants
total criminal liability, see proposed Section 509.906, and because it will arise under Chapter
1200s more sophisticated scheme, the offense will be able to account for the nature and extent of
the injury, rather than merely the fact of injury. Similarly, a defendants separate drug offense or
sex offense may lead to a distinct charge and conviction for that other offense. Where the offender
induces, assists, or causes the minor to commit the other offense, the offender would clearly
satisfy the Codes causation or accountability requirements as to that offense, notwithstanding the
minors independent act. See proposed 501.203, 503.301.
This offense applies only where the minor is the perpetrator of the criminal activity. When
the minor is the victim  as, for example, where the minor engages in sexual relations with an adult
 this statute would not impose additional liability beyond that for the other offense the adult
commits. In other words, this offense does not apply to the statutory rape situation, because in
that case, the sex offense and the Section 4107 offense cover the same harm, making multiple
liability inappropriate. See proposed Section 502.254. The proposed provision differs from
Kentucky law in this respect. See Young v Com., 968 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1998) (holding that
current offense applies where defendant asked minor to have sex with him).
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Section 541.4108: Unlawful Adoption Fees and Representation
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 199.492, 199.493
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for conflicts of interest relating to legal
representation or legal fees for an adoption.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 541.4108 is substantially similar to current
KRS 199.492 and 199.493.

Section 541.4109: Abortion
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 311.715-311.820
Comment:

Generally. This offense criminalizes conduct relating to abortion.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 541.4109 recognizes the current offenses
relating to abortion in KRS 311.715-311.820, the penalties for which are in current KRS 311.990
and 311.992.

Section 541.4110: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 2.015
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 541 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
541s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 551. BRIBERY, CORRUPT INFLUENCE,
AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT OFFENSES
Section 551.5101: Bribery
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 107.990, 432.350, 521.020, 521.050
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for offering a bribe to a public servant or
acceptance of a bribe by a public servant.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 551.5101 is substantially similar to the conduct
elements of current KRS 521.020(1). The pertinent definitions of pecuniary benefit and public
servant are included for this offense. Current KRS 521.020(2) is not carried forward into the
proposed section because it is covered by the defense of duress. See proposed Section 505.507.
Current KRS 521.020(3) also is not carried forward because its provisions are addressed under
impossibility in the law of attempts. See Proposed Section 508.801.
The provisions of current KRS 521.050 (Providing a Pecuniary Benefit for Bribery of a
Public Servant) include the same subject as the proposed section, but are in the form of complicity.
See proposed Section 503.301.
Section 551.5101 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 107.990 and 432.350.
Importantly, there is a distinction between the substantive offense of bribery and inchoate
offenses toward that offense. The substantive bribery offense is complete (for the offeror) when
the offer is made or (for the official or other would-be recipient) when it is solicited or accepted.
(And an agreement between offeror and recipient that the offeror will offer a bribe is itself an
offer, hence a violation of the substantive offense.) It is not necessary to show any actual transfer
of funds, or that any actual official act was performed under the influence of the bribe. The
substantive offense does not, however, apply to agreements to offer among two conspirators,
as where two private citizens get together and agree to offer an official a bribe. That conduct
would constitute a conspiracy to commit bribery, not a completed bribery offense.

Section 551.5102: Unlawful Compensation of a Public Servant
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 521.030, 521.040
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for offering unlawful compensation to a public
servant or acceptance of unlawful compensation by a public servant.
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Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 551.5102 is almost identical in language to
current KRS 521.030 and 521.040. The grading of the offense has been increased from a Class
A or B misdemeanor to a Class D felony, as it is considered similarly serious to other felonygraded offenses in Chapter 551 and elsewhere.

Section 551.5103: Official Misconduct
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 6.731-.761, 61.997-64.990, 70.990,
522.020, 522.030
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for public servants whose conduct falls outside
their official duties.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 551.5103 is substantially identical to the
current KRS 522.020 and 522.030. Again, the grading of the current offenses appears low.
Under the proposed provision, if the offense is committed intentionally, it is a Class D felony, but it
is a Class A misdemeanor if the person acts knowingly. A person convicted under this provision
would also forfeit his office, under the terms of section 227 of the Kentucky Constitution, which
provides for indictment of public officials for malfeasance and loss of office on conviction.
The conduct prohibited by current KRS 6.731-.761, 61.097-64.990, and 70.990 is
included in proposed Section 551.5103(1)(c).

Section 551.5104: Misuse of Confidential Information
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 11A.040, 522.040, 387.990(2)
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for abusing his access to confidential information
gained as a public servant.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 551.5104 is substantially similar to most of
the offense defined in current KRS 522.040. Current KRS 522.040(1)(c) is in the form of complicity,
and is not carried forward in its current form as it is covered by proposed Section 503.301.

Section 551.5105: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 521.010, 522.010
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 551 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
551s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 552. PERJURY AND OTHER OFFICIAL
FALSIFICATION OFFENSES
Section 552.5201: Perjury and False Swearing
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 365.992(1), 523.010, 523.020, 523.030,
523.040, 523.050, 523.060, 523.070,
523.080, 523.090
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for making material false statements39 that the
person knows are not true.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 552.5201 is substantially similar to current
law on perjury and false swearing. Proposed Section 552.5201(1)(a) is comparable to the one
type of first-degree perjury offense in KRS 523.050(1); Subsection (1)(b) is similar to the other
way in which the first-degree perjury offense is expressed in KRS 523.020(2). However, the
special limitation of this subsection, confining it to cases where the person is seeking a warrant
against a spouse for a sex offense, is unnecessarily narrow and is dropped from the proposed
Code, because the offense definition should not be confined to certain offenses or a particular
class of victims.
Section 552.5201(2) is almost identical to the current KRS 523.040 offense of false
swearing. Likewise, proposed Sections 552.5201(3)-(4) express an exception to the foregoing
offenses for a retraction and a previous trials not-guilty plea in substantially the same language as
current KRS 523.090 and 523.070, respectively.
The current definitions of material false statement, oath, official proceeding, required
or authorized by law, and statement in KRS 523.010(1)-(5) are substantially carried forward in
proposed Section 552.5201(5)(a)-(e).40 However, the definition of oath in proposed Section
552.5201(5)(b)(I)-(iii) differs from current KRS 523.010(2)(b)2.a-c. when it expresses the three
descriptive conditions for a recitation that the statement was made under oath in the disjunctive
rather than the conjunctive under current law.

Although some states have treated materiality as an issue of law for the court to determine, recent
United States Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that such a practice is unconstitutional. See United
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1996) (The Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to demand that
a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged; one of the elements in the present
case is materiality; respondent therefore had a right to have the jury decide materiality.). Accordingly, under
proposed Section 5201, the issue of materiality is to be decided by the jury.
39

As the current commentary points out, required or authorized by law means that [t]he oath must
be authorized by statute or regulatory directive, court rule, or otherwise by law and is not authorized merely
because it is not expressly prohibited. KRS 523.020, Commentary.
40
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Proposed Section 552.5201(6) is a clearer expression of the principles in current KRS
523.050 on inconsistent statements. Where a witness makes irreconcilably inconsistent statements
under oath, one of them must be false, and the witness is therefore liable for perjury without the
State having to prove which statement was the false one. If the inconsistent statements are made
in the course of a single proceeding, the witness would have the opportunity to retract one of the
statements and thus avoid liability, as Section 5201(3) provides. If the witness does not avail
himself of this opportunity, however, he is subject to liability for perjury. The reference in KRS
523.050(1) to the statute of limitations is dropped because it is controlled by principles in the
General Part. Otherwise, the proposed provision states the current principles in more concise
language.
The issues of corroboration and irregularities are addressed in proposed Section
552.5201(7)-(8) in the same manner as in current KRS 523.060 and 523.080.
The grading of the offenses in proposed Section 552.5201(9) is consistent with the penalties
for the current perjury and false-swearing offenses in KRS Chapter 523, but Section 5201(9)(b)
and (9)(c) impose grades of Class E felony and Class A misdemeanor instead of current laws
Class A misdemeanor and Class B misdemeanor. This slight upward adjustment reflects the Working
Groups view, following a comprehensive review of the proposed grading for all offenses, that the
offenses in question were more serious than the original grades suggested and should be increased
slightly. Such an increase is also possible because of the proposed Codes added grade of Class
E felony, which makes more sophisticated distinctions possible at this level of offense.
The conduct prohibited by current KRS 365.992(1) is included in this proposed section.

Section 552.5202: Unsworn Falsification to Authorities
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 523.100
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for making certain false statements in a writing
or on an object, without the presence or existence of an oath.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 552.5202 is substantially identical to current
KRS 523.100. Under proposed Section 552.5202(1)(b), the issue of whether a writing is forged
is controlled by proposed Section 531.3101.
Section 5202(3) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, whereas current KRS
523.100 grades its offense as a Class B misdemeanor. This change is in keeping with, and maintains
consistency and proportionality with, the grading modifications in proposed Section 5201(9).
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Section 552.5203: False Reporting
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 519.040, 523.110
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for falsely reporting an incident to an officer
or giving the officer a false name or address.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 552.5203 is substantially similar to and is a
combination of current KRS 519.040 and 523.110. The grading of the current offenses is carried
forward in proposed Section 552.5203(2).

Section 552.5204: Impersonating a Public Servant
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 519.050, 519.055
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for impersonating a public servant.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 552.5204 is substantially similar to and is a
combination of current KRS 519.050 and 519.055. However, the distinction drawn in current law
between peace officers and public servants occurs only in the grading of the offense. The grading
remains the same in the proposed provision as in current law.

Section 552.5205: Tampering with Public Records
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 519.060
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for a variety of conduct relating to interfering
with public records.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 552.5205 is substantially identical to current
KRS 519.060.
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Section 552.5206: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 523.010
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 552 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
552s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 553. INTERFERENCE WITH
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
Section 553.5301: Obstructing Governmental Operations
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 39A.990, 65.7641, 149.040, 149.083,
149.090, 432.590, 438.180, 441.035,
519.020
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for interfering with governmental functions.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5301 is substantially similar to current
KRS 519.020(1). Section 553.5301(1)(a) requires that the governmental function in question
must be lawful. Use of that term renders unnecessary the exemption language in current KRS
519.020s reference to the obstruction, etc., of unlawful action. The other two parts of the
current exemption section similarly add nothing new to the offense definition; one of them, for
example, refers to an omission, and omission liability is already addressed by proposed Section
501.204.
Section 553.5301(2)s definition of governmental function is nearly identical to that in
current KRS 519.010(3). The term public servant is defined in proposed Section 551.5101(2)(b).
Section 5301 covers the conduct prohibited by current KRS 39A.990, 65.7641,
149.040,149.083, 432.590, 438.180, and 441.035. KRS 149.090 covers the same conduct
but is in the form of an omission to act. See proposed Section 501.204.

Section 553.5302: Compounding a Crime
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 519.030
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for compounding a crime.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5302 is substantially identical to current
KRS 519.030.
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Section 553.5303: Hindering Prosecution or Apprehension
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 520.110, 520.120, 520.130
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for assisting a person being sought for
commission of an offense.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5303 is substantially identical to the
offenses in current KRS 520.120 and 520.130, as well as the defense in KRS 520.110(2). In
addition, the list of ways in which a person renders assistance to another person from current KRS
520.110 is carried forward, with one exception. Current KRS 520.110(1)(e), which refers to
volunteer[ing] false information to a law enforcement authority, is carried forward as provid[ing]
such information. The use of the verb provides is less ambiguous than volunteers,which may
define liability based on whom asks first for information: the officer or the person.
The grading of the offense remains the same as under current law.

Section 553.5304: Fleeing or Evading Peace Officer
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 520.095, 520.100
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for disobeying a direction to stop given by a
person known to be a peace officer.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5304 is somewhat similar to current
KRS 520.095 and 520.100. Distinctions under current law between disobeying a direction as an
operator of a vehicle and as a pedestrian are dropped. Consistent with the designation changes
for culpability made in proposed Section 501.206, the culpability requirement in the proposed
subsection (1)(b) is recklessly disobeying rather than knowingly or wantonly, as under current
law.
The conditions listed under current law to describe how a person commits the offense,
while disobeying a direction to stop, is deleted. The first three conditions  persons fleeing
immediately after committing domestic violence, committing DUI, and driving on a suspended
license  in current KRS 520.095(1)(a)1-3 are unnecessarily narrow; there is no reason to single
out those offenses from others. Without these conditions, a person still can be convicted of domestic
violence or assault, DUI, or driving on a suspended license. The fourth condition  that the
person in fleeing or eluding is the cause of serious physical injury or creates a substantial risk of
serious physical injury  likewise is unnecessary, because a person could be charged with fleeing
plus assault or reckless endangerment. See proposed Section 502.254 and 509.906 (providing
rules for imposition of liability for multiple offenses). The last condition is recognized in the proposed
section as an aggravator with a higher grading.
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The current laws exception for liability in KRS 520.100(2) when the failure relates to
noncompliance with a traffic control officers direction appears in Section 5304(2)(c) as a grade
reduction to Class C misdemeanor.

Section 553.5305: Interfering with or Resisting a Peace Officer
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 508.160, 520.090
Comment:
duties.

Generally. This provision creates an offense for obstructing an officers discharge of his

Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5305 is much broader than current
KRS 508.160 and 520.090, which merely identifies specific examples of interfering with an officer
or resisting arrest. There is a broader concern about interfering with the officers performance of
his duties that should be addressed, in addition to the specific concerns under current law. For
example, under the proposed section, a person can be prosecuted for not following an officers
directive to move on in a crowd control situation.
The phrase recognized to be acting under color of his official authority in the current law
on resisting arrest is changed in the proposed section to the culpability requirement of knowing
that the officer is acting within the scope of his duties. Similarly, neither of the exceptions to liability
in current KRS 508.160(3) is necessary, because there are already culpability requirements in the
proposed section as well as a condition that the officer must be acting within the scope of his
official duties.
The reference to attempts to prevent a peace officer from arresting someone is dropped
because it is included as an inchoate offense under proposed Section 508.801.

Section 553.5306: Escape
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 520.010(2), (4), (5); 520.015, 520.020,
520.030, 520.040,
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for escaping from the custody of law
enforcement personnel.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5306 is substantially similar to current
KRS 520.020 through 520.040. The grading under the current law is preserved.
The definitions in KRS 520.010(2), (4), and (5) are carried forward substantially intact.
The definition of penitentiary is not carried forward, because it is used only in connection with
current KRS 525.015  attempting to escape from a penitentiary  which is an inchoate offense
and thus not carried forward as a separate offense. See proposed Section 508.801 (defining rules
for attempt liability).
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Section 553.5307: Promoting or Possessing Contraband
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 520.010(1), (3); 520.050, 520.060
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for introducing contraband into, or possessing
contraband within, a detention facility.
Current law refers to the place where the offense may be committed as a detention facility
or a penitentiary. The reference to a penitentiary is dropped, because the definition of detention
facility includes a penitentiary.
The definitions of current KRS 520.010(1) and (3) for contraband and dangerous
contraband are carried forward verbatim, and the grading of the offenses remains the same as
current law.

Section 553.5308: Failure to Appear
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 258.990, 431.545, 520.070, 520.080
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5307 is substantially similar to current.

Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for failing to appear at a scheduled court
appearance.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5308 is substantially similar to the current
offenses of bail jumping in KRS 520.070 and 520.080. The justification for the persons failure to
appear in subsection (2) of each of the current offenses is retained in proposed Section 553.5308(2).
The grading of the offenses remains the same.
The conduct prohibited by current KRS 258.990 and 431.545 is included in the proposed
section.
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Section 553.5309: Bribing a Witness
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 524.010(3)-(4), 524.020, 524.030
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for offering a bribe to a witness or receiving
a bribe by a witness.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5309 is substantially similar to current
KRS 524.020 and 524.030.

Section 553.5310: Intimidating, Harassing, or Tampering with a Participant
in the Legal Process
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 514.080, 524.040, 524.045, 524.050
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for doing anything that may affect the willingness
of a witness to testify.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5310 consolidates the current offenses
of intimidating, harassing, and tampering with a participant in the legal process. References in the
current offense for intimidating a participant in the legal process to attempts to intimidate are
dropped because they are inchoate offenses covered by proposed Section 508.801. Otherwise,
the conduct elements in the current offense of intimidating a participant in the legal process are
carried forward as the objects of the persons intent (with intent to) in Section 5310(1)(a)(i)(vii).
Many of the effects of the persons conduct in harassing a participant in the legal process
in current KRS 524.040(1)(a)-(d) are already included in the current offense of intimidating a
participant in the legal process, and are also carried forward in a modified form as conduct elements
in Section 5310(1)(b)(i). The remaining portions of the conduct elements in Section 5310(1)(b)(ii)(iii) are taken from the current offense of tampering with a participant in the legal process in current
KRS 524.050.
Both the intimidating and the harassing offenses in current law contain provisions negating
two possible defenses to those charges. Those provisions are carried forward in Section 5310(2).
The definitions in current KRS 524.010(1) are carried forward in proposed Section 5310(3).
Section 5310(4) grades the offense as a Class D felony where force, or the threat of force,
is involved, and as a Class E felony otherwise. Current law grades these offenses as a Class D
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felony and a Class A misdemeanor, respectively. The proposed increase reflects the Working
Groups view, following a comprehensive review of the grading of all proposed offenses, that this
offense was more serious than other Class A misdemeanors. Because of the availability of the
added Class E felony category under the proposed Code, it was thought that this offenses grade
could be increased while retaining an aggravation for offenses involving potential violence that
would treat such offenses as a Class D felony.

Section 553.5311: Retaliating Against a Participant in the Legal Process
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 524.055
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for retaliation against a participant in the legal
process.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5311 is substantially identical to current
KRS 524.055.

Section 553.5312: Bribery of, or Improper Communication with, a Juror
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 524.010(1), 524.060, 524.070, 524.090,
524.120
Comment:
juror.

Generally. This provision creates an offense for bribing a juror or bribe receiving by a

Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5312 is substantially similar to current
offenses relating to juror bribery, intimidation, and tampering. In addition, the offense of judge
intimidation is included as part of the offense. Section 5312(1)(a) corresponds to the current
offense of bribing a juror in KRS 524.060, Section 5312(1)(b) matches the current offense of
bribe receiving by a juror in KRS 524.070, and Section 5312(1)(c) corresponds with the current
offense of jury tampering in KRS 524.090. The attempt provision of the current intimidating a
juror provision has not been incorporated, because it is covered by proposed Section 508.801.
The grading of the offenses is similar to current law, but Section 5312(2)(b) increases the
grade for the improper-communication offense from Class A misdemeanor to Class E felony. The
proposed increase reflects the Working Groups view, following a comprehensive review of the
grading of all proposed offenses, that this offense was more serious than other Class A misdemeanors.
Because of the availability of the added Class E felony category under the proposed Code, it was
thought increasing this offenses grade would appropriately maintain it as an offense one grade less
serious than the juror bribery offenses, which are treated as Class D felonies in both the current
and proposed Codes.
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Section 553.5313: Tampering with Physical Evidence
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 17.170, 524.010(2), 524.100
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for interfering with the integrity of physical
evidence to be used in an official proceeding.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5313 is substantially identical to the
current tampering with evidence offense in KRS 524.100, except that the reference to a pending
proceeding is deleted. The person committing the offense must still believe that the matter tampered
with is evidence to be presented at a hearing. Thus, not all evidence is covered.
Section 5313(2) carries forward the definition of physical evidence in current KRS
524.010(2).
The conduct prohibited by current KRS 17.170 is included in the proposed section.

Section 553.5314: Simulating Legal Process
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 524.110
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for fabricating a request for the payment of
money in a form made to appear legitimate.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5314 is substantially similar to current
KRS 524.110, except for the phrase or causes to be delivered in the current law. Section 5314
does not incorporate that phrase because it is unnecessary given the existence of proposed Section
503.301 relating to complicity.
Section 5314(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, whereas the offense under
current KRS 524.110 is a Class B misdemeanor. The proposed increase reflects the Working
Groups view, following a comprehensive review of the grading of all proposed offenses, that this
offense was more serious than other Class B misdemeanors and as serious as proposed Class A
misdemeanors.
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Section 553.5315: Unauthorized Practice of Law
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 524.130
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for practicing law without a license.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 553.5315 is a consolidated version of current
KRS 524.130. The essence of the offense is a violation of Kentucky Supreme Court rules on the
practice of law. Currently, both offense definitions essentially define the same offense. Thus, the
proposed offense simply states the offense one time and grades it in the same manner as current
law. In addition, the exception clause in current law is dropped.

Section 553.5316: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 520.010, 524.010, 525.010
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 553 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
553s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 561. PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY OFFENSES
Section 561.6101: Rioting
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.010(5), 525.020, 525.030
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for participating in a riot.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6101 is substantially similar to current
KRS 525.020 and 525.030. The culpability requirement is still knowingly. The definition of
riot in current KRS 525.010(5) is carried forward in substantially identical form. As with the
current first- and second-degree offenses, the proposed section grades the offenses according to
the occurrence of physical injury or property damage.

Section 561.6102: Inciting to Riot
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.040
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for inciting at least five others to riot.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6102 is substantially similar to current
KRS 525.040.

Section 561.6103: Unlawful Assembly
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.050
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for assembling with at least five other persons
in order to engage in a riot.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6103 is substantially similar to current
KRS 525.050.
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Section 561.6104: Failure to Disperse
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.160
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for refusing to disperse when ordered by a
law enforcement authority.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6104 is almost identical to current KRS
525.160.

Section 561.6105: Disorderly Conduct
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.010(3), 525.060
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for engaging in disorderly behavior.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6105 is substantially similar to current
KRS 525.060. Consistent with the designation changes for culpability made in proposed Section
501.206, the culpability requirement in the proposed section is recklessly rather than wantonly.
In addition, although the current reference to intentionally committing the offense is omitted, the
proposed Code would allow liability where the conduct was intentional. See Proposed Section
501.205(6).
The definition of public place currently used in KRS 525.010(3) is placed as part of the
proposed offense. As part of its definition, public place uses the term includes, which is
defined in the General Part in proposed Section 500.107 to mean includes but is not limited to.

Section 561.6106: Harassment
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.070
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for annoying or bothering others.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6106 is almost identical to current KRS
525.070, maintaining the same conduct provisions and grading.
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Section 561.6107: Harassing Communications
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.080
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for communicating in such a manner as to
harass or alarm another person.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6107 is substantially similar to current
KRS 525.080. The term written is removed from modifying the term communication in order
to broaden the scope of the offense to include any other form of communication.

Section 561.6108: Loitering
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.010(4), 525.090
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for remaining in a public place for unlawful
purposes.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6108 is similar to current KRS 525.090,
with several exceptions. Section 561.6108(1)(a) and (b) gives the police arrest powers when a
person remains in a public place for a particular illegal purpose. Section 6108(1)(a) changes the
current law from gambling to unlawful gambling, in recognition of numerous forms of legal gambling
that exist but are not intended to be included within the scope of this offense.
Unlike the preceding two subsections, Section 6108(1)(c) and (1)(d) do not require a
specific unlawful purpose. They are bracketed to call attention to an issue of why the two places
referred to in those sections are singled out for the locale of criminal liability. As a policy matter,
there may be many other places which are the equivalent of a school or transportation facility but
are not identified for criminal liability. Without an accompanying criminal trespass, the issue arises
as to whether the conduct identified in these subsections can be criminalized.
Section 6108(2)s definition of a transportation facility is the same as that in current
KRS 525.010(4).
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Section 561.6109: Public Intoxication
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.100
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for being under the influence of an intoxicating
substance.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6109 is comparable to current KRS
525.100. The current exclusion for intoxication caused solely by alcohol has been deleted, because
regardless of the source of the public intoxication  whether it is caused by alcohol, other legal
means, or illegal means  the societal injury is the same.
In part because of this expansion of its scope, the grade of the offense has been reduced
from a Class B to a Class C misdemeanor. This grade seems appropriate because it would
authorize brief incarceration, if needed, while still treating the offense as minor. Further, chronic
offenders may be dealt with more severely; under proposed Section 905, a second offense would
be a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 561.6110: Obstructing a Highway or Other Public Passage
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.140
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for blocking a public passage.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6110 is similar to current KRS 525.140.
Consistent with the designation changes for culpability made in proposed Section 501.206, the
culpability requirement in Section 6110(1)(a) is recklessly rather than wantonly. In addition,
while the current reference to intentionally committing the offense is omitted, the proposed Code
allows for liability based on intentional conduct. See Proposed Section 501.205(6).
The current exception in KRS 525.140(2) is rewritten for clarity in Section 6110(2).
Section 561.6110(1)(b) adds that the offense may be committed if, after first being given
a reasonable order to move, the person refuses to do so. As described in proposed Section
6110(3), the reasonableness of the peace officers order depends on whether they have another
way of managing the situation before shutting down the gathering. Section 561.6110(3) is similar
to current KRS 525.140(3).
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Section 561.6111: Disrupting Meetings and Processions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.150
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for interfere with gatherings.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6111 is substantially similar to current
KRS 525.150.

Section 561.6112: Interfering with Communications
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 438.210, 438.160
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for interfering with modern communications.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 561.6112 is a modernized version of current
KRS 438.210. Section 561.6112 replaces the culpability requirements of willfully and maliciously
with the defined term of knowingly. See proposed Section 501.206(2). In addition, while the
current law relates to telegraph lines, telephone lines, wire or cable, the proposed offense would
include any mode of communication, including the Internet.
Current KRS 438.160, emergency use of telephone party line, is not carried forward in
the proposed Code because party lines is no longer relevant.

Section 561.6113: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.010
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 561 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
561s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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CHAPTER 562. PUBLIC INDECENCY OFFENSES
Section 562.6201: Indecent Exposure
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 510.150
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing intentional exposure of a persons
genitals when the conduct will likely cause affront or alarm.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 562.6201 is substantially identical to KRS
510.150.

Section 562.6202: Causing or Promoting a Sexual Performance by a Minor
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 531.300(4), 531.310, 531.320
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing causing or promoting a sexual
performance by a minor.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 562.6202 is substantially identical to KRS
531.310 and 531.320. Section 6202(1)(a) omits the reference to consent found in current KRS
531.310(1), because the issue of consent is addressed in proposed Section 502.251.
The definition of sexual conduct, which appears in proposed Section 513.1303(2)(b), is
identical to the definition of sexual conduct by a minor in current KRS 531.300(4), except that
it omits an exception for private family exposures not intended for distribution. That exception is
unnecessary, because if a photograph is created or used entirely for private or family purposes,
then it would not be a public performance under 3116(2)s definition. A public performance
must be exhibited before an audience. The definition of public performance in Section
531.3116(2), like the definition of performance in current KRS 531.300(5), is broad: the
proposed definition covers any form of entertainment . . . that is viewed by the public, while the
current definition covers any play, motion picture, photograph, dance, or any other visual
representation exhibited before an audience. It is anticipated that any conduct falling within the
current definition would also fall within the proposed definition of public performance, so long as
the conduct is performed publicly.41

It is not anticipated, however, that the definition would reach conduct performed in private, such as
that in Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 838 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1991) (applying promoting sexual performance by
minor offense to defendant who required his daughter to disrobe in his presence). The conduct in Gilbert
would be a sexual abuse offense. See supra commentary for proposed Sections 513.1303, 513.1304.
41
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Section 6202(3) grades the offense as a Class D felony if the minor is under 16, and as a
Class E felony if the minor is under 18. The grading of the offense under proposed Section
6202(3) has been reduced relative to current law because the direct harm to the minor is covered
by offenses in Chapter 1300. See proposed Sections 513.1303, 513.1304 and corresponding
commentary. Section 6202s offense is directed only at the social harm that arises when there is
a public performance of this type of conduct. The purpose of the promoting performance
offense is rather to punish the coarsening of public life that such conduct entails  a more
aggravated form of indecent exposure. Importantly, a person who violates Section 6202 would
also almost certainly commit an offense under Chapter 1300 at the same time, and under the
proposed Codes liability rules, the person would face additional liability for each offense. See
proposed Section 509.906.
There is no analogue in the proposed code for current KRS 531.330(2), which appears
to be unconstitutional under Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) and Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), because the defendant has to disprove an element of the offense.
See proposed Section 501.207, regarding a mistake negating required culpability for an offense.

Section 562.6203: Distribution of Obscenity
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 531.010(3), 531.020, 531.030-.070,
531.340-.370
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing the distribution of obscenity.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 562.6203 is similar to current provisions
governing distribution of obscene material, both to adults and to minors. Section 562.6203(1) lists
prohibited conduct from current KRS 531.020(1)(c) and 531.030(1): prepares, publishes,
prints, exhibits, distributes, and possesses with intent to distribute or exhibit. The term
advertises is similar to advertising used in current KRS 531.050 (Advertising obscene material).
Statutory references in current KRS 531.020(1)(c)6 and 531.030(1)(c) to offers to
distribute and possession with intent to offer to distribute are in the nature of inchoate offenses
and are covered in proposed Sections 508.801-508.802.
The Section 562.6203(1) phrase promotes the distribution, defined in Section
562.6203(3), is broader than the phrase promotes the sale found in current KRS 531.060(1)
and covers a broader category of conduct.
The definition of distribute in Section 562.6203(2)(a) is identical to the definition in
current KRS 531.010(1) and 531.300(1).
The definition of matter in Section 562.6203(2)(b) is identical to the definition in current
KRS 531.010(2) and 531.300(2).
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The definition of obscene in Section 562.6203(2)(c) is identical to the definition in current
KRS 531.010(3). Section 562.6203(2)(c)(iv) adds another definition of obscene: material
portraying a sexual performance by a minor. This definition carries forward the language in current
KRS 531.340, using the offense of distribution of obscene material to carry forward all current
prohibitions relating to distribution of sexual performances by a minor. Section 562.6203(2)(c)(iv)
is implicitly referred to in the grading for the offense in Section 562.6203(6)(a).
The defined term promoting the distribution of material in 562.6203(2)(d) is not exhaustive,
due to the reference that it includes the conduct described. The examples used in the definition
are almost identical to current KRS 531.060(1).
KRS 531.335 (possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor) is not
included in the proposed code. There is no current criminal prohibition for possession of obscene
material generally. Moreover, criminalization of private possession of this type of obscene material
raises constitutional concerns.
Jurisdictional provisions in current KRS 531.020(1)(a)-(b) are omitted because they are
addressed in proposed Section 500.105(1)-(2).
Section 562.6203(4) creates a permissive inference that a jury may decide that possessing
more than one copy of material shows an intent to distribute. (See proposed Section 500.106(4)
and corresponding commentary for a discussion of permissive inferences.) Such information is
relevant to the intent to distribute. Current law uses the possession of more than one unit of
material as a method of enhancing the penalty for the offense of distribution of obscene matter in
KRS 531.020(2).
The exemption in Section 562.6203(5) is comparable to the exemption in current KRS
531.070.
The grading of 562.6203(6) is somewhat harsher than current law, but the grading of the
offense as a Class D felony occurs only when the person knew or had reason to know that the
matter portrays a sexual performance by a minor. The remainder of the grading section defines the
conduct as a Class A misdemeanor, which is consistent with current criminal conduct such as
possessing more than one copy of obscene material (KRS 531.020(2)), distributing obscene
matter to a minor (KRS 531.030(2)), and using a minor to distribute the obscene matter (KRS
531.0040(2)). Without such aggravating circumstances, the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
There is no analogue in the proposed Code for current KRS 531.330(1), which appears
to be an unconstitutional presumption as to age under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979). No permissive inference is provided on this issue, because such a jury instruction would
be confusing to the jury, which would wonder why the court is instructing about something it can
decide for itself.
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Section 562.6204: Prostitution or Patronizing a Prostitute; Loitering for a
Sexual Act
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 529.020, 529.080, 529.090, 510.010(7)(8)
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing prostitution and loitering in order
to engage in prostitution.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 562.6204 is broader than current law because
it refers to the offer, acceptance, payment, or solicitation of a fee either by the person performing
the intercourse or contact or by another. The reference in current KRS 529.020(1) to offers to
engage is omitted from the proposed section, because it is in the nature of an inchoate offense and
is covered in proposed Sections 508.801-508.802.
Section 562.6204(2) also provides for liability based on public loitering for the purpose of
engaging in prostitution. Such loitering presents a public harm not addressed by the prohibition on
the private prostitution transaction itself.
The grading for the offense of prostitution under Section 6204(1), Class B misdemeanor,
is identical to current law. Section 6204(2)s loitering offense is graded as a Class C misdemeanor.
Current KRS 529.090s provisions relating to knowing transmission of HIV are addressed
by the proposed endangerment offense. See proposed Section 512.1202 and commentary.

Section 562.6205: Permitting Prostitution
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 529.070
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense for permitting prostitution.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 562.6205 is substantially identical to current
KRS 529.070, except that the culpability for the offense is grossly negligently instead of knowingly.
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Section 562.6206: Promoting, Supporting, or Profiting from Prostitution
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 529.010(1), 529.030, 529.040, 529.050,
529.090
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing promotion, support or profit from
prostitution.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 521.6206(1)(a)-(e) defines the offense in
examples identical to current KRS 529.010(1)s definition of advancing prostitution. The offense
described in Section 562.6206(1)(f) is taken from the definition of profiting from prostitution in
current KRS 529.010(2). However, the proposed offense does not include the inchoate conduct
defined in the current KRS 529.010(2) definition. This specific language replaces the defined
terms currently used in KRS 529.030-.050.
The conduct defined in current KRS 529.030(1)(a) is deleted, because its reference to
compelling a person by force or intimidation to engage in prostitution is actually a form of sexual
assault, which is addressed in proposed Chapter 513. The current law creates a specialized
combination offense (promoting prostitution by compelling sexual assault) that is better addressed
under sexual assault. The same is true of the grading in current KRS 529.030(2)(c), which defines
the offense as a Class A felony when a minor is physically injured.
The grading for this offense is increased one grade from its current penalty when the
person knew that he had tested positive for the HIV virus which could be communicated to
another through sexual activity. Otherwise, the grading of the offense is similar to current law found
in the respective degrees of promoting prostitution in KRS 529.030-.050, except that Section
6206(2)(a) and (b) grades the offense as a Class C felony if the minor is under 16, and as a Class
D felony if the minor is under 18. The grading of the offense under proposed Section 6202(3) has
been reduced relative to current law because the direct harm to the minor is covered by offenses
in Chapter 1300. See proposed Sections 513.1303, 513.1304. Section 6206s offense is directed
only at the specific harm that arises from the promotion of prostitution, as opposed to the sex act
itself. Importantly, a person who violates Section 6206 would also almost certainly commit an
offense under Chapter 1300 at the same time, and under the proposed Codes liability rules, the
person would face additional liability for each offense. See proposed Section 509.906.
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Section 562.6207: Cruelty to Animals
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.125, 525.130
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing cruelty to animals.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 562.6207 is comparable to current KRS
525.125-525.130, except that knowingly is the culpability of the offense in Section 562.6207(1)(c).
Section 6207(3)(a) grades the aggravated form of the offense as a Class E felony, whereas
current KRS 525.125 grades its similar offense as a Class D felony. The modification reflects the
Working Groups view, following a comprehensive review of the grading of all proposed offenses,
that this offense was similarly serious to other Class E felonies. Because of the availability of the
added Class E felony category under the proposed Code, it was thought that grading this offense
as a Class E felony would appropriately place it within the lowest felony grade, as is true under
current law, for which Class D felony is the lowest such grade.

Section 562.6208: Desecration of Venerated Objects
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 525.105, 525.110, 525.113, 525.115,
525.120
Comment:

Generally. This provision creates an offense governing the defiling of venerated objects.
Relation to current Kentucky law. Section 562.6208 is comparable to current law. The
offense also is graded similarly, although in a different format.

Section 562.6209: Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 510.010(7)-(8); 531.010(1)-(3);
531.300(1)-(2), (5)
Comment:

Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Chapter 562 and provides crossreferences to the provisions in which they are defined.
Relation to current Kentucky law. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter
562s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which the term is
initially defined.
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TRANSLATION TABLE
CURRENT LAW TO PROPOSED CODE
Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

2.015
6.731
6.734

541.4110
551.5103
524.2403
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5103
551.5104
553.5313
553.5301
551.5103
553.5301
551.5103
551.5101
531.3101
553.5301
553.5301
553.5301
522.2206
541.4108
541.4108
511.1107

216.302
217.175
217.181
218A.1418
253.990
258.990
311.715
311.720
311.723
311.725
311.732
311.733
311.735
311.750
311.760
311.765
311.770
311.780
311.790
311.800
311.810
311.820
342.035
342.265(2)
342.335
342.400(2)
342.465
342.615
365.015
365.020

511.1106
531.3105
521.2102
521.2102
522.2206
553.5308
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
541.4109
521.2103
531.3107
521.2103
531.3102
531.3110
521.2103
531.3104
531.3105

6.737
6.741
6.744
6.747
6.750
6.751
6.754
6.755
6.757
6.760
6.761
11A.040
17.170
39A.990
61.097 - .990
65.7641
70.990
107.990
116.047
149.040
149.083
149.090
149.380
199.492
199.493
216.300
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Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

365.030
365.040
365.050
365.100
365.710
365.992(1)
387.990(2)
431.005
431.545
432.350
432.590
433.234
433.750
433.770
433.865
433.873
433.875
434.095
434.155
434.225(6)
434.310
434.320
434.340
434.442
434.445
434.550
434.560
434.570

531.3105
531.3105
531.3105
531.3104
521.2108
552.5201
551.5104
504.414
553.5308
551.5101
553.5301
521.2102
522.2206
522.2206
521.2102
522.2206
522.2206
531.3101
531.3101
531.3101
531.3110
531.3111
531.3111
531.3101
521.2106
531.3118
531.3118
531.3104
531.3110
531.3118
521.2102
521.2109
531.3118
521.2108
531.3118
531.3105
531.3118

434.610
434.620
434.630

531.3118
531.3118
531.3101
531.3118
531.3101
531.3118
521.2103
531.3118
521.2103
531.3118
521.2103
531.3118
531.3118
531.3118
521.2109
531.3118
531.3118
531.3118
531.3118
531.3118
531.3118
531.3118
524.2403
524.2402
521.2102
522.2206
522.2206
523.2301
522.2206
561.6112
553.5301
561.6112
522.2205
553.5301
500.101
500.103
500.102

434.580

434.590
434.600
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434.640
434.650
434.655
434.660
434.670
434.680
434.685
434.690
434.695
434.700
434.710
434.715
434.720
434.730
434.840
434.855
437.420(1)
437.420(2)
437.420(3)
437.420(4)
438.060
438.160
438.180
438.210
438.240
441.035
500.010
500.020
500.030
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Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

500.040
500.050
500.060
500.070
500.080

500.104
506.602
500.105
500.106
500.107
515.1501
509.901
500.102
503.302
501.204
505.502
503.302
501.206
501.204
501.205
505.502
501.205
501.205
501.203
503.303
501.207
505.511
503.304
505.509
505.506
503.302
505.507
503.301
503.301
503.301
503.301
507.701
507.703
507.702
504.400
504.412
504.413

503.050(1)
503.050(2)
503.060
503.070(1)
503.070(2)
503.080(2)
503.090(1)
503.090(2)
503.090(3)
503.110
503.120
503.808(1)
504.020
504.020(3)
504.090
504.120(4)
505.010
505.020
505.020
505.030
505.040
505.050
505.060
506.010

504.416
504.419
504.418
504.416
504.419
504.419
504.414
504.414
504.414
504.415
505.511
504.417
505.504
505.501
506.604
505.504
506.603
502.253
502.254
506.605
506.606
506.607
506.608
508.801
508.807
503.301
508.806
503.301
508.802
508.807
503.301
508.803
508.807
508.803
508.805
508.806
508.804

500.080(17)
500.100
501.010(2)
501.010(3)
501.010(4)
501.020
501.030
501.030(1)
501.040
501.050(1)
501.060
501.070
501.070(1)(c)
501.070(2)
501.070(3)
501.080
501.080(1)
501.090
502.010
502.020
502.030
502.040
502.050
502.050(2)
502.060
503.020
503.030(1)
503.040

506.020
506.030

506.040

506.050
506.050(4)
506.060
506.070
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Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

506.080
506.090
506.100
506.110
507.010
507.020

503.301
503.301
503.301
502.254
511.1101
511.1101
511.1102
511.1103
511.1104
511.1105
512.1201
512.1201
512.1201
512.1201
512.1201
512.1201
512.1203
512.1202
522.2205
512.1202
522.2205
512.1203
512.1203
512.1202
512.1203
512.1201
512.1205
512.1206
512.1205
512.1205
512.1205
512.1204
512.1206
512.1204
512.1204
512.1204
553.5305

509.010
509.020

514.1404
514.1401
514.1501
514.1401
514.1501
514.1401
514.1501
514.1401
514.1501
514.1401
514.1501
514.1402
514.1403
513.1301
513.1302
513.1303
513.1306
513.1307
562.6204
562.6209
562.6204
562.6209
513.1301
513.1301
513.1301
513.1302
513.1303
513.1304
513.1301
513.1302
513.1302
513.1301
513.1302
513.1302
513.1303
513.1304
513.1304

507.030
507.040
507.050
508.010
508.020
508.025
508.030
508.032
508.040
508.050
508.060
508.070
508.075
508.078
508.080
508.090

508.100
508.110
508.120
508.130
508.140
508.150
508.155
508.160
316

509.030
509.040
509.050
509.060
509.070
509.080
510.010

510.010(7)
510.010(8)
510.015
510.030
510.035

510.040
510.050
510.060
510.070
510.080
510.090
510.110
510.120
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Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

510.140
510.150
511.010
511.020
511.030
511.040
511.050

513.1305
562.6201
523.2303
523.2301
523.2301
523.2301
508.808
523.2301
523.2302
523.2302
523.2302
523.2301
522.2208
522.2206
522.2206
522.2206
522.2206
522.2206
522.2203
522.2206
522.2206
522.2208
522.2201
522.2202
522.2203
521.2113
521.2111
521.2113
521.2103
521.2102
521.2110
521.2103
531.3117
531.3117
521.2110
521.2108
521.2110

514.060
514.060(4)
514.065
514.065(4)
514.070
514.070(4)
514.080

521.2105
521.2110
521.2105
521.2110
521.2107
521.2110
521.2104
553.5310
521.2110
521.2103
531.3117
521.2110
521.2112
521.2109
521.2110
521.2103
521.2109
521.2110
521.2102
521.2110
521.2109
521.2110
521.2103
531.3104
521.2110
521.2103
531.3104
521.2110
515.1501
515.1501
515.1501
531.3119
531.3101
531.3101
531.3101
531.3102
531.3103

511.060
511.070
511.080
511.090
512.010
512.020
512.030
512.040
512.050
512.060
512.070
512.080
513.010
513.020
513.030
513.040
514.010
514.020(1)
514.020(2)
514.020(3)
514.030
514.030(2)
514.040
514.040(6)
514.040(7)
514.040(8)
514.050
514.050(2)

514.080(3)
514.090
514.090(2)
514.090(3)
514.100
514.110
514.110(3)
514.120
514.120(2)
514.120(4)
514.140
514.140(2)
514.150
514.150(2)
514.160
514.160(2)
514.170
514.170(3)
515.010
515.020
515.030
516.010
516.020
516.030
516.040
516.110
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Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

516.120
516.130
517.010
517.010(1)
517.010(2)
517.010(3)
517.010(4)
517.010(5)
517.010(6)
517.020
517.030
517.040
517.050
517.060
517.070
517.080
517.090
517.100
517.110
517.120
518.010
518.010(2)
518.010(3)
518.020
518.030
518.040
518.050
518.060
518.070
519.020
519.030
519.040
519.050
519.055
519.060
520.010
520.010(1), (3)

531.3101
531.3101
531.3119
531.3105
531.3107
531.3107
531.3112
531.3105
531.3113
531.3105
531.3106
531.3106
531.3107
531.3108
531.3108
531.3109
531.3110
531.3111
531.3112
531.3113
531.3119
531.3116
531.3116
531.3114
531.3114
531.3115
531.3115
531.3115
531.3116
553.5301
553.5302
552.5203
552.5204
552.5204
552.5205
553.5316
553.5307

520.010(2), (4), (5) 553.5306
520.015
553.5306
520.020
553.5306
520.030
553.5306
520.040
553.5306
520.050
553.5307
520.060
553.5307
520.070
553.5308
520.080
553.5308
520.090
553.5305
520.095
553.5304
520.100
553.5304
520.110
553.5303
520.120
553.5303
520.130
553.5303
521.010
551.5105
521.020
551.5101
521.030
551.5102
521.040
551.5102
521.050
551.5101
522.010
551.5105
522.020
551.5103
522.030
551.5103
522.040
551.5104
523.010
552.5201
552.5206
523.020
552.5201
523.030
552.5201
523.040
552.5201
523.050
552.5201
523.060
552.5201
523.070
552.5201
523.080
552.5201
523.090
552.5201
523.100
552.5202
523.110
552.5203
524.010
553.5316
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Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

524.010(1)
524.010(2)
524.010(3), (4)
524.020
524.030
524.040
524.045
524.050
524.055
524.060
524.070
524.090
524.100
524.110
524.120
524.130
525.010

553.5312
553.5313
553.5309
553.5309
553.5309
553.5310
553.5310
553.5310
553.5311
553.5312
553.5312
553.5312
553.5313
553.5314
553.5312
553.5315
553.5316
561.6113
561.6105
561.6108
561.6101
561.6101
561.6101
561.6102
561.6103
561.6105
512.1204
561.6106
512.1204
561.6107
561.6108
561.6109
562.6208
562.6208
562.6208
562.6208
562.6208

525.125
525.130
525.140
525.150
525.160
526.020
526.050
526.060
526.070
527.200
527.205
527.210
529.010(1)
529.020
529.030
529.040
529.050
529.070
529.080
529.090

562.6207
562.6207
561.6110
561.6111
561.6104
524.2401
524.2402
524.2403
524.2404
522.2205
522.2205
522.2205
562.6206
562.6204
562.6206
562.6206
562.6206
562.6205
562.6204
562.6204
562.6206
541.4101
541.4102
541.4103
541.4104
541.4105
541.4106
541.4107
541.4107
541.4107
562.6209
562.6209
562.6203
562.6209
562.6203
562.6203
562.6203

525.010(3)
525.010(4)
525.010(5)
525.020
525.030
525.040
525.050
525.060
525.070
525.080
525.090
525.100
525.105
525.110
525.113
525.115
525.120

530.010
530.020
530.030
530.040
530.050
530.060
530.064
530.065
530.070
531.010(1)
531.010(2)
531.010(3)
531.020
531.030
531.040
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Current Law
531.050
531.060
531.070
531.300(1)
531.300(2)
531.300(4)
531.310
531.320
531.340
531.350
531.360
531.370
532.010
532.020
532.030
532.060
532.080
532.090
532.110
532.120
533.060
534.030
534.040
534.050
RCr 8.06
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Proposed Code
562.6203
562.6203
562.6203
562.6209
562.6209
562.6202
562.6202
562.6202
562.6203
562.6203
562.6203
562.6203
509.901
509.902
509.903
509.903
509.905
509.901
509.903
509.906
509.906
509.906
509.904
509.904
509.904
506.604
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TRANSLATION TABLE
PROPOSED CODE TO CURRENT LAW
Proposed Code
500.101
500.102
500.103
500.104
500.105
500.106
500.107
501.201
501.202
501.203
501.204
501.205

501.206
501.207
501.208
501.209
502.251
502.252
502.253
502.254
502.255

Current Law
500.010
500.030
500.100
500.020
500.040
500.060
500.070
500.080
none
none
501.060
501.010(3)
501.030
501.030
501.040
501.050(1)
501.020
501.070
none
various
various
none
505.020
505.020
506.110
various

Proposed Code

Current Law

503.301

502.010
502.020
502.030
502.040
506.020
506.030
506.040
506.080
506.090
506.100
501.010(2)
501.010(4)
501.080(1)
501.060
501.070(2)
various
503.020
none
503.030(1)
503.040
431.005
503.090(1)
503.090(2)
503.090(3)
503.110
503.050(1)
503.070(1)
503.808(1)
503.060

503.302

503.303
503.304
503.305
504.400
504.411
504.412
504.413
504.414

504.415
504.416
504.417
504.418
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Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

504.419

503.050(2)
503.070(2)
503.080(2)
various
504.020(3)
501.010(3)
501.030(1)
none
504.020
504.120(4)
none
501.080
501.090
none
501.070(3)
none
501.070(1)(c)
503.120
various
none
500.050
505.010
504.090
RCr 8.06
505.030
505.040
505.050
505.060
various
502.050
502.060
502.050(2)
506.010
506.030
506.040
506.050
506.070

508.805
508.806

506.050(4)
506.020
506.060
506.010
506.030
506.040
511.050
various
500.080(17)
532.010
532.090
532.020
532.030
532.060
532.090
534.030
534.040
534.050
532.080
532.110
532.120
533.060
507.010
507.020
507.020
507.030
507.040
507.050
216.302
216.300
508.010
508.020
508.025
508.030
508.032
508.040
508.090

504.420
505.501
505.502
505.503
505.504
505.505
505.506
505.507
505.508
505.509
505.510
505.511
505.512
506.601
506.602
506.603
506.604
506.605
506.606
506.607
506.608
506.609
507.701
507.702
507.703
508.801
508.802
508.803
508.804
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508.808
508.809
509.901

509.902
509.903

509.904

509.905
509.906

511.1101
511.1102
511.1103
511.1104
511.1105
511.1106
511.1107
512.1201

512.1201
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Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

512.1202

508.060
508.070
508.080
508.050
508.075
508.078
508.080
508.130
508.140
508.150
508.155
525.070
525.080
508.090
508.100
508.110
508.120
508.090
508.130
510.010
510.015
510.030
510.035
510.040
510.070
510.010
510.035
510.050
510.060
510.080
510.090
510.010
510.035
510.110
510.035
510.110
510.120

513.1305
513.1306
513.1307
514.1401

510.140
510.010
510.010
509.020
509.030
509.040
509.050
509.060
509.070
509.080
509.010
509.020
509.030
509.040
509.050
509.060
500.080
515.010
515.020
515.030
none
217.181
218A.1418
433.234
433.865
434.580
437.420(1)
514.030
514.140

512.1203

512.1204

512.1205

512.1206
513.1301

513.1302

513.1303

513.1304

514.1401
514.1402
514.1403
514.1404
514.1501

515.1501

521.2101
521.2102
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Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

521.2103

342.035
342.335
342.615
434.650
434.655
434.670
514.020(3)
514.040
514.090
514.120
514.160
514.170
514.080
514.060
514.065
434.445
514.070
365.710
434.590
514.050
434.580
434.690
514.110
514.120(2)
514.150

521.2110

514.030(2)
514.040(8)
514.050(2)
514.060(4)
514.065(4)
514.070(4)
514.080(3)
514.090(3)
514.110(3)
514.120(4)
514.140(2)
514.150(2)
514.160(2)
514.170(3)
514.020(1)
514.100
514.010
514.020(2)
513.020
513.030
512.070
513.040
none
438.240
508.060
508.070
527.200
527.205
527.210

521.2104
521.2105
521.2106
521.2107
521.2108

521.2109
521.2109

324

521.2111
521.2112
521.2113
522.2201
522.2202
522.2203
522.2204
522.2205
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Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

522.2206

149.380
253.990
433.750
433.770
433.873
433.875
437.420(2)
437.420(3)
438.060
512.020
512.030
512.040
512.050
512.060
512.070
512.080
none
512.010
513.010
437.420(4)
511.020
511.030
511.040
511.050
511.090
511.060
511.070
511.080
511.010
526.020
434.855
526.050
434.840
526.060
6.734
526.070
none

531.3101

116.047
434.095
434.155
434.225(6)
434.442
434.630
434.640
516.020
516.030
516.040
516.120
516.130
342.400(2)
516.040
516.110
365.015
365.100
434.570
514.160
514.170
217.175
365.020
365.030
365.040
365.050
434.600
517.010(1)
517.010(5)
517.020
517.030
517.040
342.265(2)
517.010(2)
517.010(3)
517.050
517.060
517.070

522.2206

522.2207
522.2208
523.2301

523.2302

523.2303
524.2401
524.2402
524.2403

524.2404
524.2405

531.3102
531.3103
531.3104

531.3104
531.3105

531.3106
531.3107

531.3108
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Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

531.3109
531.3110

517.080
342.465
434.310
434.570
517.090
434.320
434.340
517.100
517.010(4)
517.110
517.010(6)
517.120
518.020
518.030
518.040
518.050
518.060
518.010(2)
518.010(3)
518.070
514.040(6)
514.040(7)
514.090(2)
434.550
434.560

531.3118

434.570
434.580
434.590
434.600
434.610
434.620
434.630
434.640
434.650
434.660
434.670
434.680
434.685
434.690
434.695
434.700
434.710
434.715
434.720
434.730
516.010
517.010
518.010
530.010
530.020
530.030
530.040
530.050
530.060
530.064
530.065
530.070
199.492
199.493

531.3111

531.3112
531.3113
531.3114
531.3115

531.3116

531.3117

531.3118

531.3119

541.4101
541.4102
541.4103
541.4104
541.4105
541.4106
541.4107

541.4108
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Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

541.4109

311.715
311.720
311.723
311.725
311.732
311.733
311.735
311.750
311.760
311.765
311.770
311.780
311.790
311.800
311.810
311.820
2.015
107.990
432.350
521.020
521.050
521.030
521.040

551.5103

522.020
522.030
6.731
6.734
6.737
6.741
6.744
6.747
6.750
6.751
6.754
6.755
6.757
6.760
6.761
61.097 - .990
70.990
11A.040
387.990(2)
522.040
521.010
522.010
365.992(1)
523.010
523.020
523.030
523.040
523.050
523.060
523.070
523.080
523.090
523.100
519.040
523.110
519.050
519.055

541.4109

541.4110
551.5101

551.5102

551.5104

551.5105
552.5201

552.5201
552.5202
552.5203
552.5204
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Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

552.5205
552.5206
553.5301

519.060
523.010
149.040
149.083
149.090
39A.990
432.590
438.180
441.035
519.020
65.7641
519.030
520.110
520.120
520.130
520.095
520.100
508.160
520.090
520.010(2), (4), (5)
520.015
520.020
520.030
520.040
520.010(1), (3)
520.050
520.060
258.990
431.545
520.070
520.080
524.010(3), (4)
524.020
524.030

553.5310

514.080
524.040
524.045
524.050
524.055
524.010(1)
524.060
524.070
524.090
524.120
17.170
524.010(2)
524.100
524.110
524.130
520.010
524.010
525.010
525.010(5)
525.020
525.030
525.040
525.050
525.160
525.010(3)
525.060
525.070
525.080
525.010(4)
525.090
525.100
525.140
525.150
438.160
438.210
525.010
510.150

553.5302
553.5303

553.5304
553.5305
553.5306

553.5307

553.5308

553.5309

553.5311
553.5312

553.5313

553.5314
553.5315
553.5316

561.6101

561.6102
561.6103
561.6104
561.6105
561.6106
561.6107
561.6108
561.6109
561.6110
561.6111
561.6112
561.6113
562.6201

328

Appendix: Translation Tables

Proposed Code

Current Law

Proposed Code

Current Law

562.6202

531.300(4)
531.310
531.320
531.010(3)
531.020
531.030
531.040
531.050
531.060
531.070
531.340
531.350
531.360
531.370
510.010(7)
510.010(8)
529.020
529.080
529.090
529.070
529.010(1)
529.030
529.040
529.050
529.090
525.125
525.130
525.105
525.110
525.113
525.115
525.120

562.6209

510.010(7)
510.010(8)
531.010(1)
531.010(2)
531.010(3)
531.300(1)
531.300(2)

562.6203

562.6203

562.6204

562.6205
562.6206

562.6207
562.6208
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